Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors., [ 1994) I SCC I : JT (1994) 6 SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished H all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. A.V. PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. [THAKKER.J.] Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and A 'I' obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed . t the application. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, B observing that "there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". B approached this Court .
28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', C Kuldip Singh, J. stated: "The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and D other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court – process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation". (emphasis supplied)
29. The Court proceeded to state: "A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the F court as well as on the opposite party".
30. The Court concluded: "The principle of'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".
31. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd, [1996] 5 SCC 550 – -t, : JT (1996) 7 SC 135, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, ( 1956) AC 336 : (1956] I All ER 855 : (I 956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated; (2007] 3 S.C.R. "The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business". (emphasis supplied)
32. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., [2000) 3 SCC 581 . : JT (2000) 3 SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance D Company, the claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. On corning to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed the order. The Company approached this Court.
33. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders, this Court stated; "It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order A. V. PAPA YY A SAS TRY v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. [THAKKER. J.] if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or A misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside without further probe B into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been specifically denied \. " by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be c allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice". (emphasis supplied) D
34. Mr. Venugopal, no doubt, contended that when the order passed by the earlier Division Bench was not interfered with by this Court and SLPs were dismissed, it was not open to the High Court thereafter to entertain recall-applications and grant the relief of recalling of earlier orders. According to him, such an exercise of power was unlawful and abuse of process of law. E
35. In this connection, our attention has been invited by the learned counsel to a decision of this Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran & Ors., [1998] 7 SCC 386: JT (1998) 6 SC 396. In that case, after dismissal of Special Leave Petition by this Court, review petition was entertained by the High Court and earlier judgment was recalled. When F the matter reached this Court, setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the Court observed: "The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the self-same order had been dismissed by this court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper. Interference by the learned single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court was aware that SLPs against the orders dated 7 .1.87 had already been dismissed by this court. This High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the self H c [2007) 3 S.C.R. same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the SLPs in this court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 7.4.1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the case was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dis.missal of their SLPs by this court, abused the process of the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly depricate the manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs by this court." (emphasis supplied)
36. The respondents, on the other hand, placed reliance upon Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr., [2000] 6 SCC 359 : JT (2000) 9 SC 110, wherein this Court had an occasion to consider the application of the doctrine of merger to orders passed by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court there observed E that exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 136 is in two stages; (i) granting of a special leave to appeal; and (ii) hearing of appeal. The Court went on to observe that the doctrine of merger does not apply to first stage i.e. at the stage of granting of special leave to appeal. It applies only at the second stage of hearing of appeals. The Court in the light of above position, F laid down the following principles: (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and A.V.PAPAYYASASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. [THAKKER,J.) when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is A converted into an appeal. (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of B merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article ~ i. 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary c jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine D of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. ( v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. gives E reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article I 4 I of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the F Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the G Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent – ") proceedings between the parties, (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affmnation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (I) of Rule (I) of Order 47 of the C.P.C.
37. In Kunhayammed, Abbai Maligai was considered and it was observed that in the facts and circumstances of that case, this Court did not ,;? ' approve the order passed by the High Court. The Court noted that in Abbai C Mdligai, this Court did not consider the doctrine of merger. According to the Court, a careful reading of Abbai Maligai "brings out the correct statement of law and fortifies us in taking the view" as taken. [see also S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State ofT.N. & Anr., [2002] 8 SCC 361 : JT [2002] 7 SCC 568].
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, D a case is decided by a competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be E a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/ authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further G elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated· as non est by every Court, superior or inferior.
40. Hence, the argument of Mr. Venugopal cannot be upheld. Even if he H is right in submitting that after dismissal of SLPs, the respondent herein could A.V. PAPAYY A SASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. [THAKKER, J.] 623 not have approached the High Court for recalling its earlier order passed in A April, 2000 and the High Court could not have entertained such applications, nor the recalling could have been done, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the finding by the High Court that fraud was committed by the land-owners in collusion with the officers of the Port Trust Authorities and Government, in our considered view, no fault can be found against the B approach adopted by the High Court and the decision taken. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly recalled the order, dated April 27, 2000 and remanded the case to the authorities to decide the same afresh in accordance with law.
41. Mr.'Venugopal also submitted that the Division Bench of the High · Court in an order dated April 27, 2000 observed that the land being a garden C land having fruit bearing trees which had been cultivated by a tenant, it did not fall within the description of 'urban land' or 'vacant land' within the meaning of Section 2(o) or 2(q) of the Ceiling Act and the said aspect had not been gone into at all by the State Government. The High Court thereafter considered the provisions of the Ceiling Act and held that the land was agricultural land and required to be excluded from the operation of the Ceiling D Act.
42. As to the above, we may only observe that it was never the case of land-owners while filling a form under Section 6 of the Act that the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the land in question because the land was used for agriculture or horticulture purposes or that it was having E fruit bearing trees. The exclusion or non-operation of the Act was sought only on the ground that the possession of the land had already been handed over to Port Trust Authorities in 1972 and hence the land cannot become subject matter of the Ceiling Act. In view of the above fact, in our opinion, · the High Court was right in passing the impugned order directing the authorities F to consider all aspects and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law.
43. Last but not the least. We are exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of th~·Constitution. It is discretionary and equitable in nature.© (Clause ©Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India reads thus; 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Cour-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory oflndia. (2) ……. .. A (I) of the said Article confers very wide and extensive powers on this Court to grant special leave to appeal against any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in India. The Article commences with a non-obstante clause, "Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter" (i.e. Chapter JV of Part V). These B words are of overriding effect and clearly indicate the intention of the Framers of the Constitution that it is a special jurisdiction and a residuary power unfettered by any statute or other provisions of Chapter JV of Part V of the Constitution. It is extraordinary in its amplitude. Its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky. Such power, therefore, may be exercised by this Court whenever and wherever justice demands intervention by the highest Court of C the country. 44. Article 136, however, does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. This Court only intervenes where D justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention. 45. Jn Baiganna v. Deputy Collector of Consolidation, [1978] 2 SCR 509 : [1978] 2 SCC 461; Krishna Iyer, J. pithily stated; "The Supreme Court is more than a Court of appeal. It exercises power only when there is supreme need. It is not the fifth court of appeal but the final court of the nation. Therefore, even if legal flaws may be electronically detected, we cannot interfere sans manifest injustice or substantial question of public importance". (emphasis supplied) [see also V.G. Ramachandran, 'Law of Writs'; Revised by Justice C.K. Thakker & Mrs. M.C. Thakker; Sixth Edn; Vol.2; pp.1440-1528] 46. Keeping in view totality of facts and attending circumstances including serious allegations of fraud said to have been committed by the G land-owners in collusion with officers of the respondent-Port Trust and Government, report submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), prima facie showing commission of fraud and initiation of criminal proceedings, 'y • etc. if the High Court was pleased to recall the earlier order by issuing directions to the authorities to pass an appropriate order afresh'in accordance H with law, it cannot be said that there is miscarriage of justice which calls for A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRYv. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. [THAKKER. J.) interference in exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this A Court. We, therefore, hold that this is not a fit case which calls for our intervention under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, decline to do so. 47. Before parting with the matter, we may state that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for the purpose of deciding B the legality and validity of the order passed by the High Court. We may clarify that we may not be understood to have expressed any opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. Therefore, as and when the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of the directions of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without being inhibited by the C observations made by us in this judgment. . -( .. 48. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs. B.S. Appeals dismissed .