Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
2. A scrutiny of the Legislative lists would show that the Con- A stitution uses different expressions in different places, appropriate to the context and these entries indicate an awareness on the part of the Constitution of the distinction between various kinds of property. Entries 32, 87 and 88 of List I and Entry 6 of List III use the word 'property', a word of the widest connotation, which takes in not B merely land, buildings and other immovable properties but also all kinds of rights and interests in tangible and intangible properties. There are Entries 35 and 49 of List II which make specific reference to 'lands and buildings'. The expression 'land' is used, therefore, obvi- ously where reference to land only is intended. Even the width of this expression is cut down and reference is confined only to 'agricultural land' as in Entries 47 and 48 of List II, 6 and 7 of List III and even JS of C List' Il. In this scheme of the entries, it would be inappropriate to interpret the word 'land' in Entry 18 as including buildings also.
3. The Bombay case, in interpreting Entry 21 of the 1935 Act, was bound to take into account the terms of s. 3 of the (English} D Interpretation Act, 1889 which specifically defined 'land' in the widest sense as including all 'messages, tenements and hereditaments, houses, and buildings of any tenure". The assistance of the Interpreta, tion Act cannot be invoked to interpret the entries in the Constitution.
4. The entry in question specifically refers to the relationship of E landlord and tenant but this is in the part of the entry which reads: "land tenures including the relationship of landlord and tenant". The words "land tenures", are not followed by a comma in some of the editions though the 1935 Act and some of the other editions and text books on the Constitution have a comma in between. But this makes no difference. Thi:. w\1rds "tenant" and "tenure" have a common. deri- vation and the expression 'tenure' no doubt comprehends within it the relationship of landlord and tenant. But this had to be specified and clarified because in India, the expression "land tenures", as pointed out in Jndu Bhushan, has acquired a special significance. It connotes various types of holdings of )and, involving the King or the Govern- ment, the zamindar, the inamdar and various other types of holders, G lessors, sub-lessors, lessees and sub-lessees under or through them and evolved at various stages of Indian history by various rulers, nawabs and chieftains Hindu, Muslim and British-differently in different parts of the country. Sir Baden Powell has written a vast treatise on such law systems prevalent in India. The Constitution in S. 3 lA con- tains a clue that expression like "estate" and "land tenures" have a H special meaning in relation to land, connoting the relationship among ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES'· U.0.1. IRANGANATI!AN, J.] 523 its owner, holder and other intermediary for the time being, be it on tenancy or otherwise and the collection of rents therefrom. Section 3 lA also describes some of these relationships. The system h~d de- veloped so many complications and nuances that a determined liquida- :tion of all these special types of relationships had to be achieved by special provisions in the chapter on fundamental rights. Viewed in this , background, the words "relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents" cannot impart a wider meaning to the words "land" and "land tenure" used in the entry.
5. While, on the one h:·,,d, the words in Entry 18 have to be given the widest meaning possible, it has to be borne in mind that the entries in the various lists have to be read together and construed in such a manner as to give a meaning and content to all of them. We .C need hardly say that the Constitution should be so interpreted as to reconcile all concerned and relevant entries (See: Hoechst Pharma- ceuticals v. State, [1983) 3 S.C.R. 130 and the Dhillon case: 1972 2 S.C.R. 33. If we give the word "land" a meaning so as to include buildings and also give the words "rights in or over land" a wide interpretation as we have to, in view of the discussion and ratio in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia, AIR 1947 P.C. 72 this entry will be seen to cover almost all kinds of not only transfer but also alienation and devolution of, or even succc .cion to, lands and buildings. The interpretation thus placed will affect not merely leases and, therefore, a small part of the contents of the item regarding 'transfer of property'; it will apply equally to sales, mortgages, charges and all other forms of transfer of all kinds of interests in land and buildings and thus make such a substantial inroad into the scope of Entry 6 in the concurrent list as to denude it of all application except to property other than land and buildings. The word "property" used in Entry 6 will thus lose even its normal meaning not to speak of its being given the widest meaning F possible appropriate to a legislative entry. It will mean that though transfer of property-other than agricultural land-is in the Concur- rent List, the State will have exclusive power to legislate in respect of transfer of all property in the nature of land and buildings; in other words, for the words "transfer of property other than agricultural land", we will be substituting "transfer of propety other than lands G and buildings". It will mean that though wills, intestacy and succession are in item 5 of. the Concurrent List, the State can legislate exclusively in respect of devolution of land and buildings of all description. It will render Entry 35 of List II a surplusage in so -far as it refers to "lands and buildings". We do not think that such an interpretation should be favoured. The more harmonious interpretation would be that any sub- A ject matter that involves the element of transfer or alienation of any property (other than agricultural land) or of devolution (on testa- mentary or intestate succession) of any property or contract (other than one in relation to agricultural land) will fall in the Concurrent List and not in the State List even though it may relate to land or buildings,
6. Another feature of the entries in the Lists also lends support to our view. Reference has been made to Entry 3 of List I by which, inter alia, Parliament has been given exclusive power to enact lease and rent control legislation in cantonment areas. Entry 5 of List II is the corresponding entry regarding local self government in areas of States excluding cantonment areas. Had it been the intention to confer C legislative power on the State Legislature in regard to housing and rent control accommodation in the States, one would have expected a repetition in Entry 5 of List II or, at least, in entry 18 of List II of the words of entry 3 of List I. We do not think that the omission of those crucial words in Entry 5 or 18 can be attributed to more inadvertance.
7. We have earlier referred to Dr. Chitale's reference to the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1971 and pointed out how the preamble to the Act does not support counsel's interpretation of Entry 18. We may point out, on the other hand, that quite a few (though not all) State Legislations on house and rent control (including the 1956 Act) have been enacted after obtaining the President's assent. This indicates a E legislative recognition that such legislation stems from the Concurrent List and not the State List.
8. The learned Attorney General sought to derive some support for his contention also from the wording of Entry 32 of List I which deals with the 'property of the Union', an expression wide enough to F comprehend all kinds of property, essentially lands and buildings. It does three things at the same time: (a) it enables Parliament to legislate exclusively with respect to all property belonging to the Union; (b) it, however, subjects such power, in so far as property situated within the territory of any State is concerned, to any legislation of the State in regard thereto; ( c) it nevertheless authorises Parliament to provide otherwise by law. ACCOUNrANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U,O._J. (RANGANATHAN, J.l 525 This language is somewhat analogous to that of article 254(2) and is consistent with a special provision for an item, which, otherwise, would primarily be covered by the Concurrent List on which· both Parliament and State Legislature can legislate. It may be usefully con- trasted with Entries like Nos. 23 and 24 of List 11 where the language of the entry clearly grants primacy to Pariiamentary legislation in regard to a part of the field occupied by an entry in the State List. There is some force in this contention wliich, effectively, is that if land and buildings were so clearly covered by Entry 18 of List II, either the wording of entry 32 would have been made subject to List II of Entry 18, in this regard, like nos. 23 and 24 would have been made subject to List I.
9. It is also a relevant consideration that, while the interpreta- tion suggested by appellants completely denies power to Parliament to legislate on the subject matter under consideration, the interpretation preferred by us does not exclude the States' power to legislate with respect to the topic. It recognises a concurrent power in Parliament c and State Legislatures. For the reasons discussed above, we are of opinion that all the legislations coming up for consideration in the present case are refer- able to entries in the Concurrent List and the topic of legislation is not referable to Entry 18 List II. The provisions of the 1971 Act, in so far as they are made applicable to the premises of the respondent bank E are, therefore, intra vires and valid. Once it is held that the 1971 Act is intra vires Parliament, no further issue between ihe parties would seem to survive for considera- tion for, as we have already pointed out, no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court.· However, there F was some discussion before us as to whether the provisions of the 1971 Act, even if intra vires, would prevail against the provisions of the State legislations. In this context, Dr. Chitale invited our attention to Jain lri'k Manufacturing Co: v. LIC, [1981] 1SCR498 where this Court held that the provisions of the 1971 Act will prevail against the provi- sions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1956 and the Delhi Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 on the grounds that it was both a later Act and a special Act. He submitted that the decision in the case is the subject matter of reference to a·larger Bench and that we should, therefore, defer our decision in.the present case to await the result' of the reference; We do not think this is called for. In our opinion; that decision has no reference to the issues before us. Irt that c case, all the three legislations were Parliamentary legislations (Delhi being a Union Territory) and the question was regarding the inter-se overlap among the three Acts touching upon the same subject matter viz. eviction of a tenant by a landlord. Here the legislations which are said to occupy th~ same field are one of Parliament of 1971 and two of the State of West Bengal of 1956 and 1962, all passed in exercise of the powers conferred with respect to matters contained in the Concurrent List. The resolution of a conflict, if any, between the two will have to be in terms of Article ~54 of the Constitution. This article reads: Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States- (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parlia- nient which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the mat- ters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legisla- ture of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provisions repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legis- lature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parlia- ment from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. n It will be convenient, before applying the provisions of the article !l to the facts of the present case, to refer to the elucidation of the scope of its provisions by decisions of this Court. Iri Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State, [1955] SCR 799 the question whether a provision in Central.Act ACCOUNTANT ANDSECRETARIALSERVICESv. U.0.1. IRANGANA1HAN,J.) 527 XXIV if 1946 as amended by the Act LU of 1950 wouldprevail against A a provision in Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947. Both legislations were referable to the Concurrent List and the State law had been passed after obtaining the assent of the Governor General. Refering to Art. 254(2), the Court said: "This is, in substance, a reproduction of section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, the concluding portion thereof being incorporated in a proviso with further addi- tions. Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature, in a situation similar to that under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord Watson in Attorney General for Outario v. Attorney General for the Dominion, (1896) A.C. 348. that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within com: petence would over ride Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority con- ferred upon it un.der the Constitution to enact a statute repealing directly any Provincial statute. That would ap- pear to have been the position under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act· with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List. Now, by the proviso to Article '254 (2) the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act and enact a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing a law of the State, when it relates to a matter mentioned in the Concur- rent List. The position then is that under the Constitution Parliament can, acting under the proviso to article 254(2), repeal a State law. But where it does not expressly do SO, even then, the State law will be void under the provision if it conflicts with a later "law with respect to the same matter" that may be enacted by Parliament." tater, the Court observed: "It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under article 254(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is identical c 119881 Supp. 1 s.c,.R. with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier· is repealed by the later enact- ment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254(2) whether the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as ffiat of the State law. We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay Act No. XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act No. XXIV of 1946 as amended by the Act no. Lii of 1950." It is sufficient to cite certain observations from one more judgment on this aspect: Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State, [1983) 3 SCR 130 which had to consider an alleged conflict between a provision of a State sales tax law and a provision of an order made under the Essential Com- modities Act of Parliament. The case dealt with several points with which we are not here concerned. Expatiating on the scope of Article 254, the Court observed: "Art. 254 of the Constitution makes provision first, as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Cent- ral and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List and secondly, for resolving such conf- lict. Art. 254(1) enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field, the former prevails over the latter. Cl. (1) lays down that if a State law relating to a concurrent subject is 'repugnant' to a Union law relating to that subject, whether the Union law is prior or later in time, the Union law will prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, be void. To the general rule laid down in cl. (1), cl. (2) engrafts an exception, viz. that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his con- sideration, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union, both laws dealing with a con- current subject. In such a case, the Central Act will give way to the State Act only to the extent of inconsistency between the two, and no more. In short, the result of ob- taining the assent of the President to a State Act which is inconsistent with a previous Union law relating to a concur- rent subject would be that the State Act will prevail in that State and override the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. The predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legis- . ·~ ACCOUNTANT AND SECRETARIAL SERVICES v. U.0.1. [RANGANATHAN, J.] 529 !ates under the Proviso to cl. (2). The proviso to Art. 254(2) empowers the Union.Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law, either directly, or by itself enacting a law repugnantto the State law with respect to the 'same matter'. Even though the subsequent law made by Parlia- ment does not expressly repeal a State law, even then,'the State law ill become void as soon as the subsequent law of B Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A State law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together." c The present case is clearly governed by the primary rule in Article 254(1) under which the law of Parliament on a subject in the Concur- rent List prevails over the State law. Art. 254(2) is not attracted because no provision of the State Acts (which were enacted in 1956 and 1962) were repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law of Parlia- ment or existing law. The fact that the 1956 Act was enacted, after D being reserved for the President's assent is, therefore, immaterial. Even if the provisions of the main part of Article 254(2) can be said to be somehow applicable, the proviso', read with Article 254(1) reaffirms the supermacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in terms amend, vary or repe~l any provision.-· of the State Legislation … The . E provisions of the 1971 Act will, therefore, prevail against those of the State Acts and were· rightly invoked in the present case by the respon- dent Bank. Dr. Chi tale, while initially formulating his contenti9ns, outlined a:n argument that the provision in the 1971 Act appointing one of the officers of the respondent bank as the Estate Officers is violative of Article 14. We do not see_ any substance in this contention. In the very nature of things, only an officer or appointee of the Government, statutory authority or Corporation can be thought of for implementing the provisions of the Act. That apart, personal bias cannot necessarily be attributed to such officer either in favour of the bank or against any G occupant who is being proceeded against, merely because he happens to be such officer. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an appeal to an independent judicial officer against orders passed by the Estate Officer. These provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Chitale did not pursue this objection seriously. No other contention was urged. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. We would, however, make no order as to costs as it is the existence of a multiplicity of statutory provisions that enabled the appellant to come to Court. B S.L. Appeal dismissed.