AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI .PATEL versus SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS.

23. It noted as well that under Section l 73(2)(i), the officer in- charge, as soon as the investigation is completed, is required to forward to the Magistrate empowered, a report in the prescribed form so as to enable the Court to take cognizance· of the offence based thereon. This Court also adverted to Section 190 enumerating the modes of taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate, as specified therein, either upon receiving a complaint of facts which constituted such offence or upon a police report of such facts or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed.

24. In the conspectus of the provisions ofCr.P.C. traversed, this Colll1 held the view that an,informant who lodges the first information report does not fade away therewith and is very much concerned with the action initiated by the officer in-charge of the pol ice station pursuant thereto, so much so, that not only a copy of the said report is to be supplied to him free of cost and in case, no investigation is intended, he has to be notified of such decision. The reason, in the contemplation of this Court, for the officer in-charge of a pol ice station to communicate the action taken by him to the informant and a report to the Magistrate under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. was that the informant, who sets the machinery of investigation into motion, was-required to know what was the result of the exercise initiated on the basis thereof, as he would be vitally interested therein and hence, the obligations cast by law on the officer in-charge. AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

25. This Court assayed the courses open to the Magistrate on receipt of a report by the police on the completion of the inyestigation. It was enunciated that if the report submitted by the police divulged that no offence had been committed, there again, the Magistrate would be left at liberty to adopt one of the three courses, namely; he could accept the report and drop the proceeding, or he could disagree with the report and taking the view that there was sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or he could direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-Section (3) of Section 156. Noticeably, these three courses referred to hereinabove are at the pre-cognizance stage and can be opted for by the Magistrate depending on his satisfaction on an assessment of the materials. then on record.

26. Be that as it may, this Court held that whereas neither the informant nor the injured nor the relative of the deceased in case of death, would be prejudicially affected in case the Magistrate decides to take cognizance of the offence and to issue a process, they would certainly be prejudiced in case, the Court holds the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and is inclined to drop the proceeding. Having regard to the scheme of Sections 154, 157 and 173 in particular of the Cr.P.C and the pattern of consequences to follow in the two contingencies referred to herein above, this Court propounded that in case the Magistrate is not i1iclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. Qua the requirement of issuance of such notice to the injured person or to a relative of the deceased, in case of death, who is/are not the informant( s) who had lodged the first information repmt, it was elucidated that it would be open for the Magistrate in the exercise of his discretion, ifhe thinks fit, to give such notice. However, the locus standi of the injured person or any relative of the deceased, though not entitled to notice .on the Magistrate to apply for the Court at the time of consideration of the report, if he/they otherwise come to know of such stage of th~ proceeding, was recognized, so much so that in case he/they would want to advance any submission with regard to the report, the Magistrate would be bound to hear him/them a.s the case may be.

27. This verdict in re the issue presently involved is significant, so far as it outlines the different modes of taking cognizance of an offence c c by a Magistrate and also the procedures and powers available to him on the submission ofa police report following the completion ofinvestigation. This decision is pellucid in its statement that the Magistrate, on receipt of the report, at that stage before taking cognizance of the offence alleged, may direct further investigation under sub-Section (3) of Sec,ticm 156 Cr.P.C. and require the police to make further report and that such power can be exercised suo motu, contingent on its satisfaction of the necessity thereof to espouse the cause of justice.

28. The question that fell for appraisal in Randliir Singh Rana ~ (supra) was as to whether a judicial Magistrate, after taking cognizance of an offence, on the basis ofa police report and after appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process issued, can order of its own, further investigation in the case. The significantly additional feature of this query is the stage of the proceedings for directing further investigation in the case i.e. after the appearance of the accused in pursuance of the process already issued. This Court reiterated that such power was available to the police, after submission of the charge-sheet as was evident from Section 173(8) in Chapter XII of the Code, 1973. That it was not in dispute as well that before taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of Chapter XIV, the Magistrate could himself order investigation as contemplated by Section 156(3) of the Code was noted as well. This Court also noticed the power under Section 311 under Chapter XXIV to summon any person as a witness at any stage of an inquiry/trial or other proceedings, if the same appeared to be essential to the just decision of the case.

29. It recalled its earlier rendering in Tula Ram and others v. Kis/wre Sillgfl, (1977) 4 SCC 459 to the effect that the Magistrate could order investigation under Section 156(3) only at the pre-cognizance stage under Sections 190, 200 and 204 Cr.P.C and that after he decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter XIV, he would not be entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156(3), and further though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202, he could order such investigation by the police, the same would be in the nature of an inquiry only as contemplated by Section 202.

30. This Court also recounted its observations in Ram Lal Nanmg (supra) to the effect that on the Magistrate taking cognizance upon a police report, the right of the police to further investigate even under the 1898 Code was not exhausted and it could exercise such right often as AMRUTBHAISHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAT KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, l] necessary, when fresh information would come to light. That this proposition was integrated in explicit terms in sub-Section (8) of Section 173 of the new Code, was noticed. The desirability of the police to ordinarily infonn the Court and seek its fonnal permission to make further investigation, when fresh facts come to light, was stressed upon to maintain the independence of the judiciary, the interest of the purity of administration of criminal justice and the interest of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such dispensation.

31. The pronouncement of this Court in Dev""'P"lli L"kshmi11ar"y(llW Reddy ""d others v. V. N"raya11a Reddy "nd others, ( 1976) 3 sec 252 emphasizing on the distinction in the power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) and under Section 202( 1) of the Cr.P.C, was referred to. It was ruled that the two powers operate in separate distinct spheres at different stages, the former being exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage and the latter at the post- cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. It was underlined that in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) could be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(l)(a), but once such cognizance is taken and he embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he would not be competent to reve11 to the pre-cognizance stage and avail Section 156(3). On the other hand, it was observed that Section 202 would be invocable at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in the proceedings under Chapter XV, but is deemed to be insufficient to take a decision as to the next step and in such an event, the Magistrate would be empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that provision, an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether or not, there is sutficient ground for proceeding. It was thus exposited that the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing the proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. It was thus concluded on an appraisal of the curial postulations above referred to, that the Magistrate of his own, cannot order further investigation after the accused had entered appearance pursuant to a process issued to him subsequent to the taking of the cognizance by him.

32. The scope of the judicial audit in Reeta N"g (supra), to reiterate, was whether, after the charge-sheet had been filed by the c c [2017) 4 S.C.R. investigating agency under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C, and charge had been framed against some of the accused persons on the basis thereof, and other co-accused had been discharged, the Magistrate could direct the investigating agency to conduct a re-investigation or fu11her investigation under sub-Section (8) of Section 173. The recorded facts revealed that the Magistrate had in the contextual facts d[rected for re-investigation and to submit a repo1t, though prior thereto, he had taken cognizance of the offences involved against six of the original sixteen accused persons, discharging the rest The informant had thereafter filed an application for re-investigation of the case and the prayer was acceded to. This Cou1t referred to its earlier decisions in Sa11katlut Si11gli and otliers v. State of Utlar Pradeslt, AIR I 962 SC 1208 and Master Co11structio11 . Company (P) Ltd. v.' State of Orissa and a11otlier, AIR 1966 SC I 04 7 to the effect that after the Magistrate had passed a final order framing charge against some of the accused persons, it was no longer within his competence or jurisdiction to direct a re-investigation into the case. The decision in Rmidhir Si11glt Rmut (supra), which propounded as well that after taking cognizance of an offence on the basis of a police report and after the appearance of the accused, a Magistrate cannot of its own order further investigation, though such an order could be passed on the application of the investigating authority, was recorded. It was reiterated with reference to the earlier determination of this Cou1t in Diues/i Dalmia v. CBI, (2007) 8 SCC 770 that the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for conducting further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code was not taken away only because a charge- sheet had been filed under Section I 73(2) and a further investigation was permissible even if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate. This Court, therefore summed up by enouncing that once a charge- sheet was filed under Section I 73(2) Cr.P.C and either charges have been framed or the accused have been discharged, the Magistrate may on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained pf or on the application made by the investigating authority, permit fmther investigation under Section I 73(8), but lie cannot suo motu direct a further investigation or order a re-investigation into a case on account of the bar of Section I 67(2) of the Code. It was thus held that ·as the investigating authority did not apply for further investigation and an application to that effect had been filed by the defacto complainant under Section 173(8), the order acceding to the said prayer was beyond the jurisdictional competence of the Magistrate. It was, however observed, AMRUTBHAJ SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI . KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] that a Magistrate could, if deemed necessary, take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C at the stage of trial.

33. This decision reinforces the view that after cognizance is taken by the Magistrate on the basis of a report submitted by the police on the completion of the investigation, no direction for further investigation can be made by the Magistrate suo motu and it would be permissible only if such a request is made by the investigating authority on the detection of fresh facts having bearing on the case and necessitating further exploration thereof in the interest of complete and fair trial.

34. The query in Vi11ay Tyagi v. lrsluul Ali® Deepak & Ors., (2013) 5 SCC 762 was whether in exercise of powers under Section 173 Cr.P.C, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any of the police reports, where there was more than one, whether by the same or different investigating agencies submitted in furtherance of the orders of a Court. The respondents therein were sought to be prosecuted by filing a First Information Report under Sections 120B, 121 and 122 of the IPC read with Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 4 and 5 of Explosives Substance Act, 1908. The FIR was filed by the Special Cell ofDelhi Police, which the respondents alleged had been lodged to falsely implicate them. Being aggrieved, the respondents cha! lenged this action before the High Court and inter alia prayed that the inv~tigation in the case be transferred to the CBI. As the High Court did not, though it had issued notice in the writ petition, stay the investigation, eventually the Special Cell ofDellli Police did file a charge-sheet before the Trial Court. The High Court finally, while disposing of the writ petition and being satisfied, directed the CBI to undertake an inquiry into the matter and submit a report. Subsequent thereto the CBI filed its report indicating in substance that the recoveries, amongst others made from the respondents in course of the inquisition m.ade by the Special Cell of Delhi Police did ·not inspire confidence and that fu11her investigation was needed.

35. The CBI, after detailed investigation, submitted a closure report, whereafter one of the respondents filed an application before the Trial Court seeking discharge. This prayer was declined by the Trial Court as pre-matured, observing that no definite conclusion could be · drawn at that stage to ascertain the truthfulness of the version of the two different agencies. The High Coui1, being approached under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C by one of the respondents, seeking to quash the First Information Report, it disposed of the same by holding that once the c c . [2017] 4 S.C.R. report had been filed by the CBI, it ought to be construed as a investigating agency, and thus its closure report should be considered by the Trial Court and thus remanded the case by observing that in undertaking the exercise, as directed, the Trial Court should not be influenced by the report of the Special Cell of Delhi Police. This order formed the subject matter of challenge before this Court.

36. After referring to Section 156(3) in particular and Section 190 Cr.P.C, this Court reverted to Section 173 and ruled that a very wide power was vested in the investigating agency to conduct further investigation after it had filed its report in tenns of sub-Section (2) thereof. It held on an elucidation of tl'ie ·contents of Section 173(8) that the investigating agency was thus competent to file a report supplementary to its primary report and that the formerwas to be treated by the Court in continuation of the latter, and that on an examination thereof and following the application of mind, it ought to proceed to hear the case in the manner prescribed. 1t was elaborated that after taking cognizance of the offence, the next step was to frame charge in terms of Section 228 of the.Code unless the Court found, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there did exist no sufficient ground to. proceed against the accused, in which case it would discharge him on reasons to be recorded in terms of Section 227 of the Code. Alluding to the text of Section 228 of the Code which is to the effectthat ifaJudge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence, he could frame a charge and try him, this Court propounded that the word "presuming'; did imply that the opinion was to be formed on the basis of the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith along with the plea of the defence to a limited extent, if offered at that stage. The view of this Com1 in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chamfer and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 underlining the obligation oftlle Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith to form an opinion as to whether there did exist or not any sufficie1lt ground to proceed against an accused was underlined. This aspect was dilated ·upon logically to respond to the · query in the contextual facts as to whether both the repo11s submitted by the Special Cell· 6f the Delhi Police and the CBI were required to be taken note of by the Trial Court. .. 37. Additionally,' this Col!i:t also dwelt upoi1 the three facets of investigation in succession: Le. (i) initial investigation (ii) further . AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] investigation and (iii) fresh or de novo or reinvestigation. Whereas initial investigation was alluded to be one conducted in furtherance of registration of an FIR leading to a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code, further investigation was a phenomenon where the investigating officer would obtain further oral or documentary evidence after the final report had already been submitted, so much so that the report on the basis of the subsequent disclosures/discoveries by way of such evidence would be in consolidation and in continuation of the previous investigation and the report yielded thereby. "Fresh investigation" "reinvestigation" "de novo investigation", however is an exercise, which it was held, could neither be undertaken by the investigating agency suo motu nor could be . ordered by the Magistrate and that it was essentially within the domain of the higher judiciary to direct the same and that too under limited compelling circumstances warranting such probe to ensure a just and fair investigation and trial. Adverting to Section 173 of the Code again, this Court recalled its observations in State of Punjab v. CBI mu/ others, (2011) 9 sec 182 that not only the police had the power to conduct further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code, even the Trial Court could direct further investigation in contradistinction to fresh investigation even where the report had been filed. 38. The decisions in Mi nu Ku11u1ri mu/ <mother v. State of Bilwr t111d others, (2006) 4 sec 359 and Ilema11t D/UIS/lUlll(I v. CBI {//ld another, (2001) 7 SCC 536 to the effect that a Court could order further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code even after a report had· been submitted under Section 173 (2) thereof, was adverted to. 39. Noticeably, none of these decisions, however pertain to a situation where after the final report had been submitted, cognizance had been taken, accused had appeared and trial is underway, the Court either suo motu or on the prayer of the informant had directed further investigation under Section 173(8) in absence of a request to that effect made by the concerned investigating officer. c 40. The rendition in Blwgwa11t Siltgh (supra) was also relied upon. It was eventually held, by drawing sustenance from the . G pronouncement in Blwgwa11t Singh (s11pra) that a Magistrate before wh01n a report under Section 173(2) of the Code had been filed, was empowered in law to direct furtj1er imri;:stigation and require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report. To reiterate, in Blwgwm1t Singh (supra), this Court had in particular dealt with the courses open c to a Magistrate, once a charge-sheet or a closure report is submitted on the completion of investigation under Section 173(2) of the Code and thus did essentially concentrate at the pre-cognizance stage of the proceedings. 41. From the issues sought to be answered in this decision and having regard to the overall text thereof, it is not possible to discern that the power of the Magistrate, even at the post cognizance stage or after the accused had appeared in response to the process issued, the suo motu power of the Magistrate to direct further investigation was intended to be expounded thereby. Significantly, the adjudication was essentially related to the pre-cognizance stage. 42. In Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State tlirougl1 Inspector of Police and others, (2015) 8 SCC 774, the appellant had filed a FIR with the Kulasckaram Police Station against the respondents-accused alleging unlawful assembly and assault resulting in multiple injuries. After the initial investigation, the same was transferred to the District Crime Branch Police, Kanyakumari which eventually filed a final report in favour of the respondents-accused, which was accepted by the learned Magistrate. Meanwhile, however the appellant/informant filed a protest petition before the Magistrate praying for a direction to the CBCID to reopen the case and file a fresh report. As before any decision on this protest petition, the final report filed by the police had already been accepted, the appellant approached the High Com1, which called for the report from the learned Magistrate and finally interfered with the order accepting the final report and directed the Magistrate to consider the same along with the protest petition. The Magistrate next held that there was no justification for ordering reinvestigation of the case and directed that the protest petition be treated as a separate private complaint. 43. This order being challenged again before the High Court, the matter was remanded to the learned Magistrate with a direction to consider the final report and the other materials on record and pass appropriate orders after hearing both the public prosecutor and the de facto complainant. This time, the learned Magistrate returned a finding that the investigation by the District Crime Branch was a biased one and that the final report was not acceptable and consequently forwarded the complaint for further investigation by the CBC ID, which was a different investigating agency. The matter was taken to the High Court by one of the respondents/accused; whereupon it annulled the direction of the AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAl PATEL v. SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] learned Magistrate for reinvestigation, holding that not only there were material discrepancies in the evidence brought on record, but also there was no exceptional circumstance for such a course to be adopted by the Magistrate. It was also of the view, having regard to the scheme of the Section 173(8) of the Code that the investigating officeron ly could request for further investigation. 44. While disapproving the approach of the High Court in reappreciating the facts in the exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction, this Court adverting, amongst others to the three Judge Bench exposition in Bltagwant Singli (supra) reiterated that a Magistrate could disagree with the police report and take cognizance and issue process and summon the accused, if satisfied as deemed fit in the attendant facts and circumstances. The rendition in Vt1wy Tyagi (supra) was also alluded to. It was ultimately expounded that the learned Magistrate had really intended to direct further investigation, but as a different investigating agency had been chosen, the word re-investigation had been used. This Court thus construed the direction for investigation by the CBI to be one for further investigation and upheld the same, but nullified the selection of a new investigating agency therefor. As a corollary, the investigating agency that had investigated the case earlier and had submitted the final report, was directed by this Cou1t to undertake further investigation to be supervised by the Superintendent of Police and to submit a report before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with law. 45. This decision too was concerned with a fact situation, pertaining to the pre-cognizance stage of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate and therefore, does not, in our comprehension, further the case of the appellant. 46. As adumbrated hereinabove, Chapter XIV of the Code delineates the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings before a Magistrate. Section 190, which deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrate, sets out that any Magistrate of the first Class and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, as contemplated, may take cognizance of any offence either upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police repmt of such facts or upon information received from any person other than the police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence had been committed. Section 156, which equips a police officer with the power to investigate c c a cognizable case mandates vide sub-section 3 thereof that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation. The procedure for dealing with complaints to Magistrate is lodged under Chapter XV of the Code. Section 202 appearing therein predicates that any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or which had been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit and shall in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of · deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The contents of this text of Section 202(1) of the Code unmistakeably attest that the investigation that can be directed by the Magistrate, to be undertaken by a police officer would essentially be in the form of an enquiry for the singular purpose of enabling him to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint of an offence, of which he is authorised to take cognizance. This irrefutably is at the pre-cognizance stage and thus logically before the issuance of process to the accused and his attendance in response thereto. As adverted to hereinabove, whereas Section 31 I of the Code empowers a Court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, to summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, if co.nstrued to be essential to be just decision of the case, Section 3 19 authorizes a Court to proceed against any person, who though not made an accused appears, in course of the inquiry or trial, to have committed the same and can be tried together. These two provisions of the Code explicitly accoutre a Court to summon a material witness or examine a person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, if it considers it to be essential to the just decision of the case and even proceed against any person, though not an.accused in such enquiry or trial, if it appears from the evidence available that he had committed an offence and that he can be tried together with the other accused persons. 4 7. On an overall survey of the pronouncements of this Court on the scope a11d purport of Section 173(8) of the Code and the consistent trend of explication thereof, we are thus disposed to hold that though the AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL v. SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefor to the learned Magistrate 11fter cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. At that stage, neither the learned Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant can direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and that too, in circumstances warranting further investigation on the detection of material evidence only to secure fair investigation and trial, the life purpose of the adjudicatiori in hand. 48. The un-amended and the amended sub-Section (8) of Section 173 of the Code if read in juxtaposition, wou Id overwhelri1ingly attest that by the latter, the investigating agency/officer alone has been authorized to conduct further investigation without limiting the stage of the proceedings relatable thereto. This power qua the investigating agency/officer is thus legislatively intended to be available at any stage of the proceedings. The recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41" Report which manifestly heralded the amendment, significantly had limited its proposal to the empowennent.ofthe investigating agency alone. 49. In contradistinction, Sections 156, 190, 200, 202 and 204 of the Cr.P.C clearly outline the powers of the Magistrate and the courses open for him to chart in the matte.r of directing investigation, taking of cognizance, framing of charge, etc. Though the Magistrate has the power to direct investigation under Section 156(3) at the pre-cognizance stage even after a c}large-s!ieet or a closure report is submitted, once cognizance is taken and the-accused person appears pursuant thereto, he would be bereft of any competence to direct further investigation either suo motu or acting on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant. The direction for investigation by the Magistrate under Section 202, while dealing with a complaint, though is at a post-cognizance stage, it is in the nature of an i!Jquiry to derive satisfaction as to whether the proceedings initiated ought to be furthered or not. Such a direction for investigation is not in the nature of further investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Code. If the power of the Magistrate, in such a scheme envisaged by the Cr.P.C to order further investigation even after the cognizance is taken, accused persons appear and charge is framed, is c c acknowledged or approved, the same would be discordant with the state of law, as enunciated by this Court and also the relevant layout of the Cr.P.C. adumbrated hereinabove. Additionally had it been the intention of the legislature to invest such a power, in our estimate, Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C would have been worded accordingly to .accommodate and ordain the same having regard to the backdrop of the incorporation thereof. In a way, in view of the three options open to the Magistrate, after a report is submitted by the police on completion of the investigation, as has been amongst authoritatively enumerated in Blwgwant Singlt (supra), the Magistrate, in both the contingencies, namely; when he takes cognizance of the offence or discharges the accused, would be committed to a course, whereafter though the investigating agency may for good reasons inform him and seek his permission to conduct further investigation, he suo motu cannot embark upon such a step or take that initiative on the request or prayer made by the complainant/informant. Not only such power to the Magistrate to direct further investigation suo motu or on the request or prayer of the complainant/informant after cognizance is taken and the accused person appears, pursuant to the process, issued or is discharged is incompatible with the statutory design and dispensation, it would even otherwise render the provisions of Sections 311 and 319 Cr.P.C., whereunder any witness can be summoned by a Court and a person can be issued notice to stand trial at any stage, in a way redundant. Axiomatically, thus the impugned decision annuli ing the direction of the learned Magistrate for further investigation is unexceptional and does not merit any interference. Even otherwise on facts, having regard to the progression of the developments in the trial, and more particularly, the delay on the part of the informant in making the request for further investigation, it was otherwise not entertainable as has been rightly held by the High Court. 50. In the result, the appeal, being devoid ofany merit, fails and is dismissed. Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.