ANVAR P.V. versus P.K. BASHEER AND ORS.

21. It may be seen that it was a case where a responsible 1. (2005) 11 sec 600. ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. 8ASHEER [KURIAN, J.] official had duly certified the document at the time of production itself. The signatures in the certificate were also identified. That is apparently in compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 658 of the Evidence Act. However, it was held that irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 658, which is a special provision dealing with admissibility of the electronic record, there is no bar in adducing secondary evidence, under Sections 63 and 65, of an electronic record.

22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted herein before, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yie!d to the same. Generalia specia/1bus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 658. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 658 are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 658 obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.

23. The appellant admittedly has not produced any certificate in terms of Section 658 in respect of the CDs, Exhibits-P4, PB, P9, P10, P12, P13, P15, P20 and P22. Therefore, the same cannot be admitted in evidence. Thus, the whole case set up regarding the corrupt practice using songs, A announcements and speeches fall to the ground.

24. The situation would have been different had the appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available in evidence, the CDs used for annou'ricement and songs. Had 8 those CDs used for objectionable songs or announcements been duly got seized through the police or Election Commission and had the same been used as primary evidence, the High Court could have played the same in court to see whether the allegations were true. That is not the situation in this case. The speeches, songs and announcements were recorded using C other instruments and by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom which were produced in court, without due certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in evidence since the mandatory requirements of Section 658 of the Evidence Act are not satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding D what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence on electronic, record with reference to Section 59, 65A and 658 of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, ·E without compliance of the conditions in Section 658 of the Evidence Act.

25. Now, we shall deal with the ground on publication of Exhibit-P1-leaflet which is also referred to. as Annexure-A. To F quote relevant portion of Paragraph-4 of the election petition: "4. · On the 12th of April, 2011, the day previous to the alection, one Palliparamban Aboobacker, S/o Ahamedkutty, Palliparamban House, Kizhakkechathalloor, Post Chathalloor, who was a member of the Constituency Committee of the UDF and the Convenor of Kizhakkechathalloor Ward Committee of the United Democratic Front, the candidate of which was the first respondent, falling within the Eranad Mandalam Election Committee ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.] and was thereby the agent of the first respondent, actively involved in the election propaganda of the first respondent with the consent and knowledge of the first respondent, had got printed in the District Panchayat Press, Kondotty, at least twenty five thousand copies of a leaflet with the heading "PP Manafinte Rakthasakshidhinam Nam Marakkathirikkuka April 13" (Martyr Day of P P Manaf – let us not forget April 13) and in the leaflet there is a specific reference to the petitioner who is described as the son of the then President of the c Edavanna Panchayat Shri P V Shaukat Ali and the allegation is that he gave leadership to the murder of Manaf in Cinema style. The name of the petitioner is specifically mentioned in one part of the · leaflet which had been highlighted with a black circle around it specifically making the allegation that it was the petitioner under whose leadership the murder was committed. Similarly in another part of the leaflet the name of the petitioner is specifically mentioned with a black border in square. The leaflet comprises various excerpts from newspaper reports of the year 1995 highlighting the comments in big letters, which are the deliberate contribution of the publishers. The excerpts of various newspaper reports was so printed in the leaflet to expose the petitioner as a murderer, by intentionally concealing the fact that petitioner was honourably acquitted by the Honourable Court … ."

26. The allegation is that at least 25,000 copies of Exhibit- P1-leaflet were printed and published with the consent of the first respondent. Exhibit-P1, it is submitted, contains a false statement regarding involvement of the appellant in the murder of one Manaf on 13.04.1995 and the same was made to prejudice the prospects of the appellant's election. Evidently, Exhibit-P1 was got printed through Haseeb by PW-4- [2014] 11 S.C.R. • A Palliparamban Aboobakar and published by Kudumba Souhrida Samithi (association of the friends ot' the families), though PW-4 denied the same. The sarnt:J was printed at District Panchayat Press, Kondotty with the assistance of one V. Hamza.

27. At Paragraph-4 of the election petition, it is further averred as follows: "4. . .. Since both the said Aboobakar and V. Hamza are agents of the first respondent, who had actively participated in the election campaign, the printing, publication and distribution of annexure-A was made with the consent and kAowledge of the first respondent as it is gathered from Shri P V Mustafa a worker of the petitioner that the expenses for printing have been shown in the electoral ret1Jrn of the first respondent. … " At Paragraph-18 of the election petition, it is stated thus: "18. . .. As far as the printing arid publication of annexure- A leaflet is concerned, the same was not only done with the knowledge and connivance of the 1st respondent, it was done with the assistance of the his official account agent Sri V. Hamza, who happened to be the General Manager of the Press in which the said leaflets were printed …. "

28. PW-4-Palliparamban Aboobakar has completely denied the allegations. Strangely, Shri Mustafa and Shri Hamza, referred to above, have not beeri examined. Therefore, G evidence on printing of the leaflets is of PW-4-Aboobakar and PW-42. According to PW-4, he had not seen Exhibit-P1-leaflet before the date of his examination. He also denied that he was a member of the election committee. According to PW-42, who was examined to prove the printing of Exhibit-P1, the said H Hamza was never the Manager of the Press. Exhibit-X4-copy ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.] of the order form, based on which the leaflet was printed, shows that the order was placed by one Haseeb only to print 1,000 copies of a supplement and the order was given in the name of PW-4 in whose name Exhibit-P1 was printed, Exhibit-X5- receipt for payment of printing charges shows that the same was made by Haseeb. The said Haseeb also was not examined. Still further, the allegation was that at least 25,000 copies were printed but it has come out in evidence that only 1,000 copies were printed.

29. It is further contended that Exhibit-P1 was printed and published with the knowledge and consent of the first respondent. Mere knowledge by itself will not imply consent, though, the vice-versa may be true. The requirement under Section 123(4) of the RP Act is not knowledge but consent. For the purpose of easy reference, we may quote the relevant provision: "123. Corrupt practices.-The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:- (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) The publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, of any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or G withdrawal, of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election."

30. In the grounds for declaring election to be void under Section 100(1 )(b), the court must form an opinion "that any A corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent". In other words, the corrupt practice must be committed by (i) returned candidate, (ii) or his election agent (iii) or any other person B acting with the consent of the returned candidate or his election agent. There are further requirements as well. But we do not think it necessary to deal with the same since there is no evidence to prove that the printing and publication of Exhibit- P1-leaflet was made with the consent of the first respondent c or his election agent, the sixth respondent. Though it was vehemently contended by the appellant that the printing and publication was made with the connivance of the first respondent and hence consent should be inferred, we are afraid, the same cannot be appreciated. 'Connivance' is 0 different from 'consent'. According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 'connive' means to secretly allow a wrong doing where as 'consent' is permission. The proof required is of consent for the publication and not connivance on public.ation. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh and another2, this Court held as under: "30 …. 'Connivance' may in certain situations amount to consent. which explains why the dictionaries give 'consent' as one of the meanings of the word 'connivance'. But it is not true to say that 'connivance' invariably and necessarily means or amounts to consent, ~hat is to say, irrespective of the context of the given situation. The two cannot, therefore, be equated. Consent implies that parties are ad idem. Connivance does not necessarily imply that parties are of one mind. They may or may not be, depending upon the facts of the situation …. "

31. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that consent needs to be inferred from the circumstances. No doubt, on charges relating to commission of corrupt practices, H 2. (1984) 1 sec 390. ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.) direct proof on consent is very difficult. Consent is to be inferred from the circumstances as held by this Court in Sheopat Singh v. Harish Chandra and another3. The said view has been consistently followed thereafter. However, if an inference on consent from the circumstances is to be drawn, the circumstances put together should form a chain which should lead to a reasonable conclusion that the candidate or his agent has given the consent for publication of the objectionable material. Question is whether such clear, cogent and credible evidence is available so as to lead to a reasonable conclusion on the consent of the first respondent on the alleged publication c of Exhibit-P1-leaflet. As we have also discussed above, there is no evidence at all to prove that Exhibit-P1-leaflet was printed at the instance of the first respondent. One Haseeb, who placed the order for printing of Exhibit-P1 is not examined. Shri Hamza, who is said to be the Manager of the Press at the relevant time, was not examined. Shri Mustafa, who is said to have told the appellant that the expenses for the printing of Exhibit-P1 were borne by the first respondent and the same have been shown in the electoral return of the first respondent is also not examined. No evidence of the electoral returns pertaining to the expenditure on printing of Exhibit-P1 by the first respondent is available. The allegation in the election petition is on printing of 25,000 copies of Exhibit-P1. The evidence available on record is only with regard to printing of 1,000 copies. According to PW-24-Sajid, 21 bundles of Exhibit-P1 were kept in the house of first respondent as directed by wife of the first respondent. She is also not examined. It is significant to note that Sajid's version, as above, is not the case pleaded in the petition; it is an improvement in the examination. There is further allegation that PW-7-Arjun and PW-9-Faizal had seen bundles of Exhibit-P1 being taken in two jeeps bearing registration nos. KL 138 3159 and KL 1 OJ 5992 from the residence of first respondent. For one thing, it has to be seen that PW-7-Arjun was an election worker of the appellant and Panchayat 3. AIR 1960 SC 1217. [2014] 11 S.C.R. • A Secretary of DYFI, the youth wing of CPl(M) and the member of the local committee of the said party of Edavanna and Faizal is his friend. PW-29 is one Joy, driver of jeep bearing registration no. KL 1 OJ 5992. He has completely denied of any such material like Exhibit-P1 being transported by him in the B jeep. It is also significant to note that neitherPW-7-Arjun nor PW-9-Faizal has a case that the copies of Exhibit-P1 were taken from the house of the first respondent. Their only case is that the vehicles were coming from the house of the first respondent and PW-4- Palliparamban Aboobakar gave them c the copies. PW-4 has denied it. It is also interesting to note that PW-9-Faizal has stated in evidence that he was disclosing the same for the first time in court regarding the receipt of notice from PW-4. It is also relevant to note that in Annexure-P3- complaint filed by the chief electoral agent of the appellant on 13.04.2011, there is no reference to the number of copies of Exhibit-P1-leaflet, days when the same were distributed and the people who distributed the same, etc., and most importantly, there is no allegation at all in Annexure-P3 that the said leaflet was printed by the first respondent cir with his consent. The only allegation is on knowledge and connivance on the part of the E first respondent. We have already held that knowledge and connivance is different from consent. Consent is the requirement 'for constituting corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the RP Act. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that there is a complete chain of circumstances which would lead to a F reasonable inference on consent by the first respondent with regard to printing of Exhibit-P1-leaflet. Not only that there are missing· links, the evidence available is also not cogent and credible on the consent aspect of first respondent.

32. Now, we shall deal with distribution of Exhibit-P1- leaflet. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that consent has to be inferred from the circumstances pertaining to distribution of Exhibit-P1. Strong reliance is placed on the evidence of one Arjun and Faizal. According to them, bundles ,H of Exhibit-P1-leaflet were taken in two jeeps and distributed ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.] throughout the constituency at around 08.00 p.m. on 12.04.2011. To quote the relevant portion from Paragraph-5 of the election petition: "5 …. Both the first respondent and all his election agents and other persons who were working for him knew that the contents of Annexure A which was got printed in the manner stated above are false and false to their knowledge and though the petitioner was falsely implicated in the Manaf murder case he has been honourably acquitted in the case and declared not guilty. True copy of the judgment in S.C. No. 453 of 2001 of the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc Np.2), Manjeri, dated 24.9.2009 is produced herewith and marked as Annexure B. Though this fact is within the knowledge of the first respondent, his agents referred to above and other persons who were working for him in the election on the 12th of April, 2011 at about 8 AM bundles of Annexure A which were kept in the house of the first respondent at Pathapiriyam, within the constituency were taken out from that house in two jeeps bearing Nos KL 13-B 3159 and KL 10-J 5992 which were seen by two electors, Sri V Arjun aged 31 years, Kottoor House, S/o Narayana Menon, Pathapiriyam Post, Edavanna and C.P. Faizal aged 34 years, S/o Muhammed Cheeniyampurathu Pathapiriyam P.O., who are residing in the very same locality of the first respondent and the jeeps were taken around in various parts of the Eranad Assembly Constituency and Annexure A distributed throughout the constituency from the aforesaid jeeps by the workers and agents of the first respondent at about 8 PM that night. The aforesaid publication also amounted to undue influence as the said expression is understood in Section 123(2)(a)(ii) of The Representation of the People Act, in that it amounted to direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the first respondent or his agent and other persons who were his agents referred to below with the consent of the first respondent, the free exercise of the [2014] 11 S.C.R. • electoral right of the voters of the Eranad Constituency and is also a corrupt practice falling under Section 123(4) of The Representation of the People Act, 1951 …. "

33. The allegation is on distribution of Exhibit-P1 at about B 08.00 p.m. on 12.04.2011. But the evidence is on distribution of Exhibit-P1 at various places at 08.00 a.m., 02.00 p.m., 05.00 p.m., 06.30 p.m., etc. by the UDF workers. No doubt, the details on distribution are given at Paragraph-5 (extracted above) of the election petition at different places, at various timings. The appellant as PW-1 stated that copies of Exhibit- C P1 were distributed until 08.00 p.m. Though the evidence is on printing of 1,000 copies of Exhibit-P1, the evidence on distribution is of many thousands. In one panchayat itself, according to PW-22-KV Muhammed around 5,000 copies were distributed near Areakode bus stand. Another allegation D is that two bundles were entrusted with one Sarafulla at Areakode but he is not examined. All this would show that there is no consistent case with regard to the distribution of Exhibit- P1 making it difficult for the Court to hold that there is credible evidence in that regard.

34. All that apart, the definite case of the appellant is that the election is to be declared void on the ground of Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act and that too on corrupt practice committed by the returned candidate, viz., the first respondent F and with his consent. We have already found that on the evidence available on record, it is not possible to infer consent on the part of the first respondent in the matter of printing and publicatiori of Exhibit-P1-leaflet. There is also no evidence that the distribution of Exhibit-P1 was with the consent of first G respondent. The allegation in the election petition that bundles of Exhibit-P1 were kept in the house of the first respc>ndent is not even attempted to be proved. The only connecting link is of the two jeeps which were used by the UDF workers and not exclusively by the first respondent. It is significant to note that there is no case for the appellant that any corrupt practice has ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.] been committed in the interest of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, as per the ground under Section 100(1 )(d)(ii) of the RP Act. The definite case is only of Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act.

35. In Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh and others4, a two-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue on appreciation of evidence, held as under: "9. By and large, the Court in such cases while appreciating or analysing the evidence must be guided by the following considerations: (1) the nature, character, respectability and credibility of the evidence, (2) the surround,ing circumstances and the improbabilities app~aring in the case, (3) the slowness of. the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court who had the initial advantage of observing the behaviour, character and demeanour of the witnesses appearing before it, and ( 4) the totality of the effect of the entire evidence which leaves a lasting impression regarding the corrupt practices alleged." On the evidence available on record, it is unsafe if not difficult to connect the first respondent with the distribution of Exhibit-P1, even assuming that the allegation on distribution of Exhibit-P1 at various places is true.

36. Now, we shall deal with the last ground on announcements. The attack on this ground is based on Exhibit- 4. (1984) 4 sec 649. A P10-CD. We have already held that the CD is inadmissible in evidence. Since the very foundation is shaken, there is no point in discussing the evidence of those who heard the announcements. Same is the fate of the speech of PW-4- Palliparamban Aboobakar and PW-30-Mullan Sulaiman.

37. We do not think it necessary to deal with the aspect of oral evidence since the main allegation of corrupt practice is of publication of Exhibit-P1-leaflet apart from other evidence based on CDs. Since there is no reliable evidence to reach C the irresistible inference that Exhibit-P1-leaflet was published with the consent of the first respondent or his election agent, the election cannot be set aside on the ground of corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the RP Act.

38. The ground of undue influence under Section 123(2) D of the RP Act has been given up, so also the ground on publication of flex boards.

39. It is now the settled law that a charge of corrupt practice is substantially akin to a criminal charge. A two-Judge Bench E of this Court while dealing with the said issue in Razik Ram v. Jaswant Singh Chauhan and others5, held as follows: "15 …. The same evidence which may be sufficient to regard a fact as proved in a civil suit, may be considered insufficient for a conviction in a criminal action. While in the former, a mere preponderance of probability may constitute an adequate basis of decision, in the latter a far higher degree of assurance and judicial certitude is requisite for a conviction. The same is largely true about . proof of a charge of corrupt practice, which cannot be established by mere balance of probabilities, and, if, after giving due consideration and effect to the totality of the evidence and circumstances of the case, the mind of the Court is left rocking with reasonable doubt – not being H 5. (1975) 4 sec 769. ANVAR P.V. v. P.K. BASHEER [KURIAN, J.) the doubt of a timid, fickle or vacillating mind – as-to the veracity of the charge, it must hold the same as not proved." The same view was followed by this Court P.C. Thomas v. P.M. Ismail and others6 , wherein it was held as follows: "42. As regards the decision of this Court in Razik Ram and other decisions on the issue, relied upon on behalf of the appellant, there is no quarrel with the legal position that the charge of corrupt practice is to be equated with criminal charge and the proof required in support thereof would be as in a criminal charge and not C preponderance of probabilities, as in a civil action but proof "beyond reasonable doubt". It is well settled that if after balancing the evidence adduced there still remains little doubt in proving the charge, its benefit must go to the , returned candidate. However, it is equally well settled that while insisting upon the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the courts are not required to extend or stretch the doctrine to such an extreme extent as to make it well-nigh impossible to prove any allegation of corrupt practice. Such an approach would defeat and frustrate the very laudable and sacrosanct object of the Act in maintaining purity of the electoral process. (please see S. Harcharan Singh v. S. Sajjan Singh)"

40. Having regard to the admissible evidence available on record, though for different reasons, we find it extremely difficult to hold that the appellant has founded and proved corrupt practice under Section 100(1)(b) read with Section 123(4) of the RP Act against the first respondent. In the result, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.

41. There is no order as to costs. Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed. e. (2009) 1 o sec 239.