BABUA RAM versus STATE OF U.P.

6. The right and remedy provided by S.l8A(l) Is not available to those who sought and secured reference under S. 18, be they poor or E others, and failed before the civil court or In appeal. The doctrine of res judicata operates against such persons. [182-B, 181-G) Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana (supra) and Scheduled Caste Co- operative Land Owning Society, Batinda v. Union of India, (1991] 1 SCC 17 4, relied on.

7. S.28A is just and fair and does not violate Article 14. The class of similar persons who availed the right and remedy but were unsuccessful are treated as a distinct class. It is not arbitrary as the classification is based on intelligible differentia and bears a reasonable relation to the G object of according another opportunity. (182-G]

8. Where the award is appealed against in the High Court or this Court, the Collector/LAO should effect redetermination only after the appeal is finally disposed of. Redetermination of compensation shonld only be on the basis of the final judgment and decree of the appellate H A forum, though it may not exceed the amount of the award of the original court under reference. Before proceeding with the determination, he should obtain ~n affidavit from the party making the application under S.28A that no appeal against the award made under s.26 relied upon by him was filed or if had been filed was disposed of by the appellate court B and to produce the certified copy of decree and judgment, if already disposed of. (184-E, 185-A)

9. The Collector should explain to the claimant his right to protest against the compensation determined under S.11 and the right to seek a reference under S.18. In case of his failur~ to avail of the same, he would not he entitled to further right and remedy to seek higher compensation. The Collector should append a certificate to this effect and obtain the signature/thumb impression of all the claimants and this should be a part of the record of the award proceedings. A register should be maintained in seriatim. The Collector/LAO should also maintain another register of the application made under S.28A. (183-C-F)

10. The offer of the Collector being on behalf of the State and the beneficiary, the State does not get the right to seek a reference under S.18. Under S.28A, the State and the beneficiary are persons interested in determination of just and proper compensation. However, acceptance of E the awa~d under sub- section (3) is acceptance by the claimant and not by the beneficiary or the State as the Collector acts on their behalf as an agent. The award of the Collector under S.28A (2) partakes the character of an offer and not a decision. The right to a reference under S.28A(3) by the beneficiary therefor does not arise and stands excluded. (186-C-G, 187-C-E)

11. In view of the local amendments to the Act by Haryana and Hlmachal Pradesh, the State may seek reference under S. 28A (3). (188-B)

12. When applications made under S.28A create a doubt that the award under s.26 which forms the basis for such application had been G secured on an antedated or fraudulent application purported to have been made under s.18, it shall be open to the State to have the matter thoroughly examined by an Officer of the status of the District Collector/Commis- sioner. [188-D) .

13. Where the Collector/LAO decides a S.28A application, the same H amount of compensation need not be given where there are differences in BABUARAMv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] nature and quality and situation of comparable land. (188-F)

14. The Statement of Objects and Reasons can be referred to ascer- tain the reason for the statute, and to ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied by the statute. (162-G) Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCR B 3.17; S.C. Prashar, Income Tux Officer v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, (1964) 1 SCR 29; Shivnarayan Kabra v. State of Madras, (1967) 1 SCR 138; Workmen of Mis. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India v. Management, (1973) 3 SCR 587 andA.C. Shanna v. Delhi Administration, (1973) 3 SCR 477, relied on. c Jia Lal v. The Delhi Administration, (1963) 2 SCR 864; Aswani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) SCR 1 and Union of India v. Majur Mahajan Manda/, (1977) 1 SCC 548, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 563 of From the Judgment and order dated 24.10.91 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 7276/87. D.P. Gupta, Solicitor General, B.D. Agarwa~ G.L. Sanghi, A Raghuvir, H.N. Salve, D.V. Sehgal, B. Sen, N.N. Goswami, M.L. Verma, E Mrs. K. Amareshwari, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachhar, Sudhir Rawat, AS. Rawat, K.C. Bajaj, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Ayesha Khatr~ Raj Kumar Mehta, Ranbir Yadav, G.K. Bansal, T.C. Sharma, B.K. Prasad, Ms. A Subhashini, Heman! Sharma, P. Parmeswaran, A Mariarputtarn, Ms. Arona Mathur, Dr. R.B. Masdokar, K.L. Taneja, M. Veerappa, K.H. Nobin F Singh, P.N. Puri, Rajendra V. Pai, N.M. Adarkar, A K. Srivastava, R. Sasiprabhu, Ranjan Mukherjee, P.L. Debey, S.K. Agnihotr~ Pradeep Misra, K. Ram Kumar, Yashank Adharyu, C. Badrinath Babu, Anip Sach- they, Y.P. Mahajan, W.S. Qadri, C.V.S. Rao, Ms. S. Janani, P. Gaur, S.M. Sood, Anil Kumar Gupta-II, Y.P. Rao, AK. Panda, Aruneshwar Gupta, G Anand Y adav and Rajeev Kr. Singh for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J. Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (for short 'the Act') proposing acquisition of H large extents of land situated in Auri and Anpara villages of U.P., was published in the State Gazette on July 1, 1978 for public purpose, namely, establishment of thermal power plant. The Special Land Acquisition Of- ficer gave two awards for the respective villages, on June 28 and July 25, 1979. The amounts were said to have been paid to the claimants on diverse dates between October 7, 1979 to August 8, 1983. One Krishna kumar on receiving the compensation under protest on June 28, 1979 made an application under Section 18 for reference to the civil court. The Addi. District Judge-II, Mirzapur, in his award and decree dated May 25, 1985 enhanced the compensation to Rs. 25,000 per bigha with enhanced statutory benefits under Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 C (for short "Amendment Act"). The State carried the matter in Appeal No. 306/85 to the High Court which is pending disposal. On August 5, 1985, the appellants moved the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 28-A to redetermine and award compensation at par with Krishna Kumar. They also simultaneously moved the High Court under Article 226 to direct the Special L.A.0. to decide their applications under Section 28-A. The D High Court by its order dated January 28, 1987, when directed Special L.A.O. to do the same, the latter rejected their applications on two grounds namely, the appellants are not aggrieved persons and that the decree and award made in favour of Krishna Kumar was pending – appeal in the High Court. They again challenged it in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7276/87 and by the impugned judgment dated October 24, 1991, the Division Bench E dismissed the writ petition holding that the appellants are not aggrieved persons within the meaning of Section 28-A read with Sections 11, 18 & 31 of the Act. Civil Appeal Nos. 6675-89/94 Leave granted. The facts are that the Notification under Section 4(1) of 'the Act' was published in the State Gazette on November 17, 1982. The Addi. Deputy Collector and Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation on . G October 25, 1985 and the respondents received compensation without protest. But one of the claimants with protest received the compensation and on his reference under Section 18 the Addi. District Judge by his award and decree dated October 25, 1990, enhanced the compensation. The State carried the matter in appeal. In the meanwhile, on January 19, 1991, the respondents moved an application under Section 28-A of the Act to redetermine the compensation as awarded by the District Judge. The BABUARAMv. STATE[K. RAMASWAMY,J.] appellant being beneficiary, objected to its maintainability contending that A the respondents are not aggrieved person. In the meanwhile, the High Court set aside the decree of the District Judge and remitted the case for fresh determination. We are informed that the Court awarded at Re.l per sq. meter. The Land Acquisition Officer by his proceedings dated Novem- ber 13, 1992, rejected their application finding that the respondents are not aggrieved persons and no application after remand was made. The respon- dents filed writ petitions No. 350/93 and batch questioning the correctness of the order passed by the LA.O. The High Court Court allowed the writ petitions holding that the respondents are persons aggrieved and that since applications have already been filed under Section 28A(l) within three months from the date of award of the civil court dated January 25, 1990 C there was not need for them to make fresh applications. Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1992. With Civil Appeals Nos. 4823, 1067-80, 2030-31 of 1992. Notification under s.4(1) was published on March 22, 1985 and the award s.11 was made on may 18, 1985. The Addi. District Judge, by his . award and decree dated 30.8.89 enhanced the compensation, on reference under s.18, at the instance of others, at a sum of Rs. 59 ,290 per acre. The E State filed an appeal under s.54 which is pending disposal. The respondents made an application under s.28-A on 3.10.89 to which the appellants, beneficiaries under the acquisition, had objected to the petition contend- ing, inter alia, that the respondents are not aggrieved persons, the appeal against the award of the Addi. District Judge was pending, yet the Collec- tor overruling the objections, by his award dated May 1, 1990 has enhanced the compensation to Rs. 59,290 per acre with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing the application. Therefore, the appellant filed an application under s.28-A(3) seeking reference and by his proceedings dated 5.2.91, the Collector rejected the request for reference under s.18. The appellant carried in revision to the High Court in C.R. No. 2313/91 G and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its order dated 17.7.91 summarily dismissed the· petition. On April 27, 1994, this Court, while noticing divergence of opinion expressed by different High Courts on the scope of Section 28-A, issued notice to all the State Governments and the Central Government, since the H A decision will have effect on all the Governments and directed them to appear and file their written arguments. Notice was also issued to the . learned Solicitor-General to assist the Court. Though notices were served accordingly to all the State Governments and the Central Government, only the Central Government and some of the State Governments have entered appearance through their counsel. However, none has filed written argu- ments till date despite opportunity afforded therefor. It is contended for the State Governments that Section 28-A since speaks of persons "interested' and 'aggrieved", a claimant who received compensation without protest, becomes disentitled to make an application under s.18 because of the second proviso to sub-s (2) of s.31. He being a C non-protester cannot be an aggrieved person. A claimant who receives compensation under protest but makes no application under Section 18, becomes a person aggrieved under Section 28-A of the Act and is entitled to seek redetermination for higher compensation. The question of redeter- mination of compensation would arise only if an award under section 11 D had been made by the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector after the Amendment Act had come into force, namely, September 24, 1984. In other words, their contention was that section 28-A is prospective in operation and has no application to any award made by the Collector/ L.AO., prior to the Amendment Act had come into force. It was also contended that such an application should be made within three months E from the date of the award of the court, i.e., civil court on reference under Section 18 and not on each successive award or decree in appeal. The limitation of three months should be computed from the date of the award of the civil court, first in point of time and that neither the subsequent award under Section 26 or the Judgment or decree of the High Court under Section 54 of this Conrt, does furnish any cause of action nor does the limitation of three months under Section 28-A start running from the later dates. When an appeal was filed by the State/beneficiary against the award and decree of the civil court, the Collector/L.A.0. has to await the decision of the High Court or of this Court before redetermining the compensation under s.28A(2). Be it the award made before the Act came G into force, or the award of the court made after the Amendment Act has come into force, no application under Section 28-A would lie. The award of the court envisaged under Section 28-A can only be of the civil court made on a reference under Section 18 and not the judgment and decree of the High Court or of this Court. The claimants who did not receive compensation under protest or unsuccessful applicants under ss.18 or 54 BABVARAMv. STATE [K.RAMASWAMY,J.] of the Act or under Art. 136 etc. are not the persons aggrieved when the A compensation was further enhanced under Section 26 or by the High Court 1mder s.54 or by this Court. It was also contended that the person aggrieved under Section 28-A, must be one who has an interest in the land which is sine qua non to claim for higher compensation. Even one who was hand- icapped due to illiteracy, ignorance or poverty had to receive the compen- sation only under protest. Only that class of persons who had received the compensation under protest could be aggrieved persons to avail of the right to claim redetermination of compensation. Section 28A is a transitional provision and does not apply to future awards. The Collector when redeter- mined the compensation under s.28A(2), the beneficiary being person interested not having accepted the award, such person becomes entitled to C seek reference, under s.28-A(3). Shri Harish Salve, the learned senior counse~ who argued for the claimants, contended that when compensation was enhanced by court, be it court of original or appellate jurisdiction, for the land in the neighbour- hood of the claimant acquired under the same Notification, such claimant D also becomes entitled to receive higher compensation for his land by making an application under s.28-A in that behalf. The grant of higher compensation would furnish the cause of action even to 'the non-protester claimant to make an application under s.28-A(l) for redetermination. Payment of inadequate compensation provides him grievance to seek redetermination. Therefore, he is an aggrieved person, whether received E compensation with or without protest or omitted to pursue the right and remedy under Section 18 or 54 or under Article 136. The right to receive adequate compensation is the object of the Amendment Act as it was intended to relieve hardship of the poor or inarticulate claimants who receive inadequate compensation as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill and the Financial Memorandum annexed to it. There- fore, whether a claimant received the compensation under protest or without protest, the moment the claimant of the neighbouring land gets higher compensation, he also becomes entitled to make an application under Section 28-A for redetermination. Appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings under Section 18. The limitation begins to run as soon G as higher compensation is awarded either by the civil court or by the High Court or by this Court. Excluding the time taken for obtaining a copy of the judgment, within three months thereafter, the application in writing should be made for redetermination. As the LA.O. is enjoined to redeter- mine the compensation on the basis of the enhanced ·award of compensa- tion made under s.26 by the court after September 24, 1984, an award made under Section 11 even before coming into force of Section 28A, would also be liable to be reopened. Each or successive award or decree of the Court, original or appellate jurisdiction would furnish fresh cause of action to those who had not sought reference under Section 18 or appellate remedres. An unsuccessful applicant for reference under Section 18, who did not avail of appellate remedies, cannot unjustly be denied payment of compensation of parity with his affluent neighbour who had been given higher compensation; be it under s.26 or 54 of the Act or article 136 of the Constitution etc. Denial would be invidious discrimination between persons similarly situated, violating article 14 when the remedy was intended to be C given by the legislature to the poor and inarticulate who usually do not take advantage of the remedy of reference to higher forums. Sections 28-A(2) and (3) throw sufficient light on the interpretation of Sections 28-A(l), 11, 18 and 31. Payment of equal compensation to all the people having interest in the lands acquired under the same Notification is the quintessence and running thread to avail of the right and the remedy provided for under D Section 28-A for redetermination of the compensation as required by the aggrieved persons. It was also contended that the finality of the disposal of the reference uoder ss. 18 and 54 or Article 136 crystalises the quantum of compensation payable to the lands under acquisition and that should not only furnish the remedy the lay claim but also provide a starting point to compute the limitation. This beneficial interpretation would subserve the purpose of Section 28-A. A harmonious interpretation to advance the object of Section 28-A should be adopted to achieve the legislative anima- tion of according parity in payment of compensation to all claimants who have an interest in the lands under the acquisition. Restricted interpreta- tion canvassed for the State frustrates the object of the right and remedy given by Section 28-A of the Act. Section 28-A is not a transitional provision but one enacted to given benefit in perpetuity even to non- protester of the right and remedy of redetermination when his neighbour secured higher compensation. Before considering the sweep and effect of Section 28-A, it would be G profitable to advert to the scheme of compensation awardable to a land acquired pursuant to the Notification published uoder Section 4(1) and declaration made under Section 6 thereof. By issuing notices uoder Section 9 & 10 to persons interested in the acquired land, they are required to putforth their claims for compensation payable therefor. The Collector defined under Section 3(c) who issues such notices is enjoined by S.11 to BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] hold an enquiry on the claims for making an award of the compensation A which in his opinion should be allowed for the land. In determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall guided by the provisions of ss.23 and 24, as is enjoied by s.15. However, such award carmot be made by the Collector without the prescribed approval of the appropriate government or of such officer as the appropriate government may authorise B in this behalf because of the proviso. However, sub-s.(2) of s.11 empowers the Collector, without any further enquiry, to make an award in terms of an agreement, where such agreement is made by writing by persons inter- ested in the land on appearing before him. The award shall be made within the period of limitation fixed by S.11-A. That award is required to be filed in this office and shall be final and conclusive evidence between the C Collector and the persons interested as regards matters specified in s.12. When the award is made, the Collector shall give immediate notice to such of the interested persons as are not present personally or by their repre- . sentatives. Section 31 mandates the Collector to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested thereto according D to the award and to pay to them unless prevented by one or more of the contingencies enumerated in Sub-sections (2) and {3) or the latter sub-sec- tion or by reason of a reference made under s.30. By operation of second proviso to S\lb-section (2) it was "provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise then under protest shall be entitled to make any application under s.18". On receiving the payment under protest, an E application for reference under s.18 shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award when the person interested was present when award was armounced. In other cases, within 6 weeks from the date of the reeeipt of the notice from the Collector under sub-s.(2) of s.12 or within 6 weeks from the dete of the Collector's award whichever period shall first expire. Under s.16, unless possession of the acquired land was taken under s.17, the Collector shall take its possession and such land thereafter vests in the State absoi>Jtely free from all encumbrances. The person receiving compensation under protest because of the first G proviso to s.31(2), gets right under s.18{1) to make an application in writing to the Colle_ctor requiring him to refer the matter to the Court 'for determination of his claim for compensation and the Collector/LA.0. in such an event, is enjoined to refer the matter with the required particulars. Court has been defined in s.3( d)to mean principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed, a special H A Judicial Officer within specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Under the respective Civil Courts Act of each State, different Courts have been conferred with original civil jurisdiction like the Courts of civil judges or Sub-ordinate Judges in South India, the Addi. District Judge in other States or Special or Senior Civil Judge etc. The Civil c Court will follow the procedure prescribed in Part III of the Act and C.P.C. in determining the compensation as envisaged under s.23 of the Act and determine the market value of the lands acquired and award the compen- sation in terms of the provisions of the Act. The details thereof are not material for the present purpose. However, by operation of s.25 the amount of compensation to. be awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under s.11. Under s.26, the Civil Court shall make its award as enjoined in sub-s.(1) and it is a decree under sub-s.(2) thereof. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Dy. Land Acquisition Officer D and Anr., (1962) 1 SCR 676, the Dy. Collector on making an award on March 19, 1950, did not notice or award to the appellant. On January 13, 1953, on coming to know of the making of the award, the appellant made an application on February 24, 1953 under s.18 requesting the Collector to refer the matter for determination by the Court. That application was dismissed as barred _by limitation. In dealing with question of limitation, E this Court held that the decision of the Collector under Section 11 is in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired. Legally such award cannot be treated as a decision. It is in law an offer or tender of the Compensation deter- mined by the Collector to the owner of a property acquired. If !he owner accepts the offer, no further proceeding is required to be pursued, the amount is paid and compensation proceedings comes to an end. If, how- ever, the oWiler does nQt accept the offer, Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the q~stion determined by court and it is the amount of compensation which the court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. The Collector does not determine the amount G with legal authority but if the court determines the amount judicially, the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. The award, therefore, was considered as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owners of the property for acceptance. Although the Government is bound by the proceedings of the Collector, the persons H interested are not concluded by the findings in the award. Therefore, he BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] makes the offer binding on the Government as well as on the owner of the A property. Communication of the award is required to be done if he is not present at the time of the making of the award or none represented them. Service of notice of award is made mandatory. Therefore, this Court held that "the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference lo the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in B his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was know to the party concerned either actually or constructively. The date of the award should be construed in that perspective. The knowledge of the party affected by the decision of the Collector, either actual or con- structive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. The communication of the award to the party C concerned, actually or constructively, is therefore, necessary. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronounce- ment of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously armounced, the award is said to be D communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. If the party is represented, the party is presumed to have the knowledge of the date. In other cases, the com- munication to the party is necessary." Knowledge of the party affected by the award eight actual or constructive is essential to satisfy the require- ments of fairness and principles of natural justice. The legal position E enunciated in Barish Chander's case being the law under Art. 141 and the legislature being presumptively aware of this legal position, has altered the law by enacting s.28A by the Amendment Act. The State having regard to the Directive Principles of State policy in F Part IV of the Constitution which has to undertake diverse measures in a massive scale to promote public welfare and to accelarate economic development has to inevitably acquire land needed for public purposes – industrial development, housing, educational institutions etc. Cases of land acquisition of land have become far more numerous than ever before. G Exercising the power of eminent domain when the State takes recourse to acquisition of lands of the individuals or institutions for public purpose, to balance the right of the individual whose land is acquired for promotion of the public purpose, the deprived owner of the land is required to be adequately compensated for his own rehabilitation keeping in view the · sacrifice he makes in the larger public interest. Taking into consideration H A the stark realities that many a poor and inarticulate owner of acqnired land are not usually taking advantage of the reference provided in Section 18 for obtaining adequate compensation for their acqnired lands, Parliament while bringing about certain amendments to the Act, has enacted Section 28-A through the reintroduced 1984-Bill, with the object mentioned in para 2(IX) of the Statement of Objects 'and Reasons, which says : – "considering B that the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage by poor and inarticulate and is usually exer- cised only by the comparatively affluent land owners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested persons, it was proposed to C provided an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same Notification to seek redetermination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders of payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act." In para 3 of the Financial Memorandum, it is stated thus : "Clause (19) of the Bill seeks to commensurate a new s.18A of the Act whjch provides that if a party in a land acquisition proceeding obtains the orders of the court under s.18 of the Act for higher compensation, another person whose lands are covered under the same Notification under s.4(1) of the Act and who may have reason to be similarly aggrieved by the award of the Collector, may file to the Collector for redetermination of their amount of compensation payable E to them on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court". The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as seen eloquently manifests the legislative animation in enacting s.28A of the Act. This Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1987] 3 SCR 317-28 E & F, held that the safest guide to the interpretation of statutes is the reason for it, which can be discovered through the external and internal aids, the external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill was presented in Parliament and internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons can be referred to ascertain the mischief sought to be remedied by the statute G vide S.C. Prashar, Income Tax Officer v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, (1964) 1 SCR 29, Shivanarayan Kabra v. State of Madras, [1967] 1 SCR 138, Workmen of Mis Firestone Type & Rubber Co. of India v. Management & Ors., [1973) 3 SCR 587; and inA.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, (1973) 3 SCR 477. InJia Lal v. The Delhi Administration, [1963) 2 SCR p.864 at 877, a BABVARAMv. STATE[K RAMASWAMY,J.) Constitution Bench held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not A admissible in evidence for construing the statute. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr. v. Arabinda Bose & Anr., (1953] SCR p.l at 28, another Constitution Bench held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons only would explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. They may or may not correspond to the objectives, the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are C not voted upon by the members. Therefore, it would not be an aid for the construction of the statute. In Union of India & Anr. v. Majur Mahajan Manda/ & Ors., (1977] 1 SCC 548 at 554 para 28], this Court held that the statement of objects and reasons would be looked into when there is ambiguity in the language used in the statute. Now let us see the text of Section 28-A. It reads as follows : "28-A. Redetennination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court – (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in E excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to thern may be redetermined on the basis or the amow.1t of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided. that in computing the period of three months within G which an application to the collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the H c persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of com- pensation payable to the applicants. (3) any person who has not accepted the award under sub-sec- tion (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18." A bare reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A would indicate that wherein an award under this Part, (Part III consists of Section 18 to 28), Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under s.11, the persons interested in all other lands covered by the same Notification under s.4(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under s.18, by writing make an application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court requiring that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. The proviso gives a right to exclude the time taken from the day on which the award was pronounced and the time required to obtain a copy of the award in computation of three months within which the application for redetermination has be made in writing to the Collector under sub-s.(1) of Section 28-A. The basis for redetermination is the award of the Court and the compensation awarded therein. Sub-section (2) thereof enjoins the Collector to issue notice to all the persons interested, i.e. the applicant, the State and the beneficiary, if any, to give them reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry conducted thereon and to make the award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants under sub-s.(l). Sub-section (3) gives a right to the applicant either to accept the award or to accept the compensation under protest. In the latter case he has been given a right under sub-s.(3) to make a written application to the Collector to refer the matter for determination under s.18 to the Court. The provisions of Sections 18 to 28, as far as may be, apply to such references. Thus, s.28-A is a complete Code in itself , providing substantive right to an interested owner who received compen- sation under s.18 without protest for higher compensation, and remedy has BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] been provided to make a written application within the prescribed period. A The non-obstanate clause lifts the rigour of the bar created by s.18(1) and the second proviso to s.31 and makes him eligible to be at par with his neighbour to claim parity for compensation to the land similarly situated as the land covered by the court award. The first question that arises for determination is, who is a person . "aggrieved" within the meaning of s.28-A(l) of the Act. Para 2 (IX) of the Statement of the Objects and Reasons read with para 3 of the Financial Memorandum would indicate that s.28-A was introduced for the first time in the second Bill to benefit poor and inarticulate people who by reason of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy fail to take advantage of their right C of reference to the Civil Court under s.18. By operation of second proviso to sub-s.(2) of s.31 and s.18(1), though such people are interested persons, if due to their ignorance, illiteracy or indigence, receive compensation for their lands without prates~ would be denied of their right to obtain higher compensation while the comparatively affluent land owners of their neigh- bouring lands who take advantage of the reference under s.18 would get higher compensation determined by the court. Hence s.28-A makes the award under s.26, the foundation for obtaining higher compensation by poor and inarticulate people. In Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, [1986] 4 SCC 151, this court held that right and remedy under s.28-A was meant for that class of persons who were poor and inarticulate and by reason of E their poverty and ignorance, should have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the court for higher compensation under s.18. How- ever, this Court concluded that to avail of the remedy under s.28-A, the conditions laid down therein were io be fulfilled. In K Rangiah v. Special Dy Collector (Land Acquisition), [1982] 2 sec 374; this court observed that in an acquisition proceedings, lands situated in the same locality and in the neighbouring locality when are possessed of the same comparable advantages, the owners of the former lands are entitled to the same rate of compensation as the owners of other G lands as determined by the judgment of the High Court which had become final as otherwise, it would be inequitable and discriminatory. In other words, the owners of the lands possessing the same kind and same quality etc. are entitled to parity in payment of compensation for their lands. Section 28-A(l) is intended to overcome the hurdle created by s.18(1) and 2nd proviso to s.31(2) in the matter of obtaining equal compensation for H A similar acquired lands. Equal compensation for similar acquired lands could be got by all the interested persons, if their lands are acquired under the same Notification. In other words, if an owner fails to a".ail of the right and remedy under s.18(1), s.28-A(l) grants an extra right and remedy for redetermination of the compensation payable to him for his land on the B basis of an award of the court giving to an owner of another land covered by the same Notification under s.4(1) and under the same award. The payment of higher compensation to his neighbouring land owner makes an applicant an aggrieved person to claim redetermination of the compensa- tion payable to him for his land. The person aggrieved is, therefore, in this context, would mean a person who had suffered legal injury or one who C has been iinjustly deprived or denied of something, which he would be interested to obtain in the usual course or similar benefits or advantage or results in wrongful affection of his title to compensation. In Collins English Dictionary, the word 'aggrieved" has been defined D to mean "to ensure unjustly especially by infringing a person's legal rights". In Webester Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition at page 28, aggrieved person is defined to mean 'subjected to ill-treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. Injured, as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights". In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Ed., Vol.1, pages 83-84, person aggrieved means "person injured or damaged in a legal sense''. In E Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at page 65, aggrieved has been defined to mean 'having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured", aggrieved persons has been defined to mean "One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment. One whose right of property may be F established or divested. The word "aggrieved' refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." The person aggrieved must; therefore, be one who 'has suffered a legal grievance because of a decision pronounced by Civil Court giving higher compensation for the acquired lands similar to his own while he is denied of such higher compensation for his land because of operation of s.18 read with s.31 of the Act resulting in affectation of his pecuniary interest in his acquired land directly and adversely by that award of the Collector made under s.11. As such he becomes as such aggrieved person and entitled to avail of the right and remedy conferred upon him under BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] s.28A( 1) to make good his denied right to receive compensation in excess A of the amount awarded by the Collector/L.A.0. Acceptance of the conten- tion of Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel and his companions, that persons who under protest received payment of compensation for their lands but failed to avail of the right and remedy under s.18 waiting in the wings for success of the land owners of the adjoining lands to get higher compensation under s.28-A(l) as person aggrieved robs the poor and inarticulate who. by reason of their poverty or ignorance failed to avail of the right and remedy under s.18, and creates not only invidious discrimina- · tion between same class of person similarly sitnated but would be highly unjust and arbitrary offending Article 14 of the Constitution, apart from flying in the face of express animation of the statute as espoused in its C Statement of Objects and Re.asons and the Financial Memorandum. In this context, we make it clear that we have looked into Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum to know what is it that induced the introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpret s.28-A(l). Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that any interested person in the D land acquired under the same Notification published under s.4(1) who failed to avail the right and remedy under s.18(1) read with second proviso to s.31(2), becomes a person aggrieved under s.28-A(l) of the Act, when the owner of the another land covered by the same notification is awarded higher compensation by the Civil Court on a reference got inade by him under s.18. The next question is as to when the period of limitation of three months beings to run under s.28-A and whether successive awards made by Civil Court at different times in respect of the land covered by the same Notification furnish separate causes of action for making applications F under s.28A. Let us consider the meaning of the words "an award under this part' referred to in s.28-A(l) which is Part III of the Act. The heading to that part begins by reference to court and its procedure. The "court" means a principal civil court of original jurisdiction or a special judicial officer appointed to perform the functions of the court under the Act as G becomes clear as is noticed already. What are the matters to be considered in determining the compensation on a reference made to it under s.18, is detailed in s.23 while matters to be neglected in determining such compen- sation is indicated in s.24. By operation of sub-s.(2) of s.26, the award made determining the amount of compensation shall be deemed to be a decree while the statement of the grounds of every such award is deemed to be H the judgment, for the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure. The above perspectives from Part III make it clear that the award of the court is that of the civil court of original jurisdiction in that part. It is decree for the purpose of an appeal under s.54 which falls in Part VIII of the Act (Miscellaneous). The decree as defined in s.2(2) C.P.C. is the decree of the High Court, which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court under Articles 132, 133 and 136 read with Order 45 C.P.C. Hence, the award of the court referred to in sub-section (1) of s.28-A is only the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction or of judicial officer performing the functions of such court under the Act on reference received by it under s.18 and an award and decree pronounced under s.26 of the Act. Since, C the judgment and decree of the High Court under s.54 or of this Court do not come in part III of the Act, they stand excluded from an award envisaged under sub-s.(1) of s.28-A. The aggrieved interested person, therefore, is entitled to the right and remedy of making an application under s.28A for redetermination of compensation for his acquired land D only on the basis of the award of the civil court or judicial officer which is a judgment and decree under s.26 when such award grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under s.11. When such an application is made in writing by the aggrieved person, notwithstanding the fact of his having received compensation under s.31 without protest and of not availing the right and remedy of the reference under s.18, the E redetermination of the compensation under s.28A(l) is required to be done. The question then is when exactly the period of limitation starts running for making an application in writing under sub-s.(1) of s.28-A. A p bare reading of sub-s. (1) along with its proviso would indicate that the making of the award by the civil court or judicial officer which becomes the judgment and decree under s26, is the starting point from which the period of limitation is allowed for making an application under s.28A. However, the person aggrieved in computing the period of three months allowed for making an application under s.28-A would be entitled to G exclude the day on which the award was pronounced by the court or the judicial officer and the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the award which is a judgment and decree under s.26. In other words, the proviso to sub-s.(1) of s.28-A excludes the requisite time taken for obtain- ing the copy of the award and in computation of the period of three months H from the date of the award, the time required to obtain a certified copy of BABUARAMv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,1.] the award should be excluded. Limitation begins to run from the date the A award was pronounced by the court under s.26. It is well-settled that the Jaw of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other proceedings cannot be entertained in court of justice or before appropriate authority, though it does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. Once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is B interdicted by an order of the court. Explanation to s.11 provides internal evidence in this behalf to make the point poignantly clear which states that in computing two years period to make award under s.11, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under s.6 is stayed by an order of a court, should be excluded. The C legislature prescribed three months' limitation to quicken diligence like caveat emtor and provided to a non-protester right to redetermination provided the application in writing is made to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction, excluding the requisite time taken to obtain a copy of the award. In other words, the right and remedy provided by s.28-A(l) stands extingoished with the expiry of three months from the date of the award under s.26. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one reference under s.18 at the behest of different claimants of the lands covered by s.4(1) Notification and the court may make successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given in an earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in sub-s.(1) of s.28-A, limitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time under s.28-A(l) nor provide fresh cause · of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Application under s.28A(l) may be made at the instance of the self-same person or different persons. Any other interpreta- tion would amount to re-writing the proviso to sub-s.(1) of s.28A. The judgment and decree of the Court of appeal either under s.54 or under s.96 of CFC or under Articles 132, 133 or 136 of the Constitution does not furnish fresh cause of action nor provide fresh limitation to make applica- tion under s.28-A(l) of the Act as has already been held in that they are not covered under Part III of the Act. May be that they are continuation of original decree made in s.26(2) and in law the executable decree is that of the Supreme Court or the High Courts. But the legislature has conferred •the right of reopening the award under s.11 only when the civil court under H A s.26 awarded higher compensation in Part III to a person having an interest in the land covered by the same Notification under s.4(1) and an applica- tion ir. writing if made within limitation. The next question is when the person aggrieved is entitled to invoke B s.28A(l)? If an award under s.11 was made prior to September 24, 1984 and reference made thereon under s.18 was decided either before that date or thereafter or if an award under s.11 was made after September 24, 1984 and the reference made thereon to court under s.18 was decided after that date. At one point, we were inclined to agree that Section 28-A operates from April 30, 1982, the date on which the first Land Acquisition (Amend- C ment) Bill, 1982, was introduced in the Parliament but para 3 of the Financial Memorandum made it explicit that the original Bill did not contain Section 28-A. On a review, Section 28-A was introduced for the first time in 1984 Bill. Admittedly, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has come into force on September 24, 1984. Section 28-A was not given D retrospective effect unlike section 34 of the Act, as amended by Section 20 of the Amendment Act. Section 30(3) of the Amendment Act gives retrospective effect to s.34 to award interest in any proceedings, at any stage, of determining computation as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of s.30(3) of Amendment Act. By operation of s.30(1) of the Amendment Act s.23(1-A) was given prospective operation under s.30(1) (a) and limited retrospective operation as transitional provision and confined the right to interest therein to the award of the Collector pending on April 30, 1982 and made before the commencement of the Amendment Act or the civil court covered by s.30(1)(b). In these cases we are not concerned with the interpretation of s.23(1-A) read with s.30(1) of the Act. So it is unnecessary to. enter into elaborate discussion. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989] 2 SCC 754, construing the wide language in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amendment Act, this Court held that the enhanced solatium by 30 per cent under Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the Amendment Act would apply to an award of the Collector or a decree of the civil court pending between April 30, 1982 and G September 24, 1984 and the High Court or the Supreme Court, in appeal would award enhanced solatium or interest under Section 28 as amended by Section 18 of the Amendment Act and does not apply to appeals pending in the High Court or this court. In other words, despite the wide language of Sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Amendment Act (Transi- H tional Provisions), this Court had given restricted interpretation. This is the BABUARAMv. STATE[K. RAMASWAMY,J.] internal evidence available from the Amendment Act itself. Now we consider the external aid to get at the crux of the question. When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. Such language best declares, without more, the intention of the legislature and is decisive on B it. Therefore, when the language is clear and capable of only one meaning, anything enacted by the legislature, must be enforced, even though it be absurd or result in startling consequences. The endeavour, therefore, must be to collect the meaniag of the statute from the expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient. When two interpretations are possible, the task C of the Court would be to fi11d which one or the other interpretation would promote the object of the statute, serves its purposes, preserve its smooth working and prefer the one which subserves are promotes the object to the . other which introduces inconvenience or uncertainty in the working of its system. The purpose of interpretation is, therefore, to ascertain the inten- tions of the legislature and to make it effective. If the statute is ambiguous or its meaning is uncertain, interpretation is resorted to for ascertaining what the le~lature meant by the words in the statute, although they do not express the legislative interest clearly and perfectly. In other words, if E the statute is plain, certain and free from ambiguity, a bare reading of its suffices and its interpretation can never arise. In discovering the legislative intent, courts are not exercising legislative power but apply the rules of common ·sense applying certain legal principles. Sub-s.(1) of s.28A reads that where an award under this part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the. Collector under s.11, the person interested in all other lands covered by the same notification under s.4(1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the .Collector under s.18, by written application G to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Coun require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of the compensation awarded by the Court. A person interested becomes aggrieved, when for other lands covered by the same notification under s. 34(1) of the Ac~ the court awards H compensation in excess of the compensation awarded under s.11 to him for his land and to others for their land. Such aggrieved persons who had not made an application to the Collector under s.18 earlier becomes entitled to invoke s.28-A. Therefore, the verb 'allows' indicates that the right to an aggrieved person under s.28-A(l) arises only when the reference court B grants compensation in excess of the amount awarded under s.11 i.e. after September 24, 1984. It is prospective in operation after the Act had come into force. The amount "awarded" speaks of past tense. In other words there must be an award in existence under s.26 made after the Amendment Act come into force. The right and remedy to claim redetermination accrues to an interested aggrieved persons after September 24, 1984. The C proviso amplifies it when it speaks of exclusion of the time taken to obtain copy of the award under s.26 till it is supplied, i.e. it operates in future. It is, therefore, clear that s.28-A does not not apply to an award under s.26 made prior to September 24, 1984. Whether it would apply to pending reference made after September 24, 1984? The language is not unambiguous. Therefore, the need for its interpretation to find the legislative intention arises. Section 28-A not only provides right and remedy for redetermination of the compensation but also prescribes limitation within which it could be availed of and the procedure under s.28-A(2) to make to award. It also gives the further rights E of reference by sub-s.(3). The procedural part thereof on reference under s.28-A(3) is relegated to what is envisaged in ss.18 to 28. It is thereby a complete Code in itself. The language of past tense to certain words and present tense to certain words emphasised hereinbefore would appear to indicate that s.28-A does operate prospectively. Having made s.30 of the Amendment Act (Transitional provisions) with retrospective effect some without limitation, others with limited retrospectivity and the third confin- ing only to the award of the Collector, and being aware of enacting s.28A, legislature had not given to s.28-A retrospectivity. In other words s.28-A is prospective in its operation. The question therefore, is under what circumstances the award under s.11 is liable to reopen under s.28-A and redetermination is done? Normal- ly the legislative purpose is to remedy some existing evil or to correct some defect in existing law or to create a new right and remedy. Section 18 or s.31 have not been amended. Non-availment of right of reference to claim H higher compensation has been lost either by receiving compensation. from BABUARAM v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY,J.] the Collector without protest or failed to make an application within the A prescribed limitation due to poverty, indigence or inarticulation. Without suitably amending ss.18 and 31, s.28-A was enacted creating new rights and remedies as a complete Code in itself. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11 the Ed. at p.79, it is B stated thus : – "general words and phrases, therefore, however wide and com- prehensive they may be in their literal sense, must, usually, be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act. It would be "perfectly monstrous' to construe the general words of the Act C so as to alter the previous policy of the law. In construing the words of an Act of Parliament we are justified in assuming the legislature did not intend to go against the ordinary rules of law, unless the language they have used obliges the court to come to the con- clusion that they did so intend". Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. at D . p.177, it is stated that but in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. At p.178 it is stated that one of the safest guides to the construction of sweeping general words, which it is difficult to apply in their full literal sense, is to examine other words of like imi)ort in the same instrument, and to see what limitations must be imposed on them. E If it is found that a number of such expressio~ have to be subjected to limitations or qualifications,. and that such limitations or qualifications are of the same nature, that forms a strong argument for subjecting the expression in dispute to a like limitation or qualification. In Bennion's Statutory Interpretation at p.385, it is stated that however the true view is not that strict and liberal construction are not themselves interpretative criteria They are simply methods or techniques by which the court applies the interpretative criteria. In statutory interpretation by Cross at p.145 in the chapter presumption against unclear changes in the law, it G is stated that the name prescription against unclear changed in the law goes back to the days when, by far, the greater proportion of law was common law and statutes were, for the most part, thought of as minor emendations of that law. In modern times it is possible to make a traversity of the presumption by stating it in some such form as that 11it is to be presumed that a statute alters the common H law as little as possible." At p.146 it is stated that no useful purpose would be served by multiplying examples, but it should be pointed out that "the presumption applies to changes in statute law". Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. at p.177, it is stated that but in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. At p.178 it is stated that one of the safest guides to the construction of sweeping general words, which it is difficult to apply in their full literal sense, is to examine other words of like import in the same instrument, and to see what limitations mnst be imposed on them. If it is found that a number of such expressions have to be subjected to limitation or qualifica- C tions, and that such limitations or qualifications are of the same nature, that forms a strong argument for subjecting the expression in dispute to a like limitation or qualification. In Bennion's Statutory Interpretation at p.385, it is stated that however the true view is not that strict and liberal construction are in themselves interpretative criteria. They are simply D methods or techniques by which the court applies the interpretative criteria. In Statutory Interpretation by Cross at p.145 in the Chapter presumption against unclear changes in the law, it is stated that the name "prescription against unclear changed in the law" goes back to the days when, by far, the greater proportion of law was common law and statutes were, for the most part, thought of as minor emendations of that law. In E modern times it is possible to make a travesty of the presumption by stating it in some such form as that "it is to be presumed that a statute alters the common law as little as possible." At p.146 it is stated that no useful purpose would be served by multiplying examples, but it should be pointed out that "the presumption applies to changes in statute law." Crawford's Interpretation of Laws at p.277, quoting Dwarris from his treatise it is stated that all new laws, though penned with the greatest of technical skill and passed upon the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal until their meaning be fixed and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudica- G tions. At p.283 it is stated that in ascertaining the legislative intent, where a statute is susceptible to two or more interpretations, should surely be accepted by the courts as constituting the one intended by the law-makers, "which operates most equitably, justly and reasonably as determined by our existing standards of proper conduct and by our conceptions of what is right and what is wrong, of what is just and what is unjust". At p.296 it is BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] stated that at one time the doctrine of equitable construction was applied A by the courts, but as such it has now been generally abandoned. By virtue of this doctrine, the letter of the law might be disregarded and its provisions extended to cases which were within the same mischief which the law undertook to remedy, even though they were not expressly in- cluded, or cases might be excepted from the statute, although covered by B its terms, where they were not fairly included, on considerations of justice and reason. The construction or interpretation, must therefore, be construed with reference to its intended purpose and the scope of meaning of the statute must be determined by the language used therein. Necessary implications C may be read into the statute. True implications, sense and spirit are as much a part of the language which makes up the statute as the meanings of the various words as a part of it. The statute must, therefore, be analysed and expressed meaning ascertained. Whether liberal or strict construction will b'e given depends largely upon a finding whether the given determinate D was intended from the alternative part of the statute, the type and its nature. Often in some statute if the same parts are subjected to different types of construction, whether liberal or strict construction is a means by which the scope of the statute is expounded or restricted in order to convey the legislative meaning. According to Crawford, 'if that be the proper position to be accorded to strict or liberal construction, it would make no E difference whether statute involved was penal, criminal, remedial or in derogation of any rights as a distinction based upon its classification would then mean nothing." Strict or liberal construction, therefore, should be used as a tool in the process of ascertaining the legislative intent when it is in doubt. Otherwise they will have little or no value. This is a part of interpretive process assigned to the court as a subject to make the legisla- tive intent, clear, effective and efficacious. In Union of India &Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989] 2 SCC 754 at p.780 in para 32, the Constitution Bench, consideration the scope of s.30(2) of the Amendment Act had applied restricted interpreta- tion to the words of width employed in s.30(2) holding that s.30(2) clearly intended to refer to the awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. In other words s.30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or the Court is made between April 30, 1982 H and September 24, 1984 or to appeals arising from such awards and decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before September 24, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between April 30, 1982 B end September 24, 1984. In para 33 at p.781 it was further elaborated that the Amendment Act had not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the Parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Since it is necessary to spell C out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of s.30(2) for deter- mining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium." As stated earlier the Constitution Bench had given restricted interpretation and cut down the width of the language of s.30(2) to be in conformity with the legislative intent. In Nyadar Singh v. D Union of India & Ors., (1988] 4 SCC 170 at 179, this Court held that even though the statute itself may not use in limiting language the interpretative factors, relevant to the provision may impose such a limitation. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuti- cals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1991] 2 SCC 637 at 666-68, this Court held that E legislature does not effect a fundamental alteration in general system or policy of law without expressing such intention with irresistible clearness. In State of Orissa & ors. v. Sukanti Mohapatra & Ors., (1993] 2 SCC 486 in para (a), it was held that rules of relaxation should be construed strictly. InA.C. Shanna v. Delhi Administration, (1973] 3 SCR 477 at 483, this Court held that the legislature does not intend to make any substantial alternation in the existing law beyond what it expressly declares or beyond the mini- mum scope and object of the statute. In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983] 1 SCC 305 relied on by Shri Salve, and followed in D.C.M. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1983] 4 sec 166 at 193 that a statute is not properly called G a retroactive statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. So it was held that the statute is not retroactive in operation. A statute is not retroactive merely because it affects existing rights no~ it is retroactive merely because a part of the requisites for 'its action is drawn from the time anticident to its passing. However, in KS. Paripooman v. State of Kera/a, S.L.P. (Civil) No.5514- BABUARAMv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 17/90 etc., dated September 12, 1994, a Constitution Bench per majority A interpreting s.23(1A) and s.30 of Transitory Provisions and the Scheme of the Amendment Act held that s.23(1A) does not apply to the award of the Collector or Civil Court made prior to April 30, 1982 and restricted to the cases covered by ss.30(1)(a) and (b). In other words it again reiterated the restricted interpretation given in Raghubir Singh's case. At this juncture, it is necessary to dispose of yet other contention argoed on behalf of the States that s.28-A is only a transitional provision applicable to pending cases only. After the Amendment Act has come into force the legislature did not intend to provide remedy of reference under s.28-A to the unsuccessful person at the first instance when one or several C claimants had reference and become successful to get higher compensation by ways of second remedy of reopening the concluded award that had become final upsetting budgetary estimates to large projects so as to throw the economy out of gear and create uncertainty. There would thus be no finality to an award under s.11. The interpretation, therefore, should lean D in favour of the construction that s.28-A be treated as transitional provision. Otherwise s.28-A itself would be violative of Article 14. The contention is not well-founded. Section 30 of the Amendment Act expressly treated differently the provision contained therein and the operation of the Amendment Act in its application to be transitional provisions as the marginal note thereof itself clearly stated as such. Had the legislature E intended to treat s.28-A also as a transitional provision, nothing prevented the legislature to expressly state so. The omission thereof by necessary implication leads to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that s.28-A to be a transitional provision. The langoage in which s.28A is couched would indicate that it was intended to operate in perpetuity. It is F true that reopening an award made under s.11 after the Amendment Act came into force would unsettle the finality of s.11 award and the budgetary estimates made for acquisition get upset but the legislature being the giver of the law, has chosen.to give prospective operation and the consequences that would flow from the operation of s.28-A are inescapable. The court while interpreting s.28-A, cannot avoid to give effect to the consequences G that would flow from the operation of s.28-A. It is for the parliament to remedy the situation, if situation not intended by it is brought about by the legislation. Thns considered from the internal and external aids of interpretation, H we are of the view that an award made under s.11 is final and cannot be reopened by having recourse to s.28A if an award was made under s.26 on reference under s.18 before Sept. 24, 1984. Therefore, if an owner of the land or person interested in compensation of the land acquired by the same Notification under s.4(1) had not sought reference under s.18 in c respect to an award made under s.11 by the Collector/L.A.0., but if on a reference made under s.18 prior to Sept.24, 1984 in respect of land covered by the same notification any award made under s.26, prior to the Amend- ment Act had come into force, the award under s.11 is not liable to be reopened for redetermination of compensation even though three months' period had not expired by September 24, 1984 for to hold otherwise would amount to giving retrospective operation to s.28-A. Any other non- protester claim will not be entitled to get an award reopened under s.11 though on reference at the instance of one or other of the owner or interested person had the benefit -0f determination of higher compensation by an award made under s.26 before Sept. 24, 1984 on his reference under D s.12 made prior to Sept. 24, 1984. An award under s.11 made prior to Sept. 24, 1984 and a reference under s.18 sought and secured was pending in the civil court on September 24, 1988 an Civil Court determines higher wm- pensation on or after Sept. 24, 1984, persons interested in other land covered by the same Notification under s.4(1), would be entitled to make an application/applications in writing to the Collector to redetermine the compensation and to make an award under s.28A(2) on the basis of the award and decree under s.26. It would be so, for that would not amounts to retrospective reopening of an award made under s.11 but drawing antecedents facts from a pending reference for giving effect to the prospec- tive operation of the provisions in s.28-A(l) consistent with the language as explained earlier and the subject of the amendment. The next question is at whose instance and in what circumstances an award under s.11 would be reopened consequent on the court enhancing the compensation in a reference under s.18. A deep into provisions in sub-s.(1) of s.4 and onwards upto the making of the award of the court G under s.26, would furnish us the clue for answering the question. Section 4(1) Notification gives the right to the State to propose acquisition of the lands for the specified public purpose and enables its officers to enter upon land and take measurements, draw up the map take other particulars required by them. Section 6 declatation or successive declarations are H conclusive evidence that particular land is needed for the public purpose BABUARAMv. STATE [K RAMASWAMY,J.] and the appropriate government becomes entitled to acquire the land in A the manner provided in the Act. The award under s.11(1) require specific number of "the respective interests of person claiming compensation (pursuant to their statement under s.10) indicating (i) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the B persons known or believed to be interested in the land, whether they were represented or appeared before the Collector or not. On receiving the compensation under protest and making the application within the prescribed period of limitation, the interested person should specify the nature of his objections whether (a) to the measurement of the land (b) the amount of compensation ( c) the persons to whom it is payable or ( d) the apportionment or the compensation among the persons interested made by the Collector. On receipt of the objection/objections, the Collec- c tor by operation of s.19, make the reference to the court furnishing the information in writing to the court of the circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-s.(1) of s.19 together with the Schedule attached D thereto under sub-s.(2) thereof. Under s.20, the notice to be issued to the person interested, other than non-protesters to specify the date on which the court will proceed to detennine the objection specified in s.21. The notice shall be served on all persons interested in the objection-vide s.20(b ), if the objection relates to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation, the notice also shall be served on the Collector. Section 21 E expressly restricts the scope of the proceedings and consideration of the interest of the persons affected only to the extent of "objection" and the determination is restricted to those objects only. If the objections relate .to 'determination of compensation' ·and the civil court enhances compensa- tion, on the basis of excess compensation awarded under s.26, the other person interested in other lands covered by the same Notification, are entitled to the award under s.28-A(l) and (2). If it relates to any other objections, s.28-A becomes inapplicable and, therefore, the award of the Collector under s.11, unless properly challenged, by a reference under s.18 should not be reopened. As regards claim for higher compensation, subs-(1) of s.28-A en- visages the awarding of higher compensation by the court on reference under s.18 in excess of the amount awarded under s.11 by the Collector. The aggrieved person must be the person interested in all other lands covered by the same Notification of s.4(1) and.the amount of the compen- sation determined by the court is relatable to the land similarly situated, possessed of the same value or potentialities etc. Despite their failure to seek and secure reference under s.18, they became entitled to make an application in writing to the Collector within the prescribed three months' limitation. Therefore, any other non-applicant is not entitled to the benefit c of the award of the Collector made on redetermination under sub- s.(1) of S.28-A. The contention of B.D. Aggrawal, learned counsel for the claimants, that all persons despite their failure to make an applications for redetermination of the compensation, are entitled to compensation under the redetermined award under sub- s.(l) of s.28-A, is without substance. It is accordingly rejected. Sub-s.(1) of s.28-A would apply only to a person who had failed to seek and secure reference under s.18 when one or other persons similarly interested in the land covered under the same notification published under s.4(1) received on reference under s.18 higher compensa- tion in an award under s.26 and should make a written application under s.28A(l). The Collector then is enjoined to redetermine the compensation D in the manner laid in s.28(1) and to make an award under s.28-A(2). The next question is whether an interested person who sought and secured reference under s.18 but was either unsuccessful and filed no appeal or had carried in appeal but unsuccessful, would be entitled to redetermination when the compensation was enhanced by the appellate court either under s.54 or on further appeal under Articles 132, 133 and 136 of the Constitution. In Mewa Ram's case, this Court held in paragraph 5 that s.28-A provides for the determination of amount of compensation subject to the conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For such redeter- mination, the forum is the Collector and the application has to be made before him within 30 days from the date of the award under s.26 and the right is restricted to persons who had applied for reference under s.18 of the Act. If these conditions are satisfied, the petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided under s.28-A of the Act. In Scheduled Caste Co- operative Land Owning Society, Batinda v. Union of India and Ors., [1991) 1SCC174, this Court held that "it is obvious on a plain reading of sub-s.(1) G s.28-A that it applies to only to those claimants who had failed to seek reference under s.18 of the Act. The redetermination has to be done by the Collector on the basis of the compensation awarded by the Court. In the reference under s.18 of the Act, an application in that behalf has to be made to the Collector within 30 days from the date of the award. Thus only those claimants who had failed to apply under s.18 are conferred with the BABUARAMv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] right to apply to the Collector for redetermination and not all those like A the petitioners who had not only sought a reference under s.18 but had also filed an appeal in the High Court'. This is also clear from a reading of the scheme of the Act in Part II and III and in particular the self-contained Code in s.28· A. It is already held that an interested person who received compensation without protest becomes an aggrieved person when another B person interested in ihe land covered by the same Notification under s.4(1) gets higher compensation for his land from the Civil Court. By. operation of the non-obstante clause within s.28A(l), the embargo created by s.18(1) and the second proviso to sub·s. (2) of s.31 is lifted and he has been given the right and remedy under s.28-A. But a person who received compensa· C tion under protest and sought and secured a reference but was unsuccessful or partially successful, does· come within the embargo· created by s.18(1) and the second proviso to sub-s. (2) of s.31 and the non-obstante clause in s.28A( 1) does not relieve him from it. Legislature made a discriminatory policy between the poor and inarticulate as one class of person to whom the benefit of s.28-A was to be extended and comparatively affluent who D had taken advantage of the reference under s.18 and the latter as a class to which the benefit of s.28-A was not extended. Otherwise, the pharageol- ogy of the language of the non-obstante clause would have been differently worded, i.e. "notwithstanding that they had not made in application to the Collector under s.18 or an appeal under s.54 or under Articles 132, 133, E 136 or unsuccessful etc.". Such is not the language. Transitional Provisions of s.30 of the Amendment Act itself discriminates among claimants, in payment of solatium in whose favour award was made by the Collector or court etc., as has already been made clear while dealing with the effect of sub-ss. (1) to (3) of s.30 in the earlier part of the judgment obviating the need for reiteration. The Parliament thereby made discrimination in pay· ment of compensation to persons though similarly situated t\l varied benefits of Amendment Act. Even payment of compensation under s.23(1) is varied, based on same quality of the land capable to fetch same price or the value of the land situated in close proximity and payment of market value is not uniform. The doctrine of res judicata under s.11 of C.P.C. G operates against such persons. Having pursued the remedy in a competent civil court and allowed the decree under s.26 or under s.54, to become final, it binds the parties and the State and operates as res judicata and he or they cannot fall back upon the right and remedy under. sub-s.(1) of s.28-A as the public policy envisaged is that such a party cannot agitate his H A right twice over. Sub-section (1) of s.28-A, therefore, by the non obstante clause made available the right and remedy to the poor and inarticulate persons interested in other lands covered by the same Notification under s.4(1) and made no application under s.18 to avail the right and remedy under s.28-(1). But those who sought and secured reference under s.18 be c the poor or others, and failed before the civil court or in appeal under s.54 or under Article 136 etc., the right and remedy provided by s.28A(l) is not available to him/them. In other words, the operation of s.28-A is confined to the award made in Part III only and not to the judgment or decree of the High Court or the appellate court under s.54 or of this court under Article 132, 133 or 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the unsuc- cessful interested persons who sought and failed in the reference under s.18 or in appeal under s.54 or under Article 136 etc., are not persons aggrieved under sub-s.(1) of s. 28-A, when other similar person had higher compensation by pursuing that remedy. Therefore, he or they, though interested in the land covered by the same Notification under s.4(1), are D not entitled to make an application/applications for redetermination under sub-s.(1) s.28-A. The next question is whether the denial of such right and remedy under sub-s.(1) of s.28-A violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is true that the legislature intended to relieve hardship to the poor, indigent and E inarticulate interested persons who generally failed to avail the reference under s.18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, s.28-A was enacted giving right and remedy for redetermination, when another person had got higher compensation under s.26 in excess of the compensation awarded under s.11. In other words, the statute makes him to be conscious of his _ F right even though the presumption that everyone knows law goes against him and failed to avail the right and remedy under s.18. Yet s.28-A gives the self-same relief. The class of similar persons who availed the right and remedy but were unsuccessful are treated as a distinct class. It by no means be said to be arbitrary as the classification is based on intelligible differen- G tia and bears reasonable relation to the object of according an another . opportunity. The legislature appears to have presumed that the same state of affairs continue to subsist among the poor and inarticulate persons and they generally fail to avail the right under sub-s.(1) of s.18 due to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of expropriation. It is already seen that the Parliament made conscious discrimination between the poor and inarticu- H late as a class and comparatively affluent as another class and conferred BABUARAMv. STATE(K. RAMASWAMY,J.] the rights under s.28-A in favour of the former. Discrimination is writ large A in s.30 of Transitional Provisions of Amendment Act which provided payment of solatium and additional compensation covered by different situations, though the persons interested are same class. Section 28A is jnst and fair and does not violate Art.14. The procedure, therefore, is just and fair and does not violate Art.21. However,. with a view to avoiding uncertainty and fluctuation, it would be appropriate that, the Collector, while paying compensation under s.31 should explain in vernacular language of the claimant, informing all persons interested in the compensation that they have a right to protest against the compensation determined under s.11 before receiving the same; C has right to seek reference in writing under s.18 to the civil court and that the application should be made expressing the specific objections in writing within the limitation prescribed under s.18. In case of his failure to avail of . the same, he would not be entitled to further right and remedy to seek higher compensation. In case the claimant to be illiterate, it should be D properly explained to him in his mother tongue. The statement made in this behalf by the collector should be in the mother tongue of the claimant. The Collector should append a certificate that it was truly, correctly and properly explained and obtain the signature or thumb impression in token thereof and 'this should be kept as part of the record of the award proceedings. He should also maintain a regular register in his office in the E serietum duly signed by him and sealed and be kept in the personal custody of the Collector. This would not only obviate the hardship to the interested persons but also prevent corrupt practices in fabricating the applications for reference after the bar of limitation. In this behalf, it is also necessary that the Collector/L.A.0. should also maintain another register for receipt of the applications under s.28-A indicating the date of its receip~ seal of the office and personal signature of the Collector/L.A.0. concerned and the receipt thereof duly communicated to the government or the authorised· officer in proviso to s.11 of the Act. The next question is .whether the Collector/L.A.0. on receipt of the G application under sub-s.(1) of s. 28-A is bound to redetermine the com- pensation while the award and decree under s.26 is pending consideration in the appeal iij the High Court or appellate forum. If he does so, whether award under s.28-A(2) is illegal? It is settled law that the decree of the trial Court gets merged in the decree of the appellate court which alone is H A executable. The finality of the determination of the compensation is at- tained with the decree of the appellate forum, be it the High Court or this Court. Take for instance that 'A', 'B' and 'C' are interested persons in the land notified under s.4( 1) and the compensation determined in the award under s.11 'A' received the compensation without protest. 'B' and 'C' c received the compensation under s.31 under protest and sought and secured reference under s.18. The court enhanced the compensation from the Collector's award of Rs.10,000 to Rs.20,000. 'B' did not file appeal under s.54 while 'C' filed the appeal. The High Court, suppose, further enhances the compensation to Rs. 25,000 or reduces the compensation to Rs. 15,000 per acre. 'A' is a person aggrieved only to the extent of the excess amount awarded either by the award and decree of the court under s.26 but he will not get the enhancement of further sum of Rs. 5,000 granted by the High Court in favour of 'C'. The decree of the High Court is the executable decree made in favour of 'C'. Unless redetermination is kept back till the appeal by the High Court is disposed of incongruity would emerge. Suppose the State filed appeal in this Court under Article 136 against the High Court decree and this court confirms the award of the Collector and sets aside the decree of civil court under s.26 and of the High Court under s.54. There is nothing left for redetermination. With a view to save 'A', or 'B' or the State from the consequences of such incongruous situations, the Collector/ L.A.0. should stay his hands in the matter of redetermination of compensation till the appeal is finally disposed of and he should redetermine the compensation only on the basis of the final judgment and decree of the appellate forum. Adoption of such course, would not merely avoid the chance element in the claimants getting the amounts of redetermined compensation but also avoids needless burden on public exchequer. As soon as the award of the civil court is carried in appeal, it becomes obligatory for the collector to keep the application/ap- plications for redetermination of compensation filed within limitation pending awaiting decision by the appellate forum and to redetermine the compensation on the basis of the final judgment and decree. Normally, the G L.A.0. would file the appeal against the enhanced compensation in a decree of either the civil court or the High Court and will know their pendency. In the case appeal filed by the interested persons, the latter should inform the Collector/L.A.0. of the pendency of appeal or otherwise comes to know of it should keep the applications for redetermination, H received under sub-s.(1) of s.28-A within limitation pendi~g, awaiting the BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] decision by the appellate court. Before proceeding with the determination, A he should obtain an affidavit from the party making the application under s.28A that no appeal against the award made under s.26 relied upon by him was filed or if had been filed was disposed of by the appellate court and to produce the certified copy of decree and judgment, if already is disposed of. Smt. K. Amareshwari, learned senior counsel appearing for the Union, contended that the beneficiary is a person interested under sub- s.(2) of s.28-A read with s.18 of the Act. An award when made by the Collector under sub-s.(2) of s.28-A redetermining the compensation, the appellant beneficiary, had not accepted the award and that, therefore, a C reference under s.28-A(3) read with s.18 was sought for and the Collector has illegally rejected it. When civil revision was filed, the High Court committed grievous error of law or jurisdiction in rejecting the revisions. According to her, the award made under s.11 was with the prior approval of the appropriate government or the authorised officer, while the award D under s.28-A(2) was without their approval. It was reopened in conse- quence to the award and decree of the court under s.26 against which the appellant being an interested person carried in appeal and the appeal is pending. The award under sub-s.(2) of s.28-A was not acceptable to the appellant and that, therefore, the appellant is an interested person to seek reference to assail the correctness of the award of the Collector. The E statutory change of the effect of the award under s.28-A(2) clothes the appellant with the right to seek reference under sub-s.(3) of s.28-A. The contention was forcibly resisted by the counsel for the respondent cpntend- ing that the award under s.11 is an offer made on behalf of the State. The appellant a beneficiary is bound by the offer made by the Collector on behalf of the beneficiary. The right to seek reference arises when the claimant does not accept the award and receives compensation under protest. The acceptance of the award without protest concludes the proceedings and binds the claimants. The non-acceptance keeps the award at large, subject to determination of compensation, on reference, under s.18 by the court, which alone is a decision and a decree which would bind G the claimant as well as the State. Against that decision, an interested person, i.e. the claimant as well as the beneficiary are given the right to file appeal against the decree and award under s.26 but that does not clothe either the State or the beneficiary to seek a reference under s.18. Though the Collector and the High Court had not considered the case from this perspective, for these reasons, the case does not warrant interference. Having given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions, we are of the view that the respondents are right in their contention. Award under dl is only an offer made by the Collector on behalf of the State and the State is bound by the offer. If the offer is accepted without protest and the claimant receives the compensation under s.31, the proceedings get concluded and no further steps need be taken under the Act. The claimant, if receives the compensation under protest and makes an applica- tion under s.18 in the prescribed manner within the limitation, the Collec- tor is enjoined to refer the objection under s.18 to the court and the controversy would be at large, subject to determination by the Court. The decision of the court is an award and decree under s.26 and is conclusive C between the parties subject to appeal under s.54 etc. Thereby the deter- mination of the compensation under s.26 even without acceptance binds the parties. The offer of the Collector being on behalf of the State and the beneficiary, the State does not get the right to seek a reference under s.18 against the award of the Collector. The beneficiary is only an interested person to adduce evidence in determining proper compensation. However, the Collector/L.A.O. is its/his agent and the acts of the agent binds the principal-beneficiary. The beneficiary does not stand on a higher footing than the State. This should not be understood to mean that the beneficiary has no right to appeal under s.54 against the award made under s.26 or further right to question the decree made in appeal before this court. No doubt s.28-A(2) speaks of interested persons and s.28-A{l) of person aggrieved. As interpreted by this court of the said expressions, the beneficiary is also an interested person to see that proper compensation is determined by the court, gets right to hearing before award is made and to carry in appeal under s.54 and has a right to appear before the Collector during award inquiry which right is only limited to participation in the inquiry and to adduce evidence or to file an appeal to determine just and proper compensation for the lands under acquisition. Sub-section (2) of s.28-A equally gives right of an opportunity of hearing to an interested person in the inquiry under s.28- A{l). The State and the beneficiary are persons interested in determination of just and proper compensation. G However, acceptance of the award under sub-s.(3) appears to us to be, an acceptance by the claimant and not by the beneficiary or the State, as the Collector acts on their behalf as an agent. It is true that the award under s.11 was made with prior approval of the State Government or its auihorised officer and that limitation expressly was not laid in s.28-A(2) H but the legal effect does not get altered by virtue of the above distinction BABUARAMv. STATE[K.RAMASWAMY,J.] or omission in s.29-A(2). The participation in the proceedings and right to A an opportunity of hearing including the right to adduce evidence by the beneficiary though the normal parlance carries with it the right to an appeal, in view of the scheme and the language of s.11 under s.28-A(2) does not clothe the beneficiary with a right to seek reference when he does not have such a right under s.18. The award of the Collector under B sub-s.(2) of s.28-A though as a post s.11 stage, nonetheless, the award under s.28- A(2) is award and partakes the same character as an offer and not a decision. Therefore, if the applicant accepts the award, the award becomes complete and acceptance brings the proceedings under s.28-A(l) to a terminus and the award binds the claimant and the Collector. On non acceptance and seeking a reference under s.28-A(3), the award made C under s.28-A(2) is at large subject to the decision by the court by applica- tion of ss.18 to 26 as is envisaged in s.28-A(3) itself. Section 2A of the local amendment made by the Haryana State Legislature adopting the Amend- ment made by the legislature of the Himachal Pradesh, manifests that despite the offer made by the Collector under s.11, the State is entitled to D ·seek reference under s.18 but the sub-s.(2) expressly excludes the right of reference under s.18 to the Union when the land was acqnired on behalf of the Union of India. Thereby it is clear that the right to such reference under s.28-A(3) by the beneficiary does not arise and stands excluded. Though not apposite, but we can have a clue from s.50 of the Act which prohibits reference at the behest of the beneficiary when the acquisition E was made on behalf of a local authority or a company. It is true that there arises an anomalous situation when an award is made under s.28-A(2) the Collector may award compensation in excess of the amount given under s.26, while the claimant was provided with remedy under s.23(3), ·the beneficiary or the State are left with no remedy under the Act However, F the Collector being an authority under the Act, the award of the Collector made under s.28A is not totally immune from jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, if required to be challenged by the State or the beneficiary, who have no other legal remedy in the matter. Thus considered, we are of the view that the beneficiary is not an aggrieved person and the Collector/L.A.0. has no power to make, at the instance of the beneficiary or the State to make a reference under sub-s.(3) of s.28-A read with s.18 subject to local amendments as was done by Haryana and the Himachal Pradesh Legislatures. This factor may be an H additional reason for the Collector to await the decision of the High Court or of this Court, when the award of the Court under s.26 was carried in appeal under s.54 or the latter under Article 136. Pending decision, he should stay his hands and take up the matter only after the decision is rendered by the High Court or by this Court. Yet, in view of the local c amendments to the Act like that made by Haryana Legislature, the State may seek reference under s.28-A(3), since s.18 gets attracted by operation of sub-s(2)-A of s.18 of Haryana local amendment. When the land was acquired for and on behalf of the State, it becomes also entitled to a reference under s.28-A(3) and all the provisions of ss.18 to 28 shall apply to such a reference. After becoming aware of the introduction of s.28-A, it would appear that several antedated applications under s.28-A or s.18 were made to use the award made under s.26 to get the benefit of s.28-A. Therefore, applica- tions made under s.28-A create a doubt whether the award made nnder s.26 which forms the basis for snch application had been secured on an D antedated or frandulent application purported to have been made under s.18, it shall be open to the State to have the matter thoroughly examined by an officer of the status of the District Collector/Commissioner Jo find the truth and such officer if one enquiry made with reference to the relevant records, finds that the applications under s.28A(l) are genuine and was/were made within limitation or the award under s.26 is founded on genuine application made on reference under s.18 within limitation. He would cause proper enquiry made so that the benefit of the award under s.26 may become unavailable for such spurious applicants who fraudulently or collusively made application under s.28-A. However, it has to be remem- bered by the Collector/L.A.O. deciding s.28A application that the compen- sation for land given in the award under s.26 or judgment in appeal should form the basis of redetermination of compensation for the applicants' land; the same amount of compensation need not be given where there are differences in nature and quality and situation of the comparable land. In the light of the above findings, our conclusion in each appeal/ap- G peal on their facts, would be as under : In Babua Ram's case, though we hold that the appellants are persons · aggrieved within the meaning of sub-s.(1) of s.28-A to avail the right under s.28-A(l) yet the High Court is right in directing that the Collector/L.A.O. H ought to have awaited the decision of the High Court. After the receipt of BABUARAM v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] the decision of the High Court, the Collector/L.A.O., after issuing notice A to the respondents and giving reasonable opportunity of hearing should enquire into (i) whether the application/applications was/were filed as written application/applications satisfying the requisites of s.28A and within limitation, and (ii) in case those findings recorded are in favour of the applicants, still the Collector should decide .whether the applicants are B persons interested in other lands covered by the same notification and the award made by the Collector under s.11. He should, therefore, enquire into the record findings in this behalf. In case, the Collector/L.A.O. records findings in favour of the claimants then he should consider whether enhan- cement of compensation can be made on the basis of the award under s.26 by the civil court or High Court and redetermine the same in accordance C with law. If he records findings in favour of the claimant/claimants, he shall make the award under sub-s.(2) of s.28-A and follow the procedure under· s.28-A and the reievant provisions in Part III in that behalf. The order of the High Court is set aside and writ petition is disposed of accordingly. The appeals, therefore, are allowed subject to the above directions. In Goa, Daman & Diu Industrial Devi. Corporation and State ap- peals, though we uphold the order of the High Court in its findings that the respondents are persons aggrieved, it is not the end of the journey. The direction issued in the impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Collector/L.A.O. He should issue notice to the applicant in each petition and give reasonable opportunity of being heard in per- son/counsel. He should consider whether the written applications satisfy the requirements of s.28A( 1) and were, in fact, filed within the limitation. Before proceeding as above, he should satisfy himself whether the award under s.26 relied upon in support of th~ application made under s.28A, F was not made on the basis of antedated or fraudulent application under s.18 or the applications made under s.28A(l) are antedated or fraudulently brought on record to claim the benefit under s.28(1). In case the findings are in favour of the claimant/claimants, then it is not necessary that there should be a second application, since the application already filed for G redetermination of the compensation after the earlier award and decree of the civil court under s.26 is sufficient compliance with the requirement of s.28-A(l). On the basis of the judgment and decree of the High Court which has become final i.e. later one, the Collector/L.A.0. should redeter- mine the compensation taking into account . all the relevant facts and circumstances enumerated in s.23 and s.28-A(l) and other related H A provisions applicable to the facts. In Union of India and connected appeals, though the appellants are the person interested under sub-s.(2) of s.28-A for the purpose of enabling them to adduce evidence in redetermination of the compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer acted as an agent on behalf of the State as well as the B beneficiary-Union of India. The appellant is bound by the offer made by the Collector/L.A.O. Therefore, the question of their accepting the award made under s.28-A(2) does not arise. It cannot seek reference under s.28-A(3) or under s.18 of the Act. However, it would he open to the appellant to challenge the correctness of the award made under s.28-A(2) C in a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227. However, in view of our finding that the Collector should await the final decision of the High Court or of this court, the Collector/L.A.O. committed grievous error of law in proceeding to make an award under s.28-A(Z). He should have awaited the decision of the High Court in that pending appeal. The order of the High D Court and that of the Collector are set aside. The cases are remitted to the Collector to keep them back pending disposal of appeal by the High Court. In case the decree of the High Court granting compen5ation is in excess of the award of the Collector/L.A.O. under s.11, then the Collector should enquire whether the application satisfy the requirements of s.28A and whether the application had been properly made and within limitation. In E case the finding/findings is/are in favour of the applicants, then he should redetermine the compensation on the basis of the award under s.26, and make the award under. s.28-A(2) and should follow the procedure prescribed in Part III. Therefore, the orders of the Collector and that of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in revisions are set aside and the F Collector shall follow the procedure indicated hereinbefore and decree as per the law and the judgment. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. All appeals in this judgment are disposed of accordingly and the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The SLP Nos. 17268/93, 21652/93, 17164/93 and 1670/94 have been delinked and the Registry is G directed to list these matters, separately, but immediately. U.R. Appeals disposed of.