Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
7. The appellant/complainant further expressed his apprehension of having no confidence and faith in any of the E three Judges of the Allahabad High Court as they could pass any order at the behest of Shri V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate. In sum and substance, the offending part of the allegation had been as under: (1) Akhlaq had good relations with Mr. Justice S.C. Nigam from the date since he was posted at Meerut on three terms, (2) that justice V.K. Verma had good intimacy with the family of the accused and the accused have made a clique alongwith one V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate of Allahabad High Court for procuring major bails illegally and with ulterior motives. Mr. Justice V.K. Verma has admitted bail to two accused namely Rizwan and Wasim illegally and with ulterior motives. The three Judges (V.K. Verma, BAL KISHAN GIRi v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. 8. S. CHAUHAN, J.] S.K. Jain and S.C. Nigam) may pass any order at the behest of V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate.
8. The allegations made by the appellant against the 3 judges of the High Court are too serious, scandalous and, admittedly, sufficient to undermine the majesty of law and dignity of court and that is too without any basis. The appellant is a practicing advocate. Plea taken by him that he had been misguided by other advocates is an afterthought. He must. have been fully aware of the consequences of what he has written. The averment to the effect that provisions of Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules had not been strictly observed remains insignificant as the appellant had not only admitted transcribing the complaint but also its contents. The appellant had submitted the reply to the show cause notice issued by the High Court of Allahabad on the judicial side. In such a fact-situation, even if, for the sake of argument it is accepted that the aforesaid Rules have not been complied with strictly, we are not willing to accept the case of the appellant for the reason that Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned senior counsel for the appellant could not show as to what was that material which was not considered by the High Court that had been put up as a defence by the appellant resulting in any miscarriage of justice.
9. This Court in M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1834, while examining a similar case observed : "The foundation of judicial system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the presiding judicial officers with impunity. It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society".
10. In Asharam M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 1151, while dealing with the issue, this Court observed as under: "The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration ofju~tice by vilification of judges. It is not that judges need be protected; judges may well take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected. "
11. In Jennison v. Baker [1972] 1 All E.R. 997, 1006, it was observed, "[T]he law should not be seen to sit by limply, 0 while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope"
12. The appellant has tendered an absolute and unconditional apology which has not been accepted by the High Court. The apology means a regretful acknowledge or excuse E for failure. An explanation offered to a person affected by one's action that no offence was intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any that may have been given .. Apology · should be unquestionable in sincerity. It should be tempered with a sense of genuine remorse and repentance, and not a F calculated strategy to avoid punishment
13. Clause 1 of Section 12 of the Act and Explanation attached thereto enables the court to remit the punishment awarded for committing the contempt of court on apology being G made to the satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or tempered at a belated stage if the accused makes it bona fide. A conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process of the court is to be dealt with iron hands and H no person can tinker with it to prevent, prejudice, obstructed or BAL KISHAN GIRi v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. 8. S. CHAUHAN, J.J interfere with the administration of justice. There can be cases where the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns only at a later stage. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or an appropriate punishment for an act which tantamounts to contempt of court. An apology can be accepted in case where the conduct for which the apology is given is s such that it can be "ignored without compromising the dignity of the court", or it is intended to be the evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow; there is no remorse; no regret; no repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an c apology can merely be termed as "paper apology".
14. In LO. Jaikwa/ v. State of UP., AIR 1984 SC 1374, this court noted that it cannot subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry- and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer. (See also: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2007) So an apology should not be "paper apology" and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it is one thing to 'say' sorry, it is another to 'feel' sorry.
15. An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at the earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the "contrition which is the essence of the purging of contempt". Of course, an apology must be offered and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. However, even if the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without real contrition and remorse, and finds that 1t was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward. (Vide: Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Anr., A AIR 1969 SC 189; Mulkh Raj v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C. Elumalai & Ors. v. A.G.L. lrudayaraj & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2214; and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2010) 11 SCC 493).
16. This Court has clearly laid down that an apology tendered is not to be accepted as a matter of course and the Court is not bound to accept the same. The court is competent to reject the apology and impose the punishment recording C reasons for the same. The use of insulting language does not absolve the contemnor on any count whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly intended to cause any insult, an apology, if tendered and lack penitence, regret or contrition, does not deserve to be accepted. (Vide: Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr., AIR 197\ SC D 71 O; The Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar etc., AIR 1976 SC 242; Asharam M. Jain v. A. T. Gupta & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1151 ; Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors., Al R 1992 SC 642; In Re: Sat'ljiv Datta, (1995) 3 SCC 619; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai E & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3016; and Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of UP., AIR 2011 SC 2275).
17. That the power to punish for contempt is a rare species of judicial power which is by the very nature calls for exercise F with great care and caution. Such power ought to be exercised only where "silence is no longer an option." (See: In re: S. Mulgaokar AIR 1978 SC 727; H.G. Rangangoud v. Mis State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 490; Maninderjit Singh Bittav. Union of G India & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 273; T. C. Gupta & Anr. v. Hari Om Prakash & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 658; and Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of UP. through District Judge, (2013) 14 SCC 127) Power of courts to punish for contempt is to secure public BAL KISHAN GIRi v. STATE OF U.P. [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.] respect and confidence in judicial process. Thus, it is a necessary incident to every court of justice.
18. Being a member of the Bar, it ·was his duty not to demean and disgrace the majesty of justice dispensed by a court of law. It is a oase where insinuation of bias and predetermined mind has been leveled by a practicing lawyer against three judges of the High Court. Such casting of bald, oblique, unsubstantiated aspersions against the judges of High Court not only causes agony and anguish to the judges concerned but also shakes the confidence of the public in the judiciary in its function of dispensation of justice. The judicial process is based on probity, fairness and impartiality which is unimpeachable. Such an act especially by members of Bar who are another cog in the wheel of justice is highly reprehensible and deeply regretted. Absence of motivation is no excuse.
19. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not committed any error in not accepting the appellant's apology since the same is not bona fide. There might have been an inner impulse of outburst as the appellant alleges that his nephew had been murdered, but that is no excuse for a practicing lawyer to raise fingers against the court.
20. Section 12(1) of the Act provides that if the court is satisfied that contempt of court has been committeq, it may punish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both. Section 12(2) further provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it." Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the court is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.
21. Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- im posed on the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and order, is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is directed to deposit the said fine forthwith.
22. We find no force in the appeal which is accordingly 8 dismissed. The appellant must surrender to serve out of the sentence forthwith, failing which, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, would secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut, for information C and 1<ompliance. Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.