Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. We have no hesitation to hold that the Division Bench was entirely wrong in interfering with the dismissal of the writ petition, as ordered by the Single Judge.
11. It is noted from the judgment and order of the Single Judge that wide publicity had been given by IBA as well as by BoI through local and national newspapers and also through its branches that employees, who are otherwise eligible, may opt for the pension scheme by 30th October, 2010. Such recording was made on perusal of the counter affidavit of BoI to the writ petition of the first appellant. It has not been shown by the first respondent that the contents of the counter affidavit, filed by BoI, either did not contain any such material or that even if it did contain such material, the same did not amount to wide publicity.
12. Our attention has been invited by learned counsel appearing for the appellants to a decision of this Court in Calcutta Port Trust and Ors. vs. Anadi Kumar Das (Captain) and Ors.7, in particular to paragraph 23 thereof, reading as follows: (2014) 3 SCC 617 [2025] 4 S.C.R. Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr. “23. We would like to observe that whenever an employer introduces the pension scheme or makes the same applicable to retired employees and gives them opportunity to exercise option, the circulars/instructions issued for that purpose should either be communicated to the retirees or made known to them by some reasonable mode. Mere display of such notice/instructions on the notice board of the head office cannot be treated as an intimation thereof to the retired employees/officers. The employer cannot presume that all the retirees have settled in the city where the head office is located. If the employees belong to the services of the Central Government or its agencies/instrumentalities, they are likely to settle in their native places which may be far away from the seat of the Government or head office of the establishment or organisation. The retirees are not expected to frequently travel from their native places to the seat of the Government or head office to know about additional benefits, if any, extended by the Government or their establishment/organisation and it is the duty of the employer to adopt a suitable mechanism for communicating the decision to the retired employees so as to enable them to exercise option. This could be done either by publishing a notice in the newspaper about which the retirees are told at the time of their retirement or by sending copies of the circulars/instructions to the retirees or by sending a copy thereof to the association of the employees and/or officers with a direction to them to circulate the same among the retirees concerned. By taking advantage of the modern technology, the employer can also display the circulars/instructions on a designated website about which prior information is made available to the employees at the time of their retirement. If one of these modes is not adopted, the retired employees can legitimately complain that they have been denied right to exercise the option and can seek intervention of the court.”
13. In the absence of the first respondent proving to the contrary, we are left with no option but to hold that BoI did observe the aforesaid directions in letter and spirit and spared no effort to make it known to all the retired employees, eligible to opt for the pension scheme, 126 that they would be having the window of opportunity to so opt by submitting the requisite forms by 30th October, 2010.
14. It is the admitted case of the first respondent that he had returned to India from the United States of America on 1st September, 2010. However, he was not diligent enough to make himself aware of the developments touching his interest while he was abroad. The bogey of hospitalisation raised by the first respondent, and that too for a short period of four days between 3rd October and 7th October, 2010, was not such so as to overlook his recalcitrance in not acting with intent and purpose within the period made available by the said circular.
15. The Division Bench referred to the beneficial nature of the policy to grant relief to the first respondent. Whenever a policy is formulated, which is beneficial in nature for the subjects to be governed thereby but, at the same time, prescribes a time limit for the subjects to act, it is not and cannot be the law that the proposed benefits can be availed of by a subject beyond the stipulated period and at any time in future suiting his convenience.
16. Almost half a century back, this Court in Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana8 had sounded a word of caution as follows: “9. … It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. …”
17. In the present case, after the first respondent did not avail the opportunity to exercise option by 30th October, 2010, there was no occasion for denial or deprivation of a legal right of the first respondent by the appellants. The harm or loss arising out of failure of the first respondent to opt for the pension scheme was not wrongful in the eye of law since it is he who had to be blamed for the situation where he found himself. The first respondent had neither sustained any injury to any legally protected interest nor had he been subjected to (1977) 1 SCC 486 [2025] 4 S.C.R. Bank of India & Ors. v. Muthyala Saibaba Suryanarayana Murthy & Anr. a legal wrong. He did not suffer a legal grievance and had no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Thus, not having a legally protected right which could have been judicially enforced by seeking a mandamus, the writ petition of the first respondent was plainly not maintainable and, thus, the Single Judge rightly dismissed the same.
18. The Division Bench, in course of its interference with the order dismissing the writ petition, failed to realise that in exercise of writ powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the high courts of the country do not come to the aid of the tardy, the indolent, and the lethargic. This golden truth has to borne in mind by all courts exercising high prerogative writ jurisdiction. While mandamus will issue to reach injustice, wherever found, it is equally true that exercise of discretion should not unnecessarily be coloured by considerations of sympathy or grace or compassion or charity. These are beyond the scope of the high courts’ writ powers. In cases such as these, where acceptable justification for the failure to act with expedition is not proffered, the high courts should stay at a distance.
19. The Division Bench should have also done well to remember that considerations of sympathy, grace, charity, or compassion do not have any place where a subject is called upon to exercise his option upon a settlement executed by and between the parties, one of which represents the subject himself, and such settlement is binding on the parties during its validity. If belated options are to be accepted, it would bring in its train chaos, confusion and public inconvenience without there being any end in sight and unsettle the very settlement reached by and between the parties which is the foundation of the rights of the subjects.
20. Since it had not been shown to the High Court that the said circular was not widely published and, therefore, opening up a window of opportunity for submission of options between 1st September and 30th October, 2010 was nothing more than a mere lip service, no case for interference had been set up by the first respondent either.
21. Also, there being no unreasonableness or arbitrariness in the process of decision making adopted by the appellants, the writ petition rightly came to be dismissed and there was absolutely no occasion for the Division Bench to interfere and allow the writ appeal of the first respondent. 128
22. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated 7th March, 2024 is set aside and the judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 22nd November, 2023 affirmed, with the result that the writ petition of the first respondent on the file of the High Court shall stand dismissed. Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain