BARADAKANTA MISHRA versus THE REGISTRAR OF ORISSA HIGH COURT & ANR.

BARADAKANTA MISHRA v. THE REGISTRAR OF ORISSA ffiGH COURT & ANR. November 19, 1973 [A. N. llAY, C.J., D. G. PALEKAR, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWAT! AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ) Contempt of Courts Ac~ 1971 (17 of 1971)-Ss. 2(c)(iii) & 13-Scope of- Contempt of Court-Djsciplinary control over Subordinate judiciary-Wlien Hlfh. Court functions in a disciplinary capacity it doe1 so in furtherance of admlnl1- tration of justice-What amounts to-Attack on the administrative act of a fudge, if amounts to contempi-Administration of justice meanltig and scope· of. The appellant, a judicial officer, was convicted and sentenced under the Con- tempt of Courts Act, 1971, by a Full Bench of the Orissa Hish Court Registrar of Orissa High Court v. Bardt>kanta Mishra & Ors. I.L.R. [1973] Cuttack 134.

The appellant's career ·as a judicial officer was far from satisfactory. When ha was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge he showed FOSS in.. discipline and committed grave judicial misdemeanour. The contempt proceed· iogs. arose out of the representation he made to the Governor for cancell.ina: the order of suspension passed against him by the Hish Court and th~ aUcsation he made in a memorandum of appeal he had filed· earlier in the SUpreme Court. In bis representation to the Governor the appellant J;nade false insinuations th.at the Governor cancelled the previous disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground that the same was vitiated a• the Hish Court prejudged the matter 1Dd the government set aside the punishment because three of the judges were biased and were prejudiced against him, that the proceeding involved the Government in heavy expenses on account of the -'palpably incorrect views of the Hiah. Court", that the High Court did not gracefully accept the Govemment'1 order cancelling his demotion, that the High Court resorted to "'subterfuge» to counterw act the said decision of the government by taking a novel step and that the · High .Court's action suffered from patent malafides. He stated that the· other judges had no independent judgment of their own and were infiuenced by the Chief Justice to take a view different from what they had already taken and characterised the High Court as an "engine of oppression.. and his order of suspension aS ·''mysterious''. In another representation made to the Governor tl1e appeliant alleged that the High Court on the administrative side was seriously prejudiced and biased against him and it acted as if the charges stood established requiring extreme punishm~nt and as such justice may not be meted out to ·him by the High Court, if it conducted the departmental inquiry. He also stated that be considered it risky to submit his explanation to the High .C.ourt and that the High Court in the best interests of justice, should not inquite into these charses against him.

He suggested that "the Court was not in a position to weiSh the evidence and consider the materials on record and impose a sentence commensu· rate with his delinquency." The ac.tion taken by the High Court was branded as "unusual". A copy of this representation was sent to the High.- Court with the remark that since the aigh Court was likely to withhold the representation it was submitted direct to the Governor. Jn the memo of appeal Sled in the Supreme Court, the appellant alleged bias and prejudice aplnSt the Hfjh Court and its Chief Justice. He took the plea that the Hlsh Court had become dis- qualified to deal with the case and expressed the v~w that "'the judaes of the High Court had fallen from the path of rectitude and were vindictive'' and had decided to impose substantive sentenec and that "they were not in a position to mete even-handed justice".

In appeal to this Court. it was contended : (i) that tbe passaa:cs about which the ~omplaint was made did not amount to contempt of court aince they did· not purport to criticize any 'judicial' act! of the judges and criticism of the administrative acts of the High Court even in vilificatory terms did not amount c

II B. K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Palekar, 1.) to contempt of court, and (ii) ·that the acts complained of were in the course"' ….. of the appellant challenging his suspension and holding of disciplinary proceed· ings, in an appeal or representation to the Governor from the orders of the Hfah Court and he gave expression to bis grievance or had otherwise acted not with a view to malign the court ot1 in defiance of it but with the sole object of obtain .. ing the reversal of the orders passed by the High Court against him. HELD : The imputations have grossly vilified the Hi~ Court tending to uffect substantially administration of justice and, therefore, ' the appellant was rightly conVicted of the offence of criminal contempt.

[304FJ Ci) Proceedings in contempt are always with reference to administration of justice. All the three sub-clauses of s. 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, define contempt in terms of obstruction or interference with administration of justice and scandalisation within the· meaning of sub-elauSe ( 1) must be in· respect of the court or the Judge with reference to administration of justice·. [297C·Dl

Debi Prasad Shanna v. The King-Emperor. 70 Indian Appeals, 216, referred to. (a) The question- ·whether contemptuous imputations made with referenCe to the: administrative acts of the High Court amount to i;ontempt of court will depend upon whether the imputations affect the_ administration of justice. Thi.s is .the basis on which the contempt is punished and must· afford the neceMa:ry ksl.

1298El (b) The mere functions of adjudication between the parties is not the Whole of administration of justice for any court. The presiding judge of a Court embodies in himself the Court and when engaged in the task. Of administering justice is assisted by a· complement of clerks and ministerial officers. The acts in which they are engaged are acts in aid of administration of justice. There~

fore, when the Chief Justice appoints ministerial officers and assumes disciplinary control over then1, that is a {Unction which. though described as administrative, i'i really in the course of admini~tration of justice. Judicial administratioi:,i. Is_ an integrated function of Judge and cannot suffer any dissection so far as. mainte- nance of high standards of rectitude in judicial administration is concerned, The whole set up of a court is for the purpose of administration of justice and the control which the judge exercises over·! bis assistants bas also the object of main,~ taining the purity of administration of justice. (298F-H; 299A] (c) The disciplinary control over the misdemeanour of the subordinate judi~ ciary in their judicial ad1ninistration is a function which the High Court must exercise in the interest of administration of justice. It is a function which is essential for the administration of justice in the wide connotation it has received and, therefore, when the High Court functions in a disciplinary capacity, it only does so in_ furtherance of administration of justice. It is as important for the superior court to be vigilant about the conduct and behaviour of the subordi- nate judge as it is to administer the law, becaUSc both functions are essential for administration of justice. The Judge of the superior court in whom this dlsclpli- nary control is vested functions as much as a Judge in sucb matters as when he hears and disposes of cases before him. [300E: 2991?1

(d) What is commonly described as an administrative function bas been, when vested in the High Court, consistently regarded by statutes as a function in the administration of justice. [299F-0]

Letters Patent for the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras Cl. 8; Tligh Courts Act, 1861, s. 9; ihe Government of India Act, 1935, Ss. 223, 224; Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 225, 227 235; State of West Bengal v. Nrfpe11dra Nath Bagclti [1966] l S.C.~. 771 referred to.

(e) Thus the courts of justice in a State from the highest.Jo the lowest are by their constitution entn1sted with functio11s directly connected with the ·admi· nistration of justice and it is the expectation and confidence of. all those who have or likely to have business there that the courts perform alt their functions [ 1974] 2 S.C.R.

on a high level of r;ctitude without fear or favour, affection or ill·will. And, it in this traditional confidence in the courts that justice will be administered in them which is '"ought to be protected by proceedings in conten1pt. [300F·G]

Rex v. Alfnon [1765] Wilmot's Notes of Opinions 243, referred to. (f) Scandalisation of the court is a species of contempt and may take 1evc· ral forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When procccdin.c.s in conten1pt are taken for such vilification the question which the court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a Judge or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If-the latter, the Judge is left to this private rcn1e- dies and the court has no pcwer to commit for contempt. If the former, the court will proceed tO exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cr.~es which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will hnve 11lso to consider the degree of harm caused, as affecting administration of justice ;i,nd if it is sJight und beneath notice, courts will not punish for conten1pt. This salutary practice is adopted by s. 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. If the ·attack on the Judge· functioning as a Judge substantially affe.cb administra- tion of justice it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt, and it matters not whether such an attack is based on what a Judge is ()]leged to have done in the exercise of his 'administrative' responsibilities. A Judge's functions

may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of administration of justice, [301D-F] Queen v. Gray, [1900] (2) Queen's Bench, 36, at page 40, ·referred to. (g) "Judicial capacity" is an ambivalent term which means "capacity of -or proper to a Judge" and is capable of taking in all functional capaciti_es of a Judge whether administrative, adjudicatory or any other-; eecessary for·the admi- nistration of justic~ There- is ITD warrant for the narrow view that the offence of .scaedamafiOn of the court takes place only when the imputation haS refe- rence to the adjudicatory functions of a Judge in the seat of justice. [3020] Rex v. Almon [1765] Wiimot's Notes of Opinion 243; Moil Lal Gfto1e and- Othas, XLV-Calcutta, 169, The State of Bombay v. Mr. P. A.I.R, Bombay, 182, Debi Prasad Shanna v. The King En1peror, 10, IndiiJ1 Appeals, 216, Spt'cial Reference fro1n the Bahania Islands, A. C, 138 at 144, QueelZ v. Gr.ay fl900J 2 Q.B. 36, referred to.

Bra~l1111a Prakash Sharn1a and 01!1c1:s v. Tl/1e State of Utta1 Pradesh, {1953] S.C.R. 1169. Gobi11cl Ram v. State of Maharashtra. [1971] 1 S.C.C. 740 and Sta1t1 v. The Editors and Publishers of Easterll Tilnes and Pra/atantra, A.I.R.

1952 Orissa, 318, held inapplicable. (ii) If in fact the language used amounts to contempt of court it will become punishable as criminal contempt. The right of appeal doeS not give the right

to commit contempt of court nor can it be used as a cover to brfug the autho· rity of the High Court into disrespect and disregard. [~98C~DJ Jugal Kishorc v. Sita1narf:i Central Co.op, Bank. AIR 1967 S.C. 1494

referred lo. Per Bhagwati & Krishna Iyer, JJ : (Concurring in ultimate decision) : The dilemma of the law of contempt arises because of the constitutional need to balance two great but occasionally conflicting principle!-4freedom of expression and fair and fearless justice. It is a moot point whether we should still be

bound to the regal moorings of-Rex v. Almon, [306E] <I) The emphasis in Ss. 2(c), 3 and 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1971, to the interference with the course of justice or obstruction of the adminis- tration of iustice or scandalising or lowering the authority of tho Court-not the Judge-highlights the judicial area as entitled to inviolability and suggests a functional rather than a personal or 'institutional' immunity. The unique

power to punish .for contempt of itself inheres in ·a Court qua court, In its essential role of dispenser of public justice. The phraseologlcal image projected c f ff B. K. l\llSHRA v. REG. ORIS_SA HIGH COUR:r (Pa/ekar, I.)

by the catena of expressions in the Act, the very conspectus of the statuti:>ry provisions and the ethos and raison d'etre of#the jurisdiction point to thd conclu- sion that the text of the Act must take its colour from the general context and confine the contempt power to the judicial-cum-para-judicial areas, including

such administrative functions as are intimately associated with the exercise of judicial power. In short the accent is on the functional pe[s:onality which b pivotal to securing justice to the people. Purely administrative acts like recruit- c

n1cnts, transfers and postings, routine disciplinary action agaim:t subordinate staff,. executive acts in running the establishment and ministerial business .ancil- lary to office-keeping-these are common to all departments in the public sector and merely because they relate to the judicial \Ving of government cannot enjoy a higher immunity from criticism. The quintessence of the contempt· power is protection of the public, not judicial personnel. If the slant on judicialisation as a functional Jimitation on the contempt jurisdiction is accepted, it must ex- clude from its ambit interference with purely administrative acts of courts and non-judicial functions of judges. This dichotomy is implicit in the 'decided cases. To tre"t as the High Court has done. "the image and personality of the High Court as an integrated one'' and to hold that every shadow that darkens it is contempt is to forget life, reason and political progress. The basic "'public

duty" of a Judge in his ''judicial capacity'" is to dispense public justice in Court ·and anyone who obstructs or interferes in this area does so at his peril. Like- wise, personal" behaviour of judicial pen1onnel, if criticised severally or even sinisterly. cannot be countered by the weapon of the contempt of court. [309C-E; 3l~A·FJ

The paramount but restrictive jurisdiction to protect the public: against substantial interference with the stream of justice CaDJlot be pol1uted or diffused into an inumidatory power for the judges to strike at

adve~e comments on adniinistrative, legislative (as under articles 225, 226 and 227) and extra~judicial acts. Comriionsense and principle can certainly accept a valid_ administrative aria so closely integrated with court work as to be stamped with judicial -character such as constitution pf benches, transfer of cases, issue of administrative direc- tions regarding submission of findiugs or disposal of cases by subordinate courts E ' and the like. Not everything covered by art. 225, 227 and 235 will be of this , texture. Thus __ even_though Judges and courts have diverse duties functionally -~-an<l'histOrically and jurisprudentially, the-value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be cardoned _off from public molestation is judicial.

Vicious criticism of personal and administrative acts of Judges may indire<;tty mar their image and weaken the confidence of the public in the judi- ciary but the countervailing good, not merely of- free speech but also of greater raith generated by exposure to the actinic light of bona fide even if rnargina11y overzealous, criticism cannot be over-looked.

[315B:E] In the instant case the suspension of the District Judge was so woven into and integrally c6nnected· with the administration of justice that it can be regarded as not purely an administrative act but a para-judicial function. The appeal

was against th! suspension which was a preliminary to contemplated discipli- nary_ action which was against the appellant in his judicial capacity for acts of judicial misconduct. The control was, therefore, judicial and hence the un- bridled attack on the High Court for the step was punishable as contempt. The impugned conduct of the contemner was qua Judge and the evil criticism was of a supervisory act of the High Court. [3150-H]

(ii) A large margin. must be allowed for allegations in remedial representa- _tion; but extravagance forfeits the protection- of good faith. [315H] .In the matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands, [1893) A.C. 139· 149· Debi PraspJ Sharma v. The King Emperor, [1942] 70 I.A. 216,

Ka)'.iath 'namodaran v. lnduchoodan, A.I.R. 1961 Keraia 321, K. L. Gaubd.1 case, LL.R. [1942) Lah.411, 419, Rex v. B. S. NpYyar, A.LR. 1950.AU. 549: 551: 555. In re S. B. Sarbad/Jicary, [1906] 34 XX I.A. 41, Brahma Prakash 'Sharmti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1169. State v. N. NaT?amani, · A.LR. 1959 Pat. 373 and In the mat/er of an Advocate of Allahabad, A.T.R. I 935 All. l. referred to.

[ 1974 J 2 S.C.ll. Remedial process cannot be a mask· to malian a judae. Jrrelevant or un- varnished imputations under the pretext of grounds of appeal amount of foul play and perversion of the legal process.

In the instant case the appellant, a senior officer who professionally weighs his thoughts and words bas no justifica- tion for the immoderate abuse he has resorted to. In this sector even truth is no defence, as in the case of criminal insult-in the latter because it may produce violent breaches and is forbidden in the name of public peace, and in' the former it may demoralise the community about courts and is forbidden in the interest of public justice as contempt of court. The Court being the guardian of the people's rights, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

[317C-E; 318H] State of Uttar P1·ades/J v. Sllyani Sunder Lal, A.LR. 1954 All. 308, Rex v. R. S. Nayyar, A.I.R. 1950 All. 549; SS4, State of Madhya Pradesh v. l/Jnll Wtanker, [1959]

S.C.R. 1367; Govind Ram v. Stat< of MahartUhtro, (1972] I S.C.C. 740, Swamamayi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak, A.J.R. 1959 Orissa 89, Quintin Hogg, 1968 2 W.L.R. 1204; 1206-7, C. K. l)apht!iry v. 0. P. Gupta, Al.R. 1971 S.C. 1132-1141 para 52, R v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, Sp•cial R<ference No. 1 of 1964. [19651 I S.C.R. 413; SOI; referred to. (iii) Jn sum, the key note word is 'justice' not 'judge'i the key note thou1ht is unobstructed public justice, not the self defence of a judge; the comer.atone of the contempt law is the accommodation of two constitutional value&-the right of free speech and the right to independent justice. The ignition of conr tempt action should be substantial and mala fide interference with fearless judi- cial action, not fair comment or triYial reftections on the judicial process and personnel.

[319EJ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN: Criminal Appeals Nos. 41 and 77 of 1973. Appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 from the Judgment and Order dated the 5th February, 1973 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1972.

A. K. Sen, G. L. Mukhoty and C. S. S. Rao, for the appellant (in Cr.A. 41/73). c G. Rath, and B. Parthasarathy, for the appellant (In Cr. A. 77/73). F. S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General, B. M. Patnaik aild Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 (in Cr. A. 41173) and respondent No. 2 (in Cr. A. 77/73).

G. Rath and u. P. Singh, for respondent No. 2 (in Cr. A. 41/73). A. K. Sen and C. S. S. Rao, for respondent No. 1 (in Cr. A. 77/73), The Judgment of the Court were delivered by PALEKAR, J.-This is (Criminal Appeal No. 41

of 1973) an appeal by one Baradakanta Mishra from bis con'1ction and sentence under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Full Bench of jive Judges of the Orissa High Court. The Judgment is reported in I.L.R. , [1973] Cuttack, 134 (ReKistrar of the Orissa High Court v. Baradakanta Mishra and Ors.).

The appellant started his career as ai Munsit in 1947. His career as a Judicial Officer was far from. satisfactory. In 1956 he was pro- moted on trial basis to the rank of a Sub-Judge with the observation. !I

••• •. B. E. MISHB;A v. R.BG. OR.ISSA HIGH COUJ.T (Palekar, J.) that it he was :ftound incompetent, suitable action would be taken. In – due course, he was confirmed as a Subordinate Judge. On April, 2, 1962 he was promoted, again on, trial basis, to the rank of Additio-1 District Magistrate <Judicjal) which is. a post in the cadre of the ·Orilea Superior Judicial Service (Junior Branch). As his work was fauni unsatisfactory, he was reverted to his substantive post of a Subordinate Judge on January 4, 1963 .. The order of reversion was challenged by him in a Writ Petition which was dismissed by a Bench of Ahmad, C.J. and Barman, J. The case is reported in [I.L.R.] 1966, Cuttack, 503. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismiissed on February 6, 1967. While working as a Subordinate Judge, after reversion, he was suspended from service from 15th May, 1964 to 9th April>' 1967 during the pendency of a. disciplinary proceeding against him. That proceeding ended in a light punishment of two of his increments being stopped. From the above order of punishment, the appellant filed on l'b-10-1967 an appeal to .the State Government. The State Government by its order dated 15-7-1970 allowed the appeal on the ground that the Public Service Commission. had not been· consulted by the High Court belbre imposing the punishment, and that tile Cbarg~Sheet .erved on the appellant having indicated the proposed punishment vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. After the case was 9Cllt back to the High Court the charges which had been earlier esta- blished, were framed again and served on him on 13-2-1971 and we are infolllll:d that the proceeding is still pending.

In the meantime, it appears, he was promoted to the post of the. Additional District Magistrate in February, 1968 though Ille High Court was of opinion that he was unbalanced, <jll1ll'I'elsome, recltle!18 and indisciplined. The aigh Colll't $J1ecili.cally observed that though the appellant suffered fwm tliese defects, be was sincere and. hard- wor'king and the other o.1lieers who .. bad superseded him as Additional · Djstrict Magistrates were not much better. The promotion was lllllde on trial basis for a period of ooe year with the observation that if dur- ing that period his work was found to be unsatisfactory, he woU!d 'be reverted to the rank of Sub-Judge.

In that year the High Court had to :lace an abnormal situation by tbci retirement of many District Judges on account of the decision of lhe Government reducing the age of retirement from 58 to '55 yeal'I. Many vacancies occurred and the appellant was then promot- ed as an Additional District and Sessions Judge on trial basis for six months in July, 1968. In January, 1969 he was allowed to continue on a temporary ·basis till further orders subject to further review of hie work at 11be time of confirmation. It is worthy o~ note that this decillion to continue was taken on the report of the pre9Cllt Chilli' Justice G. K. Misra who was at that time the Administtat.ive Ju!lae. On May 12, 1969 his services were placed at the dispasa! of the Government in the Law Department, who appointed hlllll as Joint Secretary, Law, till October 12, 1969. From October 13, 1969 .to Elecember 4, 1970 be was appomted by the Government as the Com· missioner of Endowments. The Government was thoroughly diwatis, lied with his work and on December 5, 1970 his services were replaced at the disposal of the High Court. The appellant went on leave. [ 1974 J 2 s.c.R.

On his return to the Judicial cadre, he functioned as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack till July 14, 197.1 when he was posted to act as District and Sessions Judge for 12 days in the tem- porary leave vacancy of the permanent District Judge Mr. P. K. Mohanty. . When he was thus acting as District and Sessions Judge for a short period by way of stop-gap arrangement, the High Court placed several restrictions on his administrative pOWCrs.

In the brief .period that he was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack, the appellant showed gross indiscipline by defying a request made by the District, Jud~ in due course of ad- ministration. He also committed a grave judicial misdemeanour. He heard an appeal and posted it for judgment on June 22, 197 l. The judgment was delivered on that date and the appeal was dismilsed. The Order-Sheets of the judgment were signed by the appellant and the judgment was duly sealed. Later in the day, however, the appel- lant scored through hi.s signatures both in the Order-Sheet and in the judgment and returned the ~ecord of the appeal to the District Judge for disposal by making a false statement that the judgment had not been delivered and that the parties being known to him it was not desirable that he should further hear the appeal, after taking additional evidence for which a petition liad been filed.

This was something quite extraordinary from a Judge of the appellant's standing. When these matters were brought to the notice of the High Court the Regis. trar by Order of the High Court recomlilended to the Government that the appellant be reverted to the poSt o~ the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial). There were already three departmental pro- ceedings pending against the appellant and he had also been convicted in a contempt case. The High Court expressly informed the Govern- ment that these four matters had not been taken into consideration in recommending his reversion and that his reversion was sofoly due to the fact that his work was found unsatisfactory. The recommendation was accepted by the Government who on September 1, 1971 reverted the appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate. On September 10, 1971 .the appellant made a representation to the Chief Minister praying fan the withdrawal of the order of reversion and, if necessary, to suspend him after drawing up a regular depart- mental proceeding. The representation was forwarded to the Govern- ment with the comments of the High Court.

Something unusual happened. Without anv further consultation with the High Court, the Governor cancelled the .reversion order by notification dated March 21, 1972 and on the same day the Chief Minister wrote a confidential D.O. to the Chief Justice by name ex- plaining the circumstances under which the reversion order w2s can- celled. The Chief Minister appeared to rely upon a decision of ~ Orissa High Court which had no application to the facts of thJ.S

particular case. But any way, it would ~ppear that by reason of the Order dated March 21, 1972 the revemon of tho appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrat~. stood ~an~elled and. he

continued to act in the post of the Add1t10nal District & Sessions Judge. Cuttack. c c B. K. MISHRA v. RBG. OR!SSA HIGH COURT (Palekar, J.) 289· The D.O. letter of the Chief Minister remained unopened till the retum of the Chief Justice from New Delhi where he had gone to attend the Chiof JusUcea Conference. It was opened by the Chief Justice on return on March 26, 1972. But in the

meantime the appellant, who had gone on leave, having known about the order passed on March 21, 1972 asked for his posting. The rules required that on return from leave he should produce a medical certificate and he was, accordingly directed to pi:oduce one,

On March 28, .1972 the Chief Justice placed the letter of tho Chief Minister for consideration be!ore the Full Court. The Full Court took the decision to start a disciplinary .proceeding against the appcl· !ant and, pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their powers under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30, 1972 the appellant was placed under suspension and his headguarters were fixed at Cut(ack.

The present contempt proceedings arise out of events which took place alter the suspension order. On receiving the suspension order the appellant addressed by letter an appeal to the Governor of Orissa for cancelling the ord.er of suspension and for postin!! him directly under the Government That is Annexure 8. As the High Court was of the view that no appeal lay .from an order of suspension pend· ing disciplinary charges, it did not forward the appeal to the Governor. In fact on April 28, 1972 the Registrar of .the High Court intimated the State Government that the appeal filed by the appellant to the Govern9r had been withheld by the, High Court as no such appeal lies against the order of suspension penlling disciplinary proceedings. The appellant was also intimated accordingly,

On April 29., Hl72 charges in the disciplinary proceeding were framed by the High Court and commnnicated tci the appellant and the appeltant was directed 16 llre his reply to the charges by a, certain date. On May 14; 1972 the appellant wrote three letters. One was. to the Registrar and is Annexure 13. By this letter the appellant inti· mated that he had moved the Governor to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to the Administrative Tribunal and that he would take all other alternative steps-administrative and judicial-to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. The second letter was addressed to the Governor and is Annexure 15. It purports to be a representation with a prayer to direct the High Court to forward' the appeal withheld by it. There was a third letter of the same date addressed directly to the Governor purporting to be a representation. That is Annexure 16. The prayer was that the departmental pro· ceedings be reterred to the Administrative Tribunal. A copv of this letter was sent to the Registrar of the High Court with)he following· remark:

"As the Honourable C9urt are likely to withhold such petitions, this is submitted direct with copy to the Honour- able Court for information. Honourable Court may oo pleased to send their comments on this petition to the

Governor." 2'90 [ 1974 J 2 s.c.R. On May 22, 1972 the appellant addressed a Jetter (Annexure 14) t? the Registrar intimating him that he would not submit any expl.ana· llon to the charges framed against him until his representation to the Governor waa disposed of. He also stated therein that he may file a writ application for the purpose and would take· the matter to the Supreme Court, if necessary. He also stated that he cannot wait for the permission of the High Court ~ leaving the Headquarters. It is the contents of these letters on which a show-cause notice 'for contempt was issued to the appellant under the orders of the Full Court on July 3, 1972.

On 27·7-1972 the appellant filed his preliminary objection to the show.cause notice challcngin,g its maintainability on the ground that whatever he had said had no reference to the judicial fUDctlon• of any Judge of the Hlib Court Biid, ~fore, no contempt proceedlnp would lie. He preued for a decision on the point. When the matter came before a Division Bench on 3·8·1972 the appellant waa directed to file his full reply to the show.cause notice. Accordlnily, It was filed on 7-8-1972 and the appe.llant again pressed for a decision 011 hit preliminary objection. 1'1ie Division Bench refused to deal with the ~rellminary objection and so on 30..8-1972 the appellant filed Crinunal Appeal No. 174 of 1972 in this Court praying for cancella· t!on of the contempt proceedings challengini therein the maintain· ability of the proceedings and complainina: of bias and prejudice of the High Court particularly the Honourable the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice R. N. Mishra. He said he apprehended that he would not get a fair deal if the matter is disposed~ of by the High Court. lJ

c ll On 21-11-1972 the Supreme Court appeal was withdrawn. At · E the instance of the Division Bench, a Full Bench of five Judaes was constituted by the Chief Justice and the case came on for liearin1 before the Full Bench on <I-I 2· 1972. In the meantime the appeal memo filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court was available and since it contained matter which amounted to contempt,

additional charges were framed and a show.cause notice was issued to the appel· · !ant in respect of these additional charp. A copy of the appeal memo containing the statements amounting to contempt is Annexure 20.

The Annexures were examined by the court with a view to consi- der . whether the statements therein amount to a criminal contempt. •Qn a full and prolonged consideration the Full Bench came to the unanimous conclusion that Annexures 8, 13, 14, 16 and 20 conWn matters· which amounted to gross contempt of court and since the appellant had not even offered an apology, this was a matter in which · serjoUS notice ought to be taken, especially, in view of previom COD· victions for contempt, and, accordingly sentenced the appellant to two ·months simple imprisonmeJ!t though in their opinion be deserved the maximum sentence of six months.

The several Annexures referred to above have been extracted by the Full Bench in its judgment and it is not necessary to repro~cc 'them here. It will be suffici~nt to reproduce only those portions c

B. i::. MISHM v. JU!O, ORISSA lll~H COURT (pa/ekar, I.) 2 91 which were regarded as grossly contemptuous and had been under.;. lined ln the judgment. AnntXW'e 8. As atr-..ady stated th1s 1s a letter in the form o( an appeal addressed to the Governor of Orissa complaining against the · suspension· and prayin" for stay of operation ot the suspension order on .the basis. of the

0advance copy sent to the Governor for its cancellation and for pasting the appellant directly under the Government: Jt Is dated 1 <>-4-1972. Tho appeal had been routed through the High Court

but the High Court did not forward the same. In this anoexure re· ferenco 1s made to the previous appeal filed by him against the order · of the High Court stoi>Pins? his two Increments after a departmental proceeding and how tliO Cfovemor in appeal had cancelled· even . the. very departmental proce:din:J in the. appeal.. An Interpretation was. put on that order wh!Ch it did not bear and It was made out, thou;:b falsely, that the punlshment had bec,n set a.side on the basis of tlie· allegitions madi by the a;ipcllant that some Honourable Judges o!· the High Court had be;:a biased and prejudiced against him.. The. appellall: also asked the Governor to apprCclate that by the said de·. partmental proceeding1 the Hl&h Court had put the I;xchequer to a. very heavy loss "all dn acc'Olllll of IM palpabl1 incorrect views ot lhe High Cout'I." .'.Then th:.. appellant says that the present action,. namely; the order of suspension clearly disclosed ma/a/ides. He sug- gested that there were several "embarrassing events" which he 'could· offer for consideration of the Governor but he was content •at th1s sta~ to refer to only on:: of them. In this conoection he referred ·to. the fact ·th~t when he Intimated to the High Court that he desired to join duties after his leave on March 20, 1972 he was informed by the Hilth Court on March 23, 1972 that his re-posting after leave would be decided· after the medical board reported LI to his fitness. to join after leave. This, according to the appellant,

showed that . thc High Court had already taken a decision m the absence of the- Otlef · Justice that the appc!!ant should be. re-posted. But on the return- of the Chief Justice from ·New Deihl there was a sudden change. He clearly •U.\l&ested that after the Chief Justice's retum the court took the decision to suspend him and In this connection he, made the following observations : ·

"This decision of the High Court, reached at before the Honourable the Chief· Justice attended the High Court on the 27th March after his 10 days of absence, clearly indi- cates· that no proceeding, much. less suspension, against the appellant was under contemplation till 'that day, but on the other hand, the appellant's place of posting was under consi- deration of the High Court. Circumstances clearly disclose .that after the return of the Honourable Chief Justice, the Government's order, disapproving the

High C<>urt's views about the .appellant's demotion, was not accepted gracefully by the High Court, and so subterfuge was adopted to counter- act the said decision of the Government .by a novel step,

thus to ~prlve the appellant of the result of the said ~i­ sion •. In' view of this patent mal{z fide alone, such an action- :292 ( 1974] 2 S.C.R. is liable to be quashed, by any competent Court of law."

Then at .a later stage the appellant says : "The appellant happens . to be the senior·most .iudicla\ officer in the State as regards length of service, and he has already 20 more months before attaining the age of superal:i- nuation. Hence, be may not deserve the present unwarrant-

ed, sudden and mysterious suspension, giving rise to specu- lations, touching his integrity." Then again he says : ". . . . . . the treatment of the High Court may require that after cancellation of this order of suspension, he be brought under the direct control of the Govemme.nt in a spe- cial post for the rest of bis service career of hardly 20

months more." The High Court at para 61 of the judgment bas observed as follows : "In the appeal memo (Annexure-8) the contemner attri- buted mala fities, bias and prejudice to the High Court. l{e made false insinuations that the Governor cancelled the pre- vious disciplinary proceeding against the contemner on the ground that the same was vitiated as the High Court bad

prejudged the matter and the Government set aside the punishment on the ground that three of the Honourable Judges were biased and prejudiced against him. He alleged that the disciplinary proceeding involved the Government in heavy expenses on account of the palpably incorrect views

of the High Court. He asserted that the order of suspen- sion as per Annexure-6 was mala fide. He stated that he would produce more facts relating to the mala fides of the Hi.$ Cou'rt before the Governor.

He alleged that the High Court did not gracefully accept the Government's order can· celling his demotion, and the High Court resorted to a sub- terfuge io counter-act the said decision of the Government by taking a . novel step, and that the High Court's action suffered from patent mala fide.

He stated that there was a turn of event after return of the Chief Justice from the Chief Justices' Conference and that the High Court did not nccept Government's decision gracefully, and that the other Judges bad no independent judgment of their own, and were

influenced by the Chief Justice to take a view, different from what they bad already taken, to give a posting order to the cnntemner, and that the High Court resorted to a subterfuge. He wanted protection of the

Governor against the High Court which be insinuates as an engine of qppression. He characterised the High Court's order of suspension as mys- terious and prayed that the Government should post him

directly under it." We have no doubt that the Full Bench bas correctly •ummarizcd the effect of Annexure-8, and we have nothing more to add. c ll c D. IC. MISHRA v. REG. OR!SSA HIGH COURT (Pa/ekar, 1.)

Annexurcs 13 and 14 should go together. Annexure 13 is a Jette~ by the appellant to tho Registrar dated May 14, 1972 in which he told him that he had moved the Governor, Orissa with a prayer to refer his matter to tho Tribunal under the provisions of the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules, 1951 and also that he would take all other·alter- nativc steps "administrative and judicial'" to avoid this

proceeding being dealt with by tho High Court and f.or this purpose would have to consult some prominent Advocates of Calcutta and Delhi. An- nexure-14 is a further r,tter dated May 22, 1972 to the Registrar intimating him that he would not submit any explanation to the charges framed until his representation to the Governor was disposed of. In this letter he further J?Ointed out that it would not be possible. · for him to wait for the pernusslon of the High Court to leave head- .· ·· . . quarters, because he may be called by his legal advisers at any mo•.''' : · · • ment and In those circwrutances he said "I hereby inform the Honour•· • · "'; : able Court that I may bo absent during the entire period mentioned ,, : in my letter dated the 14th May, 1972 and the Honourable Court may kindly approve of the same." ·

The effect of Annexures-13 and 14 has been.summarised by the Full Bench in these words : "Thus; in Annexures-13 and 14, the contemner exhibit· ed a contemptuous defiance of the Court's order, by declar- ing that he would not obey the order, and would leave the . station without walling for permission from the High Court, as. his first consideration was to "go out in connection with legal ·advice and filing applications and appeals in the Sup. reme Court" in matters connected with his suspension, and

to take all steps to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. These passages depict, in unequivocal terms, that the dispensation of justice by the Judges of the High Court on its administrative side, is most ctrocious and vindictive and it is. on that

ground, the contemner would not obey the Court's order, would not submit any explana· tions and would take all possible measures before the Supr~me Court, the Governor and 'the Chief Minister not to surrender to the jurisdiction of the High Court. His entire attempt has been: to present a lurid picture tJf the adminis- tration of justice, by the High Court."

tn the context, we arc not J'repa:ed to say that this summary of the effect of Annexures 13 an 14 1s far wrong. Annexure 16. That brings us to Annexure 16 .. It is dated May 14, 1972 and . purports to be a representation made by the appellant direct to ~he Governor without routing it through the. High Court.

T~e follow1ng passages have been underlined by the Full Bench as being grossly contemptuous. " …… the High Court have already conte.mplated in this departmental proceedings, a very heavy pumshment for

the petitioner." ( 1974] 2 S.C.R. . "~ on two su~h allegations, bias and prej'udice of the Hi&h Court was disclosed by strongly pleadinll for demo- tion of the petitioner, the ~ultiple number of such chargu may naturally make the pet1t1oner, •nprebensive of the result oti the proceedings, if condu4'-!t:<f tiY the High Court." ". . . . • . the High. Court even without any authority or jurisdiction in this reJl&rd and on the face of the directions of the Government in PolidcaJ. and $:1rviocs Department

communicated in the Government's Memo No. 3SS9~ .• dated the lSth March 19S8, have placed the petitioner under suspension." "The Hiah Court have also taken unusual move in plac- ing the petitioner under suspension in a 'contemplated pro- ceeding'''

"… . . the High. Court on the administrative side, is seriously prejudiced and biased against him, and they act, as if the charges stand established, r~ouiring extreme punisb· ment and as such, justice may not be meted out

to the petitioner by the High Court, if theiy conduct this depart· mental inquiry." ". . . . . . the petitioner considers it risky to submit his explanation to the High Court." ". . . . . . the High Court in the best interest of justice, should not enquire into these charges."

A copy of the above representation was sent to the Registrar and the following endorsement appears thereon. "As the Honourable Court are likely to withhold petitions this is submitted direct with copy to the Honourable Court for information. The Honourable Court may be pleased to

send their comments on this petition to the Governor." The summary of the effect of Annei:w:e· 16 is given by the Full Bench in para 70 of tbe jut~gment w"-'··' is as follows : "In Annexure-16 the contemner bas suggested that the

Court bas already prejudged the matter and has taken a preVious decision to impose a heavy punishment. Bias and prejudice on the par'. of the Court were also alleged by the contemner. He suggested that the Court is not in a position to weigh the evidence and consider the materials on record and to impose a 'entence commensurate with his delinquency. The action taken by the Hi2h Court has been branded as

'unusual' ………. " "A copy of this Annexure 16 was sent to the High Court with a contemptuous remark that since the High Court was likely to withhold the representation it was

submitted direct to the Governor. Not being satisfied with tha~ be issued a further directive to the court to send their com- ments on his representation to the Governor." c B. K. MiSHl\A v. JU!G, Oll!SSA HIGH COURT (Palekar, J.)

The above summary of the effect of Annexure·16 is, in our view, correct. Annexurt-20. This annexure is the memo of appeal filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1972. The appeal had been filed because the Division Bench had refused to consider his pre- liminary objection with reprd to the ·maintainability of the present contempt procecdinp. The pvance before the Supreme Court was that the Orissa Hl&h Court had taken six contempt proceedinas against him and in yiew of what happened in some of those proceedings the appellant entertained appreliCnslon that the court may impose 'sub- stantive punishment and may refuse bail or time to the appellant for getting redress from the Supreme Court if the present contempf'pro- ceedings were also to go on before the same High Court. In the first contempt proceeding though the proceedings were dropped, adverse comments were made against his conduct thus depriving him of an opportunity to 110 in appeal and have the adverse comments expunged. In one of the other cases he says ". . . . . . the appellant was brough1 down to -the Court-hall, and the Honourable Judges conyicted and sentenced the appellant and without affording him an opportunity to obtain stay of the sentence from this Honourable Court, executed the sentence by administering admonition in the open court and sounding warning that, if at any time such contumacious conduct of his was noticed, a very serious view would be taken about punishment." In the other contempt matter, he alleged, a Judge wanted to add a new charge. The appellant objected to the same and went in appeal to the Supremo Court.

The appellant says that when the ap~llant filed his appeal in this Court and brought this fact to the notice of the Honourable Judges, they dropped the additional charge. In an· other proceeding, he saiys, the Honourable Judges while dropping the proceeding found out a very innocent and inconsequential .mistake in tl1e sworn counter-affidavit of the appellant and on that account ordered the Ii~ of a criminal complaint for an offence under section 199 of the I.P.C. In ground (1) the appellant alleged .that the appel- lant fears bias of the Honourable High Court against him in view of the facts and circumstances stated above.

The Full Bench in its judgmen( has considered each one of the allegations in the appeal memo and shown how ~e insinuations were false and how plain facts were distorted. They are entirely right io summarising these facts of Annexure 20 in these words :

"Thus in Annexure-20 the contemner ha~, in clearest terms, alleged bias and prejudice against the High Court and its Chief Justice. He has taken the plea that the court itself bas become disqualified to deal with the case. In his view a

the Judges of this Court have fallen from t~e )lll,th ?f rectitude, and are vindictive, and have a!'eady decided to impose su~­ stantive sentence and refuse bail, and they are not m a post· ti1>n to mete out even-Ji anded justice."

7 -522SCl/7 4 [ 1974] 2 s.c.R. Even !f we dismiss Annexures 13 and 14 as nothin11 more than disrespectful fulminations of an angry insubordinate officer, there is hardly lilly doubt that Anneimres 8, l 6 and 20 contain statements which are deliberately made to grossly sr ·;:idalize the High Court. The Judges of the High Court and especially the Chief Justice are charged . with mala {ides, improper motives, bias and prejudice. It is insinuated that they are oppressing the appellant, have become vindictive and are inca~able of domg him justice. It la also suggested that they dp not administer justice fearlessly because in one matter affecting the appel· !ant, they dropped a charp against him for fear of the SuJ!reme Court. ·All this, prlma faclt, amounts to JIIOSS scandatization or the Hi&h

Court. Tho law applicable to this case i1 the law as contained In the Con· tempt of Courts Act, 1971 No. 17 of 1971. Section 2 defines "C6n· tempt of Court", as either "civil contempt" or "criminal contempt". Cause ( c) defines "criminal contempt" as follows :

(c) "criminal contempt" moans the publication (whether Ciy words, spoken or written, or by sigJOs, or by visible repre· sentations, or otherwiae) of any matter or the doing of any . other act whatsoever which-

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise; or lowel'f or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tendH to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interf~s or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;" It will be seen that the terminolilgy used In the definition is bor· rowed from the English law of Contempt and embodies concepts which ate familiar to that law which, by and large, was applied in India . . The expressions "scandalize", "lowerin~ the authority of the court'', "interference", "obstruction" and "administration of justice" have all gone into the legal currency of our sub-continent and have to be understood in the sense in which they have been so far understood by our courts with the aid of the English law, where necessary. The first sub-clause geperally deals with what is known as the scandalization of the court"discussed qy Halsbury

3rd Edition in Volume 8,. page 7 at para 9 : "Scandalous attacks upon Judges are punished by attachment or committal upon the principle that they are, as against the public, not the judge, an obstruction to public justice; and ;i lihel on; a judge, in order to constitute a contempt of court, must have been calculated to cause such an obstruction ….. . The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole o.r the indivi~ual Judges <?f the court fr?m a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribu· nal is undermined or ilnpaired." Sulxlause (i) embodlet the above concept and takes In cases when by the publication or the fact the c

c ,,n .. K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Palekar, I.) administration of justice is held to ridicule and contempt. This is regarded a_s an "obst.ructio11" of public iustice whereby the authority of the court is undernuned. Sub-clause (~l refers to one species of con- \empt of w~ich "obstructi?n" is an important element. Sub-clause (ii) speaks of mterference mth due course of judicial proceedings and is directly connected with administration of justice

in its common acceptance . While clauses '(i) and (ii) deal with obstruction and interference uspectively in. t_he particu~ar way described therein, clause (iii) is. a res1dnacy prov1Slon by which any other type of obstruction or inter- ference with the administration of justice is regarded as a criminal contempt.

In other words, all the three sub-clauses referred to above define contempt in terms of obstruction of or interference with administration of justice. Broadly speaking our statute accepts what was laid down by the Privy Council and other English authorities that proceedings in contempt are always with reference to the administration of justice. It is enough for our purpose to refer to Debi Prasad Shaiiricrv. Th~ Kinf!-Emperor(1) .in which Lord Atkin delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed at page 223 as follows :

"In 1899 this Board pronounced proceedings for this species of contempt (scandalization) to l>e obsolete in this country, though sur- viving in other parts of the Empire, but they added that it is a weapon to be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of Justice : McLeod v. St. Aubyn {I) [18991 A.C. 549. In frl re a Special Reference from the Bahama lslands-[1893] A.C.

138) the test applied by the very strong Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct. or interfere with the course of justice and the due adminis- tration of the law. In Queen v. Gray-[1900] (2) Q. B. 36 it was shown that the offence of scandalizing the court itself was not obsolete in this country. A very scandalous attack ha.d been made on a Judge for his judicia1 utterances while sitting in a criminal case on :Circuit, and it was with the foregoing opinions on record thaf'Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J. adopting the expression of Wilmot, CJ. in his opinion in Rex. v. Ahn'on-{1765 Wilmot's Notes of Opinions, 243 97 E.R. 94) which .is the source of much of the present law on the subject, spoke of the article complained of as calculated to lower the authority of the judge."

It is therefore clear that scandalization within the meaning of sub- clause (i) must b~ in respect of the court or the Judge with reference to administration of justice. The contention of Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant is that, in the first place, it must be remembered that the publicatio:i or ':'cts com- plained of are in the course of the appellant challengmg his suspen- sion and holding of disciplinar:y proceedings in an anneal or reoresen- tation to the Governor from the orders passed bv the Higli Court. Tn • Annexure-20 he was challenging the Order of the High Court before (1) 70 Indian Appeals, 216.

( 1974] 2 S.C.R. t~e Supreme Court. !he appellant in his submission, bona fide bi:. heved that he had a nght to appeal and, in pursuance of the right he thus claimed he had given expression to his grievance or had otherwise acted, not with a view to malign the court or in defiance ofit but with the sole object of obtaining the reversal of the orders pass~d by the High Court against him. In the second place, Mr. Sen contended, the passages about which the complaint was made did not amount to contempt of court since. they did not purport to criticize any 'judicial' acts of the judges sitting in the seat of justice. · It may be that in some . places disrespectful ·references have been made to the Judges which Mr. Sen assures us, he should havr. never done. At the same time, in his submission, criticism of administrative acts of the High Court even in vilificatory terms did not amount to contempt of court, So far as.the first part of the argument is concerned, the same must be· dismissed as unsubstantial because if, in fact, the language used amounts to contempt . of court it will become punishable as criminal contempt. The right of appeal does not give the right to co=it con. tempt of court, nor can it be used as a cover to bring the autfiority of c

the High Court into disrespect and disregard; It has been held by this Court in Juga/ Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bpµk(') that allegations of ma/a {ides in the grounds of appeal to the Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies from the Order of the Assistant Registrar would . constitute gross contempt.

A point of some substance is in the second part of Mr. Sen's argu- lmcnt and it will be necessary to deckle in the present case whether . contemptuous ·imputations made with reference tp "the administrative acts" of the High Court do not amount to contempt of Court. The answer to the point raised by Mr. Sen will depend upon whe- ther the imputations referred to above do or do not affect administra· tion of justice. That is the basis on which contempt is punished and must afford the necessary test.

We have not been referred to any co1_t1prehensive definition of the expression "administration of justice". But historically, and in the minds of the people, administration of justice is exclusively associated . with the Courts of justice constitutionally established. Such courts have been established th.-oughout the land by several statutes. The Presid- incr Judge of a court embodies in himself the court, and \vhen engaged in"' the task of administering justice is assisted by a complement of clerks and ministerial officers whose duty it is to protect and maintain the records, prepare the writs, serve the processes etc. The acts in which they are engaged are acts in aid o~ administration of justic~ ~y' the Presiding Judge. The power of appomtment of clerks and mmrs- terial officers involves administrative control by the Presiding Judge over them and though such control is described as administrative to distinguish it from the duties of a Judge sitting in the seat of justice, such control is exercised by the Judge as a Judge, in the course of judicial administration. Judicial administration is an integrated func- . tion of the Judge and cannot suffer any dissection so far as maintc- . nance of high standards of rectitude in judicial administration is con- (!) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1491 .

c B. K. MISHRA V. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Palektll', /.) c~med. . Th.e whole set up of a cou~t is for the purpose of administra· tioi:i of iust1c~, and the control which the judge exercises over his assistants has also the object of maintaining the purity of administra.· tion of justice. These observations apply to all courts of justice in the land whether they are regarded as superior or inferior courts of

justice. Courts of justice have, in accordance wjth· their constitutions, to perform multifarious functions for due administration of Justice. Any lapse from the strict standards of rectitude

in performing these functions is bound to affect administration of justice which is a term of wider import than mere adjudication of causes· from the seat of justice; In a country which has a hierarchy of courts one above the other, it is usuan to firtd that the one which is above is entrusted with dis· ciplinary control over the one below it. Such control is devised with a view to ensure that the lower. court functions properly in its judicial administration. A Judge can foul judicial administration by mis- demeanours while engaged in the exercise of th~ fuoctions of a Judge. lt is therefore as important for the superior court to be vigilant about the conduct and behaviour of the Subordinate Judge as a Judge, as It is to administer the law; because both functions are essential for administration of justice. The Judge of the superior court in whom thls disciplinary control is vested fuoctions as much as a Judge in such matters as when he hears and disposes of cases before hirn. The procedures'may be different.

The place where he sits may be different. But the powers are exercised in both instances in due course of judicial administration. lf superior courts neglect to dis· cipline subordinate courts, they will fail in an essential function of judicial administration and bfing the whole administration of justice into contempt and disrepute. The mere function

of adjudicaiiou between parties ·is not the whole of a<;lministration ot justice for any court. It is important to remember that disciplinary control is veste.; in the court and not in a Judge as a private individual.

Control, therefore, is a function as conducive to proper administration of .iustice as laying down the law or doing justice between the parties. What is commonly described as an administrative function

has been, when vested in the High Court, consistently regarded by the statutes as a fuoction in the administration of justice. Take for example the Letters Patent for the High Court of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras.

Clause 8 thereof authorises and empowers the Chief Justice from time to time .as occasion may require "to appoint so many and such clerks nnd other ministerial officers it shall be found necessary for the administration of justice and the due execution ot all the powers and authorities granted and committed to the said High Court by these Letters Patent." It is obvious that this authority of the Chief Justice to appoint clerks and ministerial officers for the administration of justice implies an authority to control them in the interest of administration of justice. This controlling function wbich is commonly described as an administrative function is designed with the primary object of securing administration ot justice. Therefore, 1,' ·~

[ 1974] 2 S.C.R • when the Chief Justice appoints ministerial officers and assumes dis· ciplinary control over them, that is a function which though described as administrative is really in the course of administration of justic~. Similarly section 9 of the High Courts Act, 1861 while conferring on the High Courts several types of jurisdictions and powers says that all such jurisdiction and powers are "for and in relation to the administra- tion of justice in the Presidency for which it is established."- Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915 sin1ilar!y shows that the several jurisdictions of the High Court and all their powers and autho- rity are "in relation to the administration of justice including power to appoint clerks and other ministerial officers of the court." Section 223 of the Government of India Act; 1935 preserves the jurisdictions of the existing High Courts and, the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of jµstice in the court. Section 224 of that Act declares that the High Court" shall have superintendence over c

all courts .in India for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdic- tion and this superintendence, it is now settled, extends both to administrative and judicial functions of the subordmate courts. When we come to our constitution we find that whereas Articles 225 and 227 preserve and to some extent extend these powers in relation to admini- stration of justice, Article 235 vests in the High Court the control over District Courts and Courts Subordinate thereto. In the State of We$t · D Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi(I) this qourt has pointed out, that control under Article 235 is control over the conduct and discipline of the Judges. That is a function which, as we have already seen, is undoubtedly connected with administration of justice. The disciplinary control over the misdemeanoud of the subordinate judiciary in their judicial administration is a function which the High Court must exercise m the interest of administration of justice. It is a function which is essential for the administration of justice in the wide connotation it has received and, therefore, when the High Court functions in a disci- plinary, capacity, it only does so in furtherance of administration of justice.

We thus reach the conclusion that the courts of justice in a State from the highest to the lowest are by their constitution entrusted with functions directly. connected with the administration of justi~, and it is the expectation and confidence of all those who have or likely to have business therein that the courts perform all their functions on a high level of rectitude without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. And it is this tr;ditional confidence in the courts that justice will be administered in them which is sought to be protected by proceedings in contempt.

The object, as already stated, is not to vindicate the Judge personally but to protec~ the public ~gainst :iny un~ermining of their accustomed confidence m the Judges authority. Wilmot C.J. in his opinoin in the case of Rex v. Almon al~eadiy ~efe_rred to s~ys,: "The arraignment of the justice o_f th~ Judges, 1s arra1gm~g the Kin~ s justice; it is an impeachment of his. wisdom and goodness m the ,ch01~e of his Judges, and excites in the_ m1?ds of the .Pe'.'ple a gene.rat ~1ssa!Js· faction with all judicial determma!Jons, ·and md1sposes their mmds to obey them; and whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamen- (1) [1966] (I) S.C.R. 771,

r- ~'.· .–+ t 'I c D. K. MISHRA v. REG •. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Pa!ekar, /,) tally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and in my opinion, calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsover; not for the sake of the Judges, as private individuals, but because they are the channels by which the Ki?g's justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be universally thought so, are both absolutely necessary for the giving justice that free, open, and uninterrupted current, which it has, for many ages~ found all over this kingdom, …… " Further explain- ing what he ineant by the words "authoriti of the court", he observed "the word "authority" is frequently used to express both the right of declaring the law, which is properly called jurisdiction, and of enforcing obedience to it, in, which sense it is equivalent to the word power : but by the word "authority", I do not mean that coercive power of the Judges, but the deference and respect' which is paid to them and their acts, from an opinion of their justice and integrity."

Scandalization of the court is a species of contempt and may take several forms. A common form is the vilification of the Judge. When proceedings in contempt are .. taken for such vilification the question which the court has to ask is whether the vilification is of the Judge as a Judge.

See Queen v. Gray( 1) or it is the vilification of the Judge as an individual. If the latter, the Judge is left to his pri¥ate .remedies and the court has no power to commit for contempt. If the former, the court will proceed to exercise the jurisdiction with scrupulous care and in cases which are clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the court will have also to consider the degree of harm caused as affect· lug administration of justice and, if it is slight and beneath notice, courts will not punish for contempt. This salutary practic<; is adopted by section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The jurisdiction tls not intended to uphold the personal dignity of the Judges. That

must rest on surer foundations. Judges rely on their conduct itself to be its own vindication. But if the attack on the Judge functioning as a Judge substantially affects administration of justice it becomes a public mischief punishable for contempt, and it matters not whether such an attack is based on .what a Judge is alleged to have done in the exercise of his administrative responsibilities. A Judge's functions may be divisible, but his integrity and authority are not divisible in the context of

administration of · justice. An unwarranted attack on him for corrupt administration is as potent in doing public harm as an attack on his adjudicatory function. , The Full Bench has considered a very large number of cases and come to the conclusion that there is no foundation for the view that an attack on the court in its exercise of administrative functions does not amount to contempt.' In Brahma Praka.sh Sharma and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(•) it is pointed out that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Jud~cs personallv from impu- tations to which they may be exposed as individuals but is intended .as protection to the public whose interest would be very much affected, (I) [1900] (2) Queen's Bench. 36 at page 40.

(2 ) [1953] S.C.R. 1169, [ 1974 J 2 s.c.R. , ¥ by the act or by the conduct of any party the authority of the court 1s l~w.ered . and t~e s~nse of. c~nfidence which the people have in the admm1stra~on of iustice by 11 1s weakened. Th~ cas~ is no athority to the propos1t1on put forward by Mr. Sen. In Gobind Ram v. State of Maharashtra(') some observations of Jagannadhadas, C.J. (as he then was) in the State v. The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Pra!atantra(µ) were quoted by this Court with approval. Thcs• ob9er- vations are : ''A rev1e:n of the cases in which a contempt committed by way of scandahzation of the court has been taken notice of for punishment shows clearly that the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction is confined to cases of very grave and scurrilous attack on the court or on the Judges in their judicial capacity the ignoring of which could only result encouraging a repetition of the same with the sense of impunity which would thereby result in lowering tho prestige and authoritl of the court." Mr· Sen has particularly emphasised the words ·~udicia capacity" and argued that this only refers to the Judge func· honing in the seat of justice. It does not appear from the report of the Orissa case \hat the High Court wu in any way, concerned with tile alleged dichotomy between the Judae's administration tunctiOllS and his adjudicatorr functions. "Judicial capacity" is an ambivalent term which means ' capacity of or proper to a Judge" and is capable of taking in all functional capacities of a Judge whether administrative, adjudicatory or any other, necessary for the administration of justice. There is no sufficient warrant to hold that the Orissa High Court used the words "judicial capacity" with a view to exclude alt other capacities of the Judges except the capacity to adjudicate, nor for holding that this Court approved the use of the expression as limited to the Judges' adjudicatory function.

On the other hand, there is high authority for the proposition that vilificatory criticism of a Judge functioning as a Judge even in purely administrative or non-adjudicatory matters amounts to criminal con· tempt. The case of Rex v. Almon already referred to is a case of this kind.

Almon published a pamphlet in which the Chief Justice and, impliedly, all the Judges of the court of King's Bench were accused of deliberately delaying 9r defeating the issue of the process of habeas corpus by introducing a new rule that a petition praying for the issue of that process should be accompanied by an affidavit. It was held that this constituted contempt of court. The Chief Justice and the Judges were not criticized for what they were doing in a judicial proceeding from the "seat of justice" but for making a rule which, in the opinion of the writer was deliberately designed to delay or defeat the process of habeas corpus. Apparently th.e rul~ had been made by .the cour~ ~~er its power to regulate proceedmgs m court and not m a111Y 1ud1crnl proceeding between parties to a cause. 'D!e rule ~as made un~er . the rule making function of the. court and not 1n exerc1~e ?f any ad1ud1ca· tory function as narrowly interpreted now, and still 1t was held that the court was scandalized and its authority lowered. In Moll La( Ghose and others(') a strong special bench of five Judges held that an imputa- tion made against the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court suggest· Ing that he was improperly motivated in constituting a packed, bench (l) [19711 I.S.C.C. 740;

(2) A.l.R. 1952 Od,.a, 3t8. (3) XLV-Calcutta 169. c c B. It. MISHRA V. REG. OlllSSA IUGH COURT (Pakkpr, /.) to hear a particular class of appeals was held to amount .to contempt. – Sai:denon, C. J. observed at page 180: ••1 have no doubt that this arucle, read by itself, constitutes a very serious reflection upon the administration of the court, which everyone. knows is in the hands · of the Chief Justice." Woodroffe, J. at page 199 observe•\ : "The Court, however, in such cases does not seek to vindicate any personal interests of the Judges, but the general administration of justice, which is a public concern." Mookerjee, J at page 231 observed : "it seems to me indisputably plain that the implication of the second article, whether taken along 'With or ind->pendently of the first, is that, at the instance of persons interested in the Calcutta Improvement Trust, the Chief Justice has constituted a. Special Bench to ensure a decision favourable to the Trust in the app:als against the judgment of Mr. Justice Greaves." Proceeding further he held "an imputation of this character constitutes a contemiit of court.'' It was the function of the Ch~f Justice as Chief Justice of the

Court to administratively form, from time. to time, benches for. the disposal ot the business of the court. To attribute Improper motives to him in the exercise of this function was held to be a contempt because that was boun.! to undermino the confidence of the peofle "in the High Court and its Judges in relation to administration o justice. Simiiarey, in The state of Bombay v. Mr. P."( 1)"."a scurrilous attack on the court rec.eivcr for alleged misbehaviour in his "official duties and a charge against the. Ollef Justice and the administrative judges for deliberately conniving at It were held to constitute contempt. The same argument as is now put forward was i:;ude in th,ilt case.

(See para 14 of the report), but was rejected in these words : "By making these foul attacks upon the Judges, the respondent has tried to create an apprehension in the mind of the public regarding the integrity of these Judges and has done a wrong to the public. He has attempted to shake the confidence of the public in the Judges of this Court and in the justice that is being ildmlnistered by theseJ'udges of this Court." There is no such thing as a denigration of a Ju ge function-wise. This is brought out clearly in the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Debi Prasad Sharma v. The F · King Emperor(') referred to earlier. · In that ca;e the appellant had suggested falsely that the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court had in his administrative capacity, issued a circular to the Judicial Officers under his jurisdiction enjoining on them to raise contributions to the warf1lnds which, it was said, would. lower the prestige of the court in the eyes of the people. In holding that the imputation did not consti- tute contempt of court but at the most, a personal defamation- of the atlef Justice in his individual capacity, Lord Atkin said at page 224, "When the comment in question in the present case is examined it is found that there is no criticism of any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on him for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the administration of justice. It can hardly be said that there· is ""Y crldcl.mi of him In h/3 administrative capacity, far, as far as 1/ulr Lord.rhlps have been Informed, the administrative control · of the subordinate courts of the Province, whatever It 13, Is exerc/sed, not by the Chief lustlct, but by tM court over which he presides." {I) A.l.11..19S9 !klmbay 1!2.

(2) 70 Jn~ian Appeals 216. [ 1974] 2 s.c.R. The words underlined above are important. In holding that oDly ordinary remediea for defamation were open to the Chief Justice, their Lordships had to ask the substantial question, u suggested by Lord Watson during the course of the arguments in Re : Special Refere11ce from the Bahama Islands( 1) "whether the

letter com. plained of referred to him in his official capacity." With that case obviously in mind- and the case was referred to earli~r in the judgment-Lord Atkin showed in the. words quoted above that the criticism did nqt refer (i) to any judicial act, meaning thereby any adjudicatory act and (ii) to any administrative act, because the Chief Justice alone had no administrative control over the· subordinate courts but only the High Court as a whole. The plain implication is that if the circular bad been alleged to have been issued. by the Chief Justice under the authority of the High Court, then the imputation Jlaving the effecl of lo.1Vering the prestige and authority of the High Court could conceivably have been regarded as contempt. Their Lordships of the Privy Council are not known to waste their words over matters not relevant to the issue. It was absolutely necessary for their Lordships to eliminate the possibility of the alleged action of the Chief Justice being connected in any manner with any adjudicatory or administrative function of the High Court by pointing out that it did not refer to any official act in the administration of justice or, as stated in Queen v. Gray already refer- red to, "the act of a Judge as a Judge", in which case alone the impu- tation would have amounted to scandalization of the court. The above authorities are sufficient to show that there is no warrant for the narrow view that the offence of scandalization of the court takes place only when the imputation has reference to the adjudicatory functions of a Judge in the seat of justice. We are unable, therefore, to accept the submission of Mr. Sen on this aspect of the case. We have already sho.wn that the imputations in Annexures 8, 16 and 20 have grossly vilified the High Court tending to affect substan- tially administration of justice and, therefore, the appellant was rightly convicted of the offence of criminal contempt.

As regards the sentence, it is enough to say that the Full Bench has considered the question at great length. There were six conte~pt proceedings against the appellant and the court had treated him generously. In two proceedings he was let off with a fine. Even in the present case the Full Bench was of the opinion that the maxinrnm sent~nce under the law was deserved by the appellant but imposed on him only a sentence of simple imprisonment for two months. The appellont, throughout, took a defiant. att!tude anJ dic.l not even think it- necessary to offer an apology. ()rdmarily we woul~ be most reluc- tant to interfere with the sentence imposed by the High Court, but for the fact that we notice that he has almost come to the end of his judicial career and during the last few years has been gripped by a sort of mania against the High Court which clouded his reason. We !hink the object of punishment will be served by directing him to pay (I) [1893) A. C. 138 aI 14.

.c Ii• _B. K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA"HIGH COURT (Krishna Iyer, J.) 305· a fine of Rs. 1,000/- 'or in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 3- months in substitution of the sentence inflicted by the High Court. c

It remains now to point out that when dealing principally with the contempt of the appellant, the court also thought it fit to hear the parties including the Advocate-General on some subsidiary but impor- tam questions on the relative position of the Government of Orissa. and the High Court in the matter of disciplinary control over Subordi- nate Judges. It appears that the State Government framed what are known as the Orissa Civil Services

(Classification and Control) Rules, 1962 and they appear to apply to all . Government servants. under the State. The Full llench held that some of the rules, in their application to the Subordinate judiciary of the State,· contravened Articles 235 which vested control over the Subordinate Judiciary in. the High Court. From these findings the State of Orissa has come in appeal and that appeal is numbered Criminal Appeal No. 77/1973. In our opinion, the principal matter before the Full Bench was in relation to the contempt committed by the appellant. The constiutionaI issue between the State Government and tt;e

High Court came in only .by way of a side-Wind. In fact it would appear from the judgment· that the learned Advocate-General had requested the court . not to· express any opinion on these constitutional matters, and · the court

also seems to have thought that the constitutionality of the rules had no relation to the commission of the contempt. However, the court thought that the issue became relevant, especially, oli the question of· sentence and hence applied its mind to the constitutionality of some of the rules. It has struck down those rules which, in the opinion of the court, contravene~ Article 235 iri their application to the Subordinate Judiciary; We have considered whether it is necessary for us to dear with those questions here, but are inclined to think that we should express no opinion on the constitutionality of the impugned rules. Accordingly, appeal No. 41 is dismissed with the modification in the sentence. as suggested above and criminal appeal No. 77. of 1973 is permitted to be withdrawn without prejudice to the contentions raised by the State in regard to the constitutionality of the rules struck down by the High Court.

KRISHNA IYER, J. We have had the advantage of reading the Iead– ing opinion of our learned brother, Palekar, J., and, concurring as we do in the ultimate conclusion, to depart from the option of silence 11eeds a word of explanation.

Graver issues bearing: on free speech raised in these proceedings and the correct approach to be made to· what in substance is a criminal charge, bring to the fore our diver- gence in legal reasoning and constitutional perspective which we proceed' · to set out in ·a separate opinion.

The facts of the ·present case, fully laid bare in the judgment of Palekar, J., are in a sense peculiar. The contemnor is himself a senior district judge. The alleged multiple contempt relates partly to (i) an administrative act of the High Court preliminary to disciplinary · proceedings and is stated to be contained in a representation filed; [ 1974 j 2 S.C.R.

.by him before the Governor, under a rule which apparently autho· rises· such appeals, against the suspension order of the High Cour~ .and ( i,i) averments in a special leave petition· filed by him in this Court, aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to decide a preli· minary objection in these very contempt proceedings on the juillcial .side.

A full Bench of the High Court convicted the appellant for .contempt, the action itself having been initiated by an administrative full court. The questions we are called upon to decide are (a) whet· .her criticism of an administrative act of the High Court or of an~· court could .at all amount to contempt CJf court; (b) whether pejorative imputations about a court or judge, however offensive, true or honestly held even if contained in an appeal to a higher court or in a remedial representation to a correctional authority, constitute contempt. The

:legal touchstone adopted by the High Court is that any statement which in some manner may shake the confidence of the community in a judge or in the judicial system, is straightway contempt, regardless of context or purpose or degree of publication or absence of any clear and present danger of disaffection or its being a bona fide plea for ·orderly change in the judicature and it& process. On the facts, we agree that the spirit of defiance, extenuated partly by a sense of despair, is writ large in the writings of the appellant but wish to warn our- selves that his reported past violations sho:ild not prejudioo a judicial appraisal -Of his alleged present criminal cont•rnpt.

And the bcnelit of doubt, if any, belongs to the contemne< in thls jHr4sdictiort. The dilemma of the law of contempt arises because of the consti- tutional need to balance two great but occasionally confiicting princi- ples freedom of expression and fair and fearless justice remembering the brooding presence of arts. 19( 1) (al, 19(2), 129 and 215 of the ·Constitution.

In a sense, the Indian approach is a little different from the Engilsh and its orientation is more akin to American jurisprudence, although ·there is much that is common to all the three. The .Pronouncement of 'Wilmot, C.J., posthumqusly published, has influenced the law ol' con· tempt in the United States and the Commonwealth countries, but it is a moot point whether we should, still be bound to the regal moorings .of the law in Rex v. Alma11(')

" … by our constitution the King is the fountain of justice and …. he delegates the power to the judges. . . . arraign- ment of the justice of the judges is arraigning the King's .iustice. It is an impeachment of his wisdom in the choice of )\is judges. . . . it excites dissatisfaction with judicial deter· mination and indisposes the minds of people

to obey them".-… Maybe we arc nearer the republican justification suggested in the American system(2) : c (I) Wilmot"• notes 243 -(Wilmot ed·. 1802 ~97 ER 94. as ci!ed in Fo,. Contempt of Court (1927).

(2) 18 U.S.C.A. 3691 (formerly 28 U. s. C, 386. 389. c B; K. MI~HRA v. REG, ORISSA HIGH COURT (Krishna Iyer, I.) "In this country, all courts derive their authority from the people, and hold it in trust for their security and benefit. In this state, all judges are elected by the people, and

hold their authority, in a double sense, directly from them; the power they exercise Is but the authority of the peopl~ them- selves, exercised through courts as their agents. · lt is the authority and laws emanating from the people, which the

judges sit to exercise and enforce. Contempt against these courts, the administration of their laws, are insults offered to the authority of the people thelnSelves, and not to the humble agents of the law, whom they employ in the conduct of their government."

This shift in legal philosophy will· broaden the base of the citlxen's right to criticise and render the judicial power more socially valid. We are not subjects of ·a king but citizens of a republic and a blanket ban through the co.ntempt power, stifling criticism of a strategic institution, namely, Administr~tion of Justice, thus forbidding the right to argue for reform of the judicial process and to comment on the performance of the judicial personnel through outspoken or marginally excessive criticism of the instrumentalities of Jaw and justice, may be a tall order. For, change through free •!,'Cech is basic to our democracy, and to pre- vent change through ·criticism is to petrify the organs of democratic government. The judicial instrument is no exception. To cite vintage rulings of English courts and to bow to decisions of British Indian days as absolutes is to ignore the law of all laws that the rule of law must keep pace with the rule of life. To make our point, we cannot resist quotirig McWhinney( 1), wh.o wrote:

"The dominant theme in American philosophy of law today must be the concept of change—0r revolution-in law. In Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Hoimcs' own aphorism, it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule <>f law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. The prestige argument, froi:n age alone, that because a claimed legal rule has lasted a certain length of time it must automatically be valid and binding at the present day, regardless of changes in basic societal conditions and expectations, is oo longer very persuasive. According to the basic teachings of the Legal

Realist and policy schools of law, society itself is in contlnu- ing state of flux at the. present day; and the positive law, therefore, if it is to continue to be useful in the resolution of contemporary major social conflicts and social probleins, must change in measure with the society. ·what we have,

therefore, concomitantly with ciur concepti<Jn of wc1ety in revolution is a conception of law itself, as being in a condi- tion of flux, of movement. On this view, law is not a frozen, static body of rules but rules in a continuous process of

change and. adaptation and the judge, at the fiiial appellate level anyway, is a part-'- determinant part-of this dynamic process of legal evolution;" Cmadi•n Bar ReYiew (Vol. 45) 1967, 582-583.

[ 1974 J 2 s.c.R. This approach must inform Indian law, including contempt law. It is very necessary to remember the legal transformatior: in our value system on the inauguration of the Constitution, and the dogmas of the quiet past must change with the challenges of the stormy present. The great words of Justice Homles uttered in a different context bear repetition in this context:

"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own oonduct that the i ultimate good desired is better reached by free

trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While

that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we jpathe and believe to be fraught with

. death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate inter- ference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.'"{ 1)

lleforn stating the principles of law bearing on the facets of contempt of court raised in this case we would like to underscore the need to draw the lines clear enough to create confidence in the people that this ancient and inherent power, intended to preserve the faith of the public in public justice, will not be so used as to provoke public ·hostility as overtook the Star Chamber. A vague and· wandering juris- diction with uncertain frontiers, a sensitive and suspect power to punish vested in the prosecutor, a law which makes it a crime to pub· lish regardless of truth and public good and permits · a. process of brevi manu conviction, may unwittingly trench upon civil liberties and so the special jurisdiction and jurisprudence bearing on contempt power must be delineated with deliberation and operated with serious circum- spection by the higher judicial echelons. So it is that as the palladium of our freedoms, the Supreme Court and the High Courts, must vigi- lantly protect free speech even against judicial umbrage-a delicate but sacred duty whose discharge demands tolerance and detachment of a high order.

The present proceedings challenge the projection of the power to punish for contempt into administrative domains of the Court and its extension to statements in remedial proceedings. One recalls the observations of the American Supreme Court : (2 )

"Contempt of Court is the Proteus of the Legal World, assuming an almost infinite diversity of forms." (1) T;1? Sunrem? Court and Civil Liberties by Q_;m1nd K. Fracknel-Published f:->r the A11,ric1n Civil Liberties Union in its 4'Jth anniv!rsery vear-Pornea Publications. Inc, New York (1960)-page 40.

(2) Moskovitz, Co11t•mpl of Injunctions, Criminal and Civil, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780 (1943). c B. K. MISHRA v. REG. OR!SSA HIGH COURT (Krislina Iyer, J.) 309 Considerations such as we have silhouetted led to the enactment of the Contempt of Court Act, 19_71, which makes some restrictive departures from the traditional law and implies some wholesome principles which serve as unspoken guidelines in this branch of law. Section 5 protects fair comment on the merits of cases finally decided, and s. 13 absolves from sentence all contempts which do not substan- tially interfere or tend substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. Statements which disparage a subordinate judicial officer presiding over a court are not contempt if made in good faith to foe High Court or any other lower Court to which the offended judge is subordinate. The emphasis ins. 2(c), s. 3 and·s. 13 to the interference with the course of justice or obstruction of the administration vi justice or scandalising or lowering the authority of the Court-not the judge-highlights the judicial area as entitled to inviolability and sug- gests a ·functional rather than a personal or 'institutional' immunity. The unique power to punish for contempt of itself inheres in a Court qua Court, in its essential role of dispenser of public justice. . The phraseological image projected by the catena of expressions like court, course of· justice, administration Qf justice, civil and criminal proceed- ings, judiciitl proceedings, merits of any case, presiding officer of the Court, judicial proceeding before a court sitting in chamber. or in camera undertaking given to. a court, substantial interference with the due course of justice, etc., occurring in the various sections of the Act, the very conspectus of the statutory provisions and the ethos . .and raison d'etre of the jurisdiction persuade us to the conclusion that the text of the Act Il!USt take its colour· from the geiieral context and con- fine the contempt power to the judicial.cum-para-judicial areas includ- ing those administrative functions as ·are intimately associated with the exercise of judicial power.

What then is a Court ? It is "an agency of the sovereign created by it directly or indirectly under its authority, consisting of one or more officers, established and mainta1ned for_ the purposes of hear- ing and determining issues of law and fact regarding legal rights and alleged violations thereof, and of applying the. sanctions of the law, authorised to exercise its powers in due course of law at times and places previously cletermined by lawful authority.

Isbill v. Stovall, Rex. Civ. App. 92 S.W. 2d 1057, 1070." ". . . An organised body with defined powers, meeting at certain times and places for the hearing and decision of causes and other matters brought before it, and aided in this, its proper business, by its proper officers, viz., attorneys and counsel to present and manage the business, clerks to record and attest its acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its commands, and secure due order in its pro-

ceedigs. Ex parte Gardner,, 22 Nev. 280, 39 p. 570 : Hertman v. Bertman 104 Cr. 423, 208 P. 580, 582."('). In short the accent i.s on the functional personality which is pivotal to securing justice to the people. 'PUrely administrative acts, Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edu. 425.

[ 1974] 2 s.c.R. like recruitments, transfers and postings, routine disciplinary action against ·subordinate staff, executive acts in running the establishment and ministerial business ancillary to oflice-keeping.-these are oommon to all departments in the public sector and mere!Ji because they relate to the judicial wing of government cannot enjoy a higher immunity from criticism. The quintessence ·of the contempt power is protection of the public, not judicial personnel. Excerpts from a few Anglo-

American authorities will attest our standpoint : "The object .of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of Court is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the. person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice." [Bowen,

L.J.-Helmore v. Smith ( 1887) 35 Ch. D; 449, 455] "The law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. "[Douglas, J, Cr/lig v.

Harney : 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)]. Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions. Just because the holders of judicial office are

identified with tb.e inlerests of justice they may forget their common human frailties and fallibilities. There have some- times been martinets upon the bench as there have also been pompous wielders of authority who have used the

para- phernalia of power in support of what they called their dignity. Therefore, judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt.

[Frankfurter, J., Bridges v. California (314 U.S. 252, 289 {1941)) If we accept this slant on judicialisation as a functional limitation on the contempt jurisdiction we must exclude from its ambit inter- ference with purely administrative acts of courts and non-judicial functions of judges. This dichotomy is implicit in the decided cases although the twilight of the Jaw blurs the dividing lines now and then. To cast the net wider is unreasonable and u.nwarranted by precedent. To treat, as the High Court has done, "the image and personality of the High Court as an integrated one" and to hold that every shadow that darkness it is contempt is to forget life,. reason and political pro- gress.

For, if a jndge has an integrated personality and his wife openly accuses him of neglect or worse, she would certainly reduce the confidence of the public in him as judge·! Will her accusation be personalised contempt? If a judge expresses on a platform crude views on moral lapses and is severe! y criticised in public for it, it will undoubtedly debunk him as a judge. Will such censure be branded contempt?

c c B. K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COIJJ!,T (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 311 As. early as 1892, the Privy Council in The matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands(') had to upset a sentence of indefinite imprisonment imposed by the Chief Justice of Bahmas on one Mr. Moseley for two 'letters to the editor' full of snub and sarcasm about Yelverton, Esq., Chief Justice. In these there was cynical re- ference to the Chief Justice's incompetence and imprudence, couch- ed in stinging satire. The Judicial Committee held :

"(a) That the letter signed "Colonist" in The Nassau Guardia11 though it might have been made the subject of proceedings for libel was not, in the circumstances, calcu- lated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of the law, and therefore did not

constitute a contempt of Court." The Attorney-General struck a sound note when in the course of the arguments he summed up the Jaw thus .: "A libel upon a judge, holding him up to contempt and

ridicule in his character as a judge, so as to lower him in the estimation .of the public amongst whom he exercises office is a contempt of court." (emphasis supplied) · Lord Atkin, in the celebrated case of Debi Prasad Sharma v. The King-Emperor('),

where ·the printer, publisher and editor of the Hitrctusta:n !imes were lound guilty of contempt by the Allahab.ad High Court for criticising ·the Chief Justice by falsely imputing to him · a circular communication to the subordinate judiciary to raise collec- tions for the war fund, set asida the conviction holding that the pro- ceedings in contempt were misconceived.

The learned Law ·Lord observea: "When the comment in question in the present case is examined it is fourid that there is no criticism of aj. 'y judicial act of the-Chief Justice, or 3111)' imputation on ibiJ#i for any- thing done or omitted to be done bj him in the administra- tion of justice.

It can hardly be said that there is ani cri- ticism of him in his administrative capacity, for, as far as their Lordships have been informed, the administrative control of the subordinate courts of the Province whatever it is, is exercised, not by the Chief Justice, but by the court over which he presides.

The appellants a:re not charged with saying anything in contempt of the subordinate courts or the administration of justice by them. In truth,, the Chief Justice is alleged, untnily, as is now admitted, to have committed an ill-advised· act in writing to his subordinate judges asking (as the news item says), enjoining (as the

comment says) them to collect for the War Fund. If the facts were as alleged they admitted of criticism. No doubt it is galling for any judicial personage to be criticised-publicly ·as having done something outside his judicial proceedings which was ill-advised or indiscreet.

But judicial personages can afford not to be too sensitive. A simple denial in public (!) [1S93]'A.C. 139, 149. (2) (1942) 7Q I.A. 216. 8-,22SCl/74 [ 1974] 2 S.C.R. of the alleged request would at once have allayep the trou- ble. If a judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect

the administration of justice he has the ordinary remedies for defamation if he should feel impelled to use them." The whole emphasis and ratio of the decision consists in the im' pugned editorial not being an attack on the administration of justice and, therefore, not amounting to contempt of court. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, stressed the significance of the passing observation made in the judgment that

the administrative control of the subordinate judiciary vested in the whole court and not only in the Chief Justice, and argued that by implication their Lordships must be deemed to have regarded animadversion on ev.en acts of administrative control as potential prey to the contempt law. An obscure reference to the Chief Justice not beihg even the exclusive administrative authority over the lower judiciary, meant perhaps to llring into bold relief the irrelevance of the criticism as reflecting even on the executive functions of the Chief Justice, cannot be considered to reach a reverse result, ignoring tho setting and the thrust of the whole dictum.

A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, in Kaviath Damoda- . ran v. lnduchoodan('), has relied on this Privy Council ruling for the proposition that administrative acts of the court-in that case the transfer of a Magistrate criticised as· promoted by extraneous pre- ssure–was not a fit subject for punitive action.

(In that case, of course, the contemnor was convicted for another publication). The deep concern of the law of contempt is to inhibit sqllying essays on the administration of justice in which the public have a vital- interest and not to warn oil or victimise criticisms, just or unjust, of judges as citizens, administrators, non-judicial authorities, etc.

K. L. Gauba's(') case was naturally pressed int'o service at the Bar ag&inst the contemnor but such an extreme case of wild and vicious attacks on the Chief Justice rarely serves in the search for any abiding principle in an excited setting.

That ruling reminds us t.hat, whatever the provocation, a Judge by reason of his office, has to halt at the gates of controversy but as enlightenment spreads and public opinion ripens

this judicial self-abnegation will be appreciated better and not "embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in soi:iety and to overthrow those institutions which have

hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil libertf." Again, while Young, C.J., in that case rules out the tenability o trut)J. as a valid defence against contempt actions, we observe, not without perti- nence in the constitutional context of restrictions on free expression having to be reasonable, that in most of the reported cases courts have hastened to hold the imputations false before proceeding to punish.

Contempt is no cover for a guilty judge to get away with it but a shield against attacks on public justice. Gauba's. case, on the facts, was a mud-slinging episode on the jndicial target as such–and the conviction accords with the policy of the law we have set out. (ll A.l.R. !961 Koral• 321.

(2) I.L.R. [1942] Lah. 411, 419. c , H B· x. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Krishna Iyer, J.) 313 A Division Bench of th~, Allahabad High Court, in Rex. v. B. S. Nayyar,( 1) had to deal with a representation by a litigant against a magistrate with reference to a case adversely decided, and Kidwai, J. cleared the confused ground right in the beginning by observiog : . "The first thing to be\remembered is that Courts are not conc~med with contempt of any authority except Courts of

law m the exercise of their judicial functions. Thus· any speech, writing or act which does not have the effect of interfering with the exercise of their judicial functions by the Courts cannot be the subjec.t of proceedings ill contempt. In India ve\y often the same officers exercise executive as well as judicial functions. · Sometimes it becomes difficult

to draw a distinction between their two capacities but neverthe- less a distinction must be drawn and it is only if the criticism is of judicial acts. that action by way of proceedings in con- tempt ma.y be taken."

A letter to the President of the Congress party complaining about the appointment of a judicial officer who was the brotherin-law of the Private Secretary of a Minister (belonging to that party) and of the transfer of cases to his Court wherein Congressmen were involved, waa sought to be punished as contempt of court. Kidwai, J, made the following useful remarks exonerating the contemnor :

"In this passage also the attack is on the appointment of the judicial officer and the transfer of cases to bun but there is no attack upon the officer himself. Both these attacks are upon the system and not upon any Magistrate in respect of

the performance by him of his judicial functions. They wish to see laid down a salutary principle by which justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. There

is no contempt of Court in this-rather it is an endeavour to free Courts from all extraneous shackles and proceedings to contempt are wholly uncalled for." The Judicial Committee in In re. S. B. Sarbadhicary( 2) considered the misconduct of a barrister for publishing an article ·where he cast reflections upon judges of the Allahabad High Court. The merits of the case apart, the Judicial Committee emphasized the judicial Cllpacity of the judges which attra.cte<t the contempt jurisdiction. Sir Andre~ Seoble observed :

… There is no doubt that the 'article in question was a libel reflecting not only upon Richards J., but other judges of the High Court in their judicial capacity and in reference to their conduct in the discharge of their p,ublic duties."

(emphasis added). "The public duty" in their "judicial capacity" was obviously in con" tra<listinction to merely personal activities or administrative functions. It is not as if a judge doing some non-judicial public duty is protected from criticism in which case 11ny action hr him as Dean of Law or Vice-Chancellor in a University or as Actmg Governor or President (1) A.l.R.1950 All. 549; 551, 555.

(2) (1906) 34 XX I A. 14. [ 1974 J 2 s.c.R. or Member of the Law or Finance Commission would ·also be punish- able ~ ?onten_ipt. The basic public duty of a judge in his judicial cap.ac1ty 1s to .d1sP".nse .public justice in court and anyone who obstructs or 1!1terferes. m. t.h1s area does ~o at his peril.

Likewise, personal be- haviour of 1ud1cial personnel, if criticized severely or even sinisterly cannot be countered by the weapon of contempt of court for to us~ the language of Mukherjee, J. in Brahma Prakash Sharm~ v. State of _Uttar Pradesh!(') "the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as. individuals"

(emphasis added). Otherwise, a grocer who sues a 1udge for price of goods with an imputation that the defendant has falsely and maliciously refused to honour the claim, or a servant of a judge who makes personal allegations of misconduct . against his master may be hauled up for contempt. This is no amulet worn by judges for all purposes. "The punishment is inflicted not for the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual judges of the Court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by compul- sion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the .Tribunal is undermined or impaired." (Vide para 9, Ha!sbury's Laws of England, 3rd &in. Vol. VIII). Indeed, if we peer through the mists of English Judicial history, Courte of record were not qua such courts, acting in any administrative capa- cities. How then could contempt action, going by genesis, be warrant· ed purely administrative matters of courts.

Of course, there have been cases sounding a different note. Jn State v. H. Nagamani,(') one Mr. Nagamani, an impetuous I.A.S. officer, wrote a letter making critical remarks couched in disrespectful and improper language about the inspection report of his court by a Judge of the High Court of Patna. However, Mr. Nagamani tendered an unqualified apology and the court discharged the rule for contempt since in their view the contempt. was purged by the apology. Of course, there was no need to consider in detail whether the letter reflecting upon the Judge who held the inspection was contempt; it was treated as such and the apology accepted. And the High Court's inspection of the judicial w?r~ ~f the sub-ordinate judiciary is a judi~ial function or is at least para-1ud1c1al. Th. e Allahabad High Court pumsla- ed the late Shri C. Y. Chintarnani and Shri K .D. Malaviya for pnb- lishing a criticism to the effect that comparatively undeserving lawyers were being frequently raised to the Bench.

The Court held them guilty of contempt holding the criticism of the judges as a vicious re- flection and a case of contempt. [see In the matter of an Advocate of Allahabad(')]. Borderline cases draw up to the pneurnbra of law and cannot light up dark corners.

· The learned Additional Solicitor General, in an endeavour to ex- pand the meaning of "administration of justicf'." so to rope in criticisms. of executive acts of judges, drew our attention to arts. '225, 227 and 235, and the provisions of earlier Government of India Acts ( c.f. sec. 224(1) 1935 Act) which vest the power to appoint the staff and do (I) [19S3) S.C.R. 1169.

(2) A.LR. 19S9 Pat, m (3) A.T.R. 1935 All. I. c c H.K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COUR'J: (Krishna Iyer,!.) . 315 other inci~enta1 mana&em~nt functions, in the High Court as part of the admllllstration of 1ustice. Several High Court Acts clothe Chief Justices with administrative powers and Civil Courts Acts and Letters Patents charge judges with administrative duties the goal

being effective administration of justice. If the appointment of clerks is part of th~ administration of justice, denunciation of the judges in t&ese acts mterferes with the administration of justice, liable to be visited with punishment. This means that if a judge in charge of appoint- . ments chooses relations or unqualified men or takes other considera- tion, the public must hold its tongue on pain of contempt. The para• mount but restrictive jurisdiction to protect the public against substan- tial iQ.terference with the stream of justice cannot be polluted or diffused into an intimidatory power for the judges to strike at adverse com- ments on administrative, legislative (as under arts. 225, 226 arid 227) and extra-judicial acts.

Commonsense and principle can certainly accept a valid administrative area so closely integrated with court work as to be stamped with judicial character such as constitution of benches, transfer of cases, issue of administrative directions regarding submission of findings or disposal of cases by subordinate courts, supervision of judicial work of subordinate courts and the like. Not everything cover- ed by art. 225, 227 and 235 will be of this texture. To overkill is to undermine-in the Jong run.

We may now sum up. Judges and Courts have diverse duties. But functionally, historically and jurisprudentially, the value which is dear to the community and the function which deserves to be cordoned off from public molestation, is judicial. Vicious criticism of 'personal and administrative acts of judges may indirectly mar their image and weaken the confidence of the public in the judiciary but the countervailing good, not merely of free speech but also of greater faith generated by exposure to the actinic light Qf bona fide, even if marginalliy over• zealous, criticism cannot be overlooked. Justice is

no cloistered virtue. Ill The .first part of the present case directly raises the question whe- ther statements made· in an appeal to the Governor against an order of the High Court on the administrative side attracts the contempt law. To our mind the answer arises from another question. Is the suspen- sion of the District Judge so woven into and integrally connected with the administration of justice that it can be regarded as not purely an administrative act but a para-judicial function ? The answer must, on the facts here, be in the affirmative. The appeal was against the suspension which was a preliminary to contemplated disciplinary ac- tion. What was that action about ? Against the appellant in bis judicial capacity, for acts of judicial misconduct. The control was, therefore, judicial and hence the unbridled attack on the High Court for the step was punishable as contempt. A large margin must be allowed for allegations in remedial representations but extravagance forfeits the protection of good faith· In this case reckless excess hall vitiated ·what otherwise could have been legitimate grievance at.least in one flagrant instance, the others being less clear.

One of the SUPREME COURT RE~ORTS [ 1974] 2 s.c.R. grounds for taking disciplinary action' was based on the disposal of a civil appeal by the contentnor as Additional District Judge. He heard it, delivered judgment dismissing the appeal, signed the order sheet and judgment and sealed the judgment. Later in the day, the con" temnor scored off his signatures in the order sheet and judgment, and returned the record to the principal District Judge for disposal falsely stating that the judgme~ had not been delivered. The High Court took the view that this action was without jurisdiction and revealed utter disregard of truth and procedure deserving disciplinary action. Obviously, the impugned conduct of the contemnor was qua judge and the evil criticism was of a supervisory act of the High Court and the critic would-and should-necessarily court contempt action. And in his memorandum of appeal the contemnor used expressions like 'ma/a- fides' and 'subterfuge' without good faith, and in such a case no shelter can be sought in the alibi of 'administrative act.'

The second part of the charge relates to objectionable statements in the special leave petition to this Court. Ordinarily they must be out of .bounds for the contempt power; for, fearless seeking of justice will otherwise be stifled.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shyam Sunder La/(1) a complaint about the conduct of a judicial officer in a petition to the Prime Minis- ter was held not to constitute contempt. The re.vresentation was forwarded by the Prime Minister's office to the Chief Secretary from whom it· reached the District Magistrate. Certainly there was there- fore sufficient publication in the law of libel but the Court held : "A letter sent to the Prime Minister and not intended to

be broadcast to the public or any section of the public cannot create an apprehension in the mind of public …. regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge.'' Similarly, in Rex. v. R. S. Nayyar,(2 ) the Court considered a re- presentation made to the Premier of the State about a judicial officer and also to the President of the All India Congress Committee. The Court took the view that such complaints may be addressed to the Premier about judicial officers since Government had to consider under the then rules the conduct of judicial personnel. "If these complaints are genuine and are made in a proper manner with the object of obtain- ing redress, and are not made mala fide with a view either to exert pressure upon the Court in the exercise of its judicial functions or to diminish the authority of the Court by vilifying it, it. would not be in furtherance of justiee to stifle them by means of summary action for contempt, but rather the reverse"

(emphasis added). A pregnant observation made by the Court deserves mention : "It would indeed be extraordinacy if the law should pro- vide a remedy-the conduct of even a member of the highest

Judicial Tribunal in the exercise of his judicial office may be the subject of enquiry with a view to see whether he is fit fo continue. to hold that office-and yet no one should be. able to initiate proceedings for an enquiry by a complaint (\) A.I.R. 1954 All 308.

(2) A.l.R. 1950 All. 549: 554. c p· c i. K. MISHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Kri3Fi.'la Iyer, J.) to the appropriate authority by reason of a fear of bein& : punished for contempt, and I can find no justification for this view."

At this stage it must be noticed that in the State of Madhya Pra- desh v. Ravi Shanker(') this Court ruled that aspersions of a serious nature made against a Magistrate in a transfer petition could be puni- shable as a contempt if made without goOd faith. However, in Govind Ram v. State of Maharashtra,(') this Court reviewed the deeisions on the point and ruled that if in the garb of a transfer application scurri- lous attacks were made on a· court. imputing improper motives to the Judge there may still be contempt of court, although the court referred with approval to the ruling in Swarnamayi Panigrahi v. B. Nayak( 8 ) that a latitudinarian approach was permissible in transfer applications. The core of the pronouncement is that a remedial process like a trans- fer application cannot be a mask to malign a judge, a certain generosity or indulgence is justified in evaluating the allegations against the judge. Eventually, Grover J., held that the allegations made in the proceed- ing in question were not sufficiently serious to constitute contempt. A liberal margin is permissible in such cases but batting within the crease and observing the rules of the game are still necessary; Irrele- vant or unvarnished imputations under the pretext of grounds of appeal amount to loul play and perversion of legal process. Here, the author, a senior judicial officer who professionally weighs hi~· thoughts and . words, has no jµstification for the immoderate abuSe he has resorted to. In this sector even truth is no defence, as in the case of criminal insult-in the latter because it may produce ·violent breaches and is · forbidden in the name of public peace, and in the former because it may demoralise the community about courts and Is forbidden in the interests of .public justice as contempt of court.

Even .so, if judges have frailitleS-'-41fter all they are human-they need to be corrected by independent criticism. If the judicature ha9, serious shortcomings which demand systemic. correction through socially-0riented reforms initiated through constructive criticism, the contempt power should not be an interdict. All this, far. from under- mllling the confidence of the public in courts, enhances it and, in the last· analysis, cannot be repressed by indiscriminate resort to contempt power. Even bodies like the Law Commission or the Law Institute and rosearchers, legal and sociological, may npi 'contempt' risks be- cause their professional work sometimes involves unpleasant criticism of jud~ judicial processes and the system itself and thus hover perilo

around the periphery of the law if widely construed. Creative legal jo rnalism and activist statesmanship for judicial reform cannot be jeopardised by an undefined apprehension of contempt action. Even in England a refreshingly pro-free-speech approach has been latterly adopted. · Az!y episode in the administration of justice may be· H · publicly or privately criticised, provided that the criticism is fair and . (I) (t9S9i S.C.ll. 1361.

(2) [19721 1 S.C.C. 749. (3) A.l.R. t9S9 Orissa 89. SUPB.EMB COURT RBPOJlTS ( 1974 J 2 S.C.R. temperate · and made in good faith. Lord Denning, in the famous Quintin Hogg case(!) laid down remarkable guidelines in the matter of actions for contempt. The learned Law Lord said :

"It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us but which we will most sparingly exercise; more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter. Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own ·dignity. That must rest on

surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more imrrtant at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itsel . It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken com-

ment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our .decisions erro- neous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we

would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criti- cisins. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still Jess into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself , to. be its own vindication.

Exposed as we are to tbe winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires,

· ptovided that it is pertinent to the ·matter in hand. Silence is not 'an option when things are ill done." This Court has held that .the Jaw of contempt is valid notwith- standing art. 19(1). the contention was persisted in C. K. Daphtary v. 0. P. Gupta.(')

This Court came to the conclusion that the existing law of contempt imposes reasonable restrictions within the meaning or art. 19(2). "Apart from this, the Constitution makes this Cottrt a guardian of fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution and it would not desire to enforce any law which

imposes unreasonable restrictions on the precious right of freedom of. speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution." (Sikri C.J.) The Court being the guardian of people's rights, it has been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised "with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond reason- able doubt (vide R. v. Gray)(•)

(1) (1968) 2 W.L.R. 1204: 1205-07. (2) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1132-1141, para 52. (3) [1900] 2 O.B. 36. c c B· K. MlSHRA v. REG. ORISSA HIGH COURT (Krishna Iyer, I.) 319 The policy directive can be gleaned from the ruling in Special Referen~e No. 1 of 1964(') where Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed :

"We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautionsly, wisely,. and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain_the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely.

Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dginity and status of their office is to deserve res'pect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessne~s. fairness and objectivity o[ their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum

which they observe in th'eir judicial conduct." If judges decay the contempt power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that judges, like Caesar's wife, must be

above suspicion. To wind up, the key word is "justice", not "judge"; the key-note thought is unobstructed, public justice, not the self-defence of a judge; the corner-stone of the contempt Jaw is the accommodation of two con- stitutional values-the right of free speech and the right to indcpen· dent justice.

The ignition o! contempt action should be substantial and ma/a fide interference with fearless judicial action, not fair com· ment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel. We have sought to set our legal sights in line with the new consti- tutional order and endeavoured so to draw the grey contours of the .contempt law that it fulfils its high purpose but the more. We have

tried to avoid subjedtivism in the law, recognising by a re-statement, · the truth that "the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.( 2)" The facts of the present case disclose that an incorrigible contem- nor, who had made it almost his latter-day professional occupation to cross the High Court's path, has come to this Court in appeal. He

has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining the High Court's authority in his intemperate averments in both petitions. But having regard to the fact that he is a senior judicial officer who has at some stage in his career displayed zeal and industry and is now in the (I) [1965) I S.C.R. 413 ; 'so1.

(2) Benja1nin N. Cardozo-The Nature of the Judicial Process- N~w Haven : Yale University Press-Page 163. [ 1974 j 2 S.C.R. sombre evening of an official career, a punishment short of imprison- ment would have met the ends of justice and inspired in the public mind confidence in the justice administration by shol\'ing that even delinquent judges will be punished if they play with or pervert the due course of justice, as the contemnor here has done.

A heavy hand is wasted severity where a lighter sentence may serve as well. A fine of Rs. 1000/- with three months' imprisonment in default of payment '!. will meet the ends of justice and we impose this sentence in substi· tution of the infliction of imprisonment by the High Court. With

this modification Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1973 is dismissed. On the appeal by the State the course adopted in the leading judgment of Palekar J. has our concurrence. Appeal No. 41 dismissed.

P.B.R. Appeal No. 77 allowed to be withdra>rn. c