Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
1. That in the month of December, 1951, res- pondent No. 1 has been to the premises of Akola Shree Gurudwara, where the Local Sikh Community had assembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh. At this meet- ing respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself and paid Rs. 201/-, apparently as donation to the Gurudwara, but really as gift for inducing the Sikh Community in the Akola Constituency in general and the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. Similar instances of giving illegal gratifications for securing votes of respective groups arc- (a) Donation to Hariharpeth Akhada ; 2S.C.R. (b) Payment to Panch-bungalow Committee of Bhangis of Old City. ( c) Donation to Bhaji Bazar Association. ( d) Distrib~tion of blankets and sanes and money to voters.
2. At the instance of respondent No. 1 a meet- ing of workers in Berar Oil Industries-a concern of Birla, was called by its manager on the eve of the dection and they were threatened to vote for respon- dent No. 1 on pain of losing their service or suffer pecuniary loss, in case they did not vote for respon- dent No. 1. The poster of the rival candidate affixed ,on the post-office within the premises of the Berar Oil Industries was removed and stolen away.
3. Respondent No. 1 caused groups and sections of castes and communities, such as Bohara, Lohars, Marwaries, Muslims, Rajasthanies, Bhangies, to issue appeals stating that resolutions were passed for voting for respondent No. 1, coercing the voters by threats, ,etc., to vote for respondent No. 1 and openly canvas- sing on communal and caste lines and using undue influence.
4. Issuing pamphlets and handbills without names of printer or publisher.
5. At the time of counting votes in Polling Sta- tion No. 53, several folded bundles amounting to -about 20 in number, of ballot papers were found in the ballot box of respondent No. 1, when it was opened for counting votes. This was noted by the Returning Officer. Each bundle consisted three or more than three ballot papers, folded to gether. Obviously each of the bundl.! of these. ballot papers were put in the ballot box by one person, as the ballot papers put in the ballot box by different voters could not auto- matically fold themselves into a compact bundle in the ballot box. The ballot papers issued to voters were not put in the box by the voters themselves, but were illegally brought back by the voters and handed over to persons working for and on behalf or respon- dent No. 1 on payment of illegal gratification. These ballot papers thus collected were bundled together ,56 Bhikaji KeJhao Joshi and another Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and ot!rtrl Jagannadhadas J. Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and another v. Brijlal Nartdlal Biyani and olhtrs [1955J and put in the ballot box by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 by taking illegal grati- fications. This was done· on 31st December, 1951, at Chandur by persons with the connivance of respon- dent No. 1.
6. False personation of several dead voters and voters absent in Pakistan has taken place, in Ward No. 12 and 15.
7. The respondent No. 1 resorted to false propa- ganda. His man announced on loud speakers from place to place that rival candidate Dr. Joglekar was of the caste and party of Godse, the murderer of M. Gandhi and a vote for him was a vote for Gandhi's Murderer. Another false propaganda was that Dr. Joglekar was Mishra's man, supported by Mishra's money. Lectures for respondent No. 1 in public meetings, including respondent No. 1 have freely made these false defamatory and malicious statements against Dr. Joglekar, the rival candidate and thus prejudiced the prospects of Dr. Joglekar's election. Personal character and conduct of Dr. Joglekar was also falsely attacked, thus prejudicing his prospects of election.
8. Voters were carried in hired carts at many polling stations, particularly at Kapshi Polling Sta- tion. This was arranged by persons working for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 at his expense and con- nivance. A written objection for police enquiry was given at Kapshi and one in Rifle Range area.
9. Respondent No. 1 spent lacs of rupees over his election transgressing the prescribed limit of Rs. 6,000. He has given a totally untrue .return of elec- tion expenses. This is in contravention of law. 10. Mohota Mills released workers and paid them for canvassing work for respondent No. 1 on polling day. Substitutes for these workers were en- gaged by the mills and they were also paid. This was done at .the instance of respondent No. l". There can be no doubt that almost all the instances herein-above set out are extremely vague and lack sufficient particulars. Learned counsel for the appel- 2 S.C.R. lants invited our attention to the fact that the Tribu- nal, while considering the question of vagueness dealt only with the instances of corrupt practices specified in paragraphs l(a), l(b), l(c), l(d), 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and not others. He accordingly contended that, by implication, the Tribunal was not prepared to hold that items mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 9 and 10 were vague. He urged that at least these four items must be taken not to be vague and that there is no reason why the petitioners should not have been called upon to amend the schedule by furnishing better particulars as to the rest. He further urged that, at any rate, they were entitled to a trial in respect of those four items of corrupt practices. We cannot agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the items set out in paragraphs 3, 9 and 10 are not vague. There is no specification therein of the requisite details which the Act in terms requires. Section 83(2) re- quires not only what may reasonably be considered "full particulars" having regard to the nature of each allegation, but enjoins in terms that the following particulars should also be given. (1) Names of the parties alleged to have committed the corrupt or illegal practice. (2) The date of the commission of each such corrupt or illegal practice. (3) The place of commission of each such corrupt or illegal practice. There can be no reasonable doubt that the require- ment of "full particulars" is one that has got to be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarifica- tion so as to enable the opposite-party fairly to meet them and that they must be such as not to turn the enquiry before the Tribunal into a rambling and rov- ing inquisition. On a careful scrutiny of the list in Schedule A we are satisfied that none of the items except that which is set out in paragraph 1 of item No. 1 can be said to comply with the requirements of section 83(2). In this view of -the contents of Sche- dule A, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even so the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to furnish better parti- culars as regards all the other items, by virtue of the powers conferred on it under section 83(3), and in the 10-83 S.C. lndia/59 B'""4ji K11hoo ]Olm atuJ _,,,,.. .,.. Brijlal N aMlal I Bi1oni ottd olhm J«gotinodhadu J. Bhikaji Kesh4o ]Dlhi and another v, Brijlal }fandlal Biyani and olher1 Jagannadhadas J. [1955] alternative, it should have at least called upon them to substantiate the allegation in paragraph 1 in item No. 1, which was sufficiently specific and which, if made out, might have resulted in the election being set aside. On the question whether or not the Tribunal should have called upon the petitioners to amend the schedule by furnishing better particulars, the learned Attorney-General for the 1st respondent has invited our attention to the objection taken in the written statement as regards the vagueness of the, particulars and to the various orders made by the Tribunal as appears from the order-sheet of the, .case. In the written statement of the 1st respondent-: paragraph 9 is as follows : "9. (a) It is, further, submitted that the peti- tion ought to be dismissed as it does not contain concise statement of material facts on which the peti- tioners rely. Similarly the list of particulars given in the schedule or in the petition are not in compliance with section 83(2). (b) Without prejt.dice to the generality of this objection, it is further submitted that para V of peti- tion read with para VI ( e) will show that the parti- culars given in Schedule relate to corrupt and illegal practices alleged to have been committed by respon- dent No. 1 and by his agents and persons working on behalf of respondent No. 1 with his connivance. Such particulars are bad in law. The applicants are bound to state the names of the persons who are alleged to have actually committed the corrupt or illegal prac- tice. ( c) Paras 1 and 2 of the petition allege that there was no free election by reason of general bribery and undue influence exercised by and on behalf of respondent No. 1. Similarly the allegation in para 2 is that the coercion was the result of manipulation by or at the instance of respondent No. 1. Thus these allegations must be supported by giving the necessary particulars regarding the names, date and place of commission of corrupt or illegal practice alleged. The allegations in paras 1 and 2 of the petition are allega- tior.s of corrupt and illegal practice within the mean- 2S.C.R. ing of sections 123, 124 and 125 of the Act, and are not allegations of a general charactj:r which do not implicate the candidate personally. ( d) Further by way of example, para 1 of the schedule, no names, date of the alleged practices are given. Same is the case with the · allegations in paras 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 . ( e) It is for the petitioners to satisfy the Elec- tion Commission and the Tribunal that the particulars given are according to law. This has not been done and the petition, therefore, ought to be dismissed on this ground". Now the order-sheet of the proceedings before the Tribunal discloses the following. By order dated the 16th October, 1952, the Tribunal decided that the case was in the first instance to be taken up for deci- sion on the preliminary issues. Having so decided it passed the following order: "We call upon the parties whether they want to add by way of amendment to the pleadings on facts which they have already made, as in some of the preliminary points the question of fact is involved. The respondents do not want to add to their pleadings on facts in respect of the above preliminary issues. The petitioners have made an application under Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code for striking out spmc i}ortion in paras 3-b and para 4-(d) (2) of the written statement of the respondent No. 1". On. the 17th January, 1953, the Tribunal passed the following order: "The respondent No. 1. prays for time to amend his written-statement and to ask for particulars. In the interests of justice the time is granted …. The application for amendment and for particulars to be filed five days before the date of hearing and copies thereof given to the petitioners. The petitioners shall be ready with their replies on the date of hearing". On the 27th January, 1953, the order is "The petitioners have filed their reply to the amendment application of the respondent No. 1. The BJ.ikaji Kesh.a Joshi aN/ anollllr v. Brijlal Nandltd Bi1atti and olhert Jagannadhadas ]. ll/rikqji Kn/tao ]DJ/ri """ – v. Brjjlol NllllllW Bi1alli and olhns Jllplrl1ltldWas ]. ·+14 [19551 latter has amended his application, to· which there was no objecion". On the 29th January, 1953, the order is "The petitioners do not want to amend their pleadings in view of the amendment of the written statement". In view of the specific objection taken in the written statement and the opportunities which the petitioners had for amending the petition which the above orders disclose, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the pet1ttoners, for some reasons best known to themselves, have come forward with a somewhat irresponsible petition and that while the Court has undoubtedly the power to permit amendment of the schedule of corrupt practices by permitting the furnishing of better particulars as regards the items therein specified, there was no duty cast upon the Tribunal to direct suo motu the furnishi.ng of the better particulars. It is true that the petitioners in the reply that they filed to the written statement of the 1st respondent and in answer ·to the objection that the particulars as to the alleged corrupt practices were vague, said as follows : "The petitioners are prepared to give further particulars if the Tribunal is pleased to permit under section 83(3) of the Representation of the People Act". This reply was filed on the 16th October, 1952, which is the very date on which the first of the above orders extracted from the order-sheet was passed. It is also true that the order dated the 17th January, 1953, shows that the respondent No. I at one stage, indi- cated an intention .. · himself. to ask for particulars. But ':i a matter of/this kind the primary responsibility for furnishing ·full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and to file a petition in full compliance with section 83(2) of the Act was on the petitioners. While undoubtedly the Tribunal has, in our opinion, ·taken all too narrow a view of their function in deal- ; ng with the various alleged defects in the petition and in treating them as sufficient for dismissal, the petitioners are not absolved from their duty to 2 S.C.R. comply, of their own accord, with the requirements of section 83(2) of the Act and to remove the defects when opportunity was available. They cannot take shelter behind the fact that neither the Tribunal nor the respondent No. 1 has, in terms, called upon them to furnish better particulars. The position, therefore, on the question of com- pliance or otherwise of the requirements of section 83 of the Act is that (1) the verifications in the petition and schedule are defective inasmuch as the dates thereof are not specified, and (2) the schedule of parti- culars consists of a number of items of which only one at best could have been taken up for inquiry by the Tribunal. But all the rest were not only extremely vague but no amendment was applied for nor was an opportunity for amendment of pleadings in general, open on two occasions, availed of. Learned counsel for the appellants urges that however this may be, there Was no justification for the Tribunal dismissing the petition in toto and that it was bound to have called upon the petitioners to substantiate the first allegation by evidence after striking out, if need be, the rest of the particulars, under the powers vested in it under Order VI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand the learned Attorney-General for the respondent No. 1 urges that in such a situation it was open to the Tribunal to consider whether, taking the petition as a whole and in its total effect, there was substantial compliance with the require- ments of section 83. He contends that if, in exercise · _ of its judgment, it thought ·that there was substantial non-compliance, notwithstanding that one out of the various items may have been specific, it was not bound to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners by ordering a striking out of the various items and to direct the trial of the petition to be confined to one single item which may be in order. The learned Attorney-General urgues that this would be really making out for the petitioners a different petition from what they brought up before the Election Com- mission and that in this class of case$ the Tribunal had the right and the duty to exercise great strictness J55 ' B/tikqji Ka!IM Joshi and anolhlr v. 11'ijlal N and14l Bipi and OIMn Jagannadhadas J. (1955] .1955 in order that the machinery for setting aside elections might not be abused for the purpose of maligning the Bhikajf Keshao Joshi and another successful candidate _by levelling vague and irrespon- v. sible. charges against him. _ \Vhile there is consider- . Bdjlal Nandlal able force in this argument,. we think ·that in a case Biyani and others of this kind the Tribunal when dealing with the -;;: d J matter .in the early stages should riot have dismissed aganna a as • th'e application~ It should have exerCised its powers and called for better particulars. On non-compliance therewith, it should have ordered a striking out of such of the.'charges which remained vague and called upon the petitioners ·to substantiate the allegations in respect-of those which were reasoncibly specific. \Ve are, therefore, of the opinion that the order of the .tribunal in dismissing the petition outright was clearly erroneous. : Notwithstanding this opinionwe -\vould, in the normal course,. not have felt called upon to interfere fo this case under article 136 after this lapse of time arid at the instance of persons like the appellants before us who are mere voters having no direct personal interest in the result of the election.· But there is one other circumstance .in· this case which we.have noticed and which we feel 'we ought not to overlook, though in the course of, the argu- ments the same was riot brought to our notice. Para~ graphs 6(a), (b) and (c) _of the application for setting aside the election sets out certain_ grounds of alleged disqualification of the returned candidate to stand for the election. · It is also stated therein that objections in this _behalf were taken at the. time of scrutiny of the nomination papers bufthat they were summarily ,ov:erruled by the Returning Officer. without any enquiry and that accordingly the objections to the · ._. _ disqualification have been raised in the ,application. · The objections are as follows: … 6. The material facts in support of the grounds are as follows:~ . ' ' · · (a) The .election of candidate for the Madhya Pradesh State Assembly in the single member Akola Constituency was announced to be held on31-12-1951. N:ominations were to be filed qn or before 15-11-1951; 2 S.C.R. and scrutiny of nomination was due on 17-11-1951. At this time of scrutiny objection was taken to the nomination paper of respondent No. 1 on several grounds but the material grounds were that respon- dent No. 1 was disqualified for being chosen as and for being a Member of Madhya Pradesh State Assembly under Chapter III, section 7 ( d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951). That the respondent No. 1 is disqualified to fill the seat under the Act, because he is the Managing Agent or Manag- ing Director of Rajasthan Printing and (Litho Works -private limited company under the Indian Com- panies Act. He has, as a share-holder and director, interest, in contracts for supply of goods, viz. sta- tionery, paper and printing materials, etc., to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. He has also interest in contracts for the execution of works or performance of services, such as printing; etc., under- taken by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. The respondent No. 1 gets a share by way of com- mission on sales effected by the Limited Company He has, therefore, by himself interest in the contracts of the company with the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. (b) The respondent No. 1 is a partner in the firm Berar General Agency. The said firm has entered into a contract for the performance of cloth distri- bution on behalf of the State Government to retailers and holds a licence for the same. The respondent No. 1, therefore, has interest by himself in the said contract for the performance of services unpertaken bv the Government. ( c) The respondent No. 1 is the proprietor of the monthly Journal "Prawaha" and a by-weekly paper "Matru-bhumi" These publications print Govern- ment advertisements on contract basis. The respondent No. 1 has, therefore, interest in the said contract for the performance of services under- taken by the State Government Madhya Pradesh. The income derived from these contracts by the res- pondent No. 1 are noted in the private accounts of Bltikaji K.sliao Juhi and anotlrlr v. Brjjlal N and/al Biyani and ot/rlrs Jazannadhadas J. Bltiiqji K1Moo .]ol/ti """~ /hiflal NOIUll4l BIJOni and otlrlrs j111~j. [1955] the respondent No. 1 and their details are shown in the profit and loss . statements filed with income-tax return of the respondent No. 1 for the relevant year and current year. The sales and other details of the "Matru-bhumi" concern are noted in the private accounts of the res- pondent No. L These objections were summarily overruled by the Returning Officer, without any inquiry or any reason". These allegations, if made out with such further de- tails as may be necessary, might well prove serious and bring about the setting aside of the election of the returned candidate . The 1st respondent in answer to these allegations states as follows: "It is denied that there was any improper accept- ance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 1 and in particular it is denied that any of the allega- tions made in paragraph 6(a), (b) & (c) of the peti- tion constitute in law a disqualifications of section of the Representation of the People Act. Without pre- judice to this it is submitted that the respondent No. 1 was not suffering from any of these disqualifi- cations in fact on the date of the submission of the nomination paper". Having regard to the nature of the alleged disqualifi- cation, which is substantially to the effect that the returned candidate had interest in contracts with the Government at the relevant dates, it was very neces- sary that the matters should have been cleared up in the enquiry before th~ Election Tribunal. It is not in the interest of purity of elections that such allega- tions oi disqualification should be completely ignored without cnqufry and it appears rather surprising that the Tribunal should have ignored them and exercised its powcc to dismiss the petition. However reluctant ·we might be to interfere in a matter like this after the lapse of three years and four months and with only an year and eight months before the general elections, we feel constrained to send this matter back for due aiquicy. But bc£«e doing so and in view of the delay and other circumstances that have already happened, 2 S.C.R. we, in exercise of the powers which the Tribunal in •he normal course might itself have exercised, direct the striking out of all the items of alleged corrupt practices set out in Schedule A excepting the one covered by paragraph 1 of item 1, i.e., as follows: "That in the month of December, 1951, respon- dent No. 1 had been to the premises of Akola Shree Gurdwara, where the Local Sikh Community had as- sembled to listen to the recitation of the holy book 'Granth Saheb' on the 7th day of the death of daughter of one Sardar Suratsingh. At this meeting respondent No. 1 canvassed for votes for himself and paid Rs. 201, apparently as donation to the Guru- dwara, but realy as gift for inducing the Sikh Com- munity in the Akola constituency in general and the Sikhs assembled in particular to induce them to vote for himself at the ensuing election. Respondent No. 1 was guilty of bribery within the meaning of that term in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act". The case will, therefore, go back for enquiry and trial with reference only to (1) the allegations in para- graphs 6(a), (b) and (c) of tbe application for setting aside the election, and (2) the allegations in para- graph 1 of item 1, in Schedule A attached to the ap- plication as set out above. The Election Commissioner will now reconstitute an appropriate Tribunal for the purpose. The Tribu- nal when constituted and before proceeding to trial will call upon the petitioners to rectify the lacuna as to dates in the verification clauses in the petition and the schedule. It is to be hoped that the fresh pro- ceedings before the Tribunal will be disposed of at a very early date. The appeal is allowed as stated above but in the circumstances without costs. Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and anolhu v. Brijlal N andlal Bi1ani and others Jagannadharlas ].