Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
43. Serious issues have been raised by learned senior [2010) 10 S.C.R. counsel appearing for the appellants, submitting that inquest report was defective as there has been much irregularity in the inquest itself. Undoubtedly, three Investigating Officers, namely, T. Shanmugaiah, Police Inspector (PW.116); S. Palanimuthu (PW.121); and John Basha (PW.122) had conducted the B investigation at the initial stage. The occurrence was so ugly and awful that the I.Os. had conducted the investigation under great anxiety and tension. The seizure memos were also prepared in the same state of affairs. Therefore, when the investigation had been conducted in such a charged c atmosphere, some irregularities were bound to occur. There is ample evidence on record to show that after burning of the University bus, when the students came to know that three girls had been charred and large number of girl students had suffered . burn injuries, they became so violent that they damaged the ambulance which had been brought to take bodies of the deceased girls for conducting autopsy. The State Authorities, a~er keeping all these factors in mind anq realizing that the ·investigation had not been conducted in proper manner, had taken a decision to transfer t.he investigation to the CBCID. E Therefore, the irregularities committed in the investigation by the earlier I. Os. has too little relevance on the merits of the case. The evidence collected by the said three I.Os. was not worth placing reliance on and has rightly been not relied upon by the subsequent Investigating Officer.
44. There may be highly defective investigation in a case. However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse by the 1.0. and whether due to such lapse any benefit should be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground G for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency or H omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investig~tion, there C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 301 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine the prosecution evidence de hors such lapses, carefully, to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal trial. The conclusion of the trial in the case cannot be allowed t<? depend solely on · the probity of investigation. (Vide Chandra Kanth Lakshmi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 220; Kamel Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 5 SCC 518; Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1850; Paras Yadav v. c State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 644; State of Kflrnataka v. K. Yai'appa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185; Amar Singh v. Ba/winder Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1164; Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1051; and Ram Bali v. State of UP., AIR 2004 SC 2329). Arrest of A-4
45. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel has raised the issue vehemently that arrest of C. Muniappan (A.4) is totally false. However, the evidence on record reveals that he was arrested at 1.30 a.m. on 3.2.2000, as is evident from the evidence of D. Poongavanam (PW.108), according to which when he was attending patrol duty along with other police officials on the highway from Dharmapuri to Tirupathur, near P. Mottupatti lake bridge, he got information that some one was present beneath the bridge. Thus, the said witness went to the place along with the other officers and he was taken into police custody in Crime No.115/2000 of Mathikonepalayam Police Station under .Section 151 Cr.P.C. read with Section 7(1)(A) of C.L. Act, and thus he was sent to jail. He had been released on bail on 9.2.2000 and the 1.0. had been searching for him and he was arrested at New Bus Stand, Salem, where the Dharmapuri bus was to be parked, by P. Krishnaraj (PW.109). He tendered a confessional statement which was recorded in presence of Revenue Inspector, Manickam and Village Administrative Officer, C. Ramasundaram (PW.87). (2010) 10 S.C.R. There has been no cross-examination independently on behalf of A.4 on this issue. Even in cross-examination on behalf of other accused nothing has been elicited qua irregularity or improbability of the arrest of A.4. Therefore, we do not see any reason to disbelieve the arrest of C. Muniappan (A.4) as shown B by the 1.0.
46. So far as the issue of damage to the buses and the main incident of setting the bus on fire are concerned, both the courts have proceeded on the finding, after appreciating the entire evidence on record, that there was no common object C between Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) and the other accused regarding murder of the students and burning of the bus. Therefore, all of them had been convicted under different sections. However, the High Court directed the sentence to run concurrently so far as D A.1, A.5 to A.14, A.16 to A.21, A.23 to A.26 and A.28 to A.31 are concerned. There has been sufficient material to show participation in- the "Rasto Roko Andolan" and indulging in the incident of damaging the local route bus. Both courts have recorded the concurrent findings of fact in this regard. We have also gone through the evidence. Their presence is established on the spot and we do not see any reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded in that respect. We do not find any material on record, which may warrant interference with the said findings.
47. So far as A.2 to A.4 (Nedu, Madhu and C. Muniappan respectively) are concerned, the Trial Court recorded the following findings of fact:- "Accused 2 and 3 had poured petrol into the bus through the front door steps and set fire to it resulting in the death of the abovesaid three students and causing injuries to some of the students. Knowing that students are inside the bus, they had set fire to the bus as stated above, knowing fully well that some of the students or all the inmates of the bus would meet their death inside the bus. Nobody could C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 303 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] deny this fact. There was clear intention on the part of A2 and A3 to kill the inmates of the bus and thus A2 and A3 have murdered three girl students with the intention of killing them. Hence A2 and A3 are liable to be punished u/s 302 IPC (3 counts) ……………. Presence of the 4th accused in the occurrence place has been amply proved. Though the fact that he gave matchbox to A2 to set fire to the bus had not been established, yet the fact that he aided A2 and A3 to come to the occurrence place in his motor cycle after the occurrence is over, is clearly proved, because he was the person who drove the motor cycle and thus aided A2 and A3 in the commission of the offence u/ s 4 of the TNP (POL) Act and 302 IPC and 114 IPC could be invoked in this case since as per Section 107 IPC vide third definition whoever intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission the doing of the thing is an offender as defined in 107 IPC. Hence, A4 Muniappan has committed the offences punishable u/~ 4 of TNP (POL) Act r/w 114 IPC and 302 IPC r/w 114 IPC (3 counts). Further, the High Court after appreciating the evidence on record found that :- "The identification of the A2 to A4 by the witnesses coupled with the evidence of the learned Magistrate PW- 89 and the reports of PW89 produced in Exs.
P-137 and P-142 would go a long way to show that A-2 to A-4 were involved in the crime as spoken to by the prosecution witnesses." From the record, it is evident that so far as A2 to A4 are concerned, their involvement in the incident has been substantiated by the evidence of PWs.61,62,63,97&99 G (Santhamurthy, Madhaiyan, G. Manickam, Udayasuriyan and R. Karunanidhi respectively) as some of those said witnesses had identified D.K. Rajendran, Nedu, Madhu, C. Muniappan, D.K. Murugesan, D.A. Dowlath Basha, (A.1 to A.6 respectively), K. Ravi (A.9), Sampath (A.13), K. Chandran (A.21), R. Chellakutty (A.22), K. Mani (A.24), K. Veeramani (A.30) & Udayakumar (A.31). All the witnesses have also deposed that some of the members had been in the demonstration while K. Mani (A.24) damaged the Hosur bus stand. M. Kaveri (A.23) prevented the people from dousing the fire.
48. In view of the fact that Udayasuriyan (PW.97) and Ft Karunanidhi (PW.99) had not been dis-believed by th~ court below and their evidence was found natural and trustworthy as they did not falsely implicate all the accused for causing damages to the bus and they were local and independent C witnesses and knowing some of the accused persons; the High Court held as under: "Though, both the witnesses have spoken about the demonstration and implicated most of the accused, they have spoken only about Nedu (A.2) for having set fire to the Route No.7-8 town bus and there is absolutel~o material to show as to i,oyhy both PWs 97 & 99 sh.ould ' falsely implicate Nedu (A.2). Equally, for the same reason, the implication of M. Kaveri (A.23) for having prevented the persons in and around the bus from dousing the fire also cannot be dis-believed. There is ample evidence to show that Nedu (A.2) and M. Kaveri (A.23) were part of the demonstrators as has been stated by some of the witnesses. In fact, PW.62 stated that even when he saw the demonstrators sitting on the road, he also saw the damaged buses parked nearby. None of the witnesses have implicated any of the accused except Nedu (A.2) and M. Kaveri (A.23) for causing damage to the buses. Though, PW.97 implicated K. Mani (A.24) as well for causing damage to the bus, A.24 was not spoken to by PW.99. In the absence of any corroboration, it cannot be held that K. Mani (A.24) also damaged the bus.
49. Therefore, the presence of the accused had also been established by press and media persons who were p~ent at the scene of the occurrence, as well as by tfle complainant, and C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 305 [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] those persons had not named all the accused for setting the bus on fire and only few of them had been involved. But as the said_ persons were not having any arm/weapon, the offence of Section 148 IPC was not found sustainable and thus, their conviction under Section 148 IPC has been rightly set aside. Some of the accused had been convicted under Section 147 s IPC.
50. It has been submitted that the witnesses PWs. 1, 2 and 4 have not disclosed the identities of the accused at the initial stage of investigation. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon for conviction of A.2 to A.4. However, it has been proved that there was no initial investigation and therefore the question of disclosing identity of the accused to Shri Shanmugaiah (PW.116), who had done the initial investigation, could not arise. More so, as has been mentioned hereinabove, the initial investigation was conducted in a panicked situation, therefore, the government thought it proper to scrap it out and hand over to a higher officer through the CBCID. The presence of A.2 to A.4 .with the other accused at the place of agitation stands established.
51. R. Karunanidhi (PW.99) had spoken aboutA.2 to A.4. He is an advocate and belongs to Dharamapuri. He has deposed that Nedu (A.2) had set the fire to the Route No.7-B town bus. He has also corroborated the evidence of Udayasuriyan (PW.97) that while the bus was in flames, some persons tried to douse the fire but they were prevented by M. Kaveri (A.23). Nedu (A.2) remained present in the earlier occurrence as well as the subsequent occurrence.
52. We cannot ignore one more fact, namely, that C. Muniappan (A.4) had kept the engine of the motor cycle (M.0.5) running only to escape from the scene of occurrence alongwith Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) after the occurrence. The said fact would also indicate the mind of the accused to commit the offence and to flee from the scene of occurrence to avoid the clutches of law. But for PWs 1, 2, 4 & 5 and some other students A who became alert immediately after the bus was set on fire, the consequence could have been disastrous and more deaths could have occurred.
53. P. Kandasamy, the bus driver (PW.4) has deposed that at the time of incident, a bike coming from the right side 8 of the bus stopped near the left side headlight at a distance of about 12 ft. Three persons were riding on the said motor cycle. Two persons who were sitting on the rear seat of the motor cycle came towards the bus and each of them was carrying a yellow coloured can. One of them came to the left side of the bus and C sprinkled liquid contained in the can inside the bus through the first window shutter. The other poured the liquid from the can through the second window. From the smell, he could understand that they had sprinkled petrol. Dr. Latha (PW.1) and Akila (PW.2) begged those persons and pleaded not to do any D harm. At that time there was a shout "set fire on them, then only they will realise". Students started coming out of the bus from the front entrance. The bus was put to fire immediately. The persons who poured the petrol proceeded towards the motor cycle and escaped.
54. P. Kandasamy (PW.4) has identified Nedu (A.2) and C. Muniappan (A.4) in the court and pointed out that C. Muniappan (A.4) was the person who was sitting on the motor cycle, keeping engine running at the time of occurrence. He also disclosed that the number of the maroon coloured motor F cycle was TN-29-C-2487 and identified the vehicle parked outside the court. In cross-examination again and again he was asked large number of questions, but his deposition remained trustworthy throughout.
55. The deposition of N. Jagannathan, cleaner (PW.5) corroborated the evidence of P. Kandasamy (PW.4). He identified A.2 to A.4. He also identified the motor cycle but could not identify the colour and registration number. He has identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade. He has H denied the suggestion that he had ever been shown any C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.) photograph of either of A.2 to A.4. He deposed that A.2 to A.4 were the persons who sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and he had given a version of events explaining how the girl students got burn injuries and some of them died because they could not come out of the vehicle. He denied the suggestion that he could identify A.2 to A.4 as he had been shown their photographs.
56. Dr. Latha (PW.1) had deposed that she had seen the man who was pouring the petrol. She had identified A.3 in the court as the man who sprinkled petrol in the bus. She deposed that it was A.3 who had shouted "set fire to all, then only they will realize" and at that time there was a fire from the front left side.
57. Akila (PW.2) had given same version and corroborated the evidence of Dr. Latha (PW.1), P. Kandasamy (PW.4) and N. Jagannathan (PW.5) and deposed that petrol was sprinkled near the seat which .was occupied by PW.5. She identified Madhu (A.3) as the person who sprinkled the petrol and stated that another person· lit the match stick and threw it in the bus and the bus was burnt into flames. Three girl students were charred to death.
58. Preetha (PW.8), a B.Sc. 2nd year student, aged 19 years had deposed that she was sitting on the double seat just before the front entrance on the window side. A man sprinkled petrol from a yellow can which he was holding on the seat in front of her seat through the window shutter. At the same time another person came and poured petrol inside the bus through the window shutter which was near the first seat. PWs. 1 and 2 begged them not to harm students. However, in the meantime, the front side of the bus caught fire. She had suffered some burn injuries over her left foot. She had identified Madhu (A.3) in the court as a person who had sprinkled petrol. She denied the suggestion that she was deposing, falsely or identified the accused D.K. Rajendran (A.1) and Nedu (A.2) as she had been tutored by the police. [2010) 10 S.C.R.
59. Gayathri G. (PW.11 ), another injured witness identified 'Nedu (A.2) and Madhu (A.3) in the Court. She explained how the petrol was sprinkled by A.2 anci A.3 and how PWs. 1 and 2 begged them not td harm the girls. However, at the same· time, there was fire at. the place where the petrol had been B poured. She denied any suggestion made by the defence that she was deposing falsely or she had identified any of the accused by showing their photographs.
60. R. Suganthi (PW.12) another injured witness had given the same version. She had identified Madhu (A.3) in the court C as a person who had sprinkled the petrol inside the bus and N. Thilagavathi (PW.12) another injured witness corroborated the genesis of the case as given by the other witnesses. She identified Nedu (A.2) in the court as a person who had sprinkled the petrol and denied all suggestions made by the defence.
61. S. Anitha (PW.14) supported the prosecution version thoroughly and stat~d that two persons came to the front of th~ bus and sprinkled the petrol. She had identified A.2 to A.4 in . Test Identification.Parade denying all suggestions made by the defence.
62. A large number of injured witnesses (students) were examined. They supported the prosecution case but did not identify any person either in the Test Identification Parade or in the Court. M. Kalaivani, M. Krithika, G. Gayathiri and R. F Suganthi (PWs.9 to 12), R. Banuchitra, Chitra, C. Susma, S. Thilagam, P.T. Sutha, M. Vasantha Gokilam, R. Abirami, P. Geetha and S. Gayathiri (PWs.15 to 23), K. Sumathi, M. Deivani and N. Anbuselvi (PWs. 26 to 28) got injuries, and were treated in the hospital. They were examined in the 'court. Their G seating position in the bus had been such that they could not see as who had sprinkled the petrol in the bus. They could see the motorcycle or C. Muniappan (A.4) on the scene. They did not depose anything in this regard.·
63. R. Maruthu (PW.51 ), photographer, deposed that he H was contacted by Dowlat Basha (A.6) to cover the "Road Roko C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 309 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] Agitation" at lllakkiampatti in stills and video. He reached there A on a motorcycle. There he found D. K. Rajendran (A.1) engaged in an agitation with four or five persons. They were raising slogans. He photographed and videographed the spot of the agitation. He deposed that along with (A.1 ), Muthu (A.8), Ravi (A.9), A.P. Murugan (A.11) and Vadivelu (A.12) were also present there. Their photographs and negatives were exhibited in the court. He also photographed the burning bus. He reached the spot when the bus was burning. Students were shouting. The bus was full of black smoke. Some persons were trying to break open the rear side glass panes and some were dragging c the girls from the rear side shutters. The fire spread from the front portion and engulfed the whole bus to the rear and he had been taking photographs continuously. These photographs were exhibited as Ex.P.78 and Ex.P.80. He watched the video prepared by him in the court and identified the same. In the cross~examination, he denied knowing the accused persons, particularly, Madhu (A.3), Velayutha!ll (A.7), Sampath (A.13), Selvam (A.26), Selvaraj (A.28) and Veeramani (A.30). However, they were shown in the ·photographs taken by him. He was declared hostile.
64. The shirt (M.0.4), which was worn by Nec:lu (A.2) at the time of incident, had been identified by most of the eye- witnesses in the court. It is stated that this shirt belonged to A.2.
65. In Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230, this Court disapproved the exhibiting and reading of confessional statement of the accused before the police as a whole before the court, as it had not been brought on record in a manner contemplated by law. The Court held.as under: "Law does not envisage taking on record the entire confession by making it an exhibit incorporating both the admissible or inadmissible part thereof together. We have to point out that only that part of confession is admissible, which could be leading to the recovery of dead body and/ [2010] 10 S.G.R. or recovery of articles ………………………….. ; the confession proceeded to state even the mode and manner in which they allegedly killed. It should not have been done. It may influence the mind of the Court."
66. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance on the judgments in Pu/ukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67; the State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1691; and Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865. c
67. Thus, it is evident from the above that only the admissible part of extra-judicial confessional statement can be exhibited. The statement as a whole, if exhibited and relied upon by the prosecution, leads to the possibility of the court getting prejudiced against the accused. Thus, it has to be avoided.
68. In the instant case, as has rightly been pointed out by Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel that confessional statement of C. Muniappan (A.4) had been exhibited in the court in its full text. It was neither required or warranted nor was permissible. However, in view of the fact that there had been other sufficient material on record to show his involvement in the crime, we are of the opinion that full exhibition of the statement had not prejudiced the case against him. Hostile Witness:
69. It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as flostile and cross examine him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as G effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be. accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (vide Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170; Syad Akbar v. State H of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848; and Khujji @ Surendra C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 311 [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.] Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853).
70. In State of UP. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2766, this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Batu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of C UP., AIR 2006 SC 951; Sarvesh Naraian Shukla v. Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320; and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 sec 462. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevarJt parts thereof which are admissible in lalJV, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. In the instant case, some of the material witnesses i.e. B. Kamal (PW.86); and R. Maruthu (PW.51) turned hostile. Their evidence has been taken into consideration by the courts below strictly in accordance with law. Some omissions, improvements in the evidence of the PWs have been pointed out by the learned cou1Jsel for the appellants, but we find them to be very trivial in nature.
71. It is settled proposition of law that even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version [2010) 10 S.C.R. A of the prosecution's witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (vide Sohrab & Anr. v. The State of M.P., AIR 1972 SC 2020; State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AIR B 1985 SC 48; Bharwada Bhogini Bhai Hirji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753; State of Rajasthan v. Om P~kash AIR 2007 SC 2257; Prithu @ Prithi Chand & Anr. v. State of Himacha/ Pradesh, (2009) 11 SCC 588; State of U.P. v. Santosh Kumar & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 626; and State v. c Saravanan & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 151). Death sentence
72. The guidelines laid down by this Court for awarding death sentence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898, may be culled out as under: (a) The extreme penalty of death may be inflicted in gravest cases of extreme culpability; (b)" While imposing death sentence the circumstances of the offender also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the crime; (c) Death sentence be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime; and (d) Extreme penalty can be imposed after striking the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in the case. Aggravating circumstances include: (a) If the murder has been committed after previous planning and involves extreme brutality; or {b) If the murder involves exceptional depravity. Mitigating circumstances include: C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL l''ADU 313 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.) (a) That the offence was committed under the influence of A extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (b) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death; (c) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society; (d) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by ~vidence prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions (c) and (d) above; (e) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence; (f) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of another person; and (g) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
73. In Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 957, this Court expanded the "rarest of rare" formulation beyond the aggravating factors listed in Bachan Singh (supra) to cases where the "collective conscience" of a community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial powers to inflict the death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining the death penalty, and stated that in these cases such a penalty should be inflicted. But the Bench in this case underlined that full weightage rriust be accorded to the mitigating circumstances in a case and a just balance had to be struck between aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court further held that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration may be motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as:- (i) Murder is in extremely brutal manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community. (ii) Murder of a large number of persons of a particular caste, community, or locality, is committed. (iii) Murder of an innocent child; a helpless woman, is committed.
74. In Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR C 2002 SC 1661, this Court referred to both these cases and held that death sentence may be warranted when the murder is committed in an extremely brutal manner; or for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness e.g. murder by hired assassin for money or reward, or cold blooded murder for D gains. Death sentence may also be justified: "(i) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance, when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the members of a faniily or a large number of persons or a particular caste, community, or locality are committed. (ii) When the victim of murder is an innocent child or a helpless woman or old or infirm person or a person vis-a- vis, whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a public figure generally loved and respected by the community." (See also Atbir v. Govt. of N. C. T. of Delhi, JT 2010 (8) SC 372).
75. In Mahesh v. State of M.P., AIR 1987 SC 1346, this G court deprecated the practice of taking a lenient view and not imposing the appropriate punishment observing that it will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. The court held that "To give a lesser punishment to H the appellants would be to render the justice system of this C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS . . v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.] country suspect. The common man will lose faith in the courts. · 1n such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon". (See also State of Punjab v. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2009. SC 391; and Sahdev v. Jaibar@ Jai Dev & Ors., (2009) 11 SCC 798). In Bantu v. State of U. P., (2008) 11 SCC 113, this Court placing reliance on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. AIR 1991 SC 1463, re-iterated the same view observing as under : "Therefpre, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to c undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the'.nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc." Thus, it is. evident that Criminal Lal\\' requires strict adherence to the rule of proportionality in proViding punishment according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct keeping in mind the effect of not awarding just punishment on the society.
The "Rarest of the rare case" comes when a convict would be a menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful co- existence of the society. Where an accused does not act on any spur-of-the-moment provocation and he indulged himself in a deliberately planned crime and meticulously executed it, the death sentence may be the most appropriate punishment for such a ghastly crime.
76. Life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an exception. Therefore, the Court must satisfy itself that death penalty would be the only punishment which can be meted out to a convict. The Court has to consider whether any other punishment would be completely inadequate and what would be the mitigating and aggravating. circumstances in the case. Murder is always foul, however, the degree of brutality, A depravity and diabolic nature differ in each case. Circumstances under which murders take place also differ from case to case and there cannot be a straitjacket formula for deciding upon circumstances under which death penalty must be awarded. In such matters, it is not only a nature of crime, B but the background of criminal, his· psychology, his social conditions, his mindset for committing offence and effect of imposing alternative punishment on the society are also relevant factors.
77. In the instant case, the girl students of the University, C while on tour had been the victims of a heinous crime at the tail end of their programme. The appellants may have had a grievance and a right of peaceful demonstration, but they cannot claim a right to cause grave inconvenience and humiliation to others, merely because a competent criminal court has handed D down a juaicial pronouncement that is not to their liking. A demonstration by the appellants which had started peacefully, ·took an ugly turn when the appellants started damaging public transport vehicles. Damaging the public'. transport vehicles did not satisfy them and the appellants became the law unto E themselves. There had been no provocation of any kind by any person whatsoever. Some of the appellants had evil designs to cause damage to a greater extent so that people may learn a "lesson". In order to succeed in their mission, Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran(A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) went to the extent of sprinkling petrol in a bus full of girl students and setting it on fire with the students still inside the bus.
They were fully aware that the girls might not be able to escape, when they set the bus on fire. As it happened, some of the girls did not escape the burning bus. G No provocation had been offered by any of the girls. Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) did not pay any heed to the pleas made. by Dr. Latha (PW1) and Akila (PW2), the teacher, to spare the girls. As a consequence of the actions of Nedu @ H Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. C. MUNIAPPAN & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU 317 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] Muniappan (A.4), three girls stood to death and about 20 girls received burn injuries on several parts of their bodies. There can be absolutely no justification for the commission of such a brutal offence. Causing the death of three innocent young girls and causing burn injuries to another twenty is an act that shows the highest degree of depravity and brutality on the part of Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4).
The aggravating circumstances in the case of Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) are that this offence had been committed after previous planning and with extreme brutality. These murders involved exceptional depravity on the part of Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4). These were the murders of helpless, innocent, unarmed, young girl students in a totally unprovoked situation. No mitigating circumstances could be pointed to us, which would convince us to impose a lesser sentence on them. Their activities were not only barbaric but inhuman of the highest degree. Thus, the manner of the commission of the offence in the present case is extremely brutal, diabolical, grotesque and . E cruel. It is shocking to the collective conscience of society. We do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the punishment of death sentence awarded to Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) by the courts below.
Their appeals are liable to be dismissed. So far as the other appellants are concerned, the maximum sentence to be served by them as per the Judgment of the High Court is two years. Most of these appellants have already served more than 14 months of their sentence and they are presently on bail. The incident occurred on 2.2.2000, so more than ten and a half years have already elapsed since the .incident. These appellants have already suffered a lot. Thus, their sentences deserve to be reduced.
78. Before parting with this case, we would like totake note A of the fact that this crime occurred right in the middle of a busy city. Innocent girls trapped in a burning bus were shouting for help and only the male students from their University came to their rescue and succeeded in saving some of them. There were large number of people including the shopkeepers, media B persons and on-duty police personnel, present at the place of the "Rasta Roko Andolan", which was very close to the place of the occurrence of the crime, and none of them considered it proper to help in their rescue. Even if the common man fails to respond to the call of his conscience, the police should not have c r_emained inactive. The so-called administration did not bother to find out why the police did not intervene and assist in the rescue of the girl students. It is clear that the so-called protectors of the society stood there and witnessed such a heinous crime being committed and allowed the burning of the bus and roasting of the innocent children without being reprimanded for failing in their duty. If the common citizens and public officials present at the scene of the crime had done their duty, the death of three innocent young girls could have been prevented.
79. In view of the above, all the appeals are dismissed. E So far as Nedu @ Nedunchezhian (A.2), Madhu @ Ravindran (A.3) and C. Muniappan (A.4) are concerned, sentence of death imposed on them is confirmed and the same be executed in accordance with law. However, in Criminal Appeal Nos 1632-34 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1482-1484 of 2008), the sentences are reduced as undergone. All of them are on bail, their bail bonds stand discharged. These criminal appeals stand disposed of accordingly. R.P. Appeals disposed of.
