Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
30. In B.S. Joshi & Others v. State of Haryana & Another H A (2003) 4 sec 675 the court reiterated the legal position that the court's inherent powers have no limit but should be !"." exercised with utmost care and caution. Inherent powers must be utilized with the sole purpose to prevent the abuse of the .process of the court or to otherwise secure the eQ,ds of j1:1stice. B In exercise of inherent powers, proper scrutiny of facts and circumstances of concerned case are absolutely imperative.
31. In Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation -\ ~ & Another (2008) 9 sec 677, this court while relying on the c aforesaid judgment in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) observed that on overall view of the facts the court was satisfied that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings.
32. In Jagdish Chanana & Others v. State of Haryana & D Another 2008 (4) Scale 411 this court observed as under:- "The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. In thEf light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the disp-ute. is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transaction that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise."
33. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 _, – sec 582 in which one of us (Bedi, J.) was the author of the judgment observed as under:- "We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely ….,, t- personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense ~-t approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law."
34. In a recently delivered judgment of this court in Smt. c Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal & Another JT 2009 (5) SC 321, this court approved the observations of the Special Judge. The observations of Special Judge are set out as under:- "The learned Special Judge in his order dated 16.12.2006 rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant i> herein, stating: "I have gone through the record, citation and considered the circumstances. It is true that the accused has put a good gesture by paying of the dues of the bank but I am at one with the Ld. PP '-.( that this payment cannot exonerate the accused from a prima facie charge. If I allow this, then I may have to swallow in a case of bribery that the accused has paid back the amount to the sufferer the amount received as bribe. It is a question of trial whether there was any criminal intention on the part of this Lady accused in this crime. The criminal intention is to be inferred from the evidence to be – 1 adduced by the prosecution. Simply because the money has been returned, I cannot shut the mouth of the prosecution from adducing evidence against this accused. Thus, I do r.ot like to pass any order in favour of the accused. The prayer for discharge of accused no. 7, Rumi Dhar stands rejected. Let \.– the case proceed. Fix 7.2.07 for consideration of charge. The sureties must produce all the accused persons on that date."
35. The facts of the instant case are quite akin to Rumi Dhar (supra)'s case. In the instant case, the charge-sheet clearly reveal substantial material on record making a clear case under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC against –\~ the respondents and their connivance with the bank officials. c
36. The High Court in the impugned judgment has misunderstood and misapplied the ratio of the three-Judge Bench of this court in· lnder Mohan Goswami & Anr. V. State- of Uttarachal & Ors. 2007(12) SCALE 15 to the facts of this case. One of us (Bhandari, J.) was the author of the said D judgment. The ratio of the said judgment is in para 24 at page t– 25 which reads as under:- "Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of y the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute."
37. The court in para 27also observed that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. <3
38. Let us consider the facts of this case and apply the -( – . ratio of Goswami's case (supra) where facts are as follows:- (I) allegations are th.at accused have committed _serious offences such as forgery, fabrication of · documents C!nd used those documents as genuine; {DALVEER BHANDARI, J.] -…/ t (II) allegations are that accused/respondents herein, A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad have entered into a conspiracy with the Chairman and Managing Director and other officials of the Indian Bank, Chennai with the object of cheating the Indian Bank in the matter of recommending, sanctioning, disbursing huge credit facilities running over hundreds of crores. ~ .. (Ill) Trial of all four cases are at advanced stage in which 92 witnesses have already been examined. c
39. While applying the ratio of Goswami's case (supra), how can any court in its legitimate exercise of power under section 4?4. Cr.P.C. quash the proceedings against accused A. Ravishankar Prasad and A. Manohar Prasad in the face of aforesaid allegations. In the instant case, wrong application of D the ratio of the said judgment has led to grave miscarriage of ,j, justice.
40. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly reveals that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely·depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case. The object incorporating inherent powers in the Code is to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure ends of justice.
41. Both English and the Indian courts have consistently taken the view that the inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. … )
42. When we apply the settled legal position to the facts of this case it is not possible to conclude that the complaint and charge-sheet prima facie do not constitute any offence against the respondents. It is also not possible to conclude that material on record taken on face value make out no case under section i,….. A 120-B read with section 420 IPC against the respondents. Prima facie, we are of the opinion that this is one case where adequate material is available on record to proceed against the respondents.
43. In our considered view it was extremely unfortunate that the High Court in the impugned judgment has erroneously invoked inherent power of the court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court ought to have -"\–. considered the entire material .available to establish a case c against the respondents under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC. It is significant that the respondents and the other bank officials share the charges under section 120-B read with section 420 IPC. Quashing the charges against the respondents would also have very serious repercussions on the pending cases against the other bank officials.
44. In four cases, 92 witnesses have already been examined. The trial of the case was at the advanced stage. At this sage, the High Court has seriously erred in quashing the charges against respondent nos.1 and 2.
45. Quashing the proceedings at that stage was clearly an abuse of the process of the court. The court neither considered the entire material nor appreciated the legal position in proper y perspective. The impugned judgment is wholly unsustaiQable in law and is accordingly set aside. Unfortunately, because of unnecessary interference by the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. the trial of this case could not be completed and concluded.
46. Before parting with the case we would like to observe G that mere re-payment of loan under a settlement cannot exempt the accused from the criminal proceeding in the facts of this ( — case.
47. We would like to observe that any observations made H in this case have been made to decide the present case. The trial court may decide the case without being influenced by any observations made by this court.
48. In this view of the fact, in the interest of justice we direct that the trial be now completed as expeditiously as possible. The trial court is directed to conduct .!he trial on day to day basis and parties are directed to cooperate with the trial court. The trial court shall ensure that unnecessary adjournments be avoided and trial be concluded as expeditiously as possible.
49. The appeals are consequently allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. B.B.B. Appeals disposed of.