CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI AND ORS. versus JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA AND ORS.

36. Jn the present batch of cases, the almost uniform facet is that the claim to belong to a reserved category has been rejected upon scrutiny.

37. On behalf of the persons whose caste or tribe claims have been rejected, the following submissions have been urged: i. The issue with regard to caste certificates granted prior to 28 November 2000 is not res integra in view of the dictum laid down in paragraph 38 of the judgment of this Court in Milind. The decision in Milind gave a positive direction to the effect that appointments that had become final on or before 28 November 2000 (the date when the judgment was delivered) shall remain unaffected. The Constitution Bench dealt with appointments as welt as admissions to educational institutions. Following the decision in Milind this Court disposed of several cases relating to Halba-Koshti and did not disturb appointments which had been made prior to 28 November 2000. The directions in lVIilind are based on the doctrine of prospective overruling; ii. No issue was joined before the High Court to the effect that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIJI of 200 I arc retrospective and would interdict admissions or appointments made prior to the enforcement of the Act. In any case such a stand would be contrary to the binding circulars issued by the State Government; and iii. Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001 is not retrospective in operation. The statute being of a penal nature, it cannot be construed to be retrospective since that would render it violative of Article 20(!) of the CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FC! v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] Constitution. The Act was notified on 17 October 200 I with effect from 18 October 200 I which is the relevant date under Section I (2). iv. While Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee to cancel any certificate which has been obtained before or after the commencement of the Act, the expression "before or after the commencement of this Act" is absent in Sections I 0 and 11. Consequently, though Section 7 may be retroactive in operation, Sections I 0 and I I which relate to the withdrawal of benefits ard in regard to penal offences arc prospective. Besides the above submissions it has also been urged that in so far as Halba-Koshtis arc concerned : i. Though in Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 only" Halba-Halbi" has been recognised as a Scheduled Tribe, until the decision c of the Constitution Bench in Milind, Halba – Koshtis were "socially and officially" recognized and accepted as a sub-tribe ofHalba-Halbi. This may have been as a result of the judicial pronouncement made by the High Court from 1956 or the circulars issued by the State Government; ii. It was on 28 November 2000 that the Constitution Bench in Milind held that Halba – Koshtis do not fall within the purview ofEntry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. Hence, it cannot be said that a caste ce1tificate issued at any time prior to 28 November 2000 in favour of a citizen who was a Halba Koshti was false or a fraud and it can only be held that such a person ceased to be recognized as Halba-Halbi Scheduled Tribe; iii. Section I I of Maharashtra Act XXlll of2001 which is in the nature of a penal provision will not be applicable to caste certificates which were issued prior to 18 October 200 I; iv. On 15 January 1995, a government resolution was issued by the Government of Maharashtra that appointments made prior to that date against reserved posts would remain protected even if the caste/ tribe claim of the appointee was invalidated or found to be false; v. Where an appointment in service has been acquired by practicing fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. This position will not be applicable to claimants of the Halba – Kosh tis caste to whom caste certificates were issued and appointments were made prior to 28 November 2000; and c (2017] I I S.C.R. vi. On IOAugust 2010, the Union Government in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Depaitment of Personnel and Training issued an office memorandum to the effect that persons belonging to the Halba, Balbi I Koshti castes who got appointment against a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of certificates issued by the COllllpetent authority and whose appointments have been rendered final prior to 28 November 2000 shall not be affected. vii. On 21 C>ctober 2015, the State of Maharashtra issued a circular directing that employees who have been appointed against posts reserved for Scheduled Tribes in governnmnt services between 15 January 1995 and. 17 October 200 I, whose claims have been invalidated, shall not be disbanded/terminated until further orders. In view of this circular, the State Government is estopped from challenging the Full Bench decision of the High Court in A run Sononc. H PART II : Analysis

38. Having put together the body of material on the subject, including the precedents and legislation governing the area, the stage for analysis is now reached. That is what this j udgmcnt now seeks to embark upon.

39. The backdrop for the decision in Madhuri Patil (supra) was provided by the significant scale on which benefits were secured by imposters by passing themselves off as members of castes, tribes and classes for whom reservations have been earmarked pursuant to constitutional provisions. By its directions which this Court issued on 2 September 1994 provision was made for the constitution of committees for verification of claims belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class. This Court explained the modalities to be followed by the Scrutiny Committees and the manner in which action would be taken if a claim was found to be false. The directions which were issued by this Court envisaged that upon a claim being found to be false or spurious : (i) the Caste Scrutiny Committee should pass an order cancelling and confiscating the certificate; (ii) the cancellation of the certificate should be communicated to the educational institution where the candidate has been admitted or to the appointing authority where the candidate is employed; CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] (iii) upon this, the head of the institution or the appointing authority should cancel the admission or appointment without further notice and debar the candidate from further study or continuance in office; and (iv) a prosecution should be launched against the candidate or, as the case may be, the parents or guardians responsible for making the false claim. The regime postulated in the judgment of this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra) took effect from 2 September 1994, which was the date of the judgment. Eventually in the State of Maharashtra these . directions received legislative recognition upon the enactment of the Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I which came into force in the State on 18 October 2001. However, it is impo11ant to notice that even before the State Legislature stepped in to confer a statutory form to the directions which were issued by this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra) the regime, as it then obtained prior to the enactment of the law, also envisaged consequences upon a caste or tribe claim being found to be false upon a verification by the Scrutiny Committee. The cancellation ofa certificate would, as a necessary consequence, involve the invalidation of the appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution. Where a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post on the basis of the claim that he or she was a member of the group for which the reservation is intended, the invalidation of the claim to belong to that group would, as a necessary consequence, render the appointment void ab initio. The rationale for this is that a candidate who would otherwise have to compete for a post in the general pool ofunreserved seats had secured appointment in a more restricted competition confined to the reserved category and usurped a benefit meant for a designated caste, tribe or class. Once it was found that the candidate had obtained admission upon a false representation to belong to the reserved category, the appointment would be vitiated by fraud and would be void ab initio. The falsity of the claim lies in a representation that the candidate belongs to a category of persons for whom the reservation is intended whereas in fact the candidate does. not so belong. The reason for depriving the candidate of the benefit which she or he has obtained on the strength of such a claim, is that a person cannot retain the fruits of a false claim on the basis of which a scarce public resource is obtained. The same principle would apply where a candidate secures admission to an educational institution on the basis of a false claim to belong to a reserved category. A candidate who does c c I-I [2017] ll S.C.R. so causes detriment to a genuine candidate who actually belongs 10 the reserved category who is deprived of the seat. For that matter a detriment is caused to the entire class of persons for whom reservations are intended. the members of which are excluded as a result ofan admission granted to an imposter who docs not belong to the class. The withdrawal of benefits. either in terms of the revocation of employment or the termination of an admission was hence a necessary corollary of the invalidation of the claim on the basis of which the appointment or admission was obtained. The withdrawal of the benefit was not based on mens rea or the intent underlying the assertion of a false claim. In the case of a criminal prosecution, intent would be necessary. On the other hand, the withdrawal of civil benefits flowed as a logical result of the invalidation of a claim to belong to a group or category for whom the reservation is intended. This was the position under the regime which prevailed following the decision in Madhuri Patil.

40. The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided Milind (supra) was on a reference whether it is permissible to hold an enquiry and let in evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or a part or group within the tribe or community is included in the general name. even though it is not so specifically mentioned in the entry contained in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The Constitution Bench held that it was not permissible either to hold an enquiry or to allow evidence 10 decide that though a tribe (or its sub group) is not specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it must, nonetheless. be treated or deemed to be included in the general name. The view of this Court is that an entry in the Order has to be read as it stands. However, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 38 of its decision, having due regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before the Court, protected the degree obtained by the candidate concerned. This Court also provided that having regard to the passage of time including interim orders which were passed, the admissions and appointments that have become final would remain unaffected by the judgment. The observations in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench have been construed in at least the following judgments of this Court as directions referable to Article 142 of the Constitution: (i) Bank of India Vs. Avinash D.Mandivikar"'; "(2005) 7 sec 690 at para 10 CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] (ii) Additional General Manager- Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde"; (iii) Union oflndia Vs. Dattatray, S/o. Namdeo Mcndhckar36 ;and (iv) Yogcsh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs. State of Maharashtra".

41. Since the decision of the Bench of three judges in R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State ofKcrala (supra) the position oflaw which has been laid down by this Court is that where an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution is made against a vacancy which is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or Tribe or a socially and educationally backward class. the invalidation of the claim of the candidate would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission being void and non est. This principle has been followed by another judgment of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). The same position has been propounded by a two judge bench in Bank of India Vs. Avinash Mandivikar (supra). The formal termination of an employment or the withdrawal of admission is a necessary consequence which flows out of the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim. The only exception to this principle consists of those cases where, in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142, the Court considered it appropriate and proper to protect the admission which was granted or, as the case may be, the appointment to the post.

42. In Ka vita Sohmkc (supra) the appellant had been appointed on the strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in AugLL~t 1995. After the tribe claim was verified by the Scrutiny Committee it was found that the appellant was in fact a Koshti and not a member of F the Halba Scheduled Tribe following which an order of termination was issued. The sole ground on which the termination was challenged and which was accepted by the bench of two judges was that since the appointment of the appellant had attained finality, it could not have been set aside on the ground that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. Maharashtra Act XXlll of 200 I was evidently not placed before the court in Kavita Solunkc (supra) and has not been noticed. Upon "(2007) 5 sec 336 at paras 7-9 and 13 ·"' (2008) 4 sec 612 at paras 5-7 "(2008) 5 sec 652 at paras 5 & 6 c (2017] l l S.C.R. the enactment of the Act, the invalidation of a caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee would as a statutory mandate result in the withdrawal of the benefits which had accrued on the strength of the claim and where a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post, termination would follow the finding that the candidate did not belong to the category for whom the post WflS reserved. If the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I were to be considered by the bench of two judges, it would be apparent that under the provisions of Section 7 the Scrutiny Committee is empowered tQ verify a caste certificate whether issued before or after the commencement of the Act and if it comes to the conclusion that the caste certificate is fals·c and is obtained fraudulently it is empowered to order its cancellation and confiscation. Section I 0 provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured when a caste certificate is concerned for its falsity. Falsity is adjudicated upon when an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7. Once a caste certificate is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under Section 7, the individual affected by the order has a remedy to challenge its cancellation before the High Court under Article 226. lfthe challenge fails or if the challenge is given up, and the only relief sought is of the protection of service, or of the admission to the course, the gmnt of such protective relief simpliciter would be impermissible. The withdrawal of the benefit under Section 10 follows an order of cancellation under Section 7. Once the conditions for cancellation are fulfilled and an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7 withdrawal of all benefits which have accrued on the basis of the claim (which stands invalidated) cannot be opposed on a theory that there was an absence of dishonest intent.

43. The rationale which weighed with the Bench of two Judges which decided Kavita Solunke (supra) was that if the Halba Koshti had been treated as Halba even before the appellant had joined the service and ifthe only ground for ouster was the law declared in Milind (supra), there was no reason why protection against ouster to appointees whose applications had become final be not also extended to the appellant. Placing reliance on the decision in Kavita Sohmkc (supra) another Bench of two Judges of this Court in Shalini (supm) propounded a test of dishonest intent for the grant or denial of protection to persons whose caste claims had been invalidated. The view of the Court emerges from the following extract contained in para 9 of the decision which reads thus: CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] "9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. Therefore, as we see it, on one bank of the Rubicon are the cases of dishonest and mendacious persons who have deliberatc)y claimed consanguinity with the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, etc. whereas on the other bank are those marooned persons who honestly and correctly claimed to belong to a particular Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe but were later on found by the relevant authority not to fall within the particular group envisaged for protected treatment. In the former group, persons would justifiably deserve the immediate cessation of all benefits, including termination of services. In the latter, after the removal of the nebulousness and uncertainty, while the services or benefits already enjoyed would not be negated, they would be disentitled to claim any further or D continuing benefit on the predication of belonging to the 'said Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe." {Id. at pgs. 534-535) The above observations must be read together with those in paragraph 11 (extracted earlier) where the Court held that a dishonest intent requires legal retribution. In Shalini (supra) the.Court noticed the provisions of Section 10 ofMaharashtraAct XXIII of2001 (which the earlier decision in Kavita Solunkc (supra) had not noticed) but nonetheless held that in order to attract the provisions of Section 10 a dishonest intent for the purpose of claiming a benefit reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or a designated backward class is necessary. The expression "false" contained in Section I 0 of the Maharashtra Act XXIII of200 I is construed to necessarily require the presence of mens rea·or a dishonest intent.

44. The object and purpose underlying the enactment of the state legislation is to regulate the issuance of caste certificates and to deal with instances which had come to light where persons who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or reserved categories were seeking appointments or admissirns to the detriment of genuine candidates, The basic purpose and rationale for the legislation is to secure the just entitlements oflegitimate claimants. The judgment in Shalini (supra) is with respect in error in imputing the requirement of a dishonest intent intothe provisions of Section I 0. Sections 7 and 10 have to be construed c (2017] ll S.C.R. in harmony. Section 7 provides for the cancellation of a caste certificate where before or after commencement of the Act, a person who does not belong to a reserved category has obtained a false caste ce11ificate and the Scrutiny Committee, after enquiry. is of the opinion that the certificate was obtained fraudulently. These requirements have to be fulfilled before tj1e ce11ificate is cancelled. The falsity of the caste certificate and the opinion of the Scrutiny Committee of its being fraudulently obtained form the basis ofa cancellation under Section 7. Section I 0 presc11bes that a person who docs not belong to a reserved category and secures admission or obtains appointment against a reserved post by producing a false caste certificate shall upon its cancellation by the Scrutiny Committee be debarred from the institution or as the case may be discharged from employment and the benefits derived shall be withdrawn. Sub-section (2) provided for the recovery of all financial benefits while sub-section (3) provides for the cancellation of a degree, diploma or educational qualification. Sub-section (4) provides for disqualification from electoral office. The falsity of the cc11ificate is the basis of an order under Section 7. Section 10 provides the consequence. The challenge to an order of the Scrutiny Committee (invalidating a caste or tribe certificate) may fail or succeeds. If the challenge before the High Court succeeds, no question of the consequence under Section 10 arises. If the challenge fails, the consequence under Section I 0 follows the finding in the orderundcr Section 7 that the certificate is false. Similarly, if the orderunder Section 7 is not challenged. or ifthe challenge is given up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits secured on the basis of a certificate which is invalidated. The expression ~'false" must be construed in contra-distinction to that which is true, genuine or authentic. Falsity in this sense means the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category.

45. Section 10. it must be noted. provides for the withdrawal of civil benefits which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a claim to belong to a reserved category, when the claim upon due enquiry and verification is invalidated. Section 10. as its marginal note indicates, provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate. Section 11 provides for offences and penalties. The invalidation of a caste certificate may result in two consequences : (i) immediate cancellation or withdrawal of the benefits received by the candidate on the basis of a false caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a claimant who procw-es a certificate which is found to be false by the Scrutiny Committee. The intent of a candidate may be of relevance only CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] ifthere is a prosecution for a criminal offence. However, where a civil consequence of withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on the basis of a false caste claim is in issue, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to import the requirement of a dishonest intent. In importing such a requirement, the bench of two Judges in Shalini (supra) has, with great respect, fallen into error. The judgment in Shalini (supra) must, therefore, be held not to lay down the correct principle. In the very nature of things it would be casting an impossible burden to delve into the mental processes of an applicant for a caste certificate. As the provisions of the Act indicate. a person, who claims to belong to a reserved category and who seeks the benefit of an appointment to a reserved post or ofadmission to an educational institution against a reserved seat or any other benefit provided by the provisions of Article 15(4), has to apply for the grant of a caste certificate. The burden of proof that he or she belongs to such a caste, tribe or class lies with the claimant. The legislature has legitimately assumed that a person who seeks a caste certificate must surely be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he or she belongs and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the reserved category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be cancelled on the ground that it has been obtained falsely. The grant of the benefit to the candidate is fraudulent because the candidate has obtained a benefit reserved exclusively for a specified caste, tribe or class to which he or she is not entitled. The decision in Shalini (supra) would result in serious consequences and would eviscerate the statutory provision. The interpretation which has been placed on the provisions of Section I 0 by the judgment in Shalini (supra) is evidently incorrect.

46. Service under the Union and the States, or for that matter under the instrumentalities of the State subserves a public purpose. These services arc instruments of governance. Where the State embarks upon public employment, it is under the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 to follow the principle of equal opportunity. Affirmative action in our Constitution is part of the quest for substantive equality. Available resources and the opportunities provided in the form of public employment are in contemporary times short of demands and needs. Hence the procedure for selection, and the prescription of eligibility criteria has a significant public element in enabling the State to make a choice amongst competing claims. The selection of ineligible persons is a manifestation of a systemic failure and has a deleterious effect on good governance. c c [2017] l I S.C.R. Firstly, selection ofa person who is not eligible allows someone who is ineligible to gain access to scarce public resources. Secondly, the rights of eligible persons are violated since a person who is not eligible for the post is selected. Thirdly, an illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits upon an imposter undeservingly. These effects upon good governance find a similar echp when a person who does not belong to a reserved category passes of as a member of that category and obtains admission to an educational lnstitution. Those for whom the Constitution has made special provisions are as a result ousted when an imposter who does not belong to a reserved category is selected. The fraud on the constitution precisely lies in this. Such a consequence must be avoided and stringent steps be taken by the Court to ensure that unjust claims of imposters are not protected in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The nation cannot live on a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving the rule oflaw. The judicial process should not be allowed to be utilised to protect the unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have accrued to an imposter on the specious plea of equity. Once the legislature has stepped in, by enacting Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001, the power under Article 142 should not be exercised to defeat legislative prescription. The Constitution Bench in Milind spoke on 28 November 2000. The state law has been enforced from 18 October 200 I. Judicial directions must be consistent with law. Several decisions of two judge benches noticed earlier, failed to take note of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. The directions which were issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous inarticulate premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shalini noted the statute but misconstrued it.

47. Cooley's Treatise on Constitutional Limitations" places the matter succinctly in the following terms : "An officer dejure is one who, possessing the legal qualifications, has been lawfully chosen to the office in question, and has fulfilled any conditions precedent to the performance of its duties. By being thus chosen and observing the precedent conditions, such a person becomes of right entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the office, and the public, in whose interest the office is created, is entitled ofright to have him perform its duties. Ifhe is excluded from it, the exclusion is both a public offence and a private injury." "g• Ed. Vo!.2 pages! 355-1358 CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] In a recent judgment of this Court in Anurag Kumar Singh Vs. State ofUttarakhand39, it has been held that judicial discretion can be exercised only when there are two or more possible lawful solutions. Courts cannot give a direction contrary to a statute in the purported exercise of judicial discretion. The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is one which is wielded with circumspection and not in a manner which would defeat statutory intent, purpose and language. Aharon Barak in his book titled "Judicial Discretion ( 1989)" states thus: "16 …… Discretion assumes the freedom to choose among several lawful alternatives. Therefore, discretion does not exist when there is but one lawful option. In this situation, the Judge is required to select that option and has no freedom of choice. No discretion is involved in the choice between a lawful act and an unlawful act. The Judge rriust choose the lawful act, and he is precluded from choosing the unlawful act. Discretion, on the other hand, assumes the lack of an obligation to choose one particular possibility among several." (Id at p. 430)

48. The Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High CoUit in Arun Sonune (supra) has essentially construed the judgments in Kavita Solunke (supra) and in Shalini (supra) as having impliedly overruled the earlier Full Bench judgments in Ganesh Rambhau Khalalc and Ramesh Kamblc. In view of the conclusion which we have arrived at in regard to the earlier decisions rendered by the two Judge Benches in Kavita Solunke (supra) and Shalini (supra), we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Full Bench in Arun Sonone (supra). The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonone (supra) holds that (i) mere invalidation of the caste claim by the Scrutiny Committee would not entail the consequences of withdrawal of benefits or discharge from employment or cancellation of appointments that have become final prior to the decision in Milind (supra) on 28 November 2000; (ii) the benefit of protection in service upon invalidation of the caste claim is available not only to persons belonging to Kosh ti and Halba Koshti but is also available to persons belonging to the special backward category on the same terms. The High Court has even gone to the extelrt "(2016) 9 sec 426 c c [2017] ll S.C.R. of holding that the decision in Milind (supra) was in the nature of prospective overruling of the law which was laid down by the Bombay High Court. The above view of the Bombay High Court is clearly unsustainable. Neither the judgment in Milind (supra) nor any of the judgments of this Court which have construed it have held that Milind (supra) was an e)\ercise in prospective overruling. The High Court was in error in holding so. The decision of the Full Bench in Arun Sononc (supra) is unsustijinable. The Full Bench had evidently failed to notice that cases where the protection was granted by this Court following the invalidation ofa caste claim was in exercise of the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The jurisdiction under Article 142 is clearly not available to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court erred in arrogating that jurisdiction to itself.

49. We do not find any merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the persons whose castes/ tribes claims have been invalidated that Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 cannot apply to admissions or appointments which were made prior to the date on which the Act came into force.

50. The submission based on retrospectivity overlooks certain crucial links in the analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. However, the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing40• Maharashtra Act XXIII of2001 provides in Section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such dates as the State Government may, by notification in the oftieial gazette, appoint upon receiving assent of the President. The Act was notified to come into force by a government notification dated 17 October 2001 with effect from 18 October 200 I. Prior to the enforcement of the Act, the regime which held the field was in terms of the directions that were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 September 1994 in Madhuri Patil. The directions which were issued by this Court comprehended: ·t11 c; P Singh, On the Interpretation of Statutes -4 Edition pages 580. 583 CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] i. Applica~ions for the grant of caste certificates being made to a notified officer; ii. Submission of an affidavit together with relevant particulars in support of the application; iii. Submission of an application for verification of the caste certificate before a Scrutiny Committee well in advance of seeking admission to an educational institution or appointment to a post ; iv. Grant of provisional admission or a provisional appointment where the verification by the Scrutiny Committee was likely to take ti~c; v. Constitution of Scrutiny Committees for verification of caste certificates; vi. Constitution ofVigilance Cells for the purpose ofinvestigating the social status of the candidate and affinity with the tribal group; c vii. Modalities to be followed for revoking caste certificates when the claim for social status was found to be not genuine, doubtful, spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed; · viii. Passing of an order of cancellation and confiscation of the caste certificate if the claim was found to be false; ix. Prosecution of the candidate or, as the case may be, the parent or the guardian who had made a false claim; x. Cancellation of the admission granted or the appointment made where the caste certificate is invalidated and debarment of the candidate from further studies or to continue in a post.

51. The regime which obtained since 2 September 1994 under the directions in Madhuri Patil was granted a statutory status by the enactment of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001. Section 7 provides for the cancellation and confiscation of a false caste certificate whether it was issued before or after the commencement of the Act. The expression "before or after the commencement of this Act" indicates that the Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel a caste certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 200 I or thereafter. Section I 0 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate which is withdrawn is essentially a c (2017] ll S.C.R. consequence of the cancellation of the caste certificate. Where a candidate has secured admission to an educational institution on the basis that he or she belongs to a designated reserved category and it is found upon investigation that the claim to belong to that category is false, admission to the institution necessarily falls with the invalidation of the caste certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong to a specified caste, tnibe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim being found to be untrue. The same must hold in the case ofan appointment to a post. Therefore. the absence of the words "before or after the commencement of this Act" in Section l 0 makes no substantive difference because a withdrawal of benefit is an event which flows naturally and as a plain consequence of the invalidation of the claim. Moreover, as we have seen even prior to the enactment of the state legislation, the benefit which was secured on the basis of a caste claim was liable to be withdrawn upon its invalidation. The Act has hence neither affected vested rights nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair existing obligations in Sections 7 and I 0. However, an analysis of the provisions of Section 11 demonstrates that the provision creates offences and provides for penalties. Under Section I I (I) (a) the off¢nce consists of obtaining a false caste certificate (by furnishing false information). filing a false statement or document or by any fraudulent means. Under Section 11 (J)(b) the offence consists in securing a benefit exclusively reserved for designated castes, tribes or classes by a pers9n who does not belong to that category in terms of i. Appointment; ii. Admission in an educational institution against a reserved seat; or iii. Election to a local authority or cooperative society against an office which is reserved for that category.

52. The provisions of Section I I ( 1) must be read and construed in a prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article 20 (I) of the Constitution. The offence having been created by Maharashtra Act XXIII of 200 I, the Act which constitutes the offence must relate to a period after the date of the enforcement of the Act. In terms of the penal provisions of Section l I, the statute in so far as it creates offences and provides for penalties must hence be construed prospectively. CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.]

53. Administrative circulars and government resolutions are subservient to legislative mandate and cannot be contrary either to constitutional norms or statutory principles. Where a candidate has obtained an appointment to a post on the solemn basis that he or she belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom the post is meant and it is fow1d upon verification by the Scrutiny Committee that the claim is false, the services of such an individual cannot be protected by taking recourse to administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection of claims of a usurper is an act of deviance to the constitutional scheme as well as to statutory mandate. No government resolution or circular can override constitutional Or statutory nOrnlS. The principle that government is bound by its own circulars is well-settled but it cannot apply in a situation such as present. Protecting the services of a candidate who is found not to belong to the community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended substantially encroaches upon legal rights of genuine members of the reserved communities whose just entitlements are negated by the grant c of a scat to an ineligible person. In such a situation where the rights of D genuine members of reserved groups or communities are liable to be affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions cannot operate \o their detriment.

54. One of the considerations which is placed in store before the court particularly when an admission to an educational institution is sought to be cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe claim is that the student h.as substantially progressed in the course of studies and a cancellation of admission would result in prejudice not only to the student but to the system as well. When the student has completed the degree or diploma, a submission against its withdrawal is urged afortiorari. In our view; the state legislature has made a statutory decision amongst competing claims, based on a public policy perspective which the court must respect. The argument that there is a loss of productive societal resources when an educational qualification is withdrawn ora student is compelled to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not to belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a reserved seat was pbtained) carmot possibly outweigh or nullify the legislative , mandate contained in Section I 0 of the state legislation. When a candidate is found to have' put forth a false claim of belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class for whom a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation of the rule oflaw to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect c (2017] 11 S.C.R. that individual. Societal good lies in ensuring probity. That is the only manner in which the sanctity of the system can be preserved. The legal system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those who make untrue claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially and educationally backward class. These benefits arc provided only to designated castes, tribes or classes in accordance with the constitutional scheme and cannot be usurped by those who do not belong to them. The credibility not merely of the legal system but also of the judicial process will be eroded if such claims arc protcotcd in exercise of the constitutional power conferred by Article 142 despite the state law.

55. This aspect has been considered in a recent j udgmcnt rendered by one of us in Nidhi Kaim and Another V. State o(Madhva Pradesh Ami Others'' , wherein, speaking for a Bench of three Judges, in a case of systemic fraud in relation to medical admissions in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was observed as follows : "92 … We are of the considered view that conferring rights or benefits on the appellants, who had consciously participated in a well thought out, and meticulously orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid down norms, for gaining admission to the MBBS course, would amount to espousing the cause of "the unfair". It would seem like allowing a thief to retain the stolen property. It would seem as if the Cou1i was not supportive of the cause of those who had adopted and followed rightful means. Such a course would cause people to question the credibility of the justice-delivery system itself. The exercise of jurisdiction in the manner suggested on behalf of the appellants would surely depict the Court's support in fa vow· of the sacrilegious. It would also compromise the integrity of the academic community. We are of the view that in the name of doing complete justice it is not possible for this Court to support the vitiated actions of the appellants through which they gained admission to the Ml3BS course." Explaining the matter further, this Court held that : "99 ….. Besides the consideration recorded by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking the view that we have, for a very important reason – national character. There is a saying-when wealth is lost, nothing is "(2017) 4 sec 1 CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] lost; when health is lost, something is lost; but when A character is lost, everything is lost. ….. The issue in hand has an infinitely vast dimension. Ifwe were to keep in mind immediate social or societal gains. the perspective of consideration would be different. The submission canvassed needs to be considered in the proper perspective. We shall venture to drive home the point by an illustration. We may well not have won our freedom, if freedom fighters had not languished in jails … and if valuable lives had not been sacrificed. Depending on the situation, even civil liberty or life itself, may be too trivial a sacrifice. when national interest is involved. It all depends on the desired goal. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution rests on the foundation of governance on the touchstone of justice. The basic fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of the laws is extended to citizens and non-citizens alike through Article 14 of the Constitution on the fountainhead of fairness. The actions of the appellants are founded on unacceptable behaviow·. and in complete breach of the Rule of Law. Their actions constitute acts of deceit invading into a righteous social order. National character, in our considered view, cannot be sacrificed for benefits-individual or societal. Ifwe desire to build a nation on the touchstone of ethics and character and if ow· determined goal is to build a nation where only the Rule of Law prevails, then we cannot accept the claim of the appellants for the suggested societal gains. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, we have no difficulty whatsoever in concluding in favour of the Rule of Law. Such being the position, it is not possible for us to extend to the appellants any benefit under Article 142 of the Constitution." We are in respectful agreement with the above principle and statement of the legal position.

56. Medical education is what middle-class parents across the length and breadth of the county aspire for their children (whether this will continue to be so in future is a moot question). There is intense competition for a limited number of under-graduate, post-graduate and super-speciality seats. This can furnish no justification for recow·se to unfair means including adopting a false claim to belong to the reserved category. The fault – lines of our system, be it in education, health or law, are that its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for the few who choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a c [2017) ll S.C.R. situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance must be firm in sending out a principled message that there is no incentive other than for behaviour compliant with rules and deviance will meet severe reprimands of the law. c I Conclusion

57. For these reasons, we hold and declare that i. The directions which were issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in panigraph 38 of the decision in Milind were in pursuance of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution; ii. Since the decision of this Court in Madhuri Patil which was rendered on 2 September 1994, the regime which held the field in pursuance of those directions envisaged a detailed procedure for (a) the issuance of caste certificates; (b) scrutiny and verification of caste and tribe claims by Scrutiny Committees to be constituted by the State Government: ( c) the procedure for the conduct of investigation into the authenticity of the claim; ( d) Cancellation and confiscation of the caste certificate where the claim is found to be false or not genuine; (e) Withdrawal of benefits in terms of the termination of an appointment, cancellation of an admission to an educational institution or disqualification from an electoral office obtained on the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category; and (f) Prosecution for a criminal offence; iii. The decisions of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai and in Datta tray which were rendered by benches of three Judges laid down the principle of law that where a benefit is secured by an individual – such as an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution – on the basis that the candidate belongs to a reserved category for which the benefit is reserved, the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim upon verification would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the admission being rendered void or non est. iv. The exception to the above doctrine was in those cases where this Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to render complete justice; v. By Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 there is a legislative codification of the broad principles enunciated in Madhuri Patil. The legislation provides a statutory framework for regulating the issuance of caste certificates (Section 4); constitution of Scrutiny Committees for CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.) verification of claims (Section 6); submission of applications for verification of caste certificates (Section 6(2) and 6(3); cancellation of caste certificates (Section 7); burden of proof (Section 8); withdrawal of benefits obtained upon the invalidation of the claim (Section 10); and initiation of prosecution (Section J l), amongst other things; vi. The power conferred by Section 7 upon. the Scrutiny Committee to verify a claim is both in respect of caste certificates issued prior to and subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on 18 October 200 J. Finality does not attach to a caste certificate (or to the claim to receive benefits) where the claim of the individual to belong to a reserved caste, tribe or class is yet to be verified by the Scrutiny Committee; vii. Withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a caste claim which has been found to be false and is invalidated is a necessary consequence which flows from the invalidation of the caste claim and no issue ofretrospcctivity would arise; c viii. The decisions in Ka vita Solunkc and Shalini of two learned D Judges are overruled. Shalini in so far as it stipulates a requirement ofa dishonest intent for the application of the provision of Section 10 is, with respect, erroneous and docs not reflect the correct position in law; ix. Mens rea is an ingredient of the penal provisions contained in Section 11. Section 11 is prospective and would apply in those situations where the act constituting the offence has taken place after the.date of its enforcement; x. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in A run Sononc is manifestly erroneous and is overruled; and xi. Though the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of F the Constitution is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering complete justice and is a power which is couched in wide terms, the exercise of the jurisdiction must have due regard to legislative mandate, where a law such as Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 holds the field.

58. We will, now in the light of the reasons indicated above, proceed to dispose of the individual cases in the following terms: I Chairman and Managing Director FCI Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira42 : 42 C. A. No.8928 of2015 c [2017) l l S.C.R. On 6 December 1984, Food Corporation of India offered appointment to the respondent on the post of Messenger- Depot which was reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate dated 28August 1978 issued by the Executive Magistrate, Panvel, stating that the applicant was a Hindu Mahadev Kohli and hence belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Upon a declaration submitted by the respondent he was appointed to the post on 8 January 1985 in the Scheduled Tribe quota. The resp011dcnt received promotional benefits in the post of Dusting Operator ( 13 August 1990), Senior Dusting Operator (30 December 2000), Picker (I December 2003) and Senior Picker (20 December 2005). The caste certificate submitted by the respondent was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Thane. The claim of the respondent to belong to the Mahadco Koli Scheduled Tribe was found not to be established and the certificate was accordingly invalidated and cancelled. Following this his services were terminated on 4 October 2013. The respondent instituted writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court to challenge the order of the Scrutiny Committee and his termination from service. By a judgment dated 4 April 2014 the High Court noted thaHhe respondent was seeking only protection ofhis services and was willing to give up the claim of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. By its judgment, the High Court accepted the contention of the respondent and held that he was entitled to protection of services with continuity while the mam1gemcnt would be at liberty to withdraw such benefits as were granted after 28 September 2000. The employer moved a Special Leave Petition and in pursuance of an interim order dated JI August 2014, the respondent was reinstated in service and was granted further promotions. Eventually upon his superannuation on 31August2015 the respondent was granted his terminal benefits including gratuity, arrears of wage revision, medical reimbursement. leave encashmcnt, contributory provident fund and productivity linked incentive. During the pendcncy of the litigation, the respondent is retired from service and has even been paid his terminal dues. Hence, at this stage, all that can be observed is that no claim by a member ofMahdeo Koli, Scheduled Caste shall be made or entertained on behalf of the respondent or any member of his family on the strength of the caste certificate which has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. No CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] further benefits of any nature whatsoever would be admissible to the respondent on the basis of his claim which has been invalidated. However, in the peculiar facts. we are not inclined to order recovery has to be made from the respondent. The Civil Appeal is disposed ot: 2. Shri Shivaji Shikshan Sanstha & Anr. Vs. Raju Laxman Gadckar & Ors.43 and 3 State of Maharashtra Vs. Raju Laxman Gadckar & Ors44 : In September 1981, Raju Laxman Gadekar obtained a caste certificate that he belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in Mahara~htra. On the strength of the caste certificate, he was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a post reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in Shri Shivaji High- School, Dongaon on 24 June 1989. On 2 March 2005, he filled up an application in Fo1m E and submitted an affidavit in Form F through his employer to the Scrutiny Committee, which was invalidated on 20 February 2008. Since the claim that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe was invalidated, his services were terminated by the employer on 26 February 2008. The challenge to the order of termination failed before the School Tribunal. The writ petition challenging the orclerofthe Scrutiny Committee was dismissed on 7 August 2009. The order of the School Tribunal was challenged in a separate Writ Petition which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 16 October 2009 and the employee was directed to be reinstated. In an appeal by the employer, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge on 17 April 20 lO and dismissed the writ petition. A Special Leave Petition filed by the employee under Article 136 of the Constitution was dismissed by this Coult as not pressed on 1 October 2010. Thereafter the respondent filed a writ petition praying for his reinstatement and protection of his service. By the judgment dated 5/8/9/I 0 July 2013 the High Comt held that the employee was entitled to the protection of his services. Froni the narration of the facts it is clear that the Writ Petition filed by the employee challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee was dismissL'd on 7 August 2009 and it has been held that he docs not belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste certificate which was obtained by the respondent has been demonstrated to be a false caste "(Civil Appeal No. 91 SS of 20\S) "(Civil Appeal No. 91S7 of2015) c certificate. The challenge to the order of termination also attained finality since the Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed as not pressed. In the circumstances, the High Court has clearly erred in allowing protection of service to the employee. Such a direction is also contra1y to the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXl!I of 200 l. The appoin1tment secured by the respondent on the basis of a false caste claim was required to be withdrawn in terms of provisions of Section l 0. There has been a complete misuse of the process by the Respondent. We, therefore, allow the Civil Appeals and set aside the judgments and orders of the High C our! dated l 0 April 2013 and 5/8/9/ J 0 July 20 l3. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 4 Stak of Maharashtra Vs. Ku. Chham D/o.Hcmraj Nimjc & Ors.45 : Chhaya Nimje obtained a caste certificate on 20 July 1991 from the Executive Magistrate. Narkhcd to the effect that she belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. On the basis of the caste certificate she obtained appointment as an Assistant Teacher on 24 December 1996 in Bhimrao Bapu Dcshmukh Adarsh Vidyalaya. On 9 March she filled up an application informE together with an affidavit in Form Funder Ruic 11 of the Maharashtra ST (Regulation of!ssuance & Verification of) Caste Certificate Rules, 2003. The Vigilance Cell submitted a report showing that her records were of the Koshti community. Before the Scrutiny Committee could decide her claim she approached the High Court in a writ petition see~ing protection of service. The High Court disposed of the writ petition on 30 January 2013, on the statement of the employer that her services will not be terminated unless the caste certificate is invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. She again filed a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking protection of her services. The respondent has no right to claim protection of her services. The respondent has misused the process oflaw by filing successive writ petitions to pre-empt un adjudication by the Scrutiny Committee and then confining the claim only to the protection of her services. For the reasons which arc indicated in the body of the judgment and for the above reasons, the Civil Appeal is allowed and impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. No other submission is urged. ';(Civil Appeal No.9160 of2015) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGD!SH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 5 State of Maharashtra & Anr. Vs. Mrs.Arundhati Surcsh Nimnvc & Anr.46: The respondent was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 20 March 1997 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 18 May 1995 stating that she belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee has invalidated the caste certificate and directed it to be confiscated. The High Court by its order dated 26 November 2012 has confirmed the order ofinvalidation but has granted protection of service. By a subsequent order the High Court has ordered the State to consider rcvision/refixation of pay scales. For the reasons indicated by this court while disposing of Civil Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015 and for those contained in the body of the judgment, the Civil Appeals arc allowed. The impugned judgments and orders of the High Court arc set aside. No other submission is urged. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 6 Mnhatma Fulc Krishi Vidyapccth Vs .. Nagnath Baburao Mnngrule & Ors.47 : The respondent was appointed as an Agricultural Assistant on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 22 July 1996 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 3 February 1991 stating that he belongs to the Mahadco Kali tribe. On 26 August 2011 the respondent submitted his caste certificate and oti)er documents for verification of the caste claim, which were forwarded to the Scrutiny Committee. In the meantime the appellant initiated a departmentul enquiry against the respondent and terminated the services of the respondent by its order dated 18 December 20 l 2. Subsequently the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste claim of the respondent by its order dated 3 October 2013. The High Court by its order dated 4 April 2014 has confirmed the order of invalidation but has granted protection of service. For the reasons indicated in the body of the judgment and those indicated while allowing Civil Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157of2015, the Civil Appeal shall stand allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Com1 is set aside insofar as it protects the services of the respondent. "\Civil Appeal Nos .. 9203-04 of 2015) "(Civil Appeal No.8926 of2015) c (2017] ll S.C.R. There shall be no order as to costs. c 7 Suresh Slo.Dewaji Vairagadc Vs. The Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines. Indira Bhavan. Civil Lines, Nagpur & r\nr.4tt … : The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Store Keeper on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 14 November 1988 on the strength of a caste certificate dated 14 January 1985 slating that he bdongs to the H~lba Schedule Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 August 2005 invalidated the caste claim of the appellant. Subsequently the respondent terminated the services of the appellant in pursuance of the proviso to Sub Ruic 1 of Ruic 5 of the Central Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. Being aggrieved. the appellant filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Com1 by its order dated 3 August 2009. Having due regard for the reasons contained in the body of this judgment, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed. No other submission is urged. There shall be no order as to costs. 8 Rajcndra S/o. Ramaji Mahisbadwc Vs. The Joint Commissioner and Vice-Chairman Scheduled Tribe, Caste Ccrtificak Scrutinv Committee & Anr" : The appellant was appointed as a trainee technician in Air India on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 6 August 1 997 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 9 August 1988 stating that he belongs to the Halba Schedule Tribe. Thereafter the appointment of the appellant was confirmed on 1 March 1999. The second respondent sought a clarification from Tehsildar, Nagpur to ascertain whether the caste certificate is genuine or not. The Tchsildar by a letter dated 17 October 2008 stated that the name of the appellant is not borne in the records. Accordingly the second respondent terminated the services of the appellant by an order dated 3 November 2009. The Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 5 October 2012 invalidated the caste claim of the appellant. "I Civil Appeal No.1918 of 20 I 0) "tCiviJ Appeal No. 9154 of2015) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] The High Court by its j udgmcnt dated I I March 2013 has declined to grant protection to the services of the appellant upon the invalidation of his claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe by the Scrutiny Committee on 5 October 2012. There is a clear and patent misuse of process by the Appellant. In the abscnceofthe caste validity certificate, the appointment of the Appellant cannot be held to have attained finality. Having due regard to the reasons contained in the body of this judgment, we find no error in the judgment of the High Cowt. The Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed. No other submission is urged. There shall be no order as to costs. 9 Chhava d/o.Yadaorao Barapatrc {a) Chhaya W/o. Rajccv c Dhakatc Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.50 : The appellant was appointed as a Junior Lecturer in the fourth respondent High School on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 2 July 1991 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 23 July 1984 stating that she belongs to the Halba Schedule Tribe. On 14 March 1997 the appellant's appointment as a Junior Lecturer was confirmed by the fourth respondent. The Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste claim of the appellant by its order dated 8 Novem9cr 2012. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 5 April 2013 has declined to grant protection of services. The appellant preferred a review which was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 10 May 2013. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due regard to the invalidation of the claim of the respondent by the Scrutiny Committee, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeals arc accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 10 Ravindra Govindrao NagpurkarVs. Sccrctarv, Rajasthan Education Society \Vashim & Ors." : The appellant was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on .14 August 1995 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 13 May 1982 stating that he belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste claim of the appellant was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 18 January 2005. Thereafter the appellant "(CivilAppcal Nos. 9158-59 of2015) "(Civil Appeal Nos.8604-05/17@ SLP (C) Nos. 33864-65 of 2015) c [2017] l l S.C.R. was issued a show cause notice dated 3 January 2006 by the first respondent to explain why his services should not be terminated. On 16 January 2006 the appellant filed a writ petition and challenged the show cause notice. However. on the same day the first respondent had already issued an order of termination. Thereafter the High Court granted permission to withdraw the writ petition and liberty was granted to tile proceedings before the appropriate forum. The appellant preferred an appeal before the University & College Tribunal. Nagpur which was dismissed by the tribwrnl by its order dated 30 December 2012. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 18.3.2013 has declined to grant protection of services. The Review Petition was also dismissed on 29 November 2013. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due regard to the invalidation of the claim of the respondent by the Scrutiny Committee, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeals are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 11 Shri Shivaji Education Society & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.": The third respondent was appointed as an Assistant Tcachc.r on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate showing him as belonging to the Thakur Scheduled Tribe. By its order dated 23 April 2008 the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the tribe claim and confiscated his certificate. The services of the third respondent were terminated on 12 May 2008. While dismissing the writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the High Court by its order dated 15 December 2015 has none the less directed reinstatement of the third respondent subject to an undertaking that he would not claim the benefit of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe in future. Once the tribe claim of the respondent has been held to be false, the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable for the reasons indicated in the body of this judgment. The Civil Appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court dated 15 December 2015 is set aside. In consequence the Writ Petition filed by the third respondent shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. "(Civil Appeal No.8601117@ SLP (C) No. 289 of 2016) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] 12 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Vs. Murlidhar Arjun Ncwarc and Anr.": The respondent was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer (Grade-I) reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 11 March 1992 on the strength ofa caste ce1tificatc stating that he belongs to the Gondgowari tribe. The Scrutiny Committee initially by an order dated 23 June 2004 rejected the tribe claim. Subsequently in pursuance of order of remand passed by the High Cmut, the Scrutiny Committee investigated into the matter again and invalidated the tribe claim by its order dated 2 January 2006 and ordered the tribe certificate to be cancelled. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent on 10 November 2006 and the review petition was also dismissed for want of prosecution on 5 April 2006. However, subsequently the review petition, after restoration, was allowed on 30 January 2015 and while the cancellation of the caste certificate was upheld protection to the services of the respondent was granted. c For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due regard to the fact that the claim of the respondent has been found to be false, we find merit in the appeals which have been filed by the appellant. The impugned judgments of the High Court dated 30 January 2015 arc accordingly set aside. The writ proceedings filed by the respondent shall, in the circun1stances, stand dismissed. The Civil Appeals arc allowed in these terms. No other submission is nrgcd. There shall be no order as to costs. 13 India Trade Promotion Organisation Vs. Vivckkumar Lajjashankar Chaurasiya": The Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 March 2013 has found that the respondent docs not belong to the Nagawanshi tribe. The respondent was appointed on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the strength of a certificate that he belongs to the Nagawanshi tribe. The Division Bench of the High Court, placing reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench in Arnn Sononc's case (supra), has by its judgment dated 16 February 2015 granted reinstatement to the respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the appeal filed by the employer shall have to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. "(C.A. Nos. 8602-03/17@SLP (CJ Nos.529-30 of2016) ,., (C.A.No.8607117@ SLP @No.14830 of 2015) The impugned judgment of the High Coundated 16 February 2015 is set aside. No other submission is urged. c There shall be no order as to costs. 14 Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Vs. Rajendra Ramchandra Dhakate & . .\nr.'' : The claim of the respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 July 1998. The Scrutiny Committee has found that the documents submitted by the first respondent were manipulated and fabricated. The respondent was appointed to a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste ce11ificatc stating that he belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The termination of the services the respondent has followed upon the cancellation of the caste certificate. In the circumstances and for the reasons contained in the body of the judgment. the High Cowt erred in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent and directing the appellant to reinstate him. The Civil Appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 20 January 2015. The writ petition filed by the respondent shall. in the circumstances. stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 15 State of Maharashtra Vs.Vasant, s/o.Gyundco Gonnade"': The respondent was appointed on the post ofJw1ior Engineer on 2 I July 1982 on the basis of a claim of belonging to the "'Halba Koshti'" Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee invalidated his claim on 19 August 1985. In the meantime. the Maharashtra Public Service Commission recommended the respondent for appointment in the cadre ofAssistant Engineer in 1984 and 1986 but he was not granted placement. The respondent filed a writ petition to challenge the order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 19 August I 985 which was dismissed by the High Court on 4 July 1986. Thereafter the respondent filed an appeal (Caste Appeal) 11/ 1986-87 before the Divisional Commissioner. Nagpur against the order of the Scrutiny Committee. The appeal was disposed of on 23 August 1985 by remanding the proceedings back to the Scrutiny Committee. On remand, the Scrutiny Committee, by its order dated 28 ''(Civil Appeal 8609;17@ SLP (CJ No.13409 of 2015) "!Civil Appeal 8606/l 7@ S.L.P.(C)No. 19992 of 2015) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] August 1989 found that the respondent docs not belong to the Scheduled Tribe and cancelled his caste certi fie ate. The respondent filed an appeal before the Additional Divisional Commissioner. Nagpur which was dismissed on 12 November 1990. The respondent filed a writ petition challenging the invalidation of his caste claim and to seek relief in respect of his service conditions. By an order dated 23 March 1995 the writ petition was allowed by holding that the respondent belongs to the Halba Koshti caste but that was made subject to the decision in Milind (supra). The respondent was granted placement in the seniority of Assistant Engineer with effect from 29 July 1987. subject to the final outcome of the proceedings in Milind (supra). On 18 October 1995 the respondent was appointed as Assistant Executive Engineer subject to the decision in Milind (supra) and he joined on 4 December 1995. On 4 October c l 999 the respondent was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer subject to the final disposal of the proceedings before this Court in Milind (supra). It was directed that the seniority would be fixed after the final decision of this Court. On 15 September 2000 the respondent was given a deemed date of 29 May 1987. On 15 April 2005, considering the judgment of this Court in Milind (supra), the appointment of the rcspomlent to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was protected and he was regularized on the post considering it as an open category post. His seniority was directed to be fixed from the date of appointment and it was ordered that he shall not get the benefit of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. On 6 August 2005 the earlier deemed date of29 May 1987 was modified and his seniority on the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was fixed from 4 December 1995. On 5 June 2006 a G.R. was issued by which the deemed date was modified to 29 May 1987 on the post of Assistant Executive Engineer for the purpose of seniority. On I August 2009 a GR. was issued by which the deemed date for the purpose of seniority on the post of Executive Engineer was set as 29 May 199 l subject to approval of the M.P.S.C. On 28 April 2014 the State Government published a seniority list from I January 2011 to 13 December 2013 for Executive Engineer. The respondent who was aggrieved by the GR. dated 28 April 2014 filed a writ petition before the High Court at its Nagpur Bench praying for an appropriate writ for the declaration of the date of his seniority. The High Court by its judgment dated 27 Febrnary 2015 has c [2017] I l S.C.R. adverted to the decision in A run Son one and has come to the conclusion that the G.R. dated 6 August 2005 is not sustainable and the state government has been directed to give effect to its G.R.s dated 15 September 2000 and 15 April 2005 by placing the respondent in the cadre of Assistant Engineer with effect from 29 May 1987. From a re11ding of the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the primary consideration which weighed with it was the decision of its Full Bench in A run Sononc. In view of the reasons contained in the body of this judgment, this basis of the impugned decision of the High Court is erroneous. The Respondent does not belong to the Halba Schcdukd Tribe. It is also clear that the benefits obtained by the Respondent were subject to the decision in Milind. In Milind, this Com1 has held that Halba – Koshti is not a Scheduled Tribe. the relevant entry in the Scheduled Tribes Order 1950 being 'Halba. Halbi'. We accordingly allow the Civil Appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated 27 February 2015. There shall be no order as to costs. 16 State of Maharashtra Vs.Ku.Yijaya Dcorao Nandanwar & Anr.57 : The claim of the respondent of belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 7 November 2009. The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. Following the invalidation of the claim, the services of the respondent were terminated. The High Court by its impugned order dated 5 July 2013 set aside the order of termination and granted protection to the service of the respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent shall, in the circumstances, stand dismissed. The Civil Appeal is allowed in these terms. No other submission lrns been urged. There shall be no order as to costs. I 7 Ishwar Shrawan Nikharc Vs.State of Maharashtra & Ors." : "(C. A. No.9107 of2015) "(Civil Appeal No.7187 of2013) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.] The appellant wits appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a vacancy reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 30 January 1999. The Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated the claim of the appellant on l July 2008. The Division Bench of the High Court, by its order dated 30 January 2009 allowed the request for the withdrawal of the writ petition filed by the appellant keeping open the validity of the observations made by the Scrutiny Committee whereby prosecution was ordered. The services of the appellant were terminated on 8 February 2009. The appellant filed an appeal before the School Tribunal which was dismissed on 19 October 2011 on the ground that the appointment of the appellant was not a valid appointment in the eye of law. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal.A Letters Patent Appeal has been dismissed by the Division Bench by its judgment dated 7 May 2012. Having regard to the fact that the claim of the appellant to belong to a Scheduled Tribe was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee, the School Tribunal cannot be faulted in declining to entertain the appeal against the consequential order of termination of service. Moreover, for the reasons contained in the body of the present judgment, we find no merit in the Civil Appeal. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No other submission has been urged. There shall be no order as to costs. 18 Eknath Barikrao Dhanwadc Vs.Divisional Controller, State Transport Corporation & Anr.59 : The appellant was appointed as a driver in 1999 with the respondent on a post reserved for Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste ce11ificate that he belongs to the Mahadeo Koli tribe. The appellant's caste claim was rejected by the Scrutiny Committee holding that the appellant docs not belong to the said tribe. A writ petition was filed by the appellant. The High Court by an order dated II January 2000 remanded the matter to the Scrutiny Committee. On 2 March 200 I the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the tribe chiim of the appellant. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. By an order dated 30 June 20.14, the High Court dismissed the petition. The appellant filed another writ petition which was dismissed with costs by an order dated 19 September 2014. Subsequently on 19 November 2014 the first respondent terminated the service of the appellant. Being aggrieved, the ;, (Civil Appeal 8608/17@ SLP (C) … CC No. 10889 of 2015) L2017111 S.C.R. appellant filed another writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court by its order l 9 January 20 15. The above narration indicates a complete abuse of process by the appellant. For the reasons contained in the body of the present judgment and in view of the above, we find no merit in the appeal. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No other submission is separately urged. c There shall be no order as to costs. J 9 Pradip Gajanan Koli Vs.State or Maharashtra & Ors."': The appellant was appointed to the post offireman in the reserved category for the Scheduled Tribes on 12 March l 996. Thereafter a caste certificate dated 22 June 2000 certifying that the appellant belongs to the Mahadeo Koli Scheduled Tribe was issued. The caste certificate was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification. The appellant submitted an affidavit slating that he belongs to the said caste and also appeared before the Committee. By an order dated 7 July 2012 the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste certificate of the appellant. The appellant filed a writ petition which was disposed of by the High Court, by its judgment and order dated 20 November 2013 with a direction that in case the appellant is still in service as on that date. his employment shall not be terminated for a period of three months from the date of its order. For the reasons contained in the body of the present judgment, we find no error in the impugned judgment. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No other submission is separately urged. There shall be no order as lo costs. 20 Union or India & Ors. Vs.Suryakant & Ors.•1 : The Director General, Vigilance, New Delhi by an order dated 1 July 2005, initiated the verification of tribe certificates of employees who were appointed from 1995. Accordingly, the original tribe certificate of the respondent was asked to be produced. The respondent was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the strength ofa caste certificate stating that he belongs to the Mahadco Koli tribe. The certificate was issued by the Tahsildar, Ako la on 13 May l 985. Subsequently on enquiry about the authenticity of the tribe certificate, the Tahsildar, Akola informed that the register for the '"(Civil Appeal No.8598/17@ SLP (C) 18925 of2014) "'(Civil Appeal No.8597/17@ SLP (CJ No. 16852 of 2016) CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI v. JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA [DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD. J.] year 1985 was not traceable and hence it cannot be stated whether certificate was issued by office or otherwise. Instead of submitting his original caste certificate the respondent produced a fresh tribe certificate dated 21 July 2005 issued by S.D.O., Bhusawal wherein it was stated that he belongs to the Mahadeo Koli tribe. By an order dated I 0 October 2011 the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the caste claim of the respondent. The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 20 October 2015 allowed the writ petition, relying upon its Full Bench judgment in Arnn Sononc (supra) with a direction that the respondent is entitled to claim service protection and shall not be entitled to claim promotion in employment. The narration of facts reveals a complete misuse of process by the Respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The Civil Appeal is accordingly allowed in these terms. No separate submission is urged. c There shall be no order as to costs. 21 Executive Director (Lubes), lndiun Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Ashok Mahadcorao Pathrabc & Ors.62 : The respondent joined IOCL in 1976 at i;, R & D Centre, Faridabad. At the time of the appointment, the respondent has shown himself as belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The appointment was subject to the information submitted by the re~pondent being true and correct. The respondent submitted his caste certificate along with a prescribed form/documents on 15 December 2006 which were forwarded for verification. The Scrutiny Committee rejected the caste claim of the respondent on 4 October 2010. Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred an internal appeal and also a writ petition before the High Court. By its order dated I March 2011 the appellant rejected the appeal of the respondent upholding the dismissal order. Subsequently on 7 December 20 I J the High Court also dismissed the petition of the respondent upholding the dismissal order. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a Special Leave Petition before this Cmu1 which was dismissed by an order dated 27 Febmary 2012. The appellant filed another writ petition before the High Cou11 which was allowed by an order dated 24 November 2015 to the extent that the services of the respondent were protected ti II his superannuation. "(Civil Appeal Nos.8599-8600/17@ SLP (C) Nos. 29388-89 of 2016) l2017] l l S.C.R. The facts narrated above reveal a complete misuse of process by the Respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the impugned orders of the High Court arc unsustainable and arc accordingly set aside. The Civil Appeals are accordingly allowed in these terms. No other ~ubmission is urged. There sha II be no order as to costs. c 22 The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Rupcsh s/o. Tcksingh Shindc'" : The respondent was appointed as a clerk on a post earmarked for the Vimukta Jatis on 26 March 1999 claiming that he belongs to the Raj put Bhamta Vimukta Jati. The caste claim of the respondent was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification and was invalidated by an order dated 29 July 2011. As the caste claim was invalidated the respondent was terminated from service by an order dated 16 August 2011. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court. After hearing both the parties, the court remanded the matter back to the Scrutiny Committee. The caste certificate was again invalidated by an order dated 21 January 2014 and the Committee observed that the respondent obtained a false caste certificate and directed the registration of an FIR against the respondent, pursuant to which the services of the respondent were terminated. Being aggrieved the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court. The High Cmu"t by its impugned judgment and order dated 3 February 2016 allowed the writ petition relying upon its Full Bench judgment in the case of Arun Sononc Vs. State or Maharashtra (supra) with a direction to the appellant to reinstate the respondent on his original post. The facts narrated above indicate the manner in which the process has been abused by the Respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The Civil Appeal is accordingly al lowed in these terms. No other submission is urged. There shall be no order as to costs. Nidhi Jain Appeals disposed uf. "'(Civil Appeal Nos.8610/17 (ii/ SLP (C) No.2299 of 2017)