CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI versus K.C. PALANISAMY AND OTHERS

20. Hence, this appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 13120 of 2013 by the appellant- Chandran Ratnaswami. S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 3273-3274 of 2013 have also been filed by the same D appellant (an accused in Chargesheet CC 162 of 2013) against orders dated 29th January, 2013 and 1st February, 2013 respectively in Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013 and Crl.M.P. No.3 of 2013 in Criminal O.P. No. 2283 of 2013. In these SLPs, notice has not been issued and they are fresh ones.

21. Criminal Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) Nos. 1924- 1927 of 2013 have been filed by K.C. Palanisamy [respondent No. 1 in civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 13120 of 2013] challenging the order dated 26th February, 2013 in Criminal O.P. Nos. 2283, 2282 and 2166 of 2013 and Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos. 11342-11343 of 2013 (D.No.7366/2013) have been filed challenging the order dated 26th February, 2013 in Writ Petition Nos. 2739 and 2740 of 2013. In these matters, the appellant – K.C. Palanisamy has challenged the said High Court's order by which the accused G have been exempted from filing proper bail application under the Criminal Procedure Code.

22. Contempt Petition (C) No. 166 of 2013 in S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9853 of 201 O has been filed by the applicant – Chand ran H Ratnaswami for wilful and deliberate violation and CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] , disobedience of order da)ed 22nd November, 2010 by re- opening the closed FIR No. 7 of 2007. In this contempt petition, notice has not been issued and it is a fresh one.

23. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing in SLP(C) No.13120 of 2013 assailed the impugned order passed by the Division Bench and also the orders passed in criminal proceedings as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel drew our attention to the entire facts of the case discussed hereinabove and submitted that respondent No.1 filed a series of complaints which have either been dismissed or quashed or stayed by the High Court or this Court. Learned counsel submitted that the criminal courts including the High Court have completely failed and erred in not condemning respondent No.1 for approaching the courts to obstruct the proceedings before the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. Learned coun~el submitted that the disputes arose with regard to the Joint Venture Agreement between the parties have been finally adjudicated by the Company Law Board and the High Court, but respondent No.1 instead of complying with the directions of the Company Law Board and High Court started filing frivolous criminal cases 'against the appellant, which were either quashed or stayed by · the High Court. Learned counsel seriously assailed the conduct of the Superintendent of Police, who directed reinvestigation in a matter which was finally closed. Learned counsel submitted that the Division Bench failed to note that the entire efforts of the respondent in PfOSecuting the appellant are serious abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel referred the allegations made in the complaint petition and submitted that the whole object of filing those complaints are nothing but to pressurize the appellant and to harass him. Learned counsel then submitted that the whole procedure in the proceedings initiated against the appellant is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that the conduct of respondent No.1 is deplorable and the same is contemptuous amounting to deliberate obstruction of the judicial proceedings c and an abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel lastly contended that the Division Bench has erroneously set aside the order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the issue was pending in this Court.

24. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing in SLP(Crl.) Nos.1947-48 of 2013 after narrating the entire · facts in the case and the sequence of events submitted that the continuation of criminal proceedings and the submission of the charge-sheet is the result of the wrong understanding of the order by Superintendent of Police, Tiruppur, who directed reinvestigation in a matter which was closed. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the order for reinvestigation passed by the Superintendent of Police is totally illegal, void and contemptuous. It was contended that series of complaints filed by respondent No.1 has either been dismissec:J.,pr quashed or D stayed by the High Court and that respondent 'No.1 has the propensity to abuse the legal process and utilize it as a tool to wreak vengeaQce against others involved with the CEPL so that the appellants' Company does not pursue the Company Law Board proceedings. Learned counsel submitted that it has been the modus operandi of respondent No.1 to file false and bogus complaints and utilize the same to harass and coerce the . appellant. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the dispute raised by the respondent is purely a civil dispute but it has been . given the colour of criminal act with the sole objective to implicate and detain these two appellants, who are foreigners, in criminal cases and not to allow them to travel outside India.

25. Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the appellants contended that it is a matter of record G that every single complaint filed by respondent No. 1 has been either dismissed or quashed or stayed by the High Court or this Court and respondent No. 1 has the propensity to abuse the legal process and utilize it as a tool to wreak vengeance against others involved with CEPL so that the appellant's company does not pursue the Company Law Board proceedings. CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] Learned counsel contended that it has been the modus operandi of respondent No. 1 to file false and bogus criminal complaints and to utilize the same to harass and coerce the appellant. Respondent No. 1 had malafidely filed a complaint CC 157/07 before the Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai. This was an ingenious case where respondent No. 1 deliberately and fraudulently signed and issued a cheque from the CEPL account to his own company, namely, Cherraan Constructions Limited (CCL) for Rs. 5 crore (when there was no transaction, liability to the payee or authority to issue the cheque) and then caused the cheque to be dishor.oured. Promptly·, CCL filed a c Section 138 NI Act complaint against the appellant and the other Director of CEPL etc. but did not make respondent No. 1 an accused. The Madras High Court quashed this complaint in Criminal O.P. No. 29737 of 2007.

26. Mr. Karthik Sheshadri, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,.on the other hand in support of continuance of criminal proceedings, submitted that the respondent – complainant made out a case in the complaint for prosecuting the· appellant for cheating and misappropriation of money. With regard to the filing of FIR being No.7 of 2007, learned counsel submitted that immediately after the FIR was lodged, the appellants approached the High Court of Madras and got an order of stay for further investigation in Criminal O.P. NO. 12695/2007 and Criminal O.P. No.19384 of 2007 and consequently all further investigation of the crime atteged \.:ame to be stayed. Appellants also filed a case for quashing of the FIR before the Madras High Court. Learned counsel vehemently argued that FIR No.7/2007 was never closed at any point of time and, therefore, the direction for the reinvestigation was perfectly justified. Based on the investigation, charge-sheet was filed. According to the learned counsel, the Superintendent of Police passed order for the reinvestigation only because no investigation was ever conducted because of the stay granted by the High Court. While justifying the legality and validity of (2013] 17 S.C.R. reinvestigation, learned counsel submitted that even without permission of the Magistrate, Police Officer can direct further investigation. In support of that, learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in State of Bihar & Another vs. J.A.C. Saldanna and Others, AIR 1980 SC 326. Lastly, learned B counsel submitted that when the charge-sheet makes out a case then civil liberty is not the appropriate remedy for the aggrieved person.

27. In the light of factual situation and having gone through C the entire facts and the sequence of events in the criminal proceedings before the criminal courts and the orders passed time to time by such courts, the question that falls for consideration is as to whether continuance of such criminal proceedings is an abuse of the process of the Court.

28. Before we embark upon dealing with the issue posed before us, we would like to discuss the principles laid down by various courts as to when continuance of criminal proceeding will amount to abuse of process of the Court.

29. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is well- established and recognized doctrine both by the English courts and courts in4 India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be abuse of process of court. Lord Morris in the case of Connelly vs. F Director of Public Prosecutions, (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL) observed: "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rule of G practice and to suppress any abuse of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process". "The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuse of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or H prejudice." In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

30. In Hui Chi-Ming vs. The Queen [(1992) 1 AC 34 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.

31. In the leading case of Bennett vs. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, (1993) 3 All ER 138, on the application of C abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair 0 trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.

32. In R. vs. Derby Crown Court exp Brooks, (1985) 80 Cr.App.R. 164, Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: "It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution pas manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."

33. Lord Justice Neill in R. vs. Beckford, [1996] 1 Cr.App.R. 94: [1995] R.T.R. 251 observed that: "The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried." What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

34. This C{)urt in State of Kamataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It was held in this case (at p.703 of SCC): "7. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts.

35. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, this Court in the backdrop c of interpretation of various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this .Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) "102. (1) …….. . (2) …. . (3) ….. . (4) ····· (5) ….. (6) ….. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

36. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8) "8 . … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the · complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out.even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

37. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. and Others, (2006) 6 8CC 736 this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749, para 13) "13 . … Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."

38. Jn the case of lnder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, (2007) 12 SCC 1, this Court H after considering series of decisions observed: CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI. v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.) "46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not A used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of c the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. xxx xxx xxx 50. Civilised countries have recognised that liberty is the D most precious of all the human rights. The Ame·rican Declaration of Independence, 1776, French Geclaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen, 1789, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 1966 all speak with one voice-liberty is the natural and inalienable right of every human being. Similarly, Article 21 of our Constitution proclaims that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. 51. The issuance of non-bailable warrants involves interference with personal liberty. Arrest and imprisonment means deprivation of the most precious right of an individual. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely careful before issuing non-bailable warrants. 52. Just as liberty is precious for an individual so is the interest of the society in maintaining law and order. Both are extremely important for the survival of a civilised society. Sometimes in the larger interest of the public and the State it becomes absolutely imperative to curtail freedom of an [2013) 17 S.C.R. individual for a certain period, only then the non-bailable warrants should be issued." 39. In G. Sagar Suri and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636, this Court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process, particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature. 40. In the case of S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Others, AIR 1970 SC 786 (at p. 789), this Court has stated C thus: "7 …… It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered powe< to investigate all cases-where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code." 41. In the case of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others, AIR 1982 SC 949 while examining the power of a police officer in the field of G investigation of a cognizable offence, Chandrachud, C.J. has affirmed the view expressed by Mathe~. J. and observed as follows: (at p.958 of AIR) "22 ….. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. 42. In the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2005) 10 SCC 336, this Court has held as under: "6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the· facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence whatsoever. is made out much less offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petition against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that there is no other allegation in the petition of complaint. It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons may . take steps for moving the Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheattias developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons G to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. 7. In our view petition of complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all much less any offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-B IPC and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lies before a civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the same it was just and expedient for the High Court to quash the same by exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC which it has erroneously refused." 43. Coming back to the instant case from the affidavits filed by the parties, the facts which come into light are that the appellant-Chandran Ratnaswami settled in Canada since 1974. He is holding executive posts in various companies ·based in Canada and has made investment in India worth more than 1 billion USO. He is also a Director on the Board of various D renowned companies including ORE Holdings Limited based . in Mauritius. The said company ORE entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with C.G. Holdings Private Limited (respondent No.1 – K.C. Palanisamy's Company) and N. Athappan for constructing and developing a hotel property, E shopping complex etc. owned by Cherraan Properties Limited (CPL) and Vasantha Mills Limited (VML). ORE invested Rs.75 crores and got 45% in Cheran Enterprises Private Limited (CEPL). Athappan invested Rs. 4 crores and got 10%. 44. Disputes arose between the parties when respondent No.1 alleged to have transferred shares of CPL and VML to CEPL instead of bringing money and got 45% shareholdings in CEPL. Respondent No.1 allegedly swindled the said 75 crores deposited by the appellant Company ORE and G transferred the immovable assets of CPL and VML, subsidiaries of CEPL. Consequently, ORE filed Company Petition before the Company Law Board on account of alleged acts of oppression and mismanagement indulged by respondent No.1. The matter CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] before the Company Law Board was hotly contested and finally A the Company Law Board by order dated 13th August, 2008 directed respondent No.1, CG Holdings and CEPL to return the investment of appellant Company ORE and Athappan with 8% interest. On payment of money it was directed that respondent K.C. Palanisamy will take control of CEPL and its subsidiaries. Clarification Petition was also disposed of by Company Law Board on 13th August, 2008. 45. Both the parties moved the Madras High Court by filing appeals and those Company Appeals were finally disposed of C on 5th August, 2011 and the order passed by the Company Law Board was confirmed. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court while confirming the view taken by the Company Law Board held that both parties cannot jointly run the business and, therefore, to D ensure smooth exit of ORE and Athappan, the Company Law Board passed the order. The said order of the Division Bench passed in appeals, however, was not challenged by respondent No.1 K.C. Palanisamy. 46. The appellant filed execution case, which is pending. It further appears that a suit was also filed being O.S.No.90 of 2007 before the District Munsiff Court. 47. Instead of complying with the order of the Company Law Board and the directions and observations made by the Madras. High Court in the aforementioned Company Appeals, respondent No.1 started filing several criminal complaints against the appellant. The first complaint was filed by the respondent before the Economic Offences Wing, Chennai, alleging that ORE invested only Rs. 75 crores and for not G bringing Rs. 300 crores in Joint Venture Company. The petition filed in the High Court seeking direction to EOW to take action on·the complaint was, however, withdrawn. Respondent No.1 then filed a second complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai which was dismissed after examining respondent H (2013] 17 S.C.R. No.1 and his two witnesses. The respondent then filed another complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Kangeyam without disclosing the dismissal of the earlier complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai. The said complaint finally came to be registered as FIR No.7 of 2007. The appellant moved the High Court for quashing the said FIR. In the said petition, the High Court, after noticing the similar complaint filed earlier by respondent No.1 in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai, finally observed that the second criminal proc~eding initiated by respondent No.1 has no merit. The court further passed a c stringent remark against the conduct of respondent No.1 for filing cases on the same issue. 48. Respondent No.1 then moved this Court by filing SLP(Crl.) No.9853 of 2010 alleging the pendency of the protest petition and non-closure of the criminal case. This Court refused to interfere with the order but observed that if any protest petition is pending the same shall be disposed of in accordance with law. 49. Curiously enough, on the report of Superintendent of Police, Tiruppur, the criminal case in FIR No.7 of 2007 was directed to be reopened for re-investigation. On this FIR, the Magistrate before whom the criminal case was pending passed various orders which were time to time challenged by the aggrieved party before the High Court and before this Court. Simultaneously, the appellant also filed counter criminal cases against the respondent which were also proceeded and are pending in those criminal courts. 50. In a nutshell, the dispute arising out of Joint Venture Agreement has been fully and finally settled by the Company G Law Board and also the.High Court and several directions were issued for compliance including the return of the amount by respondent No.1 to the appellant and to become the sole owner of those companies. 51. It is pertinent to mention here that in course of CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] arguments the action of Superintendent of Police was_ A challenged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. In order to justify the action of the Superintendent of Police in directing the investigation, Mr. P.S. Narsimhan, learned senior counsel submitted that on the instruction of Inspector General of Police such reinvestigation was directed by the Superintendent of Police. However, no such letter of instruction has been produced before us by the learned counsel. At this juncture, we reiterate that the power of Police Officers in the field of investigation ofa cognizable offence is not unlimited. Hence, the power during the investigation must .be exercised c strictly within the limitation prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure and such power may not result in destroying the personal freedom of a citizen. 52. As noticed above, after the dispute was finally settled by the Company Law Board and the Madras High Court in appeal, the respondent approached the Economic Offences · Wing, who refused to entertain the complaint. The respondent then moved the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Perundurai for initiating criminal action against the appellant for breach of contract, which was dismissed by the Magistrate holding the same as nothing but to take vengeance. The Magistrate further held that if the conditions of the agreement are violated the respondent has to seek remedy under the Contract Act or the Company Law instead of filing criminal case. Suppressing the said complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, the respondent tried again by filing a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, Kangayam for initiating criminal action against the appellants for the breach of contract and conspiracy. Although the FIR was registered, but a closure report as a mistake of fact was prepared. The High Court while passing th.e order observed that the Court would frown upon the conduct of the complainant in indulging in repeated. harassment of the petitioners-appellants. Irrespective of the dispute with regard to the closure of the case, a fresh life was given to the criminal case at the instance SUPREME COURT REPORT§ A of Superintendent of Police, who directed re-investigation and in course of the said criminal proceeding irrespective of FIR No.7/2007 the appellants were harassed and on technicalities various orders for surrender, arrest and their detention had been passed. As noticed above, in the three writ petitions filed B by respondent No.1, though not against the appellant but against the C.B.I. in respect of different transactions, the High Court dismissing all those writ petitions observed that the modus operandi of the writ petitioner (respondent No.1 ). was to defraud the person or entity and thereafter approach the c Courts with multiple proceedings in order to distract attention from his own misdeeds. 53. Neither the High Court nor the Magisterial Court have ever applied their mind and considered the conduct of the respondent and continuance of criminal proceedings in respect D of the disputes, which are civil in nature and finally adjudicated by the competent authority i.e. the Company Law Board and the High Court in appeal. 54. We are of the definite opinion that the complainant has E manipulated and misused the process of Court so as to deprive the appellants from their basic right to move free anywhere inside or outside the country. Moreover, it would be unfair if the appellants are to be tried in such criminal proceedings arising out of alleged breach of a Joint Venture Agreement specially F when such disputes have been finally resolved by the Court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, allowing the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.7 of 2007 to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court and, therefore, for the ends of justice such proceedings ought to be quashed. Since G the High Court failed to look into this aspect of the matter while passing the impugned order, in our opinion, the same could not be sustained in law. 55. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.13120 of 2013, SLP (Crl.) Nos.3273-3274 of 2013 H and SLP (Crl.) Nos.1947-1948 of 2013 are allowed, whereas CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C. PALANISAMY [M.Y. EQBAL, J.] th.e appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.1924-1926 of 2013 A a~d SLP (C) Nos.11342-11343 of 2013 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 56. Although we do not appreciate the action of a senior Superintendent of Police, but in view of the order p,assed in these appeals, we do not want to proceed any further in Contempt Petition (C) No.166 of 2013, which stands disposed of. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals and contempt petition disposed of.