Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
34. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, [I 973] 2 SCC 793, this Court held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate Court. "In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate Court to review the whole evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinize the probative material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual -1. liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding without very F convincing reasons and comprehensive considerations."
35. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, Krishna Iyer, J. said; "Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social G perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic ___._ appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the c contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned author (Glanville Williams : 'Proof of Guilt') has saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has • gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard cf the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from, the conviction of innocent..' Jn short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presum_ed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents". (emphasis supplied)
36. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1979] 2 SCR 363 F : [1979] 1 SCC 355: AIR 1979 SC 387, the Court was considering the power of the High Court against an order of acquittal under Section 3 78 of the present Code. Chinnappa Reddy, J. after considering the relevant decisions on the point stated: "The principles are now well settled. At one time it was thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for 'substantial and compelling reasons' only and Courts used to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh & CHANDRAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [THAKKAR, J.] Ors. v. State of Rajasthan. In Sanwat Singh's case, this Court harked A back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Shea Swamp v. Emperor and re-affirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, this Court has consistently recognised the right of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swamp's case. Occasionally phrases like B 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used more, as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the Appellate Court to review the entire C evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramabhupala Reddy & Ors. v. State of A. P., AIR (1971) SC 460, Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1974) SC 286, it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh 's case may be added the further principle that "if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate D Court should not disturb the finding of the Trial Court". This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily E concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not F entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable". (emphasis supplied)
37. In Ramesh Babu/al Doshi v. State of Gujarat, [1996] 9 SCC 225, this G Court said; "While setting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the H A appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then- andJhen only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions". In Alarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, [2002] 3 SCC 57, referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated; "The paramount consideration of the court should be to avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise B from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed any offence or not. C Probable view taken by the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is based upon legal and admissible evidence. Only because the accused has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such a finding''.
38. In Bhagwan Singh & Ors. v. State of MP., [2002] 4 SCC 85, the trial Court acquitted the accused but the High Court convicted them. Negativing the contention of the appellants that the High Court could not have disturbed the findings of fact of the trial Court even if that view was not correct, this Court observed; "We do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that under Section 3-78 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court could not disturb the finding of facts of the trial court even if it found that the view taken by the trial court was not proper. On the basis of the pronouncements of this Court, the settled position of law regarding the powers of the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that the Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based and generally it will not interfere with the order of acquittal because by passing an order of acquittal the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of ju'stice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but a Judge made guidelines for circumspection. The paramount consideration of the court is to CHANDRAPPA v. STATE or KARNATAKA [THAKKAR, J.] ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A miscarriage of justice A which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any of the accused has committed any offence or not".
39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., y Hyderabad, [2002] 6 SCC 470, this Court said; "Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or C merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order .of acquittal presumption of inn decree in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because it feels th1.t sitting as a trial court would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while D reversing an order of acquittal to examine anti discuss the reasons given by .. ' the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity".
40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha, [2003] 12 SCC 606, this E Court observed; "There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if F two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, G a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not".
41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of MP., [2006] IO SCC 313: AIR 2006 SC A 831, this Court stated; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgriient of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is B reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the C trial court". (emphasis supplied) .
42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (I) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; ' (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in 'llind that in case of 'lj acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, 'I CHANDRAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [THAKKAR, J.] reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
43. Applying the above principles to the case on hand, we are of the considered view that the learned counsel for the accused is right in submitting B that the High Court ought not to have disturbed an order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. For acquitting the accused and extending them the benefit of doubt, the trial Court observed that the prosecution had failed to examine certain persons who could have unfolded the genesis of the prosecution case. The trial Court indicated that the root cause of the quarrel was refusal C to exchange copper vessel (Kolaga) to Nagraj, winner of the draw, but he was not examined. Likewise, Krishnaiah, son of Oblaiah, who accompanied injured (deceased) Anjaniappa to the hospital, was not brought before the Court. Though it is in evidence that Accused No. 1 Chandrappa was injured and was also taken to the hospital alongwith Anjaninappa, some witnesses had denied the fact as to injuries sustained by the Accused No. I. The High Court did D not give much weight to the said circumstance observing that Accused No .
I was neither examined by a doctor nor a cross-complaint was filed by him against the prosecuting party. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that it is not material whether Accused No. 1 had or had not filed a complaint or he was or was not examined· E by a doctor, but the fact that even though it was the case of prosecution that Accused No. 1 was injured during the course of incident, prosecution witnesses tried to suppress that fact which would throw doubt as to the correctness of the case or the manner in which the incident had happened. The trial Court had also stated that it was unnatural that the prosecution witnesses and deceased Anjaninappa could have goni;: to Hanumanthapura F Bypass at about 9 .30 p.m. when a shorter route was available for going to their destination. The trial Court observed that there was inconsistency in prosecution evidence as to availability of electric light at the time of incident.
The Court also noted that the knife produced before the Court as mudamal article was not the same which was used by Accused No. 8 for inflicting G injury on the deceased. There was also no consistency in evidence as to injuries sustained by prosecution witnesses.
44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial Court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the H A opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of appellate Court are as wide as that of the trial Court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view B was equally possible. But it is well-established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate Court. In this case, a possible view on the evide11ce of prosecution had been taken by the trial Court which ought not to have been disturbed by the C appellate Court. The decision of the appellate Court (High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside.
45. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed. The order of conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court is set aside and the order of acquittal passed by the Additional D Sessions Judge, Tumkur is restored. The appellants are hereby acquitted of the offences with which they were charged. They are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless their presence is required in any other case. B.S. Appeal allowed.