Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. A conjoint reading of Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act with reference to the presumption raised was discussed in para 32 of the aforesaid judgment, which is extracted below:- “32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab [Shindo v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] . In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao [K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 271] to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.
14. With reference to the legal position as referred to above, the matter is now required to be examined as to whether the case in hand falls in the category where the presumption can be raised against the appellant relieving the prosecution from proving its case and putting the onus on the accused/appellant.
15. The date of death of the deceased is 22.6.1995. She was cremated on the same day. The stand taken by the appellant was that the parents of the deceased were informed who were living about 290 kms. away. However, they could not reach on time. It was further submitted that the maternal grandmother and two maternal uncles who were living at a distance of about one furlong from the matrimonial residence of the deceased when she died were present at the time of CHARAN SINGH @ CHARANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND [RAJESH BINDAL, J.] cremation. They neither raised any issue nor did they inform the police. Rather on the intervention of the panchayat, they had taken all the dowry articles.
16. The cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death. In his evidence, Pratap Singh (PW-1), father of the deceased stated that two months after the marriage his daughter came to the parental home stating that the appellant was demanding motorcycle, however, she was sent back. Thereafter, she again came and apprised him that the demand of motorcycle was being pressed by the appellant. Besides motorcycle, land was also demanded. There is nothing in the statement that any such demand was raised immediately before the death as the incidents sought to be referred to are quite old. He admitted in his cross examination that at the time of funeral, his mother-in-law and two brothers-in-law were present. However, they were threatened not to lodge the complaint. Balbir Singh (PW-2), maternal uncle of the deceased, merely stated that at the time of marriage sufficient dowry was given by the father of the deceased. However, later he heard that the appellant had demanded the motorcycle. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he was living at the distance of about one furlong from the house of the appellant. No dowry was demanded at the time of marriage of the deceased. He did not state that the deceased ever shared with him about the demand of dowry or any harassment on account of non-fulfilment thereof though he was living close to the matrimonial house of the deceased.
17. Beero Bai (PW-3), the maternal grandmother of the deceased, stated that her house is located at a distance of about one mile from the house of the appellant. She used to go to the house of the deceased. The deceased was being treated badly. She was not allowed to go to her parental house. The deceased informed her that the appellant used to ask her to bring motorcycle from her maternal grandmother. After the death of her husband in February 1995, the appellant asked the deceased to get land from her maternal grandmother. On a demand made to her, she replied in negative. However, in her cross-examination, she stated that the land was not demanded from her. Even in her statement, there is nothing to suggest that soon before the death, any cruelty or harassment was made to the deceased, either by the appellant or his family members. All what is stated is regarding the demand. There are no details of any cruelty or harassment, though this witness was living about a kilometre from the house of the deceased and is her maternal grandmother.
18. Joginder Singh (PW-4) is another witness produced by the prosecution, who is maternal uncle of the deceased. He was declared hostile.
19. Rajindra Singh (PW-5), Sub Inspector was a formal witness who had only registered the FIR and arrested the accused.
20. Babban Singh (PW-6), Circle Officer, Faridpur was the Investigating Officer. In his examination-in-chief, he admitted that he recorded the statement of Jagir Singh. He is the person who, as per the complaint made to the police, had informed the father of the deceased about the death of his daughter. However, he was not produced in evidence.
21. In the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, none of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.
22. Defence had produced Gurmej Singh as DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident. He stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members. He stated that belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation. His statement is in line with the admission made by Biro Bai (PW-3), maternal grandmother, Balbir Singh (PW-2). Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.
23. On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the pre-requisites to raise presumption under Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be CHARAN SINGH @ CHARANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND [RAJESH BINDAL, J.] sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC. The cause of death as such is not known.
24. For the reasons mentioned above, in our opinion, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 304B, 498A and 201 IPC cannot be legally sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The bail bonds stand cancelled. Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed. (Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)