Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
14. The High Court obviously relied upon the oral statement purported to have been made by the officers present in the court through the learned A.G.P. and considered the same to H be concession as regards the title/ownership of the land in CITY AND INDUS. DEVE. CORPN. v. DOSU AARDESHIR BHIWANDIWALA & ORS. [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] question. The appellant in its reply affidavit merely referred to a letter received by it from the Government informing itthe land in question to be a private land. We fail to appreciate as to how the said statement and the averments made in the reply affidavit amount to concession recognising the title/ownership of the lfnd in question in favour of the respondent. Such a statement by itself cannot confer title in respect of immovable properties on any individual. The courts are not relieved of their burden to weigh and evaluate the relevancy and effect of such statements in adjudicating the lis between the parties.
15. The Writ petition was filed on 20th April, 2005 but c whereas the petitioner executed the Deed of Confirmation on 13th April, 2005 describing himself as vendor in favour of Ms. Hemlata Bedi and Urmish Udani as the purchasers of the land in question. The appellant in its review application filed in the High Court pointed out that as on the date of the filing of the Writ Petition the first respondent was not the owner of the land in as much as he executed the Deed of Confirmation on 13th April, 2005 itself. When the appellant pointed out this in its review application the High Court brushed aside the same and dismissed the Review Petition relying on the explanation offered by the writ petitioner that the writ petition was drafted much earlier to 13th April, 2005 for filing in the court on 20th April, 2005. The fact remains that the respondent never brought -"': this fact on record during the pendency of the writ petition. The High Court ought to have considered whether there was any suppression of material facts from the court. The High Court did not consider the effect of respondent describing himself as the vendor in the Confirmation Deed which is not in tune with the recitals in the Deed of Conveyance dated 26th August, 1982. The High Court did not address to itself as to whether G such complex and disputed facts could be satisfactorily adjudicated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court was carried away by the fact that the relief had already been granted inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings have commen<(ed after the disposal of the Writ [2008) 16 S.C.R. A Petition. We are constrained to express our reservation about the manner and approach of the High Court in disposing of the Writ Petition and the Review Petition.
16. In our view, the High Court ought to have examined the B contents of Deed of Confirmation as well as the Deed of . Conveyance dated 26th;August, 1982 before granting the relief as prayed for by the respondent. It is plainly evident from the Deed of Conveyance dated 26th August, 1982 that it was executed in favour of only one person namely Ms. Hemlata Bedi as the purchaser whereas in the Deed of Confirmation the C name of Urmish Udani is also shown as the purchaser along with Ms. Hemlata Bedi. It is not clear from the document as to how all of a sudden Urmish Udani's name is shown as the purchaser. The circumstances may lend credence to the submission made by learned senior counsel for the appellant D that urmish Udani did not purchase the land but the litigation. However, we do not wish to express any conclusive opinion on the question as to whether the parties are indulging in any speculative litigation. These are the aspects which ought to have been taken into consideration by the High Court before E granting relief to the respondent. In the absence offinding on the vital issue noticed herein above no relief could have been granted to the respondent.
17. Having regard to the magnitude and complexity of the F case the High Court in all fairness ought to have directed the official respondents to file their detailed counter affidavits and produce the entire material and the records in their possession for its consideration. Be, it noted the reply affidavit filed by the appellant herein obviously was confined to opposing the G admission of writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage, of course after issuing Rule as is evident from the order: "Rule. l-;leard forthwith …. "
18. We are constr~ined to confess the case has left us H perplexed. The stance ~dopted by the State of Maharashtra CITY AND INDUS. DEVE. CORPN. v. DOSU AARDESHIR BHIWANDIWALA & ORS. [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] and the District Collector is stranger than fiction. It is difficult to A discern as to why they remained silent spectators without effectively participating in the proccedings before the Court. No explanation is forth coming as to why they have chosen not to file their replies to the Writ Petition in the High Court. However, in t~ese appeals the State Government as well as the appellant B filed detailed affidavits disputing each and every statement and assertion of the writ petitioner made in the Writ Petition opposing grant of any relief whatsoever to the writ petitioner. But even in this court the State of Maharashtra having filed its affidavit did not participate in the proceedings and rendered c any assistance in the matter:
19. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of Mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed D as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the · person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a Writ is an adequate ground for refusing a Writ. The principle is that courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage E agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.
20. The appellant in its reply opposing the admission of Writ Petition in clear and categorical terms pleaded that the writ F petitioner has kept silent for more than 35 years and filed belated writ petition. It was asserted that on account of inordinate delay and !aches the writ petition suffers from legal infirmities and therefore liable to be rejected in limine. The High Court did not record any finding whatsoever and ignored such G a plea of far reaching consequence.
21. As noticed hereinabove the High Court obviously was impressed by the oral statement made during the course of the hearing of the writ petition and some vague and self defeating averments made in the affidavit filed by the appellant in the H A High Court.
22. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction' under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to take all .the relevant facts and circumstances B into consideration and decide for itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing ari ex-parte writ of Mandamus, order or c direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering validity of impugned action or inaction the court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether. any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extra. ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The. court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is dutY bound to consider whether : (a) adjudication' of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and !aches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of Limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors. The court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately H for the consideration of the court and particularly in cases where CITY AND INDUS. DEVE. CORPN. v. DOSU AARDESHIR BHIWANDIWALA & ORS. [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.) public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions A always are required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by B _,.. themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.
23. None of these parameters have been kept in view by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition and the c Review Petition.
24. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned orders and remit the matter for fresh consideration by the High Court on merits. Consequently, all the notifications issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 including the D award passed and the reference made to the Civil Court are set aside.
25. During the course of hearing of these appeals not only affidavits and additional affidavits but also some documents E which may have a vital bearing on the merits of the case are placed on record. These affidavits and the documents filed into this court shall form part of the writ proceedings. The matter requires fresh consideration by the High Court.
26. Parties are given liberty to supplement their respective pleadings if they so choose and file additional documents, if any, which shall be received by the High Court for its consideration. We may hasten to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. All the contentions of both sides are expressly kept open for their G determination by the High Court.
27. It will not be appropriate to dispose of the matter without one word about the conduct of the State Government reflecting highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. We express our grave H A concern as to the manner in which State has conducted in this case. It is the constitutional obligation and duty of the State to place true and relevant facts by filing proper affidavits enabling the court to discharge its constitutional duties. The State and other authorities are bound to produce the complete re.cords B · relating to the case once Rule is issued. by the court. It is needless to remind the Governments that they do not enjoy the same amount of discretion as that of a private party even in the matter of conduct of litigation. The Governments do not enjoy any unlimited discretion in this regard. No one need to remind c the State that they represent the collective will of the society.
28. The State in the present case instead of filing its affidavit through higher ,officers of the Government utilised the lower ones to make oral statements and that too through its A.G.P. in the High Co'urt. This malady requires immediate D remedy. We hope the.Government sh~ll conduct itself in a responsible manner and assist the High)~ourt by placing the true and relevant facts by filing a proper affidavit and documents that may be available with it. We also hope and trust that the Legal Advisors of the Government will display greater E competence and attention in drafting a.ffidavits. Let not the fence eat the grass.
29. With these observations, we allow the appeals F accordingly. B.B.B. Appeals allowed.