nr. Vim/" Dr/hi Adminirtratian Subba Rao, J. 1.962 Not•ember, 29. ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The con- viction and sentence passed on her are set 11side. Fine, if pJid, is directrd to be refunded tn the
appellant. Appeal (11/ou·i•tl, CITY OF NAGPUR CORPORATION v. JOHN SERV AGE PHILLIP & ANR. (S. K. DAS, .J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAII and RAOHUllAR DAYAJ,. JJ.) Corporation-Power of .'fnding 1lelegalio11–Jurisdictio>t
of civil court-Power of corporation to providt for e:rpen•M of delegation-The city of Naupur Corporation Act, Jfl48, (C.P. and Berai· II of 1950), 88, 58 (s), 88. The appellant Corporation passed a resolution deciding
to send two of its 1nembers to a health conference at Harrbgate in U.K.. On the application of the respondent, the High Court of Bombay issued a write restraining the appellant from carrying out the resolution.
Held, thats. 58 (s) of the Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, which gave power to the appellant Corporation to provide for any matter likely to promote public health autholised the resolution and it was for the appellant Corporation to decide how a thing which it had the power to do was to be done.
It was not a case where it could be said that the delegation would have been of no benefit to the appellant Corporation at all and that was enough to prevent an interference by the Courts in the method of the exercise of its undoubted power by the appellant Corporation.
t' Mayor etc. oj IV estminater v. Lont!on & ,.lnrtli 1Ve.•tm1 Rai'.lwa~t C0mpan11, p 905 A.C. 426] relier! upon. 2.S.C.R. The resolution could not be challenged on the.ground that the budget did not prDvide for the expense• of the del<'- gation.
'I'll' hudget in fact ditl so and even ir' it <lid not, there "'"' power tmdtJ' s. ll8 of the Act to ,ltn tht h11d.o;et to make the necessary pt'ovision. Statures cannot be confined only to thoHghts prevalent1
at the time when they are euacted. They al'c pul in geneml •ermJ to embrace innm·arions. E\'en if in 19411 delegation by Corporation were not in contemplation, s. 58 (s) may be interpreted as inducting in "matters likely to promote a public health", the sending of the delegations.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 508 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment .and order dated April 23, 1959 of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur in Special Civil
Application No. llO of 1959. 8.'r. De8ai, J.B. Dadachanji, 0.0. Jlathur and Rm•inr/e;· N11rain, for the appellant. Tl'. 8. Barli11gay, R. llfahalingfrr and G<mpr1t Rai, for respondent No. I.
· 11'!. H.K. 8a.~tri and R. N. 8<,clithey, for respondent No. 2. Hl62. November 2!1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAUKAR, J.-This appeal is against an order of the High Court of Bombay issuing a writ whereby
the !vlunicipal Corporation of Nagpur, the appellant before us, wa~ restrained from carrying out a resolu- tion proposing to send two of its members as dele- gates to a Health Congress at Harrogate in U.K. and
sanctioning certain expenses in connection with the delegation. There is no doubt that if what a Corporation proposes to do is what it had been authorised hy its incorporating- st:ltutc to do, it is not the business of
City of Nae,..,. Corporatiun v. lolm Smagr Pliilfip Snrkar, J. Ci{v '!f }lag~ur Cfitftoralion v. John Sen1agr Phillip Sarkar, J. a court to interfere with the mode in which the Corporation decides to act : see :Mayor, etc. nJ
Westminster v. Landon a11d Nnrtll Western R"Uway Oompan11 ('). If, therefore, the appellant Corporation had power under its incorporating statute, the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, l!J48, to send delegates to
the Congress at Harrogate, it would appear prima facie that writ was erroneously issued by the High Court. Now, s. 58 (s) of the Act provides, "The Corporation may in its discretion
provides from time to time either wholly or partly for all or any of the following matters, namely:- ……………………………………………….. (s) any other matter likely to promote
the public health, safety and convenience of the public." The question is whether the action of the appellant Corporation is within this section. It appears that the convenors of the Congress at
Harrogate had sent an invitation to the appellant Corporation to send delegates to the Congress. The following facts appear from the invitation: dcle· gates representing all aspects of public
health would discuss at the Congress subjects of common interest ; there would be a health exhibition where latest equipment and products of leading manufacturers and trade and research organi-
sations would be put on show; and the delegates might visit water supply unde.rtaking, sewage disposal works_, housing schemes, hospitals, health service contres, food factories and canteens and similar
organisations. We think it beyond question that a delegate attending the congress would certainly (I) [1905) A.C. 426. 2 s~c.R. have acquired much useful knowledge of matters c0111:erni11g public health and become arquaintt>d
with the modern equipment and appliances used in. and organisations suited for and the latest trend of thoughts regarding, matters concerning public health. It appears to us plain that by sending delegates to the
Congress, the appellant Corporation would have acquired useful knowledge connected with public health which it could utilise later to promote public health at Nagpur. The sending of delegates,
th« refore, was something which the appellant Corporation was authorised by section 58 ( s) of its incorporating statute to do. As we understand the judgment of the High Court, it does not seem to have felt much doubl:
about this. The High Court appears, however, lo have taken the view that there was no reasonable and legitimate connection between the sending of the delegates to the Congress and the promotion of
public health at Nagpur. It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the High Court's point of view. In the first place, the High Court seems lo have been sceptical of the benefit to be derived from
the delegation because the subjects to he discussed at the Congress were, in its opinion, highly tcchnic:il and the delegate .. < proposed to be sent being non. technical men, namely, lawyers, were not likely to be in a
position to follow the discussion. \Ve have no reason to think that the subjects to be discussed at the Congress were highly technical. That it would not have been so, appearn to us clear from the fact
that a very large gathering was expected at the Congress_. O\'Cr 2,GOO having attended at the predous one. There is further no reason to think that the delegates proposed to be sent
by the appellant Corporation would not have been able to acquire at the Congress a great deal of useful general know- ledge regarding. matters.of public health. Lastly, it js not for this Court to decide how the delegatioµ
Ci(v of .Vagpur Corporatit.n v. Jolin Servage P/iillip Sarkar, J. City of Nagpur Corporation v. John Servage Phillip Sarkar, J, should have been constituted so that the appellant Corporation might have had the largest benefit from
it. It was for the Corporation to decide how the thing which it had the power to do was to be done. It was not a case where it could be said that the delegation proposed to be sent would have been of
benefit to the appellant Corporation at all, and that is enough to prevent an interference by the courts in the method of the exercise of its undoubted power by the appellant Corporation. We arc unable to
agree with the view of the High Court that there. is no reasonable or legitimate connection between the sending of the delegation to the Congress and the provisions of s. 58 (s) which we have earlier set out.
The High Court also said that the capacity of the appellant Corporation to make use of the know- ledge gained at the Congress was extremely limited. There arc no materials on the record on which this
observation can be justified. The appellant Corpo- ration can no doubt increase its capacity. In any e\"ent, it would, after the delegation had returned .. ha vc been in a better position to discharge its
functions concerning public health within its present capacity. It would be absurd to say that the appellant Corporation did not have the capacity to improve its public health services. There was no
warrant to issue the writ on the ground of want of capacity. The Hi!4h Court also relied on certain sections dealing with the budget. It was said that there was no provision in the budget for expenses of sending a
delegation abroad. Under s. 84 of the incorporating statute, no payment can be made out of the muni- cipal funds unless the expenditure is covered by the budget. The High Court, therefore, observed that
the resolution sanctioning expenses for the sending of the delegation ahroad was heyond the powers of the appr.llant Corporation. In the first place, we are not ..,.. 2 S.C.R. sure that the budget did not provide for such expen-
ses. There was a head in it which dealt with allowances payable to the members of the Corpo- ration. It may reasonably be contended that the expenses of the members for the visit to the
Congress are such allowances. But assume, they arc not. Section 88 of the Act gives the Corporation power to transfer the amount of one budget grant from one major head to another provided however a
certain balance is maintained in the budget. There i~ nothing to show that the appellant Corporation could not have acted in this case under s. 88 and altered the provisions of the bl\dget making express
provision for the expenses of the delegation. Jt was not even suggested that the appellant Corporation could not do so. We think it right also to point out that in the petition for the _writ it had not been said that the
resolution was bad because the expenses sanctioned by it were outside the budget. That being so, this point should not have been taken into consideration by the High Court. It is true that the Corporation at the
request of the High Court placed before the High Court. some of the papers in connection with the bud~ct. That the Corporation out of r.espect to the High Court should have done and, therefore, actually
did. From this it cannot be contended that the appellant Corporation never objected to the resolution bemg challenged on the ground of .1 want of express provision in the budget for the expenses of the dele-
gation or would not have prejudiced in ·the hearing of the petition if the rL'SOlution was attacked. on the ground of want of a provision in the budget. This challenge involved a question of fact and without
proper pleadings, the appellant Corporation was surely at a disadvantage in meeting it. Furthermore, we are not· sure that s. 84 would have made the resolution invalid. That section only prohibits an
expenditure for which the budget does not provide. Ci()' of Nagpur CorporatWn v. John Servagt Philli; Sarkar, J. City of .A"agpur Corporation v. Jolut Seruage Philli/1 arkar, J. So it may be that all that s. 84 affects is the actual
expenditure. It may not affect the resolution itself. We think it- right to point out that the High Court held that the appellant Corporation ha<l actccl . honestly. It observed that the circumstances did not
warrant the inference that the action of the Corpora· tion was mala fide. That being so, and the action proposed being clearly within the statutory powers of the apµdlant Corporatio11, we think that the High
Court was i11 error in issuing the writ. We may now·notice one or two points of minor importance argued at the bar on behalf of the respon- dents. It was said that the question raised in this
appeal had become academic since the Congress was long over. It may be stated that the Congress was held from April :!7, to l\fay l, l!J59 and the writ was issued by the High Court on April 23, 195!!.
It is suggested that it is not, therefore, a fit case for deci- sion in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. W c arc not at all impressed by this contention. It seems to us that it is a matler of the utmost impor.
lance fur the appellant Corporation lo know its rights uudcr its iucorpurali11g statute:. It will have to guide itself according to. our decision in future when a similar point arises· again. If we do not
decide the point raised now, then on every subsequent occasion the Corporation would be bound by the judgment of the High Court under appeal and by the tilne the matter is brought up here the same
argument that the qurstion has uecomc arack111ic can always !Jc raised to defeat the µoint. We thil1k that the point raised by the appellant Corporation as lo its powers under the statute and how far courts rnn review
the exercise of its power by the appellant Corporation is of great importance and must he decided in this appeal. It is also said that in 1948 when the City of 2 S.C.R. Nagpur Corporation Act was passed, these dele·
gations were not in contemplation. Therefore, s. 58 (s) cannot be interpreted as including promotion or public health by sending of delegations. This is, in our view, a completely idle contention. We have
no reason to think that the delegations were not sent in 19·18. In any case, statutes cannot be confined only lo thoughts prev>ilent at the time when they were enacted. They arc put in general words tu
emurnce innovations as they come along. Therefore, even iF in 1948, delegations by Corporations were not in contemplation, there is nothing to prevent us inter· preting s. 58 (s) as including within matters likely to
promote public health, actions involving the sending of delegations where promotion of public health becomes likely as a result thereof. We allow the appeal. In view of the order of
October 19, 1959, the appellant will pay the costs of the respondent Phillip. Appeal allowed. Ciry of Nagput Corporation y, John Ser11a1< Phillip Sarkar, J.