S.C.R. COLLECTOR OF BOMBAY v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS . . [HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, DAS, CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR and VIVIAN. BosE JJ.] Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of 1876), s. 8-Resolution of Government gr1inting land
to Corporation free of rent-Statutory formalities not complied with-Corporation in possession for over 70 years and erecting costly structures-Assessment to land revenue -Legality-Equitable
estoppel~Part-performance-Acquisition of right to exemption from assessment-Prerogative of Crown. In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the predecessor in title of the Corporation of Bombay to
remove some markets from a certain site and vacat~ it, and on the application of the then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution approving and· authorising the grant of another site to the Municipality.
The resolution stated further that "the Gover1i- ment do not consider that any rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be, likq other public buildings, for the benefit of the whole community."
The Corporation gave :io the sites on which the old markets were situated and spent a sum of over 17 lacs in erecting and maintaining markets on the new site. In 1940 the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objec-
tion of the Corporation, assessed the new site under s. 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act to !'and revenue rising from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 30,000 in 50 years. The Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires
and that it was entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of any assessment. The High Court of Bombay held applying the principle of Ramsden v. Dyson( 1 ) that the Government had lost its right to assess the land in question
by reason of the equity arising on the facts of the case in favour of the Corporation and there was thus a limitation on the right of the Government to assess under s. 8 of the said Act :
Held per KANIA C. J., DAs, CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAR and BosE JJ. (PATANJALI SAsTRr J. dissenting)-that the Government was, not under the circumstances of the case\ entitled to assess land revenue on the land in question.
Per KANIA C. J.; DAs and BosE JJ.-Though there was no effectual grant by the Government passing title in the land to the Corporation by reason of non-compliance with the statutory
formalities, yet, inasmucli as the Corporation had never-the-less taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolu- tion and continued in such possession open!~, uninterruptedly and
as of right for over 70 years, the Corporation had acquired the (1) (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129. October 5. Collector of Bombay v. [19521 limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent, but only for the purposes of a market and for no other purposes. The right acquired included as part of it an immunity from pay- Municipal Cor-
poration of the City of Bombay ment of rent which constituted a right in limitation of the Government's r.ight to assess in excess of the specific limit esta- blished and preserved by the Government Resolution within
the meaning of s. 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of 1876) there being for the purposes of ·this case no distinction bet- and Others. weea rent and revenue. Per CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-If the
Resolution of 1865 can be read as meaning that the grant was of rent-free land the case would come strictly \vithin the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even otherwise, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in the future the Government must
be deemed to have bound themselves to fulfil it. The right to levy assessment is a prerogative right of the Government and it is hard to conceive of a case where it could be said to be lost by adverse possession.
court of equity must prevent the per· petration of a legal fraud. PATANJALI SASTRI J. (contra)-The principle of Ramsden v. Dyson cannot prevail against statutory requirements regarding
disposition of property or making of contracts by Government. No question of estoppel by representation arises, as the Govern· mcnt made no representation of fact which it now seeks to deny. Nor can any case of estoppel by acquiescence be founded on the
facts of the case as there was no lying by and letting another run into ~ trap. No right of exemption has been established either on the basis of oxpress or implied contract or on the basis of equitable principles of part·performance or estoppel by .acquiescence.
The right to lev"y land revenue is no part of the Government's right to property but a prerogative of the Crown .and adverse possession of the land could not destroy the Crown's prerogative to impose assessment on the land.
CML APPELLATE JUR1sorcTioN : Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1950. Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay (Sen and Dixit JJ.) dated 21st February, 1947, in First Appeal No. 64 of 1943.
'C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General (S. B. /athar, with him) for the appellant. N. C. Chatterjee (N.K. Gamadia,· with him) for the respondents. 1951. October 5. The Judgment of Kania C.J., Das
and Bose JJ. was read by Das J. Patanjali Sastri and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. delivered separate J udg- rnents. S.C.R. DAs J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of a Bench of the Bombay High Court (Sen and Dixit JJ.)
delivered on February 2, 1947, in an appeal filed under section 18 . of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act II of 1876 against the judgment of the Revenue Judge at Bombay delivered on October 27, 1942, in a suit filed
by the respondents, the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, and Madusudan Damodar Bhat, the then Muni_cipal Commissioner for the city of Bombay against the Collector 0£ Bombay.
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts lead- ing up to this litigation and they may be shortly stated. In 1865, the Government of Bombay, having decided to construct an Eastern Boulevard, called upon
the Corporation of Justices of the Peace for the City of Bombay, the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation, to remove 'its then existing fish and vegetable markets from the site required for the cons-
truction of the Boulevard. The then Municipal Com- mission Mr. Arthur Crawford, after whom the present municipal market was named, applied for the site set aside for the exhibition buildings on the Esplanade for
the purpose of constructing new ·markets as the dist- ing markets could not be removed until new markets had been provided. On December 5, 1865, the Archi- tectural Improvement Committee informed tlie Govern-
ment that it had no objection to the proposed site · measuring about 7 acres being "rented to the Municipal Commissioner" and suggested that "the annual charge of one pie per square yard. be levied in consideration
of the expense of filling in the ground." Computed at this rate, the annual rental would have amounted to about Rs. 176. On December 19, 1865, the Govern- ment passed the following resolution:-
" ( 1) Government approve of the site and authG- • · rise its grant .. (2). The plans should be submitted for approval; but Government do not consid~r any rent should be charged to the Municipality' as the markets will be
like other ,public build'ings, for the benefit \of the whole community." Collector oJ Bombay ·V. Municipal Cor- poration 'of the City of Bombay and Others. Das/. Collector of Bombay
v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Das/. [1952} Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, possession of the site was made over to the then Municipal Commis- sioner, but no formal grant was executed as required
by the Statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41. It has nowhere been contended that even if the statutory formalities had been complied with the grant upon the terms mentioned in the Resolution would nevertheless have been invalid
being in excess of the powers of the Government. The Municipal Commissioner had the site filled up and levelled at the expense of the Corporation. The plans were approved by the Government and the market
buildings were erected by the Corporation at consider- able expense. The respondent Corporation wa. incor- portated in 1888 as the successor of the Corporation of the Justices of the Peace for the City of Bombay and
it continued in possession of the land and the buildings without paying any rent to the Government according to the Government Resolution of 1865. Indeed, it is pleaded in paragraph 7 of the plant and it is not
denied in the written statement that acting upon the said grant contained in the Resolution and the terms contained therein the respondent Corporation and its predecessor spent considerable sums of money in build-
ing and improving the market and have been in posses- sion of the land and the buildings thereon for over 70 years in accordance with the terms of the Resolution and that no land revenue or rent had been paid to the
Government ever since the grant was made. It is in evidence that besides giving up the sites on which the old markets had been situate, a total sum of Rs. 17,65,980-12-1 has been spent by the Corporation
upto March 31, 1940, in filling up and levelling the site and erecting and maintaining the new market buildings on this site. In 1911, a portion of the market site was acquired by the Government for the widening
of the Palton Road. Upon the Collector of Bombay being called upon to put in his claim, 'if any, to any part of the compensation money awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Superintendent,
City Survey, on behalf of the Collector, replied that Government had no claim in respect of the said land. The respondent S.C.R. Corporation, therefore, received the whole of the compensation money and it continued in possession of
the rest of the land and the buildings thereon without payment of any rent. On March 18, 1938, · the appel- lant Collector of Bombay informed the respondent Municipal Commissioner that it was proposed to assess
the land occupied by the Crowford Market under sec- tion 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act II of 1876 and asked for certain information to enable him to do so. In his reply, the
Municipal Commissioner wrote to say that the site of the market had been given to the Municipality as a gift for the construction of the market and that, therefore, the question of assessment
did not arise. The appellant Collector of Bombay having insisted that in spite of the Government Reso- lution of 1865 the Government had the right to assess the site, the Mayor of Bombay an March 23, 1939, wrote
a letter to the Government stating, inter alia, as follows i- "The Corporation have been advised that there can be no doubt that it was 'the intention of Govern- ment to make \a permanent grant oif the :land to the
Municipality, and, further, that it was also the inten- tion that permanent grant should be free from rent and from assessment to land revenue. I am to point out that the word 'rent'
was used in official documents with the greatest frequency with reference to the land revenue lev!able by the East India Company and later by Government in the City of Bombay and in the·
Presidency. It is, therefore, clear that it was the inten- tion of Government in 1865 that this grant should be free from any form of rent or assessment. The Corpo- ration were put into possession for a period of over 70
years, during which period the land has without inter- ruption been devoted to the purpose for which the grant was made. Throughout this long period there has been no suggestion from Government
that the grant was other than- a permanent one, free of revenue, or that the terms of the grant were in any way subject to revision." 4_;.2 S.C. India/71 19Si Collector of Bombay v.
Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay 11nd Others. Dorf. Collector <>f Bombay v. Municipal Cor~ poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Das f. [1952] The above contentions
were repudiated by the Government in its letter of January l, 1940, rn the following terms :- "As regards the contention that the land has been held by the Municipality uninterruptedly for over 70
years without any suggestion from Government that it was liable to assessment, I am to state the right to levv the assessment is the prerogative of the Crown and a mere non-user of this prerogative cannot destroy
it. Besides, conditions have considerably altered since the land was originally allotted to the Municipality without charging any ground rent or assessment: the Municipality has been recovering substantial rents by
letting out stalls in the market and should now be in a position to pay the assessment. Under the circum- stances, the levy of as;cJ>ment in this case can no longer be foregone or postponed."
On January 31, 1940, the appellant Collector assessed the land under section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 with a guarantee of SO years as under :- "Assessment Rs. 7,500 per annum for
the first 10 years from 1st April, 1940. Assessment Rs. 15,000 per annum for the next 10 years. Assessment Rs. 30,000 per annum for the remain- ing 30 years." The assessment was to begin to run from 1st April,
1940, and the first payment of the assessment was to become due on 1st April, 1941. The present suit was thereupon filed in the Court of the Revenue Judge in accordance with the provisions
of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, for the following reliefs, inter alzia :- " (a) that it may be declared that there is a right on the part of the plaintiff Corporation in limitation
of the right of Government to assess the said land and that the plaintiff Corporation is· entitled to hold the said land for ever without payment of any assessment and that the Government has no right to assess the
said premises. S.C.R. (b) That the said assessment may be declared ultra vires, invalid and may be ordered to be set aside." c bllecior of Bombay .v .. Municipal Cor- poration of the
City of Bombay By his judgment dated October 27, 1942, the learned Revenue Judge dismissed the suit with costs. The Corporation appealed to the High Court. Before the High Court, as before us, two of the learned Revenue
Judge's conclusions were not challenged, namely, (1) that the Government Resolution of 1865 was bad in law either as a grant or even: as a contract and could not by itself operate to give any interest in the land to
the respondent Corporation because of the non-com~ pliance with the formalities required to be observed by Statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41. in the matter of disposi- tion of all real and personal estate vested in the Crown
ur.1der Statute 21 & 22 Vic. C. 106, and (2) that the Crown's right to levy assessment on property was a prerogative right to which the ordinary presumption that rights to property which had not been asserted or
exercised for a long period of years had been granted away did not apply. What was urged before and accepted by the High Court was that the right of the Government to levy any assessment on the land in
question had been lost and could not be asserted or exercised by die Government by reason of· the equity • arising on the facts and circumstances of the case in faNour of the respondent Corporation on the principal
established by the decision in Ramsden v. Dyson(?-) which was adopted by Jenkins C.J. in The Municipal. Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of. State (') and which equity was, on the authorities,
biRding on the Crown. After dealing with the cases of Dadoba /anardhan v. The Collector of Bombay(3) and Jethabhoy Ruttonsey v. The Collector of Bombay( 4 ) the High Court observed :-
"We think, on a reading of the language of the' Government Resolution dated the 19th December, 1865, that we should be justified in holding (within the meaning of the rule in Ramsden v. Dyson) that an·
expectation was created or encouraged by the landlord (1) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. (3) (1901) I.L.R. 25 Born. 714. (2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580. (4) (1901) I.L.lt 25 Born. 752. …..
and Others. Das f; i Collector of Bombay Vo•r Municip~I Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Das f. [ 1952 J that the Municipality was to get possession of the land rent-free and that the latter took possession of the land
with the consent of the landlord, and upon such expect- ation, with the knowledge of the landlord and without objection by him, laid out money upon the land." According to the High Court the rule of
equity enunciated in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) was not, as pointed out by Jenkins C.J. in Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State (supra), dependent of the validity of the disposition and could
be asserted even where the statutory formalities relat- ing to the disposition of the property had not been observed and performed, and that this equity consti- tuted a right on the part of the respondent Corporation
in limitation of the right of the Government in conse- quence of a specific limit to ascessment having beea established and preserved w'ithin the meaning of section 8 of the Act II of 1876 so as to disentitle the
Government from assessing the land in question. The High Court relied on the decision in Kamalavahooji Maharaj v. The Collector of Bombay(') in support of their view that section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876
would apply even where the specific limit was nil. In the result, the High Court reversed the decision of the learned Revenue Judge, allowed the appeal and passed a deci·ee declaring the rights of the respondent Cor-
poration and awarding to it the costs in both Conrts. The Collector of Bombay appealed to the Federal Court and the appeal has now come up for hearing before us. There has been considerable discussion before us
as to the precise scope and effect of . the principle of equity enunciated in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra), as 'to whether such principle should be extended to the facto of the present case, w he th er
the facts of this case attract the application of the equity established in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) or attract the equity estab- lished in Maddison v. Alderson(') and Walsh v. Lons-
dale(") and finally as to whether, in view of the decision (1) (1937) 39 Born. LR. 1046 (3) (1882) LR, 21 Ch. D. 9. (2) (1883) LR. 8 App. Cas. 417. S.C.R. of the Privy Council in Ariff v. Jadunath(1), the equity
in Ramsden v. Dyson (supra) can prevail against the requirement of formalities laid down in the Victorian Statute referred t10 above any more than. the equity in Maddison v. Alderson
(supra) can do against the reqmrements of the Transfer of Property Act and whether the decision in The Municipril Corporation of the City 8f Bombay v. The Secretary of State(2) requires
reconsideration in the light of the decision in Ariff's c,ase (Supra). Irt the view we have taken, it is not necessary to go into, and to express any opinion on, any of these questions, for this appeal can, in our opinion,
be disposed of on a narrower and shorter ground. The Government claims to asses~ . the lands in terms of :;ection 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 wh'ich runs thus:– "8. It shall be the duty of the Collector, subject
to the orders of the Provincial Government, to fix and to levy the assessment for land revenue. Where there is no right on the part of the superior hc>lder in limitation of the right of
the. Provincial Government to assess, the assessment shall be fixed at the discretion of the Collector subject to the control of the Provincial Government. When there is a right on the part of the superior
holder in limitation of· the right of the Provincial Government, in consequence of a specific limit to ass'essmen1~ having \:Aeen established 1and preserved, the assessment shall not exceed such ~ecific limit."
The sole question for our consideration is whether, on the facts of this case, the m!Pondent Corporation has succeeded in establishing in itself a right in limitation of the right of 1the Government to assess the fand in
consequence of a specific limit to assessment having been established and preserved. There is no dispute that by reason of the non-compliance with the statu-. tory formalities the Government Resolution of 1865 is
not an effectual grant passing title in the land to the respondent Corporation and is not also an enforceable . (l) (1931) LR, 58 I.A: 91. (2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Bom. 580. Collector of
Bombay V; . Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and 0th er.~. Da1 ]. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Das/. [19521 contract. On the other hand, there is no doubt as to the
existence of an intention on the part of the Govern- ment to make and on the part of the Corporation to take a grant of the land in terms of the Resolution of 1865 including an undertaking by the
Government not to charge any rent. Both parties acted on the basis of that Resolution and the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation went into possession of the land in question pursuant to the Government
Resolution of 1865 and, acting upon the said Resolu- tion and the terms contained therein, the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title spent consider- able sums of money in levelling .the site and erecting
and maintaining the market buildings and have been in possession of the land for over 70 years .. What, m the circumstances was the legal position of the respond- ent Corporation and its predecessor in title in relatiott
to the land in question? They were in possession of the land to which they had no legal title at all. Therefore, the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor, in title was that of a person having
no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land m perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any
legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession
of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued open I y, as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corroration has acquired the limited
title it and its predecessor in tide had been prescrib- ing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of the Govern-
ment Resolution of 1865. The immunity from the liability to pay rent is just as much an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title so acquired as is the obligation to hold the land for the purposes of a
market and for no other purpose. There is no queotion l S.C.R. .of acquisition .by ·adverse ,possession of the Govern- ment's prerogative right to levy assessment. What the respondent Corporation has acquired is the legal right
to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent for the specific ·purpose of erecting and maintaining a market upon the terms of the Government Resolution as if a legal grant had been made to it. The right thus acquired includes,
as part of it, an immunity from payment of rent which must necessarily constitute a right in limitation of the Government's right to assess in excess of the specific limit established
and preserved by the Government RescJution within the meaning of section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876. It is true, a~ pointed out by the Privy Council in Kamalavahooji Maharaj v.
Collector of Bombay (supra) that the words of the section would appear to apply rather to the case of . a limitation on the right to assess than to the case of a complete exemption from
assessment but such a construction would not protect the cases of total exemption which, as conceded in that very case did in fact exist and were recognised and protected by vitue of the words of section 8 of the Bombay Act II
of 1876. It has not been suggested before us that there are no cases of total exemption or that those cases are protected by any provision of law other than that of this very section. There is, therefore, no escape from
the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, with which we concur, that the words of section 8 would apply to a case where total exemption from assessment was granted. In other words, specific limit may be
nil for the purposes of section 8 of the Act. It was sought to be iirgued that even if the Govern- ment be precluded from enhanCing the "rent" in view of the terms of the Government Resolution, it cannot be
held to have disentitled itself from its prerogative right to assess "land revenue". This contention is sought to be founded on a distinction between "rent" and "land revenue". This contention, however, was not raised
in the written statement and was not made the subject- matter of any issue on which the parties went to trial anll was never put forward before either of the Courts Collector of Bombay
v. Municipal Cor- poration of the Gty of Bombay and Others. Das]. Collector of . Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. v., J. 119521 below. Indeed, in the letter of the Mayor of Bombay
dated March 22, 1939, to wl11ch reference has been made, it was clearly alleged that the word '"rent" was used in official documents with the greatest frequency with reference to the land
revenue leviable by the East India Company and later by the Government in the Citi of Bombay and in the Presidency." In the Government's reply dated January 24, 1940, also quoted aboye this assertion was never repudiated or
denied. In the premises, the appellant cannot be permitted at this stage to raise this contention founded on the supposed distinction, if any, ~tween "rent" and "land revenue" and for the purpose of this , case
we must proceed on the basis that the word "rent" in the Government Resolution of 1865 was synonymous with or included "land revenue." In our opinion, for reasons stated above, the actual
decision of the High Court was correct and this appeal should be dismissed with costs, and we order ac- eordingly. P.HANJALI SASTRI J.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be allowed and I will briefly iRdicate my
reasons w~thout recapitulating the facts which have been fully •tated in the judgment of my learned brother Das which I have had the adva!ltage of reading. The appeal wncerns a claim by the ProviRcial Govern-
ment of Bombay to charge land revenue on a plot of land on which the predecessors of the respondent Municipality erected the buildings known as the Crawford Market in the City of Bombay. It is common
ground that the land in question would be assessable to land revenue under section 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (No. II of 1876) unless th@ respond- dent established "a right in limitation of the right of
the Provincial Government in consequence of' a specific limit to assessment having been established and preserved", in which case, the assessement must not exceed such specific limit.
It has been held, and it is not now disputed, that the words quoted above CO\'tr S.C.R. a right · of total exemption from assessment, the "specific limit" in such a case being nil (see Goswamini
Shri Kamalavahooji v. Colfrctor of Bombay () ). The only question, therefore, is whether the respondent has established a right to such. exemption. The resolution of the Government
dated 19th December, 1865, authorising the grant of the land with- out "any rent being charged to the Municipality as the market will be like other buildings for the benefit of the whole community" did not by 'itself purport ro
pass title to the land in question or to confer on the Municipality a right to exemption from land revenue. Admittedly no formal instrument was executed either granting the land or exempting it from assessment.
Nor could the resolution be regarded as .a valid dis- , position of property or an enforceable contract not to charge revenue on the land, as it did not comply with the . requirements of the statute 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41
which prescribed certain formalities to be observed for such transactions. As pointed out by Jenkins C.J. in Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State( 2 ) all land in British India having
been vested in the Crown bv 21 & 22 Vic. C. 106, the Government-in-Council in . Bombay could not dispose of property o.f enter into a contract· on behalf of the Crown except in exercise of the power bestowed on
them for the purpose under 22 & 23 Vic. C. 41 and that power could be exercised only by observing the formalities prescribed by that statute. The learned Judges of the High Court, while
recognising . this difficulty in the way of the respondent establishing a legal right to exemption from assessment, held that the conduct of the Provincial Government in allowing and, indeed, encouraging the respondent to erect the
buildings at great cost on the faith of the promise not to charge ·land revenue contained in the Resolution of 19th . December, 1865, precluded the respondent on the equitable principle recognised in Ramsden v. Dyson(3)
from assessing the land in question, and that this (1) L.R. 64 I.A; 334. (3) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. {2) (1905) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580. 1~51 Collector of ·Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the
City of Bombay and Others. Patanjali .S•stri /. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Patanjali Sastri /. (1952J equity was a· "right" in
limitation of the right of the Provincial Government to assess. I am unable to share that view. There is, in my opinion, no room here for the application of the prin- ciple of Ramsden v. Dyson('). That decision has been
explained by the Privy Council in Arifj v. fadunath(') as based on the equitable doctrine of part performance which, their Lordships held, could not be applied so as to nullify the express provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act relating to the creation of leases. They observed:- "Whether an English equitable doctrine should, m any case, be applied so as to modify the effect of an Indian statute may well be
doubted; but that an English equitable doctrine, affecting the provisions of an English statute relating to .ihe right to sue upon a contact, should be applied. by analogy to such a
statute as the Transfer of Property Act and with such a result as to create without any wntmg an interest which the statute says can only be creaited by means of a registered instrument, appears to their
Lordships, in the absence of some binding authority to that effect, to be impossible." After quoting the well-known passage in the judg- ment of Lord Kingsdown, their Lordships commented
thus.:- "It will be noticed that .Lord Kingsdown is dealing with the case of express verbal contract or something 'which amounts to the same thing.' He nowhere puts the case of estoppel; the word is not mentioned. He
would appear to be dealing simply with the equitable doctrine of part performance. His reference to Gregory v. Mighall r (811) 18 Ves. 328J confirms this view, for that case was simply an earlier instance of the ap-
plication of the doctrine. Even if Lord Kingsdown's language was intended to cover something beyond the equitable doctrine of part performance in relation to the Statute of Frauds, and was
intended to refer to circumstances in which a court of equity will enforce (l) (1866) L.R. I H.L. 129. (2) (1931) 58 I.A. 91. ' 1 S.C.R. a title to land against the person who at law is the
owner thereof, the title must, nevertheless, in their Lordships' view, be based either upon contract express or implied, or upon some statement of fact grounding an estoppel.' In the later decision in Mian
Pir Bux v. Sardar Mahomed(') their Lordships reiterated the same view . and held that English equitable · doctrines did not afford in India a valid defence to an action in eject- ment based on title.
' ' ' After these decisions of the Privy Council elucidat- ing the principles underlying Ram~den v. Dyson( and Maddison v. Alderson(3), it. seems to me clear that they have no applic:~tion to the facts of the present
case. They can no. more prevail against the statutory provisions regarding .the disposition of property or the making of contracts by Government than against the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act requiring
registered instruments for effecting certain classes of transiactions. No quest~on of estoppel by representa- tion arises, for the .Government made no representation of fact which it now seeks to. deny.
Nor can any case of estoppel by acquiscence be founded on the facts of the case. Both parties knew the facts and neither was misled. There was no lying by and letting another run into a trap [per Cot.ton L.J. in Russell v. Watts(
) ]. The conduct of the parties was referable to the express agreement evidenced by the Government Resolution of 19th December, 1865, to . make a grant of the land free of rent (whrch, in such context, means and in-
cludes revenue). No question, therefore, of any implied contract could arise. Unfortunately for the respondent, the express agreement was unenforceable owing to non-observance of the prescribed statutory formalities,
though it wJs acted upon by both sides. No question arises here as to the respondent's title to the land which apparently has been perfected by lapse of time, but it is clear that no right of exemption has been
established either on the basis of .express or implied (1) (1878) 6 I.A. 388. (3) (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467. '(2) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. (4) (1884) 25 Ch. D. 559. Collector of Bombay
v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others . Patanjali · Sastri ]. C o/lcctor of Bombay v. Municipal Cor· poration of the .City of Bombay and Others. Patanja/i Sastri f.
contract of part 11952] or on the basis of performance or estoppel equitable principles by acquiescence. It was next contended that, on the analogy of the line of cases holding that a limited interest in land
could be acquired .by adverse possession for over the statutory period, the respondent's possession of the land in dispute without payment of any quit rent or revenue for over 70 years to the knowledge of the
Government perfected its title to hold the land free from liability to pay land revenue. It is difficult to appreciate the argument so far as the claim to exemp- tion is concerned.
There is no question here of acqui- sition of limited interest- in land by adverse poS<es- sion. The respondent was asserting full ownership and a right of exemption from assessment and the
Government agreed with that view as shown by their letter dated 26th June, 1921, to the Land Acquisition Officer for the City of Bombay wherein they stated that "no Government claim in respect of the land
under acquisition (a portion of the land here in ques- tion) in the above mentioned case is made as the land vests in the Municipality." Be it noted that the Government made no claim even ro a portion of the
compensation on the basis of any right of resumption reserved to them, the Resolution of 1865 having made no such reservation. The position. then was that throughout the period of adverse possession, the
n::.- pondent Municipality regarded itself and was regarde<l bv the Government as absolute owner of the la:id with tl;e additional right of exemption from assessment to land revenue with the result that the Government's
"right to such property" (the subject of adverse pos- session) was "extinguished". under section 28 of the Limitation Act. But the right to levy land revenue was no part of the Government's right to the property.
It is a prerogative right of the Crown which was placed on a statutory basis under the Bombay City Land Revenue Act of 1876, and could be exercised in res- pect of a land only on the footing that it belonged to
another, the "superior holder", for, the · claim to levy assessment itself implies a recognition of ownership in f, l' ,,.., S.C:R. another. It is, therefore, difficult to see how adverse
possession of . the land could entitle the respondent to exemption from assessment of land revenue. It was . said that the Government having intended to grant the land on the terms that it was to be held
free of quit rent or revenue and the respondent hav- ing held the land on such terms claim'ing i~ to be exempt from assessment, a title to hold it on those terms Wa5 perfected by the adverse possession,
the covenant for exemption from assessment forming part and parcel of the title. In other words, the respondent should be placed in the same position as if the Government had made a valid revenue free grant.
The arguement is, to my mind, fallacious. If the Government had given effect to their expressed inten- tion by executing an instrument in writing observing the due formalities, the respondent would, no doubt,
have secured a valid title to the property with a con- tract binding the Government not to charge revenue, supported as it was by consideration. But, as already stated, the Government's promise not to charge land
revenue was unenforceable from the inception, and the respondent's adverse possession of the land, though accompanied by a claim to exemption from revenue, could not destroy the Crown's
prerogative right to impose assessment on the land. A somewhat analogous question arose in Goswamini Shri Kamala Vahooji v. Collector of Bombay('). The Government admitted that no land revenue had ever been charged in respect
of the land which was enjoyed by the holders for more than a century without paymen~ of revenue and it was urged that in virtue of such a long enjoyment a lost grant of the land on the terms that it should be
held free from liability to pay revenue must be pre- sumed. Rejecting that contention, their Lordships observed:- "The appellant submits that in the circumstances a lost grant should be presumed, and that this lost grant
should be presumed to have contained an exemption from land revenue or a 'right in limitation of the right (1) (1937) 64 I.A. 334. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the
City of Bombay Rnd Others. Patanjali Sastri /. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- _poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Pato.njali Sastri ]. (19521 of Government' to assess t!ze property.
The law may presume the existence of a grant which has been lost where it is sought to disturb a person in the enjoyment of right which he and his predecessors have immemori- ally enjoyed, but it is a different thing to seek to pre-
sume that the Crown has by some lost grant deprived itself of the prerogative power to tax the property of its subjects, and their Lordships are of opinion that this plea is untenable." (Italics mine).
The decision shows that exemption from land revenue does not form part and parcel of the title to land but is collateral to it. If a presumed lost grant could not cover it neither could title by adverse pos-
session. I would allow the appeal but make no order as to costs. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J :-I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother Mr. Justice Das, and I agree in the conclusion
he has reached; but I wish to add a few words of my own on some of the points that have been discu~sed during the course of the hearing. In the first place, there can be little doubt that the
word "rent" in paragraph 2 of the Government Resolution of the 19th December, 1865, means "assessment". It is true that this word is used generally in cases of landlord and tenant, but when it
is remembered that here the Government was parting with the land vested in the Crown in favour of the Municipal Corporation of Bombay, it can safely be assumed or presumed 'that they were th.inking not
merely of their rights as landlord but also of their prerogative right as well. That the land was going to be used for the building of markets for the benefit of the whole. community and, therefore, should not be
charged with rent is a comideration more relevant and appropriate to the prerogative right to assess than to a right to collect rent in respect of a transaction of lease. Moreover, it is well-known that whenever we speak of
S.C.R.· a rent-free grant of an inam by the Government, what is meant is land revenue or assessment. Collector of Born bay v.· The Resolution in questi-0n authorized the grant of the site.
There is apparently no grant in writing, conforming to the formalities prescribed by the law thell' in force. Part of the site was wanted for the erection of stables and the question of title to that
portion. was considered and decided in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State for India in Council('), where the Government gave the Municipality notice to quit and brought a suit
for rent on the alleged determination of the tenancy. It is part of the' same transaction with which we are concerned now, and it seems to me that there was no valid grant. The grant having
been authorized, the Corporation went into possession and it is not denied that they have built the Crawford Market at enormous cost. Though the grant was invalid, the Corporation
has now acquired a title by adverse possession to the site; this, however, is not the case with reference to the stable site covered by the aforesaid Bombay decision. There the question was
brought before the Court, well within the 60 years' period. Municipal Cor- pora_tion of the City o/Bombay The Crawford Market site has been in the possession of the Municipal Corporation for over 60 years under
an invalid grant, a term of which was that no rent should be charged. We are not concerned now with any question of ejectment or determination of tenancy. Could it be said that the right to levy assessment on
the land, enjoyed without any payment of any kind so far, was lost by adverse possession? I find it difficult· to give an affirmative answer. Before a right could be said to be acquired or lost by
adverse possession, it must have been the subject of possession by a man without title as against the· person with the rightflil title. Right to levy assessment is a prerogative right
of the Government and it is hard to conceive of a case where it could be said to be lost by· adverse possession. True, there can be adverse possession of a limited (1) (1904) I.L.R. 29 Born. 580.
and Others. Chandrasekhara Aiyar f. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor~ poration of the City of Bomh11y and Others. Chandmsekhar• Aiyar /. [1952] right like that of a mortgagee or a lessee or e»en a
permanent tenant, but still a right must have been enjoyed by the possessor adversely to the claim of the true owner. It is unnece~sary to go into the wider question whether the denial of the right to levy assess-
ment and possession of property coupled with tbis denial for over a period of 60 years will negative that right; it is mfficient to say that no right to levy assessment was exercised in the case before us before
March, 1938, and the denial was only afterwards. This, however, does not determine the case in favour of the appellant, as there is a question of equity to consider and on which the appellant failed in the
court below. In fact, it is the crucial point for deter- mination. When the Architectural Improvement Committee proposed to levy a nominal rent, the Government stated that no rent need be charged, as
the markets to be built were for the benefit of the whole community. This was a representation made by the Government when the site was given and possession was taken. How far tb'is
representation was taken into consideration when the Corporation of Bombay took possession· of the site under the grant is not necessary to be considered at any great length. It is just possible that they would have taken the site .
even with the nominal rent, but it is equally possible" that had ·they known that the rent was in the nature of assessment and liable to enhancement from time to time or periodically. they would have insisted on get-
ting a site free from assessment in consideration of the sites they gave up for forming the eastern Boulevard. The allegation in paragraph 7 of the plaint that the Corporation acted on the faith of the terms contained
in the grant has not been denied by the Government. The accident that the grant was invalid does not wipe out the existence of the representation of the fact that it was acted upon by the Corporation. Even if
the suit had been brought within 60 years for eject- ment and the Corporation had no answer to such a claim, the right to levy assessment might have con- ceivably stood on a different footing. In any event
S.C.R. there can be no doubt that it would have been competent for a Court of equity to give compensation for the expenditure and protect the possession in the meantime. Lord Kingsdown refers to this aspect of t.he
matter in Ramsden v. Dyson(1). In the present case, the Corporation stands on much firmer ground. They have acquired a title to the land which the Government cannot upset or challenge. This acquisition of title is
as a result of the law of limitation. It has nothing to do with any conduct on the part of the Corporation which can be said to have rendered tl\e representation about IJOn-libility to assessment of
no legal effect or consequence. The invalidity of the grant does not lead to the obliteration of the representation. Can the Government be now allowed to .go back on the representation, and, if we do so, would it not amount
to our countenancing the perpetration of what can be compendiously described as legal fraud which a court of equi,ty must prevent being committ;ed? If the resolution can be read as meaning that the grant was
of rent-free land, the case . would come s~rictly within the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. But even otherwise, that is, if there was. merely the holding out of a promise that
no rent will be charged in the future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances of this case to have bound themselves to fulfil it. Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsden's case (1), or it is some
other form of equity, is not of much importance. Courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith, as far as it lies in their power. As pointed out by Jenkins C. J. in Dadoha /anardhan's case (2), a
different conclusion would be "opposed to what is reasonable, to what is probable, and to what is fair." . I am of the ·opinion that the decision of the Privy Council in Ariff v. Jadunath(3) is not applicable to
the facts before us, as the doctrine of part performance (1) (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. (2) Dadoba fanardan v. The Collector of Bombay (1901) I.L.R. 25 Bom. 714. (3) {1931) 58 I.A. 91.
5-2 s c. India/71 Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay and Others. Chandrasekhara Aiyar /. Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Cor- poration of the City of Bombay
and Others. Oct. 26. [1952] is not being invoked here as in that case, to clothe a person with title which he cannot acquire except by the pursuit of or in conformity with certain legal forms.
Here, as pointed out already, the Corporation became the full and absolute owner of the site on the lapse of 60 years from the date of the grant. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: P. A. Mehta.
Agent for the respondent : R. A. Govind. THAKUR RUDRESW ARI PRASAD SINHA v. SRIMATI RANI PROBHABHATI AND OTHERS [PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs and VIVIAN BosE JJ. J Ghatwali tenures-Nature and incidents-Alienability of Ze1nin- dari Ghatwalis-Taluka Kakwara whether alienable.
Taluk Kakwara was in its origin a Zemindari Ghatwali tenure and continued to be so, and was in fact treated as such ever since. Even if by virtue of Captain Browne's Sanad it became
a Government Ghatwali tenure, then under the Sanad of Raja Kadir Ali or after the Permanent Settlement at any rate, it be- came a Zemindari Ghatwali and as ·such alienable with the
consent of the Zamindar according to the custom of Kharakpur judicially recognised. [Nature and incidents of Ghatwali tenures discussed] . . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 75 of 1950. Appeal from Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 22nd November, 1944, in Appeal No. 238 of 1940 arising out of order dated 13th July, 1940, of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur
in Mis. Case No. 174 of 1939. The facts of the case appear from the judgment. The appeal was originally preferred to the Privy Council and was subsequently tranferred and heard by the Supreme Court.
N. C. Chatteriee (B. Sen, with him), for the appellant. C. De (Ragunath ]ha, with him) for the respondents.