Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the Service Tax {Determination of Value) Rules, 2006were made, Rule 2Aof which reads as under:- "2A. Subject to the provisions of section 67, the value of service portion in the execution of a works contract, referred to in clause {h) of section 66E of the Act, shall be determined in the following manner, name1y:- (i) Value of service portjon in the execution of a works contract shall be equivalent to the gross amount charged for the. works contract less the value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the said works contract. · Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause,- {a) gross amount charged for the works contract shall> not include value added tax or sales tax, as the case c may be, paid or payable, if any, on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of the said works contract; (b) value of works contract service shall include, – (i) labour charges for execution of the works; (ii) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services; {iii) charges for planning, designing and architect's fees; {iv) charges for obtaining on hire _or otherwise, machinery and tools used for the execution of the works contract; (v) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel used in the execution of the works contract; (vi) cost of establishment of the contractor relatable to supply of labour and services; c (vii) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services; and (viii) profit earned by the service provider relatable to supply of labour and services; ( c) where value added tax or sales tax has been paid or payable on the actual value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the works contract, then, such value adopted for the purposes of payment of value added tax or sales tax, shall be taken as the value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the said works contract for determination of the value of service portion in the execution of works contract under this clause. (ii) Where the value has not been determined under clause (i), the person liable to pay tax on the service portion involved in the execution of the works contract shall determine the service tax payable in the following manner, namely:- (A) in case of works contracts entered into for execution of original works, service tax shall be payable on forty per cent of the total amount charged for the works contract; (B) in case of works contract entered into for maintenance or repair or reconditioning or restoration or servicing of any goods, service tax shall be payable on seventy per cent of the total amount charged for the works contract; (C) in case of other works contracts, not covered under sub-clauses (A) and (B) including maintenance, repair, COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v~ M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARI MAN, J.] completion and finishing services· such as glazing, plastering, floor and wall tiling, installation of electrical fittings of an immovable' property, service tax shall be payable on sixty per cent of the total amount charged for the works contract. Explanation 1.-Forthe purposes of this rule,- (a) "original works" means- (!) all new constructions; (ii) all types of additions and alterations to abandoned or damaged structures on land that are required to make them workable; (iii) erection, commissioning or installation of plant, machinery or equipment or structures, whether pre- fabricated or otherwise; (d) 'total amount" means the sum total of the gross amount charged for the works contract and the fair market value of all goods and services supplied in or in relation to the execution of the works contract, whether or not supplied under the same cohtract or any other contract, after deducting- (i) the amount charged for such goods or services, if any; and (ii) the value added tax or sales tax, if any, levied thereon: c Provided that the fair market value of goods and services so supplied may be determined in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles. Explanation 2.-For the removal of doubts, it is clarified thatthe provider of taxable service shall not take CENVAT (2015] 8 S.C.R. credit of duties or cess paid on any inputs, used in or in relation to the said works contract, under the provisions of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004."2
14. Crucial to the understanding and determination of the issue at hand is the second Gannon Dunkerley judgment which is reported in (1993) 1 SCC 364. By the aforesaid judgment, the modalities of taxing composite indivisible works contracts was gone into. This Court said:- c "On behalf of the contractors, it has been urged that under a law imposing a tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract under Entry 54 of the State List read with Article 366(29-A)(b), the tax is imposed on the goods which are involved in the execution of a works contracf and the measure for levying such a tax can only be the value of the goods so involved and the value of the works contract cannot be made the measure for levying the tax. The submission is further that the value of such goods would be the cost of acquisition of the goods by the contractor and, therefore, the measur~ for levy of tax can only be the cost at which the goods involved in the execution of a works contract were obtained by the contractor. On behalf of the States, it has been submitted that since the property in goods which are involved in the execution of a works contract passes only when the goods are incorporated in the works, the measure for the levy of the tax would be the value of the goods at the time of their incorporation in the works as well as the cost of incorporation of the goods in the works. We are in agreement with the submission that measure for the levy of the tax contemplated by Article 366(29-A)(b) is the value of the goods involved in the 2 The said Rule was substituted by the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2012 with effect from 01.07.2012. which substituted Rule has been set out hereinabove. COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] execution of a works contract. In Builders' Association case [(1989) 2 sec 645: 1989 sec (Tax) 317: (1989) 2 SCR 320] it has been pointed out that in Article 366(29- A)(b), "[t]he emphasis is on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form)". (SCC p. 669, para 32: SCR p. 347), This indicates that though the tax is imposed on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract, the measure for levy of such imposition is the value of the goods involved in the execution of a works contract. We are, however, unable to agree with the contention urged on behalf of the contractors that the value of such goods for levying the tax can be assessed only on the basis of the cost of acquisition of the goods by the contractor. Since the taxable event is the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract and the said ' transfer of property in such goods takes place when the,. goods are incorporated in the works, the value of the goods which can constitute the measure for the levy of . the tax has to be the value of the goods at the time of incorporation of the goods in the works and not the cost of acquisition of the goods by the contractor. We are also unable to accept the contention urged on behalf.of the States that in addition to the value of the goods involved in the execution of the works contract the cost of incorporation of the goods in the.works can be included in the measure for levy of tax. Incorporation of the goods in the works forms part of the contract relating to work and labour which is distinct from the contract for transfer of property in goods and, therefore, the cost of incorporation of the goods in the works cannot be made a part of the measure for levy of tax contemplated by Article 366(29-A)(b). Keeping in view the legal fiction introduced by the Forty- c sixth Amendment whereby the works contract which was entire and indivisible has been altered into a contract which is divisible into one for sale of goods and other for supply of labour and services, the value of the goods c involved in the execution of a works contract on which tax is leviable must exclude the charges which appertain to the contract for supply of labour and services. This would mean that labour charges for execution of works, [item No. (1)], amounts paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services [item No. (i1)], charges for planning, designing and architect's fees (item No. (iii)], charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used in the execution of a works contract [item No. (iv)], and the cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel, etc. which are consumed in the process of execution of a works contract [item No: (v)] and other similar expenses for labour and services will have to be excluded as charges for supply of labour and services. The charges mentioned in item No. (v1) cannot, however, be excluded. The position of a contractor in relation to a transfer of property in goods in the execution of a works contract is not different from that of a dealer in goods who is liable to pay sales tax on the sale price charged by him from the customer for the goods sold. The said price includes the cost of bringing the goods to the place of sale. Similarly, for the purpos~ of ascertaining the value of goods which are involved in the execution of a works contract for the purpose of imposition of tax, the cost of transportation of the goods to the place of works has to be taken as part of the value of the said goods. The charges mentioned in item No. (vii) relate to the various expenses which form part of the cost of establishment of the contractor. Ordinarily the cost of establishment is included in the sale price charged by a dealer from the customer for the goods sold. Since a composite works COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARI MAN, J.) contract involves supply of materials as well as supply of labour and services, the cost of establishment of the contractor would have to be apportioned between the part of the contract involving supply of materials and the part involving supply of labour and services: The cost of establishment of the contractor which is relatable to supply of labour and services cannot be included in the value of the goods involved in the execution of a contract and the cost of establishment which is r~latable to supply of material involved in the execution of the works contract only can be included in the value of the goods. Similar apportionment will have to be made in respect of item No. (viii) relating to profits. The profits which are relatable to the supply of materials can be included in the value of the goods and the profits which are relatable to supply of labour and services will have to be excluded. This means that in respect of charges mentioned in item Nos. (vit) and (viii), the cost of establishment of the contractor as well as the profit earned by him to the extent the same are relatable to supply of labour and services will have to be excluded. The amount so deductible would have to be determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the basis of the material produced by the contractor. The value of the goods involved in the execution of a works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account the value of the entire works contract and deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and . services which would cover- (a) Labour charges for execution of the works; (b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services; (c) charges for planning, designing .and architect's fees; c (cf) charges for obt:iining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for the execution of the works contract; (e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel, etc. used in the execution of the works contract the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works contract; and c (f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent it · is relatable to supply oflabour and services; (g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services; (h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services. The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the basis of the material produced by the contractor. Normally, the contractor will be in a position to furnish the necessary material to establish the expemjes that were incurred under the aforesaid heads of deduction for labour and services. But there may be cases where the contractor has not maintained proper accounts or the accounts maintained by him are not found to be worthy of credence by the assessing authority. In that event, a question would arise as to how the deduction towards the aforesaid heads may be made. On behalf of the States, it has been urged that it would be permissible for the State to prescribe a formula on the basis of a fixed percentage of the value of the contract as expenses towards labour and services and the same may be deducted from the value of the works contract and that the said formula need not be uniform for all works contracts and may depend on the nature of the works COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. MIS LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARI MAN, J.] contract. We find merit in· this submission. In cases where the contractor does not maintain proper accounts or the accounts maintained by him are not found worthy of credence it would, in our view, be permissibleforthe State legislation to prescribe a formula for determining the charges for labour and services by fixing a particular percentage of the value of the works contract and to allow deduction of the amount thus determined from the value of the works contract for the purpose of determining the value of the goods involved in the execution of the works contract. It must, however, be ensured that the amount deductible under the formula that is prescribed for deduction towards charges for labour and services does not differ appreciably from the expenses for labour and services that would be incurred in normal circumstances in respect of that particular type of works contract. Since the expenses for labour and services would depend on the nature of the works contract and would not be the same for all types of works contracts, it would be permissible, indeed necessary, to prescribe varying scales for deduction on account of cost of labour and services for various types of works contracts."( at paras 45, 47 and 49) "'*:>r c
15. Areading of this judgment, on which counsel forthe F assessees heavily relied, would go to showthaUhe separation of the value of goods contained in the execution of a works contract will have to be determined by working from the value of theentire works contract and deducting theJ~from charges towards labour and services. Such deduction~, are stated by G the Constitution Bench to be eight in number. What is important in particular is the deductions which 31re to be made under sub-paras (f), (g) and (h). Under each of.these paras, a bifurcation has to pe made by the charging Section itself so that the cost of establishment of the contractor is bifurcated A into what is relatable to supply of labour and services. Similarly, all other expenses have also to be bifurcated insofar as they are relatable to supply of labour and services, and the same goes for the profit that is earned by the contractor. These deductions are ordinarily to be made from the contractor's B accounts. However, if it is found that contractors have not maintained proper accounts, or their accounts are found to be not worthy of credence, it is left to the legislature to prescribe a formula on the basis of a fixed percentage of the value of the entire works contract as relatable to the labour and service C element of it. This judgment, therefore, clearly and unmistakably holds that unless the splitting of an indivisible works contract is done taking into account the eight heads of deduction, the charge to tax that would be made would D otherwise contain, apart from other things, the entire cost of establishment, other expenses, and profit earned by the contractor and would transgress into forbidden territory namely into such portion of such cost, expenses and profit as would be attributable in the works contract to the transfer of property E in goods in such contract. This being the case, we feel that the learned counsel for the assessees are on firm ground when they state that the service tax charging section itself must lay down with specificity that the levy of service tax can only be on works contracts, and the measure of tax can only be on that F portion of works contracts which contain a service element which is to be derived from the gross amount charged for the works contract less the value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the works contract. This not having been done by the Finance Act, 1994, it is clear that any charge to G tax under the five heads in Section 65(105) noticed abo~ would only be of service contracts simpliciter and not composite indivisible works contracts.
16. At this stage, it is important to note the scheme of H taxation under our Constitution. In trot': i1sts c:Ontained in the ?lh COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. MIS LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] Schedule to the Constitution, taxation entries are to be found A only in lists I and II. This is for the reason that in our Constitutional scheme, taxation powers of the Centre and the States are mutually exclusive. There is no concurrent power of taxation. This being the case, the moment the levy contained in a taxing statute transgresses into a prohibited exclusive field, it is liable to be struck down. In the present case,, the dichotomy is between sales tax leviable by the States and service tax leviable by the Centre. When it comes to composite indivisible works contracts, such contracts can be taxed by Parliament as well as State legislatures. Parliament can only tax the t service element contained in these contracts, and the States can only tax the transfer of property in goods element contained in these contracts. Thus, it becomes very important to segregate the two elements completely for if some element of 0 transfer of property in goods ren:iains when a service tax is levied, the said levy would be found to be constitutionally infirm. This position is well reflected ·in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1, as follows:- "No one denies the legislative competence of the States to levy sales tax on sales provided that the necessary concomitants of a sale are present in the transaction and the sale is distinctly discernible in the transaction. This does not however allow the State to entrench upon the Union List and tax services by including the cost of such service in the value of the goods. Even in those composite contracts which are by legal fiction deemed to be divisible under Article 366(29-A), the value of the goods involved in the execution of the whole transaction cannot be assessed to sales tax. As was said in Larsen & Toubro v. Union of lndia[(1993) 1 SCC 364]: (SCC p. 395, para 47) :-"The cost of establishment of the contractor which is relatable to supply of labour and services cannot be included in the value of the goods .E .G c involved in the execution of a contract and the cost of establishment which is relatable to supply of material involved in the execution of the works contract only can be included in the value of the goods." For the same reason the Centre cannot include the value of the SIM cards, if they are found ultimately to be goods, in the cost of the service. As was held by us in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 214], SCC at p. 228, para 23:-"This mutual exclusivity which has been reflected in Article 246(1) means that taxing entries must be construed so as to maintain exclusivity. Although generally speaking, a liberal interpretation must be given to taxing entries, this would not bring within its purview a tax on subject-matter which a fair reading of the entry does not cover. If in substance, the statute is not referable to a field given to the State, the court will not by any principle of interpretation allow a statute not covered by it to intrude upon this field." (at paras 88 and 89)
17. We find that the assessees are correct in their submission that a works contract is a separate species of contract distinct from contracts for services simpliciter recognized by the world of commerce and law as such, and has to be taxed separately as such. In Gannon Dunkerley, 1959 SCR 379, this Court recognized works contracts as a separate species of contract as follows:- "To avoid misconception, it must be stated that the above conclusion has reference to works contracts, which are entire and indivisible, as the contracts of the respondents have been held by the learned Judges of the Court below to be. The several forms which such kinds of contracts can assume are set out in Hudson on Building Contracts, at p. 165. It is possible that the parties might enter into COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARI MAN, J.] distinct and separate contracts, one for the transfer of materials for money consideration, and the other for payment of remuneration for services and for work done. In such a case, there are really two agreements, though there is a single instrument embodying them, and the power of the State to separate the agreement to sell, from the agreement to do work and render se_rvice and to impose a tax thereon cannot be questioned, and will stand untouched by the present judgment." (at page 427)
18. Similarly, in Kone Elevator India (P) Ltd. v. State C of T.N., (2014) 7 SCC 1, this Court held:- "Coming to the stand and stance of the State of Haryana, as put forth by Mr Mishra, the same suffers from two basic fallacies, first, the supply and installation of lift treating it as a contract for sale on the basis of the overwhelming component test, b~cause there is a stipulation in the contract that the customer is obliged to undertake the work of civil construction and the bulk of the material used in construction belongs to·the manufacturer, is not correct, as the subsequent discussion would show; and second; the Notification dated 17-5-2010 issued by the Government of Haryana, Excise and Taxation Department, whereby certain rules of the Haryana Value Added Tax Rules, 2003 have been amended and a table has been annexed providing for "Percentages for Works Contract and Job Works" under the heading "Labour, service and other like charges as percentage of total value of the contract" specifying 15% for fabrication and installation of elevators (lifts) and escalators, is self- contradictory, for once it is treated as a composite contract invoking labour and service, as a natural corollary, it would be works contract and not a contract for sale. To elaborate, the submission that the element of c (2015] 8 S.C.R. labour and service can be deducted from the total contract value without treating the composite contract as a works contract is absolutely fallacious. In fact, it is an innovative subterfuge. We are inclined to think so as it would be frustrating the constitutional provision and, accordingly, we unhesitatingly repel the same." (at para 60)°
19. In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 1 SCC 708, this Court stated:- "ln our opinion, the term "works contract" in Article 366(29- A)(b) is amply wide and cannot be confined to a particular understanding of the term or to a particular form. The te'rm encompasses a wide range and many varieties of contract. Parliament had such wide meaning of "works contract" in its view at the time of the Forty-sixth Amendment. The object of insertion of clause (29-A) in Article 366 was to enlarge the scope of the expression "tax on sale or purchase of goods" and overcome Gannon Dunkerley (1) [State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560: 1959 SCR 379]. Seen thus, even if in a contract, besides the obligations of supply of goods and materials and performance of labour and services, some additional obligations are imposed, such contract does not cease to be works contract. The additional obligations in the contract would not alter the nature of contract so long as the contract provides for a contract for works and satisfies the primary description of works contract. Once the characteristics or elements of works contract are satisfied in a contract then irrespective of additional obligations, such contract would be covered by the term "works contract". Nothing in Article 366(29- A)(b) limits the term "works contract" to contract for labour and service only. The learned Advocate General for COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. MIS LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.) Maharashtra was right in his submission that the term "works contract" cannot be confined to a contract to provide labour and services but is a contract for undertaking or bringing into existence some "works". We are also in agreement with the. submission of Mr K.N. Bhat that the term "works contract" in Article 366(29-A)(b) takes within its fold all genre of works contract and is not restricted to one specie of contract to provide for labour and services alone. Parliament had all genre of works contract in view when clause (29-A) was inserted in Article 366." (at para 72)
20. We also find that the assessees' argument thatthere is no charge to tax of works contracts in the Finance Act, 1994 is correct in view of what has been stated above.
21. This Court in Mathuram Agrawal v. State of M.P., (1999) a sec 667, held:- "Another question that arises for consideration in this c connection is whether sub-section (1) of Section 127-A and the proviso to sub-section (2)(b) should be construed together and the annual letting values of all the buildings owned by a person to be taken together for determining the amount to be paid as tax in respect of each building. In our considered view this position cannot be accepted. f The intention of the legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions particularly where the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose of the statute more than what is stated in the plain language. It is not the economic results sought to be obtained by making the provision which is relevant in interpreting a fiscal statute. Equally impermissible is an interpretation which does not follow from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. Words cannot be added to or substituted so as to give a meaning to the statute which will serve the spirit and intention of the legislature. The statute should clearly and unambiguously convey the three components of the tax law i.e. the subject of the tax. the person who is liable to pay the tax and the rate at which the tax is to be paid. c If there is any ambiguity regarding any of these ingredients in a taxation statute then there is no tax in law. Then it is for the legislature to do the needful in the matter. This construction, in our considered view, amounts to supplementing the charging section by including something which the provision does not state. The construction placed on the said provision does not flow from the plain language of the provision. The proviso requires the exempted property to be subjected to tax and for the purpose of valuing that property alone the value of the other properties is to be taken into consideration. But, if in doing so, the said property becomes taxable, the Act does not provide at what rate it would be taxable. One cannot determine the rateable value of the small property by aggregating and adding the value of other properties, and arrive at a figure which is more than possibly the value of the property itself. Moreover, what rate of tax is to be applied to such a property is also not indicated." (at paras 12 and 16)
22. Equally, this Court in Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. CST, 1985 Supp sec 205, held:- "The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity." (at para 6)
23. To similar effect is this Court's judgment in CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, (1981) 2 SCC 460, held:c "Section 45 charges the profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset to income tax. The asset must be one which falls within the contemplation of the section. It must bear that quality which brings Section 45 into play. To determine whether the goodwill of a new business is such an asset, it is permissible, as we shall prasently show, to refer to certain other sections of the head, "Capital gains". Section 45 is a charging section. For the purpose of imposing the charge. Parliament has enacted detailed provisions in order to compute the profits or gains under that head. No existing principle or provision at variance with them can be applied for determining the chargeable profits _and gains. All transactions encompassed by Section 45 must fall under the governance of its computation provisions. A transaction to which those provisions cannot be applied must be regarded as never intended by Section 45 to be the subject of the charge. This inference flows from the general arrangement of the provisions in the Income Tax Act, where under each head of income the charging provision is accompanied by a set of provisions for computing the income subject to that charge. The character of the computation provisions in eac.h case c c bears a relationship to the nature of the charge. Thus the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. Otherwise one would be driven to conclude that while a certain income seems to fall within the charging section there is no scheme of computation for quantifying it. The legislative pattern discernible in the Act is against such a conclusion. It must be borne in mind that the legislative intent is presumed to run uniformly through the entire conspectus of provisions pertaining to each head of income. No doubt there is a qualitative difference between the charging provision and a computation provision. And ordinarily the operation of the charging provision cannot be affected by the construction of a particular computation provision. But the question here is whether it is possible to apply the computation provision at all if a certain interpretation is pressed on the charging provision. That pertains to the fundamental integrality of the statutory scheme provided for each head." (at para 10)
24. A close look at the Finance Act, 1994 would show F that the five taxable services referred to in the charging Section 65(105) would refer only to service contracts simpliciter and not to composite works contracts. This is clear from the very language of Section 65(105) which defines "taxable service" as "any service provided". All the services referred to in the G said sub-clauses are service contracts simpliciter without any other element in them, such as for example, a service contract which is a commissioning and installation, or erection, commissioning and installation contract. Further, under Section 67, as has been pointed out above, the value of a taxable H service is the gross amount charged by the service provider COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] for such service rendered by him. This would unmistakably A show that what is referred to in the charging provision is the taxation of service contracts simpliciter and not composite works contracts, such as are contained on the facts of the present cases. It will also be noticed that no attempt to remove the non-service elements from the composite works contracts B has been made by any of the aforesaid Sections by deducting from the gross value of the works contract the value of property in goods transferred in the execution of a works contract.
25. In fac~ by way of contrast, Section 67 post amendment C (by the Finance Act, 2006) for the first time prescribes, in cases like the present, where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, to be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner.
26. We have already seen that Rule 2(A) framed pursuant · to this power has followed the second Gannon Dunkerley case in segregating the 'service' component of a works contract from the 'goods' component. It begins by working downwards from the gross amount charged for the entire works contract E and minusing from it the value of the property in goods transferred in the execution of such works contract. . This is done by adopting the value that is adopted for the purpose of payment of VAT The rule goes on to say that the service component of the works contract is to include the eight F elements laid down in the second Gannon Dunkerley case including apportionment of the cost of establishment, other expenses and profit earned by the service provider as is relatable only to supply of labour and services. And, where value is not determined having regard to the aforesaid parameters, G (namely, in those cases where the books of account of the contractor are not looked into for any reason) by determining in different works contracts how much shall be the percentage of the total amount charged for the works contract, attributable .H A to the service element in such contracts. It is this scheme and this scheme alone which complies with constitutional requirements in that it bifurcates a composite indivisible works contract and takes care to see that no element attributable to the property in goods transferred pursuant to such contract, B enters into computation of service tax. c
27. In fact, the speech made by the Hon'ble Finance Minister in moving the Bill to tax Composite Indivisible Works Contracts specifically stated:- "State Governments levy a tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract. The value of services in a works contract should attract service tax. Hence, I propose to levy service tax on . o services involved in the execution of a works contract. However, I also propose an optional composition scheme under which service tax will be levied at only 2 per cent of the total value of the works contract."
28. Pursuant to the aforesaid speech, not only was the statute amended and rules framed, but a Works Contract (Composition Scheme for Payment of Service Tax) Rules, 2007 was also notified in which service providers could opt to pay service tax at percentages ranging from 2 to 4 of the gross F value of the works contract.
29. It is interesting to note that while introducing the concept of service tax on indivisible works contracts various exclusions are also made such as works contracts in respect G of roads, airports, airways transport, bridges, tunnels, and dams. These infrastructure projects have been excluded and continue to be excluded presumably because they are conceived in the national interest. If learned counsel for the revenue were right, each of these excluded works contracts H could be taxed under the five sub-heads of Section 65(105) COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] contained in the Finance Act, 1994. For example, a works A contract involving the construction of a bridge or dam or tunnel would presumqblyfall within Section 65(105)(zzd) as a contract which relates to erection, commissioning or installation. It is clear that such contracts were never intended to be the subject matter of service tax. Yet, if learned counsel for the revenue is right, such contracts, not being exempt under the Finance Act, 1994, would fall within its tentacles, which was never the intention of Parliament.
30. It now remains to consider the judgment of the Delhi C High Court in G.D. Builders.
31. In the aforesaid judgment, it was held that the levy of service tax in Section 65(105)(g), (zzd), (zzh), (zzq) and (zzzh) is good enough to tax indivisible composite works contracts. Various judgments were referred to which have no direct bearing on the point at issue. In paragraph 23 of this judgment, the second Gannon Dunkerley judgment is referred to in passing without noticing any of the key paragraphs set out hereinabove in our judgment. Also, we find that the judgment E in G.D. Builders (supra) went on to quote from_the judgment in Mahim Patram Private Ltd. v: Union of India, 2007 (3) · SCC 668, to arrive at the proposition that even when rules are not framed for computation of tax, tax would be leviable.
32. We are afraid that the Delhi High Court completely misread the judgment in Mahim Patram's case. This judgment concerned itself with works contracts being taxed under the Central Sales Tax Act. What was argued in that case was that in the absence of any rule under the provisions of the Central G Act, the determination of sale price would be left to the whims and fancies of the assessing authority. This argument was repelled by this Court after setting out Sections 2(g) and 2Qa), which define "sale" and ''works contract". The Court then went on to discuss Sections 9(2) and 13(3) of the Central Sales Tax H A Act. Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act provides:- "Section 9. Levy and collection of tax and penalties.- (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the authorities for the time being empowered to assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the general sales tax Jaw of the c appropriate State shall, on behalf of the Government of India, assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment of tax, including any interest or penalty, payable by a dealer under this Act as if the tax or interest or penalty payable by such a dealer under this Act is a tax or interest or penalty payable under the general sales tax law of the State; and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales tax Jaw of the State; and the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, provisional assessment, advance payment of tax, registration of the transferee of any business, imposition of the tax liability of a person carrying on business on the transferee of, or successor to, such business, transfer of liability of any firm or Hindu undivided family to pay tax in the event of the dissolution of such firm or partition of such family, recovery of tax from third parties, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, refunds, rebates, penalties, charging or payment of interest, compounding of offences and treatment of documents furnished by a dealer as confidential, shall apply accordingly: Provided that if in any State or part thereof there is no general sales tax Jaw in force', the Central Government may, by rules made in this behalf make necessary provision for all or any of the matters specified in this sub-section." COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
33. Section 13(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act says:- "The State Government may make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions· of this Act and the rules made under sub-section (1), to carry out the"purposes of this Act."
34. In the aforesaid judgment it was found that Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act conferred powers on officers of the various States to utilize the machinery provisions of the States' sales tax statutes for purposes of levy and assessment of central sales tax under the Central Act. It was also noticed c that the State Government itself had been given power to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Central Act so long as the said rules we~e not inconsistent with the provisions of the . Central Act. It was found that, in fact, the State of Uttar Pradesh had framed such rules in exercise of powers under Section D 13(3) of the Central Act as a result of which the necessary machinery for the assessment of central sales tax was found to be there. The Delhi High Court judgment unfortunately misread the aforesaid judgment of this Court to arrive at the conclusion that it was an authority for the proposition that a tax E is leviable even if no rules are framed for assessment of such tax, which is wholly incorrect. The extracted passage from Mahim Patram's case only referred to rules not being framed under the Central Act and·not to rules not being framed at all. The conclusion therefore in paragraph 36(2) of the Delhi High Court judgment is wholly incorrect. Para 36(2) reads as follows:- "(2) Service tax can be levied on the service component of any contract involving service with sale of goods etc. Computation of service comppnent is a matter of detail and not a matter relating to validity of imposition of service tax. It is procedural and a matter of calculation. Merely because no rules are framed for computation, it does not follow that no tax is leviable." [at para 36]
35. The aforesaid finding is in fact contrary to a long line of decisions which have held that where there is no machinery for assessment, the law being vague, it would not be open to the assessing authority to arbitrarily assess to tax the subject. Various judgments of this Court have been referred to in the B following passages from Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of c U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443. This Court said:- "This Court has in a long line of decisions rendered from time to time, emphasised the importance of machinery provisions for assessment of taxes and fees recoverable under a taxing statute. In one of the earlier decisions on the subject a Constitution Bench of this Court in K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kera/a [Al R 1.961 SC 552] examined the constitutional validity of the Travancore- Cochin Land Tax Act (15 of 1955). While recognising what is now well-settled principle of law that a taxing statute is not wholly immune from attack on the ground that it infringes the equality clause in Article 14, this Court found that the enactment in question was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution for inequality was writ large on the Act and inherent in the very provisions under the taxing section thereof. Having said so, this Court also noticed that the Act was silent as to the machinery and the procedure to be followed in making the assessment. It was left to the executive to evolve the requisite machinery and procedure thereby making the whole thing, from beginning to end, purely administrative in character completely ignoring the legal position that the assessment of a tax on person or property is a quasi-judicial exercise." Speaking for the majority Sinha, C.J. said: (K. T. Moopil case [AIR 1961SC552) ,AIR p. 559, para 9) "9 …. Ordinarily, a taxing statute lays down a regular machinery for making assessm.:::nt of the tax proposed COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOL)BRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] to be imposed by the statute. It lays down detailed procedure as to notice to the proposed assessee.to make a return in respect of property proposed to be taxed, prescribes the authority and the procedure for hearing any objections to the liability for taxation or as to the extent of the tax proposed to be levied, and finally, as to the right to challenge the regularity of assessment made, by recourse to proceedings in a higher civil court. The Act merely declares the competence of the Government to make a provisional assessment, and by virtue of Section 3 of the Madras Revenue Recovery. Act, 1864, the landholders may be liable to pay the tax. The Act being silent as to the machinery and procedure to be followed in making the assessment leaves it to the Executive to evolve the requisite machinery and procedure. The whole thing, from beginning to end, is treated as of a purely administrative character, completely ignoring the legal position that the assessment of a tax on person or property is at least of a quasi-judicial character." (emphasis supplied) In Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [AIR 1963 SC 1667] this Court was examining the constitutional validity of the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961. Reiterating the view taken in K. T. Moopil Nair (AIR 1961 SC 552] this Court held that a statute is not beyond the pale of limitations prescribed by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and that the test pf reasonableness prescribed by Arti.cle 304(b) is justiciable. However, in cases where the statute was completely discriminatory or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of tax or where it was confiscatory, the Court would be justified in striking it down as unconstitutiorial. In such cases the character of the material provisions of the c impugned statute may be such as may justify the Court taking the view that in substance the taxing statute is a cloak adopted by the legislature for achieving its confiscatory purpose. In Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P [AIR 1962 SC 1563] this Court was exam·1n'1ng the constitutional validity of the U.P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act (31of1957). Dealing with the argument that the Act did not make a specific provision about the machinery for assessment or recovery of tax, this Court held: (AIR pp. 1570-71, para 17) "17 . … if a taxing statute makes no specific provision about the machinery to recover tax and the procedure to make the assessment of the tax and leaves it entirely to the executive to devise such machinery as it thinks fit and to prescribe such procedure as appears to it to be fair, an occasion may arise for the courts to consider whether the failure to provide for a machinery and to prescribe a procedure does not tend to make the imposition of the tax an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(5). An imposition of tax which in the absence of a prescribed machinery and the prescribed procedure would parlake of the character of a purely administrative affair can, in a proper sense, be challenged as contravening Arlicle 19(1)(f)." (emphasis supplied) In StateofA.P v. Na/la RajaReddy[AIR 1967SC1458] this Court was examining the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue (Additional Assessment) and Cess Revision Act, 1962 (22 of 1962) as amended by the Amendment Act (23 of 1962). Noticing the absence of machinery provisi0:;s in the impugned COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL ~XCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] enactments this Court observed: (AIR p. 1468, para 22) "22 . … if Section 6 is put aside, there is absolutely no provision in the Act prescribing the mode of assessment. Sections 3 and 4 are charging sections and they say in effect that a person will have to pay an additional assessment per acre in respect of both dry and wet lands. They do not lay down how the assessment should be . levied. No notice has been prescribed, no opportunity is given to the person to question the assessment on his land. There is no procedure for him to agitate the correctness of the classification made by placing his land in a particular class with reference to ayacut, acreage or even taram. The Act does not even nominate the appropriate officer to make the assessment to deal with questions arising in respect of assessments and does not prescribe the procedure for assessment. The whole thing is left in a nebulous form. Briefly stated under the Act there is no procedure for assessment and however grievous the blunder made there is no way for the aggrieved party to get it corrected. This is a typical case where a taxing statute does not provide any machinery of assessment." (emphasis supplied) The appeals filed by the State against the judgment of the High Court striking down the enactment were on the above basis dismissed.' Reference may also be made to Vishnu Dayal Mahendra Palv. State of U.P ((1974) 2 SCC 306) and D.G. Gose and Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. v .. State of Kera/a ((1980) 2 SCC 410] where this Court held that sufficient guidance was available from the Preamble and other provisions of the Act. The members of the committee owe a duty to be conversant with the same and discharge their functions in accordance with the c [2015) 8 S.C.R. provisions of the Act and the Rules and that in cases where the machinery for determining annual value has been provided in the Act and the rules of the local authority, there is no reason or necessity of providing the same or similar provisions in the other Act or Rules. There is no gainsaying that a total absence of machinery provisions for assessment/recovery of the tax levied ·under an enactment, which has the effect of making the entire process of assessment and recovery of tax and adjudication of disputes relating thereto administrative in character, is open to challenge before a writ court in appropriate proceedings. Whether or not the enactment levying the tax makes a machinery provision either by itself or in terms of the Rules that may be framed under it is, however, a mafter that would have to be examined in each case." (at paras 15-21)
36. In a recent judgment by one of us, namely, Shabina Abraham & Ors. v. Collector of Central Excise & E Customs, judgment dated 29'" July, 2015, in Civil Appeal No.5802 of 2005, this Court held:- "It is clear on a reading of the aforesaid paragraph that what revenue is asking us to do is to stretch the machinery provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 on the basis of surmises and conjectures. This we are afraid is not possible. Before leaving the judgment in Murarilal's case (supra), we wish to add that so far as partnership firms are concerned, the Income Tax Act contains a specific provision in Section 189(1) which introduces a fiction qua dissolved firms. It states that where a firm is dissolved, the Assessing Officer shall make an assessment of the total income of the firm as if no such dissolution had taken place and all the provisions of the Income Tax Act would apply to assessment of such COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] dissolved firm. lnterestinglX enough, this provision is referred to only in the minority judgment in M/s. Murarilal's case (supra). The impugned judgment in the present case has referred to Ellis C. Reid's case but has not extracted the real ratio contained therein. It then goes on to say that this is a case of short levy which has been noticed during the lifetime of the deceased and then goes on to state that equally therefore legal representatives of a manufacturer who had paid excess duty would not by the self-same reasoning be able to claim such excess amount paid by the deceased. Neither of these reasons are reasons which refer to any provision of law. Apart from this, the High Court went into morality and said that the moral principle of unlawful enrichment would also apply and since the law will not permit this, the Act needs to be interpreted accordingly. We wholly disapprove of the approach of the High Court. It flies in the face of first principle when it comes to taxing statutes. It is therefore necessary to reiterate the law as it stands. In Partington v.A.G., (1869) LR4 HL 100at122, Lord Cairns stated: "If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable, construction, certainly, such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute". (at paras 26 and 31) c
37. We find that the Patna, Madras and Orissa High Courts have, in fact, either struck down machinery provisions or held machinery provisions to bring indivisible works contracts into the service tax net, as inadequate. The Patna High Court judgment was expressly approved by this Court in State of Jharkhand v. Voltas Ltd., East Singhbhum, (2007) B 9 SCC 266. This Court held:- c "Section 21 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, as amended states: "21. Taxable turnover.-(1) For the purpose of this part the taxable turnover of the dealer shall be that part of his gross turnover which remains after deducting therefrom- (a) (1) in the case of the works contract the amount of labour and any other charges in the manner and to the extent prescribed;" Rule 13-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules which was also amended by a notification dated 1-2-2000 reads as follows: "13-A. Deduction in case of works contract on account of labour charges.-lf the dealer fails to produce any account or the accounts produced are unreliable deduction under sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of Section 21 on account of labour charges in case of works contract from gross turnover shall be equal to the following percentages … " The aforesaid provisions have been adopted by the State of Jharkhand vide notification dated 15-12-2000 and thus are applicable in the State of Jharkhand. Interpretation of the amended Section 21(1) and the newly substituted Rule 13-A fell for consideration of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Larsen & COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] Toubro Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(2004) 134 STC 354]. The Patna High Court in the said decision observed as under: "Rule 13-A unfortunately does not talk of 'any other charges'. Rule 13-A unfortunately does not take into consideration that under the Ruies the deduction in relation to any other charges in the manner and to the extent were also to be prescribed. Rule 13-A cannot be said to be an absolute follow-up legislation to sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of Section 21 (1 ). When the law provides that something is to be prescribed in the Rules then that thing must be prescribed in the Rules to make the provisions workable and constitutionally valid. In Gannon Dunkerley & co. [(1993) 1 sec 364 : (1993) 88 STC 204] the Supreme Court observed that as sub-section (3) of Section 5 and sub-rule (2) of Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and the Rules were not providing for particular deductions, the same were. invalid. In the·· present matter the constitutional provision of law says that particular deductions would be provided but unfortunately nothing is provided in relation to the other charges either in Section 21 itself or in the Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 58 of the Bihar Finance Act. In our considered opinion sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of S~ction 21(1) read with Rule 13-A of the Rules did not make sub-clause ( 1) fully workable because the manner and extent of deduction relating to any other charges has c not been provided/prescribed by the State." (at paras 9- 12)
38. Similarly, the Madras High Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1993] 88 STC 289, struck down Rules 6A and 68 of the Tamil Nadu H General Sales Tax Rules as follows:- c ''. .. The eight principles are the criteria and the norms which every State legislation has to conform as per the decision of the apex Court which has been already adverted to by us supra. In addition thereto, we have also referred to at considerable length the particular reasons assigned by the apex Court while striking down section of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and rule 29(2) of the Rules made thereunder. The impugned rules 6-A and 6-B of the Rules, in our view, do not pass the above vital and essential test and the basic requirements laid down by the ratio of the decision of the apex Court in Gannon Dunkerley's case supra; . The impugned rules are squarely opposed to the ratio of the said decision and particularly the ratio laid down in conclusion Nos. 1, 2, 3, . · 6 and 7 of the decision in Gannon Dunkerley's case [1993] 88 STC 204 supra; and also reiterated by the apex Court in the second Builders Association of India case [1993] 88 STC 248 (SC); [1992] 2 MTCR 542. In the light of the above, we see no merit in the stand taken for the respondents relying upon the decisions reported in [1957] 8 STC 561 (SC) (A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala) and [1969] 23 STC 447 (Mad.) (Kumarasamy Pathar v. State of Madras) that the omission to exclude certain items relating to non-taxable turnovers is of no consequence and does not affect or undermine the validity of the impugned proceedings. Consequently, applying the ratio of the above decisions, we hereby strike down rules 6-A and 6-B as illegal and unconstitutional, besides being violative of sections 3 to 6, 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act and consequently unenforceable. The provisions of section 3-B merely levied the tax on COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS,' KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.] the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of the works contract. The assessment, determination of liability and recovery had to be under the provisions of the Act read with the relevant rules. In exercise of rule-· making power conferred under section 53(1) and (2)(bb), rules 6-A and 6-B came to be made and published. The ruies miserably failed to provide the procedure and principles for effectively determining the taxable turnover, after excluding the items of turnover relating to such works contract which could not be subjected to levy of tax by the State in exercise of its power of legislation under entry 64 of the State List. Rule 6 by its own operation had no application in the matter of determination of liability under section 3-B since it has been made applicable only in respect of determining the taxable turnover of a dealer under section 3, 3-A, 4 or 5. Consequently, with our decision above striking down rules 6-A and 6-B of the Rules, there is no proper machinery provisions to determine the taxable turnover for purposes of section 3- B. The provisions of section 3-B, therefore, in the absence of the necessary rules for enforcing the same . and determining the taxable turnover for the purposes of section 3-B is rendered dormant, ineffective and unenforceable. Such would be the positiQn till sufficient provisions are made either in the Act itself or in the rules by virtue of the rule-making power to ignite, activate and give life and force to section 3-B of the Act." (at paras 32, 33) c
39. And the Orissa High Court in Larsen & Turbo v. G State of Orissa, (2008) 012 VST 0031, held that machinery provisions cannot be provided by circulars and held that therefore the statute in question, being unworkable, assessments thereunder would be of no effect. c (2015] 8 S.C.R.
40. Finally, in para 31, the Delhi High Court holds:- ''The contention of the petitioners that the impugned notifications override the statutory provisions contained in Section 65(105), which defines the term "taxable service", Section 66, which it is claimed is a charging section, and Section 67, the valuation provisions of the Finance Act, 1994, has to be rejected. We have, as already state.d above, rejected the argument of the petitioners on bifurcation/vivisect and held that as per the provisions of Section 65(105)(zzq) and (zzzh), service tax is payable and chargeable on the service element of the contract for construction of industrial and commercial· complexes and contract for constructi.on of complexes as specified and in case of a composite contract, the service element should be bifurcated and ascertained and then taxed. The contention that the petitioners are paying sales tax or VAT on material in relation to execution of the contract under composite contracts for construction of industrial/commercial complexes and construction contracts as specified under Section 65(105)(zzq) and (zzzh) therefore fails. The contention that there was/is no valid levy or the charging section is not applicable to composite contracts under clauses (zzq) and (zzzh) of Section 65(105) stands rejected. But the petitioners have rightly submitted that only the service component can be brought to tax as per provisions of Section 67 which stipulates that value of taxable service is the "gross amount charged" by the service provider for such services provided or to b.e provided by him and not the value of the goods provided by customers of service provider and the service tax cannot be charged on the value of the goods used in the contract." COMMISSIONER, CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, KERALA v. M/S LARSEN & TOUBRO [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
41. We are afraid that there are several errors in this A paragraph. The High Court first correctly holds that in the case of composite works contracts, the service elements should be bifurcated, ascertained and then taxed. The finding that this has, in fact, been done by the Finance Act, 1994 Act is wholly incorrect as it ignores the second Gannon Dunkerley B decision of this Court. Further, the finding that Section 67 of the Finance Act, which speaks of "gross amount charged", only speaks of the "gross amount charged" for service provided and not the gross amount of the works contract as a whole from which various deductions have to be made.to arrive at C the service element in the said contract. We find therefore that this judgment is wholly incorrect in its conclusion that the Finance Act, 1994 contains both the charge and machinery for levy and assessment of service tax on indivisible works 0 contracts.
42. It remains to consider the argument of Shri Radhakrishnan that post 1994 all indivisible works contracts would be contrary to public policy, being hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and hit by Mcdowell's case.
43. We need only state that in view of our finding that the said Finance Act lays down no charge or machinery to levy and assess service tax on indivisible col)lposite works contracts, such argument must fail. This is also for the simple reasol) that there is no subterfuge in entering into composite works contracts containing elements both of transfer of property in goods as well as labour and services.
44. We have been informed by counsel for the revenue G that several exemption notifications have been granted qua service tax "levied" by the 1994 FinanceAct. We may only state that whichever judgments which are in appeal before us and have referred to and dealt with such notifications will have to be disregarded. Since the levy itself of service tax has been H A found to be non-existent, no question of any exemption would arise. With these observations, these appeals are disposed of.
45. We, therefore, allow all the appeals of the assessees B before us and dismiss all the appeals of the revenue. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals disposed of.