COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. versus MEHAR SINGH

22. Against the above background, we shall now examine E what is the nature of acquittal of the respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal, respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron chains, lathis, danda, stones etc. stopped a bus, rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to take the fare from one of their associates. Those who F intervened were beaten-up. They received injuries. The miscreants broke the side window panes of the bus by throwing stones. The complainant was also injured. This incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public order. The assault on the conductor was pre-planned and pre-meditated. The FIR was G registered under Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. )I' The order dated 30/01/2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC are concerned, the accused entered into a compromise with the complainant. H Hence, learned Magistrate acquitted respondent – Mehar Singh COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] – ,.. and others of the said offences. The order further indicates that so far as offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 of the IPC is concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. Learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused of the said offence. This acquittal can never be described as an acquittal on merits after a full fledged trial. Respondent – Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in the police force by portraying this acquittal as an honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion on merits of the case in this order. Respondent – Mehar Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the evidence. c

23. So far as respondent – Shani Kumar is concerned, the FIR lodged against him stated that he along with other accused abused and threatened the complainant's brother. They opened fire at him due to which he sustained bullet injuries. Offences 'j( under Sections 307, 504 and 506 of the IPC were registered against respondent – Shani Kumar and others. Order dated 14/ 5/2010 passed by the Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the injured person did not support the prosecution case. They were declared hostile. Hence, learned Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal. Use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter. For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on benefit of doubt in a serious case of this nature is bound to act as an impediment.

24. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushi/ Kumar. In that case, the respondent therein had appeared for recruitment as a constable in .Delhi Police Services. He was selected provisionally, but, his selection was subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of constable was not found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or [2013) 13 S.C.R. A acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304, Section 324 read with Section 34 and Section 324 of the IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. This Court disapproved of the Tribunal's view. It was observed that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the s important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State. This Court observed that though the candidate was provisionally selected, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint him on account of his antecedent record and this view taken by the appointing c authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. Whether the respondent was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question as to whether he should be appointed to the post. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. It was argued that Sushi/ Kumar must be distinguished from the facts of the instant case because the respondent therein had concealed the fact that a criminal case was registered against him, whereas, in the instant case there is no concealment. It is not possible for us to accept this E submission. The aspect of concealment was not considered in Sushi/ Kumar at all. This Court only concentrated on the desirability to appoint a person, against whom a criminal case is pending, to a disciplined force. Sushi/ Kumar cannot be restricted to cases where there is ccncealment of the fact by a F candidate that a criminal case was registered against him. When the point of concealment or otherwise and its effect was not argued before this Court, it cannot be said that in Sushi/ Kumar this Court wanted to restrict its observations to the cases where there is concealment of facts.

25. Reliance placed by the respondents on Dhaval Singh is misplaced. In Dhaval Singh, the respondent had not mentioned the fact that a criminal case was pending against him in the application form submitted by him on 21-27/8/1995 H seeking post of a constable. He was provisionally selected and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 459 SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] ·- 1- was interviewed pending verification of his character. Before any order of appointment could be issued in his favour, he, realizing the mistake, wrote a letter to the Deputy Commissioner of Police on 15/1111995 that a criminal case was pending against him and he had inadvertently not mentioned this fact in the application form. On the ground that the respondent had concealed a material fact, his candidature was cancelled on 20/11/1995. He was acquitted in the criminal case on 8/12/1995. On being so acquitted, he filed a representation before the Commissioner of Police which was turned down. He approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal set c aside the cancellation of candidature of the respondent and the rejection of his representation. Aggrieved by this, the Commissioner of Police approached this Court. This Court confirmed the Tribunal's order basically on the ground that the order of cancellation dated 20/11/1995 did not show that the .lr; information furnished by the respondent vide his letter dated 15/ 11/1995 was communicated to the Commissioner of Police. There was no indication in the record that the competent authority had a look at the letter. Therefore, the cancellation of candidature was without any proper application of mind and without taking into consideration all relevant materials. The Tribunal's order was upheld on the ground of non-application of mind by the Commissioner of Police to a vital fact. Besides, .A this Court also noted that pursuant to the Tribunal's order the respondent therein was already reinstated. This decision will have no application to the present case. Reliance on Ghurey Lal is also misplaced. There can be no debate over the observation made by this Court in that case that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty. These observations were made while dealing with a reversal of )i acquittal by the High Court. They are not relevant to the present case.

26. So far as respondent – Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to disputes. B They have to be encouraged also to reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation; But these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the Screening Committee m~y decline to take cognizance of a ,lo._ c compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be faulted for that. .._

27. The· respondents ~re trying to draw mileage from the fact that in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed their involvement ih a criminal case. We do not see D how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of the$e facts in the application/attestation form is an .essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that While deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in G similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee's decision is not ma/a fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.

28. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR 461 SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] -' f- great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if 8 he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a _) > possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, c has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision _of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is ma/a fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with even hand.

29. The Screening Committee's proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However, certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious offences have been recommended for . .,,. appointment by the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the Screening Committee which is constituted to A carry out the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people with doubtful background do not enter the police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but we cannot allow B that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents to rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the police force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds that it has done so. Public c interest demands an in-depth examination of this allegation at the highest level. Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps D forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing Order is strictly implemented.

30. Our attention is drawn to certain orders of this Court where, according to the respondents, special leave petitions filed by the State, arising out of similar fact situations, have E been dismissed. It is not necessary for us to state that in limine dismissal of special leave petition does not mean that this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any declaration of F law or a binding precedent. This submission is, therefore, rejected.

31. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of G Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents are not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force. does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the respondents' candidature. In the ~· – COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. MEHAR SINGH [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the respondents – Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals allowed.