Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. As far as the other part of alleged misuse relating to construction raised on the terrace of the premises is concerned, it was stated on behalf of the respondent that such construction had been raised by the tenant without obtaining the sanction of the lessee and consequently, the respondent had initiated action against the said tenants for their eviction therefrom.
14. What also weighed with the Judge is the fact that the first Show-Cause Notice issued to the petitioner was in regard C to alleged misuse of the basement from 30th July, 1983, the mezzanine floor from 20th June, 1990, and the terrace from 7th September, 1992, till 13th January, 2003. However, although, the first Show-Cause Notice was issued fo the respondent on 8th August, 1983, regarding misuse of the basement and a D reply was also submitted by the respondent on 10th August, · 1983, no decision was taken by the ODA on the said Show- Cause Notice. On the other hand, in June 1990, upon an alleged inspection by the ODA, another Show-Cause Notice was issued to the respondent on 28th June, 1990, only in respect of the alleged misuse of the basement arid the mezzanine floor. Despite a reply being sent, again no action was taken by the DOA except for issuing Final Notices to the respondent on 3rd September, 1990 and 11th December, 1990, requiring him to stop violation of the conditions of the lease deed, failing which it would be terminated. The respondent sent a reply to the first Final Notice on 5th November, 1990, but again no decision was taken on any of the two Final Notices which had been sent to the respondent. Periodical inspection was thereafter carried out, but no action G was at all taken by the ODA and its authorities against the respondent for alleged misuse of the premises in question.
15. Ultimately, on a question of limitation being raised in respect of the demand of misuser charges, the Division Bench observed that where no period of limitation is prescribed, action has to be taken by the authorities within a reasonable. period of time, but by no stretch of imagination, could it be said that after a lapse of almost 25 years that the ODA had not acted arbitrarily or at least unfairly in so far as the respondent is concerned. In addition, the respondent was never informed by the DOA that he was required to pay any misuser charges. On the basis of such reasoning, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge.
16. Mr. Sharan submitted that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had misconstrued the principles relating to limitation in holding that the DOA had acted arbitrarily and unfairly in so far as the respondent was concerned, and, in any event, the respondent was never informed by the ODA that he was required to pay misuse charges.
17. Mr. Sharan urged that both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court failed to consider the core issue relating to the user of the premises in keeping with paragraph 13 of the lease deed executed by the DOA in favour of the respondent on 5th April, 1972. In this regard Mr. Sharan referred to paragraph 13 of the lease deed which reads as follows: "13) The lessee shall not without the written consent of the lessor carry on or permit to be carried on, on the plot or in any building thereon any trade or business of manufacture which in opinion of the lessor may be noisy, noxious or offensive or the same or permit the same to be used for any purpose other than those specified or do or suffer to be done therein any act or thing whatsoever which in the opinion of the lessor may be a nuisance annoyance or · disturbance to the lessor or the person living in the neighbourhood. Provided that, if the lessee is desirous of using the said plot or ttie building thereon for a purpose other than those DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAM PRAKASH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] specified the lessor may allow such Change or user on 'such terms and conditions. including payment of additional premium and additional rent, as the lessor may in his absolute discretion determine."
18. Mr. Sharan submitted that having regard to the above, the respondent was not entitled to use the demised premises in a manner which was; contrary to paragraph 13 of the lease deed. It was contended that the respondent was carrying on a business in the demised premises in respect whereof there was no feed back whatsoever from the lessee. Mr. Sharan urged that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17th August, C 2007, could not be sustained and the same was liable to be set aside, along with the order of the Division Bench impugned in the Special Leave Petition.
19. Appearing in person, the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that after the Show-Cause Notices were issued no action whatsoever was taken on the basis thereof and all of a sudden the exorbitant misuser charges, amounting to Rs. 1,78,85,001/- was demanded from him. Professor Ram Prakash suemitted that from 1983, nothing had been done by the DOA on the basis of the Show-Cause Notices which had been issued, to which the respondent had promptly replied stating that the construction on the terrace had been effected by the tenants and not by him and in respect whereof proper proceedings had been initiated for their eviction from the F premises. The respondent submitted that it is only under severe compulsion, that he had to move the Writ Court for relief in relation to the demand of misuser charges of Rs. 1,78,85,001/ -. The respondent submitted that for the last 25 years he had been made to face various problems and uncertainties, but that it was entirely unjustified on the part of the DOA to raise the G claim of alleged misuser charges of Rs. 1, 78,85,001 /-. The respondent submitted that after a long period of'25 years, a quietus was required to be given to the ,matter.
20. The respondent submitted that after issuance of Show- Cause Notices, the DDA should have taken further steps in the matter within a reasonable time and that too relating to misuser chargers where he was not at fault. The respondent submitted that he had taken prompt steps not only to reply to the Show- Cause Notices issued to him, but to initiate action against the tenants who had used the property in a manner which was different from the purpose for which the property had been let out. The respondent submitted that this was a case where both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench decided the matter in the crucible of events peculiar to the facts of this case, c having particular regard to the length of the period for which the misuser charges had been demanded.
21. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the DDA and by the respondent appearing in-person, and also having considered the reasoning of the learned Single Judge· and the Division Bench in repudiating the claim of misuser charges by the DOA, we are unable to convince ourselves that the decisions rendered by the High Court, both by the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench, require any interference in these proceedings. The materials on record will show that the respondent took prompt steps against the tenants for their transgression. During arguments it was indicated that, in fact, one of the tenants had already vacated the portion of the premises occupied by him. It is also very clear that after issuing the Show-Cause Notices, the petitioner did not take any follow-up action thereupon. Instead, after a lapse of 25 years, the petitioner set up a claim on account of charges for the entire period. It would be inequitable to allow the petitioner which had sat over the matter to take advantage of its inaction in claiming misuser charges.
22. Even as to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that there was no limitation prescribed for making a demand of arrear charges, the Division Bench relying on the decision of this Court in State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. ((2007) 11 DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAM PRAKASH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] sec 363), observed that even where no period of limitation is indicated, the statutory Authority is required to act within a reasonable time. In our view, what would construe a reasonable time, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, but it would not be fair to the respondent if such demand is allowed to be raised after 25 years, on account of the inaction of the petitioner.
23. We do not, therefore, find any reason to interfere with the judgment either of the learned Single Judge or of the Division Bench of the High Court and the Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
24. There will, however, be no order as to costs. B.B.B. Special Leave Petition dismissed.