[2008] t1 S.C.R. 801 -y DINESH SINGH v. STATE OF U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2001) AUGUST 4, 2008 ..y [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] Pena/Code, 1860-ss. 96-101, 103ands. 304 (Part/)
– Right of private defence -Availability and extent of- Com- c mencement and continuance of right – Stated – On facts, ac- cused allegedly caused fire arm injury to deceased resulting in his death – High Court convicted accused u/s. 304 (Part I}, though upheld acquittal of other co-accused – Claim of right of private defence and that the other co-accused acquitted on D the self same evidence – On appeal, held: It is established … ,,..
beyond doubt from the evidence on record that deceased died due to gunshot injury caused by accused – There was no rea- sonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to accused nor s. 103 attracted – High Court analysed in detail that case of accused stood on a different footing and evidence was in- adequate with regard to the other co-accused – Thus, order of r-
High Court does not call for interference. Maxims – Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus – Meaning and applicability of – Stated. ~ ). On the fateful day, the appellant allegedly fired upon
J. Other accused were also present. J sustained fire-arm injury on his chest and died on the spot. The appellant along with other accused were charged for offences pun- ishable u/s. 147, 148, 302, 325, 323 and 149 IPC. However, G the trial court acquitted all of them. In appeal, the High Court upheld the acquittal of the accused persons except
the appellant. It convicted the appellant for offence pun- ishable u/s. 304 Part (II) IPC. Hence the present appeal. r Appellant contended that the trial court rightly no- ticed that the appellant and the co-accused exercised right of private defence; and that the evidence was found in-
adequate for rest of the accused persons, thus, the High Court could not have held the appellant guilty. Dismissing the appeal, the .Court 't HELD: 1.1 A plea of right of private defence cannot
be based on surmises and speculation. While consider- ing whether the right of private defence is available to an r c accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In or- der to find whether the right of private defence is avail- able·to an accused, the entire incident must be examined
with care and viewed in its proper setting .. To claim a right D of private defence extending to voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were drcum- stances giving rise to reasonable gr~unds for apprehend-
~ ,._ ing that either death .or grievous hurt would ·be caused to him. The burden is on the accused to show that he 'had a E right of private defence which extended to causing of death. The right commences, as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body aris~s from an at- tempt, or threat, to commit the offence, although the of- .,,, fence may not have been committed but not until there is that reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as
F the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body continues. As soon as the cause for reasonable appre- ·-\ :- hension disappears and the threat has either been de- stroyed or has been put to route, there. can be no occa-
sion to exercise the right of private defence. [Paras 5 .and G 6] [809 F-G, 810 B-E] 1.2 The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable d·oubt. It ·is
'ff' enough for him to show as in a civil ·case thatthe prepon- derance of probabilities is in favour ·of his plea. In order to find whether right of private defence is available or not, A the injuries received by the accused, the imminence of
threat to his safety, the injuries caused by accused and the circumstances whether accused had time to have re- course to public authorities are all relevant factors to be considered. [Paras 4 and 7] (809 E, 810 F]
1.3 The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. The right of private defence is essentially a de- fensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e.
the tPC, available only when the circumstances clearly C justify it. It should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a vindictive, aggressive or retributive pur- pose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlawful aggression and not as retalia-
tory measure. While providing for exercise of the right, D care has been taken in IPC not to provide and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend · no longer survived. [Paras 9 and 11] (811 F, 812 D-F]
Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration AIR 1968 SC 702; State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima AIR 1975 SC 1478; State of UP v. Mohd. Musheer Khan AIR 1977 SC 2226; Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 577; Salim Zia v. State of U. P AIR 1979 SC 391; Jai Dev. v. State of Punjab ._
AIR 1963 SC 612; Biran Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 87; Wassan Singh v. State of Punjab 1996 ( 1) SCC 458; Sekar alias Raja Sekharan v. State represented by Inspector of Po- lice, TN. 2002 (8) SCC 354; Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1991 SC 1316; Vidhya Singh v. State of MP AIR 1971
SC 1857; V Subrarnani and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu 2005 (1 O) sec 358 – relied on. Russel on Crime, 11th Edition Volume Ip 49- referred to. 2.1 With regard to the effect of acquittal on the self H
y-..; A same evidence, it is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or mate- rial particular would not ruin it .from the beginning to end .. The maxim "fa/sus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no appli-
cation in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as B liar. The maxim has not received general acceptance nor come to occupy trye status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases tes- timony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disre-
garded. The doctrine merely involves the question of c weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not called 'a mandatory rule .. , of evidence'. [Para 14] [813-H, 814-A-C]
Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366 – relied on. 2.2 The doctrine "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is a dangerous one especially in ·1ndia for if a whole body of
)A( ….. the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be E feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving em-
broidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be in-
F sufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a wit- ness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evi- dence has to be sifted with care. The dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a wit-
G ness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellish- ment. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from false- hood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up,
and in the process of separation an absolutely new case H has to be reconstructed by divorcing ess.ential details •Y presented by the prosecution completely from the con-
text and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evi- dence in toto. [Para 15] [814 D-H, 815 A] Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya 8
·Pradesh 1972 (3) SCC 751; Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277; Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 15; Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab AIR 1975 SC 1962; State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. AIR 1981 SC 1390 – relied on.
c 2.3 Normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental dis- position such as shock and horror at the time of occur-
rence and those are always there however honest and D truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are those … y which are not normal, and not expected of a normal per- son. Courts have to label the category to which a discrep- ancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do
not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material dis- crepancies do so. [Para 15] [815-B-C] Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. JT 2002 (4) SC 186; Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa 2002
(7) Supreme 276; Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh 2003 (2) sec 661 – relied on. .._ ,.. 3. In the instant case, the High Court analysed the evidence in great detail as regard the claim of right of pri- vate defence by the appellant. It observed that the
appellant's case stood on different footing. He is alleged to have fired upon, J, who sustained fire-arm injury on G his chest and died on the spot. No person on the pros- –T ecution side is shown to be armed with any weapon.
Therefore, there could not be any reasonable apprehen- sion of death or of grievous hurt at their hands nor the case attract s. 103 IPC. The fact that appellant fired from SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS
y h.i$ ·gun :9n_ J, is estaqlished ·beyond dou_bt from the evi- ·dence ,on record. Thus, the evidence on record leaves no ·room fo·r doubt that .J died due to a gu~shot injury and
the same was caused by accused-appellant. The High 'Court analysed in detail as to how the case of appellant '.8 ·stood· on a differe.nt footing arid directed his conviction, though in the-case of co-accused, the evidence was found
-t to be inadequate. There is no infirmity in the conclusions '.arrived atby the High Court to warrant interference. [Paras 13and1"6]'[812 G-H,.813-A,H] c Case Law Reference AIR 1968 :sc 702
Reli_ed on. Para 3 AIR _197 5 'SC ~ 478 Relied on. _Para 3 AIR 1977 SC 2226 Relied on. Para 3 'D AIR t97.9 .SC 577 Relied on. Para 3 AIR -1979 ·SC 391 – ·Relied on. Para 3 · AIR 1963.SC 612
Relied- on. – Para 6 -E AIR 1975 SC 87 Relied on. Para 7 1996 (1) sec 458 Relied on. Para 7 :2002 (8) sec 354 Relied on .. Para 7 AIR 1991 SC 1316 Relied on. Para 8 AIR 1971 SC 1857
Relied on. Para 9 2oos (1 O) sec 358 Relied on. Para 12 AIR 1957 SC 366 Relied on. Para 14 1912 (3) sec 751 Relied on. Para 15 AIR 1965 SC 277 Relied on. Para 15 AIR 1954SC 15 Relied on.
Para 15 AIR 1975 SC 1962 Relied on. Para 15 AIR 1981 ·sc 1390 Relied on. Para 15 JT 2002 (4) SC 186 2002 (7) Supreme 276
2003 (2) sec 661 Relied on. Para 15 Relied on. 'Para 15 Relied on. Para 15 CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 544 of 2001 From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.12.2000 of
the High Court of Allahabad in GovernmentAppeal No. 1709 of R.D. Upadhyay for the Appellant. M. Yunus Malik, Fuzail Khan and Anil Kumar Jha for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court allowing the Govern- ment Appeal. In the said appeal challenge was to the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karvi, directing acquit- tal of the respondents-the accused 1 to 10 of the charged of- fences relatableto Sections 147,148,302, 325, 323 and 149 of E the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The High Court while upholding the acquittal of the rest of the accused persons found the evidence cogent and credible so far as the present appellant is concerned and directed conviction for offence pun- ishable under Section 304Part11 IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court had rightly noticed that the appellant and the co-accused exercised right of private defence and, therefore, the High Court could not have held the appellant guilty. It is also submitted that when the evidence was found inadequate for rest of the accused persons, appellant should not have been convicted.
3. First question which needs to be considered is the al- leged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC pro- vides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of H v~
the right of private defence. The Section does not define the "l expression 'right of private defence'. It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right. Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legiti- mately acted in the exercise of the right of private defence is a B question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a t
…. question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that c he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court can consider it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from the material 011 record. Under D _Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evi- dence Act'), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not )I(
possible for the Court to presume the truth of the plea of self- defence. The Court shall presume the absence of such circum- •"f ·E stances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by elic- iting necessary facts from the witnesses examined for the pros- ecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private de- fence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can es- tablish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from F. the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecu- tion ~vidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying G the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further rea- sonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The bur- den of establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance
H of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material • ~-)I on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Delhi Administration A (AIR 1968 SC 702), State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (AIR 1975 SC 1478), State of UP v. Mohd. Musheer Khan (AIR 1977
SC 2246), and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections 100 to 101 define the extent of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private de- s fence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Sec- tion 100 to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted observation of this Court in Salim Zia v. . State of UP (AIR 1979 SC 391 ), runs as follows:
c "It is true that the burden on an accused person to establish the plea of self-defence is not as onerous as the one which lies on the prosecution and that, while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
the accused need not establish the plea to the hilt and may discharge his onus by establishing a mere preponderance ·of probabilities either by laying basis for that plea in the cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses or by adducing defence evidence." 4. The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is· enough for him to show as in a civil case that the preponderance of prob- abilities is in favour of his plea.
5. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, it is not relevant whether he may have a chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In order to find whether the right of private defence is available to an accused, the entire incident must be G examined with care arid viewed in its proper setting. Section 97 deals with the subject matter of right of private defence. The plea of right comprises the body or property (i) of the person exercising the right; or (ii) of any other person; and the right may be exercised in the case of any offence against the body, and in a:to·
SUPREME COLI.RT REPORTS [2008] 11 S, C .. R. A the.case-of offences oftheft, robbery, mischief or criminal tres- pass, and.attempts at such offences in relation to.property. Sec.,. tion 99.lays down the.limits of the right of private defence. Sec- tio,ns, 9-6,and, 98 give. a. right of private defence· against certain offences::and:acts. Theright given under Sections.96.to 98.and. e: 100;to., 1
.. Q6 is, controlled by Section 99. To claim a, right of, pri- vate. defence-. extending .. to voluntary causing. of death, the ac-. cused; must show. that'there:were circumstances giving rise to reasonable grounds for apprehending:thateither death or,griev~ ous,,tmrtwould.be.caused to.him. The· burden is.on.the;accused. C; to,showthat he-had a right of private defence which extended.to causing· of death: Sections 100 and 101, !PC define· the limit and:extent·of right of private defence.
6: Sections. 102 and 105, IPC deal with commencement and:continuanceof1he.right of private d.efence·ofbody and prop.,. Qr erty respectively. The right commences, as soon as a reason- ab1ecapprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt, · or threat, to commit the offence, although the offence may not have been committed but not until there is that-reasonable ap- prehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable appre- E hension of the danger to the body continues. In Jai Dev. v. State ofPunjab (AIR 1963 SC612), it was observed that as soon as the cause for reasonable apprehension disappears and the
threat has either been.destroyed or has been put to route, there can be no occasion to exercise the right of private defence, T In order to find whether right of private defence is avail- able or not, the injuries· received by the accused; the imminence of threat-to his safety, the injuries caused· by the· accused and the· circumstances whether the accused had time to have re- course to public authorities are all relevant factors to be consid- G ered. Similar view was expressed by this Court in Biran Singh v. State. of Bihar: (AIR 1975 SC 87). (See: Wassan Singf1 v. State.of Punjab (1996) 1 SCG 458., Sekar alias Raja Se.kharan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, TN. (2002 (8) SCC 354}. … _ ')( 8. As noted in Butta Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1991 SC 1316), a person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of_injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In mo-
ments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is ·often ., . difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of private-defence commences, as soon as the threat c becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmati-
cally viewed and not with high-powered spectacles or micro- scopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of D the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human re- action and conduct, where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable appre,.. E hension has disappeared, the plea of right of private'.'"defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is ac- ceptable. It is essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact. 9. The right of self-defence is a very valuable right, serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. (See Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P (AIR 1971 SC 1857). Situations have to be judged from the subjective point of view of the ac- cused concerned in the surrounding excitement and confusion of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and not by G any microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the ques- tion as to whether more force than was necessary was used in -it
the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be inappro- priate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached objec- tivity which would be so natural in a Court room, or that which A would seem absolutely necessary to a perfectly cool bystander. y …… ·
The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to him- self cannot be expected to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude of only that much which is re- quired in the thinking of a man in ordinary times or under normal B circumstances.
10. In the illuminating words of Russel (Russel on Crime, –+ … 11th Edition Volume I at page 49): ." …. a man is justified in resisting by force anyone who c manifestly intends and endeavours by violence or surpris~
to commit a known felony against either his person, habitation or property. In these cases, he is not obliged to retreat, and may not merely resist the attack where he stands but may indeed pursue. his adversary until the
danger is ended and if in a conflict between them he happens to kill his attacker, such killing is justifiable." 11. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right circumscribed by the governing statute i.e. the IPC, avail- able only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It should not E be allowed to be pleaded or availed as a pretext for a v~ndic- tive, aggressive or retributive purpose of offence. It is a right of defence, not of retribution, expected to repel unlavvful aggres- sion and not as retaliatory measure. While providing for exer- cise of the right, care has been taken in IPC not to provide and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may be pre-
,,.. tence for k.illing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive, particularly when the need to defend no longer survived. . 12. The above position was highlighted in V Subramani
G and Anr v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (10) SCC 358). 13. So far as the claim of right of private defence is con- cerned, it is to be noted that the High Court analys~d the evi- dence in great detail and observed that the appellant's case stood on different footing. He is alleged to have tired upon, ~y Juguntha, who sustained fire-arm injury on his chest and died A -l on the spot. No person on the prosecution side is shown to be armed with any weapon. Therefore, there could not be any rea- sonable apprehension of death or of grievous hurt at their hands nor the case attract Section 103 IPC. The fact that appellant fired from his gun on Jugntha, is established beyond doubt from -t
the evidence on record. P.W.1, Hari Mohan, who is wholly an independent witness, has categorically stated in his statement before the trial court that it was accused Dinesh Singh who fired upon Juguntha, which struck on his chest and he fell down and died. The incident occurred in broad-day light. Hari Mohan him- c self sustained injuries and, therefore, his presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted. This witness had no animos- ity against the appellant nor had any affinity with the complain- ant party. His statement is also corroborated by medical evi- dence brought on record. Anurudh, P.W.2 is the other witness to D depose that it was the accused-respondent Dinesh Singh who … .,..
fired from his gun upon Juguntha. This fact is also mentioned in the first information report which was lodged promptly. Dr. M.L. Verma, PW 6 who conducted autopsy on the dead body of
Juguntha found only one gutter shaped gunshot wound on the deceased and has stated that injury sustained was the cause of death and the same was sufficient to cause death in the ordi- nary course of nature. He also categorically stated that the said injury could not be caused by a hand granade. We have also examined the post-mortem report and have no doubt in our mind that the said injury was a gun shot injury in as much as the pal- lets entered on the right lateral side of chest and then made exit from medial left side chest fracturing fourth, fifth ribs with ster- num into pieces and causing lacerations in both the lungs and heart. The direction of wound was also from right to left. The evidence on record thus leaves no room for doubt that Juguntha G died due to a gunshot injury ~nd the same was caused by ac- cused-appellant Dinesh Singh.
-.,, 14. So far as the effect of acquittal on the self same evi- dence is concerned, it is the duty of Court to separate grain A from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or material par- ticular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance B nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circum- C stances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 366).
15. The doctrine is a dangerous one especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because D witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroi- dery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is wor- E thy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted .with care. The aforesaid . F dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellish- ment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1972 (3) SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir and Ors.
G v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, sepa- rate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain. and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separa- tion an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorc- t
r r …,.y ing essential details presented by the prosecution completely A from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 15) and Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab. (AIR 1975 SC 1962). As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. (AIR 1981 SC 1390), normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and hor- ror at the time of occurrence and those are always there how- c ever honest and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepan- cies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a nor- mal person. Courts have to label the category to which a dis- crepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material discrep- ancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in
y.. Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. (JT 2002 (4) SC 186), Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa (2002 (7) Supreme 276) and Rizan and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2003 (2) sec 661). 16. The High Court has also analysed in detail as to how the case of appellant stood on a different footing and has di- rected his conviction, though in the case of co-accused, the evi- dence was found to be inadequate. We find no infirmity in the conclusions arrived at by the High Court to warrant interference. Appeal fails, hence dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.