Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
81. Appellants have urged that the need for Respondent No. 3 to personally take the first step under Section 91 is part of the minimal safeguards that exist under the MMC Act and must be adhered to. We feel that the purpose behind the provision of ensuring that the highest- 24 (1980) 1 SCC 403. ranking officer in the municipal corporation is privy and amenable to the acquisition proceedings is achieved by his participation and sign off on the action, regardless of whether he personally sends the application.
82. In this respect, the holding of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. v. The Collector & Ors.25 becomes relevant. The High Court was dealing with the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, and efforts made by the Pune Municipal Corporation to set up a “Forest Garden”. One of the several alleged defects in the process which arose for consideration before the High Court pertained to the fact that the Assistant Commissioner, instead of the Commissioner, had made the application for commencing proceedings under the LAA. It was urged that the Commissioner was the designated authority under Section 78 of the Act.26 Rejecting this argument, the Division Bench observed: “24. We do not find any substance in the contention of the petitioner that it is not the Assistant Municipal Commissioner but the Commissioner himself who should have applied for initiation of proceedings under the said Act…Therefore, even if contention of the petitioner is accepted that the actual application sent to the Collector seeking to initiate proceedings under the said Act for compulsory acquisition of the lands in issue was signed and sent by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner and not by the Commissioner of the said Corporation himself, we do not find that this will constitute a gross illegality in the initiation of the acquisition proceeding in issue. In our view, once the proposal is shown to have been accepted by the Commissioner, processed by the Commissioner and sent to the Collector in terms of the directions of the 25 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1067. 26 78. Procedure when immovable property cannot be acquired by agreement (1) Whenever the Commissioner is unable under section 77 to acquire by agreement any immovable property or any easement affecting any immovable property vested in the Corporation or whenever any immovable property or any easement affecting any immovable property vested in the Corporation is required for the purposes of this Act, the1 [State] Government may in its discretion, upon the application of the Commissioner, made with the approval of the Standing Committee and subject to the other provisions of this Act, order proceedings to be taken for acquiring the same on behalf of the Corporation, as if such property or easement were land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894[I of 1804]. DR. ABRAHAM PATANI OF MUMBAI & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [SURYA KANT, J,] Commissioner, only because the same was formally signed not by the Commissioner himself but by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner, in law, would not be so vital to warrant vitiating of the entire acquisition proceeding. In our view, if it is demonstrated that substantial compliance is done with the statutory requirement of Section 78 of the said Act, no fault can be found with these acquisition proceedings, on this ground as claimed by the petitioners.” (Emphasis Applied)
83. The High Court, thus, rebutted this particular contention raised by the Petitioners. However, the Petitioners’ Writ Petitions were allowed overall due to certain other discrepancies that were discovered in the setting up of the Forest Garden. The Pune Municipal Corporation filed an SLP against this judgment assailing the High Court’s final conclusion which is unrelated to the specific issue we are concerned with in the present case. Notwithstanding the fact that the matter remains sub- judice on other facets of the case, we find some prima facie merit in the reasoning by the Bombay High Court for repelling the argument that only the Commissioner may submit the application for reservation and acquisition of land under the LAA.
84. As submitted by learned Counsel, Mr. Godbole, Respondent No. 3’s seal of approval was granted for the actions taken under Section 91 of the MMC Act. We, therefore, hold that once the proposal has been approved by the Commissioner, the lack of a formal signature from him on the eventual application is not a serious defect and cannot annul the entire process that followed.
85. Based on the discussion above, we are satisfied that Section 91 of the MMC Act has been substantially complied with in this case. We now turn our attention to the second contention by the Appellants on the issue of compliance with procedural requirements, which is the purported absence of an order by the State Govt. for initiating land acquisition proceedings under the LAA.
86. To ascertain the veracity of the Appellants’ claim we may refer once again to the final award of compensation passed on 26.11.2007. Under the sub-heading “Introduction” under the main heading “Reasons for the Award”, it is noted that the Office of the Chief Engineer sent the application to the Collector 05.02.1999 for procuring the land in question. Following the application, it was recorded that: “The Addl. collector M.S.D. along with his letter dt. 21/7/99 sent the said proposal to this office directing this office to process acquisition proceeding.”
87. We are, therefore, unable to spot the infirmity in the actions of Respondent authorities. The Additional Collector, acting on behalf of Respondent No. 1, forwarded the proposal from Respondent No. 2 to the SLAO for further processing and commencement of the procedure under the LAA. There is no indication in Section 91 of the MMC Act that the order of the State Govt. to carry out the land acquisition is supposed to be in a specific form. Keeping this in mind, we have no hesitation in taking a pragmatic and practical approach to this requirement. It is enough that the relevant office in Respondent No. 1 accepted the application from Respondent No. 2 and conveyed it to the authorities empowered to act under the LAA. The direction from the Additional Collector for the SLAO to process the request from Respondent No. 2 would be sufficient compliance with Section 91 of the MMC Act.
88. In any case, Respondent Nos. 10 & 11, in performing the steps under the LAA to procure the land, acted for and on behalf of Respondent No. 1. Thus, it is incontrovertible that Respondent No. 1 was fully on board with the initiative to acquire Appellants’ land for constructing the link road. The fact that all the steps under the LAA were carried out is sufficient evidence that there has been adherence to the spirit and scheme of Section 91 regarding Respondent No. 1 being involved and sanctioning the actions of Respondent Nos. 10 & 11.
89. In summation, we conclude that the objections by the Appellants on the grounds of non-adherence to procedural requirements under Section 91 of the MMC Act are without merit. There has been substantial compliance with the provision and the objective underlying it has been honoured. C.3. Public Interest v. Private Interest
90. It is important for us to take stock of the nature of the present dispute. The Appellants are private citizens who have valid title and ownership over the land in question. Without doubt, their personal and private rights are of great importance. In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, the rights of an individual carry immense importance and are the foundational blocks on which our legal, social, and political milieu thrives. Under no circumstances should the rights of individual DR. ABRAHAM PATANI OF MUMBAI & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [SURYA KANT, J,] citizens be trodden upon arbitrarily and any curtailment of them must be scrutinized with utmost care.
91. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that in several situations, the needs of the many must outweigh that of the few. We say so not with any fervour nor as a mantra, but as a solemn acknowledgment of the realities of modern life. The question of what constitutes “public interest” has been contemplated upon multiple times and the history of this Court is full of musings by different benches on the exact contours of this phrase in the context of various situations and statutes.
92. In Manimegalai v. Special Tehsildar,27 it was surmised that: “14. Similarly, public purpose is not capable of precise definition. Each case has to be considered in the light of the purpose for which acquisition is sought for. It is to serve the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual. Public purpose broadly speaking would include the purpose in which the general interest of the society as opposed to the particular interest of the individual is directly and vitally concerned. Generally, the executive would be the best judge to determine whether or not the impugned purpose is a public purpose. Yet it is not beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny. The interest of a Section of the society may be public purpose when it is benefitted by the acquisition. The acquisition in question must indicate that it was towards the welfare of the people and not to benefit a private individual or group of individuals joined collectively. Therefore, acquisition for anything which is not for a public purpose cannot be done compulsorily.”
93. In B.P. Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.28 the nebulous nature of phrases such as “public interest” or “in the interest of the general public” was commented upon, with the Court stating: “15. …The phrase “in the interest of the general public” has come to be considered in several decisions and it has been held that it would comprise within its ambit interests like public health and morals, economic stability, stability of the country, 27 (2018) 13 SCC 491. 28 (2003) 7 SCC 309. equitable distribution of essential commodities at fair prices for maintenance of purity in public life, prevention of fraud and similar considerations…”
94. This point was emphasized in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr.29 as well, which held that no strict definition for “public interest” existed: “22. The expression “public interest” has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression “public interest” must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression “public interest”, like “public purpose”, is not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs. It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake.”
95. It is unnecessary to belabour the point. The proposition is simply that the notion of public interest will necessarily reflect the specificities of the situation at hand. In the present case, the public interest which has been emphasized upon by Respondents is the urgent need for the creation of a connecting road through the Appellants’ property. The need stems from the traffic congestion caused on the route from the Mahakali Caves to the Central MIDC. The lack of a direct linkage requires detours to be taken that significantly increase commuting time and cause inconvenience to the general public.
96. When the public interest is so clearly articulated and is an urgent and pressing exigency, private interests must give way to the extent required. This Court has acknowledged this before, such as in Ramilila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors.30: “119. The right to freedom in a democracy has to be exercised in terms of Article 19(1)(a) subject to public order. Public order and public tranquillity is a function of the State which duty is discharged by the State in the larger public interest. The 29 (2012) 13 SCC 61. 30 (2012) 5 SCC 1. DR. ABRAHAM PATANI OF MUMBAI & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [SURYA KANT, J,] private right is to be waived against public interest. The action of the State and the Police was in conformity with law. As a large number of persons were to assemble on the morning of 5th June, 2011 and considering the other attendant circumstances seen in light of the inputs received from the intelligence agencies, the permission was revoked and the persons attending the camp at Ramlila Maidan were dispersed.” (Emphasis Applied)
97. In K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka,31 the origins of “Eminent Domain” were traced and the ethos behind acquisition of land by the government for public good was discussed. The Court elaborated on this in the following terms: “134. Hugo Grotius is credited with the invention of the term “eminent domain” (jus or dominium eminens) which implies that public rights always overlap with private rights to property, and in the case of public utility, public rights take precedence. Grotius sets two conditions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain: the first requisite is public advantage and then compensation from the public funds be made, if possible, to the one who has lost his right. Application of the above principle varies from countries to countries. Germany, America and Australian Constitutions bar uncompensated takings. Canada’s constitution, however, does not contain the equivalent of the taking clause, and eminent domain is solely a matter of statute law, the same is the situation in United Kingdom which does not have a written constitution as also now in India after the 44th Constitutional Amendment.” (Emphasis Applied)
98. With these considerations in mind, we deem the present case to be an appropriate instance where public interest must have paramountcy over private interest. We emphasize once again before parting that the rights of the individual must only be watered down when the necessary circumstances demanding such a drastic measure exist.
99. Learned Counsel, Mr. Godbole, has candidly explained to us that the plan for the road through the Appellants’ property is mapped in 31 (2011) 9 SCC 1. such a way that it will not disturb the buildings that have been constructed on it. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Divan, has fairly admitted that this is indeed the case. Given this, we consider that a suitable middle ground has been arrived at which is practical and optimally balances the competing interests between the parties. D. CONCLUSION
100. For the reasons detailed above, we find that Respondent No. 2 validly exercised its powers under the MMC Act to direct the acquisition of the Appellants’ land. The argument by the Appellants that the MRTP Act maintains supremacy over the MMC Act is not the correct position of law, in our opinion, and the two statutes exist side-by-side with some degree of overlap. The powers under the MMC Act remain intact even in cases where they cover a subject that is also provided for in the MRTP Act.
101. The procedure contemplated under Section 91 of the MMC Act to commence proceedings under the LAA for procuring land was substantially complied with. The part of the provision relied upon by the Appellants is directory in nature and requires substantial compliance rather than strict compliance. The objections raised by the Appellants regarding certain aspects of the process are unfounded as no prejudice was caused to them, and the purported defects are not nearly grave enough to cause an annulment of the entire process.
102. In light of these findings, we do not consider it necessary to comment upon the submissions by learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Naphade, regarding the bona fides of the Appellants and their entitlement to relief on the grounds of equity. Considering the other issues which have been answered in favour of the Respondents, this point becomes moot.
103. In the final outcome, we dismiss the present appeal as being devoid of merit.
104. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of. Ankit Gyan and Anurag Bhaskar Appeal dismissed. (Assisted by : Rahul Kumar, LCRA) DR. ABRAHAM PATANI OF MUMBAI & ANR. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [SURYA KANT, J,]