Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Before coming to the conclusion, we would like to refer to the relevant provisions of the Assam Urban Area Rent ControlAct, 1972.
11. The expression "landlord" has been defined in Section 2(c) of the RentActwhich reads as under:- "(c) Landlord" means any person who is, for the time being receiving, or entitled to receive rent in respect of any house whether on his own account, or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person; and includes, in respect of his subtenant, a tenant who has sub-let any house and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord."
12. Section 5 of the Act creates a bar against the passing or execution of a decree or order for ejection. Section c 5 reads as under:- "5. ( 1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy: c Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house:- (a) Where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provisions of clause {m), clause (o) or clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or to the spirit of the aforesaid clause in areas where the said Act does not apply, or (b) Where the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance of an annoyance to the occupiers of the adjoining or neighbouring houses, or (c) Where the house is bonafide required by the landlord either for purposes of repairs or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house is held, or whether the landlord can show any other cause which may be deemed satisfactory by the Court, or ( d) Where the tenant sublets the house or any part thereof or otherwise transfers his interest in the house or any part thereof without permission in writing from the landlord, or (e) Where the tenant has not paid the rent lawfully due from him in respect of the house within a fortnight of its falling due, or (f) Where the tenant has built, acquired or been allotted a suitable residence."
13. From the definition of 'landlord', it is clear that the DR. AMBICA PRASAD v. MD. ALAM AND ANOTHER 103 [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] definition is couched in a very wide language, according to A which not only the owner but also any person receiving rent, whether on his own account or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person, is also the landlord.
14. However, for the purpose of eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal need or reasonable requirement, one must show that he is the owner of the building.
15. A similar question came for consideration before c a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of M.M. Quasim vs. Manohar Lal Sharma & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 113. The matter related to the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. In the Bihar Rent Act, the definition of expression 'landlord' is similar as that of Assam Rent Act. Further the ground for eviction of personal necessity is also similar to that of the Assam Act. Considering these provisions, this Court held:- "14 … Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision, enacted in Section 11 (1 )(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression "landlord" in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11 ( 1 )(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression "landlord" for the purpose of Section 11 (1 )(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against c (2015] 4 S.C.R. the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of clause (c) of sub- section (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to .remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11 (1 )( c) the expression 'landlord' could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a rightto remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot DR. AMBICA PRASAD v. MD. ALAM AND ANOTHER 105 [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation: That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of clause (c) of Section 11(1)which reads: "Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation … " Assuming that the expression "landlord" has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rem collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that he wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression "landlord" would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation." c
16. The High Court appears to have taken a very narrow meaning and interpretation of the expression 'landlord' as defined in the Assam Rent Act. The finding recorded on that score to the effect that there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant is not in accordance with the true meaning of the term 'landlord'. This aspect of the law has not been considered by the High Court. On the contrary, the High Court proceeded on the basis that the relationship of 'landlord and tenant' has not been established although the ownership of the appellant G by virtue of the deed of exchange has neither been denied nor been disputed by the respondent-tenant. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the elder brother of the appellant was acting as a landlord by receiving rent, it will not debar the original owner from filing a suit for eviction not only on the ground of personal necessity but also on the ground of default when it has come in evidence that the respondent on many occasions went to the appellant to pay rent but the latter refused to receive the rent. Moreover, admittedly, the respondent-tenant was B paying electricity and other charges of the tenanted premises to the appellant.
17. On the question of tenancy, both the trial court and the High Court have not considered the provision of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. "109. Rights of lessor's transferee.-lf the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him: Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that, if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee. The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine what proportion of the premium or rent reserved by the lease is payable in respect of the part so transferred, and, in case they disagree, such determination may be made by any Court having DR. AMBICA PRASAD v. MD. ALAM AND ANOTHER 107 [M. Y. EQBAL, J.] jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the property leased.
18. From perusal of the aforesaid Section, it is manifest that after the transfer of lessor's right in favour of the transferee, the latter gets all rights and liabilities of the lessor in respect of B sul:lsisting tenancy. The Section does not insist that transfer will take effect only when the tenant attorns. It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does C not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant attorns to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice D under Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment.
19. As noticed above, the respondent-tenant on many occasions approached the appellant, the transferee, owner E and the landlord to receive the rent. Further, admittedly, the electricity charges of the tenanted premises were paid by the tenant to the present appellant. Non-consideration of subsequent tenancy agreement executed by the erstwhile F owner namely the brother of the appellant will not come in the way of the present appellant to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity as also on the ground of non- payment of rent. The approach of the High Court reversing the appellate court's finding cannot be sustained in law.
20. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court ·is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs: Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.