Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
17. The word "occupy"used in Section 11(4)(v) is not · synonymous with legal possession in technical sense. It means actual possession of the tenanted building or use thereof for the purpose for which it is let out. If the building is let out for residential purpose and the tenant is shown to be continuously absent from the building for six months, the Court may presume that he has ceased to occupy the building or abandoned it. If the building is let out for business or commercial purpose, complete cessation of the business/commercial activity may give rise to a presumption that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises. In either case, legal possession of the building by the tenant will, by itself, be not sufficient for refusing an order of eviction unless the tenant proves that there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy the building.
18. The initial burden to show that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building continuously for 6 months is always on the landlord. He has to adduce tangible evidence to prove the fact that as on the date of filing the petition, the tenant was not occupying the building continuously for 6 months. Once such A evidence is adduced. the burden shifts on the tenant to prove · ~tha·t there was reasonable cause for his having ceased to occupy the tenanted premises for a continuous period of 6 months. No strait-jacket formula can be evolved for determining as to what is the reasonable cause and each case is required s to be decided keeping in view the nature of the lease, the purpose for which the premises are let out and the evidence of the parties. If the building, as defined in Section 2(1 ), is let out for industrial or commercial/business purpose and the same is not used for the said purpose continuously for a period of c six months, the tenant cannot plead financial crunch as a ground to justify non occupation of the building unless cogent evidence is produced by him to prove that he could not carry on the industrial or commercial/business activity due to fiscal reasons which were beyond his control. If the tenant does not use the building for the purpose for· which it is let ;)Ut, he cannot be said to be occupying the building merely because he has put some furniture or articles or machinery under his lock and key.
19. At this stage, we may notice some precedents which throw some light on the true interpretation of the expressions E "occupy" and "reasonable cause" used in Section 11 (4)(v) of the 1965 Act.
20. In Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684, this Court interpreted Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban F (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.in terms of which an order of eviction could be passed against the tenant if he is shown to have ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of 4 months without reasonable cause. Respondent Davinder was tenant in the shop belonging to appellant-Ram G Dass. The appellant filed a petition for eviction of the respondent on the ground that he had ceased. to occupy the shop for a continuous period of 4 months without any reasonable cause. The Rent Controller analysed the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced by them and held that the appellant has been able to prove that the respondent had DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1109 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of more than 4 months and there was no reasonable cause for doing so. The plea of the respondent that he had kept the shop closed intermittently due to sickness was not accepted by the Rent Controller. The Appellate Authority, on an independent evaluation of the evidence, confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller. The High Court allowed the revision filed by the respondent and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. This Court reversed the order of the High Court and restored the one passed by the Rent Controller. The Court highlighted the distinction between the terms c "possession" and "occupy" in the context of Rent Control Legislation in the following words: "The terms "possession" and "occupy" are in common parlance used interchangeably. However, in law, possession over a property may amount to holding it as an owner but to occupy is to keep possession of by being present in it. The rent control legislations are the outcome of paucity of accommodations. Most of the rent control legislations, Jn force in different States, expect the tenant to occupy the tenancy premises. If he himself ceases to occupy and parts with possession in favour of someone else, it provides a ground for eviction. Similarly, some legislations provide it as a ground of eviction if the tenant has just ceased to occupy the tenancy premises though he may have continued to retain possession thereof. The scheme of the Haryana Act is also to insist on the tenant remaining in occupation of the premises. Consistently with what has been mutually agreed upon, the tenant is expected to make useful use of the property and subject the tenancy premises to any permissible and useful activity by actually being there. To the landlord's plea of the tenant having ceased to occupy the premises it is no answer that the tenant has a right to possess the tenancy premises and he has continued in juridical possession thereof. The Act protects the tenants from eviction and enacts specifically c [2011) 5 S.C.R. the grounds on the availability whereof the tenant may be directed to be evicted. It is for the landlord to make out a ground for eviction. The burden of proof lies on him. However, the onus keeps shifting. Once the landlord has been able to show that the tenancy premises were not being used for the purpose for which they were let out and the tenant has discontinued such activities in the tenancy premises as would have required the tenant's actually being in the premises, the ground for eviction is made out. The availability of a reasonable cause for ceasing to occupy the premises would obviously be within the knowledge and, at times, within the exclusive knowledge of the tenant. Once the premises have .been shown by evidence to be not in occupation of the tenant, the pleading of the landlord that such non-user is without reasonable cause has the effect of putting the tenant on · notice to plead and prove the availability of reasonable cause for ceasing to occupy the tenancy premises." (emphasis supplied) . E
21. In Brown v. Brash (1948) 1 All. E.R. 922, the Court of appeal was called upon to examine correctness of an order passed by the County Court Judge, who upheld the tenant's claim to possession of the premises and awarded damages against the appellant for trespass. The facts of that case were F that the premises were let out to the tenant in 1941 on a quarterly rent of 26 pounds. In 1945, the tenant was convicted and sentenced to serve 2 years' imprisonment for stealing 6 tones of tea. While going to jail, the tenant left physical occupation of the premises to his mistress and two illegitimate G children. In March 1946, the tenant's mistress left the premises /and dropped the two children with his mother. In the meanwhile, the landlord sold the premises. The purchaser filed an action in July 1946 for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had abandoned possession. The County Court Judge held that the tenant had not abandoned possession and that even though he DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1111 [G.S. SINGHVI, J~] failed in some of his obligations under the tenancy, it was not reasonable to make an order for possession against him. In December 1946, the purchaser of the original landlord transferred the premises to the ,appellant. After release from prison, the tenant brought an action for possession and damages for trespass. His claim was allowed by the County Court Judge, who directed the appellant' to return the premises to the respondent-tenant and also pay damages. The Court of appeal reversed the order of the County Court Judge arid held: . "We are of opinion that a "non-occupying" tenant prima facie forfeits his status as a statutory tenant. But what is meant by "non-occupying"? The term clearly cannot cover every tenant who for however· short a time, or however necessary a purpose, ot with whatever intention as regards returning, absents himself from the demised premises. To retain possessi~n or occupation for the purpose of · D retaining protection the tenant cannot be compelled to . spend 24 hours in all weathers under his own roof for 365 days in the year. Ciearly, for instance, the tena11t of a London house; who spends his week-ends in the country, or his long vacation in Scotland, does not necessarily cease to be in ocQupation. Nevertheless, absence may be sufficiently prolonged or unintermittent to compel the inference, prima facie, of a cesser of possession or occupation. The question is one of fact and of degree. Assume an absence sufficiently prolonged to have this effect. The legal result seems to us to be as follows:-(1) The onus is then on the tenant to repel the presumption that his possession has ceased. (2j To repel it he must, at all events, establish. a de facto intention on his part to return after his absence. (3) But we are of opinion that neither in principle nor on the authorities can this be enough. To suppose that he can absent himself for 5 or 10 years or more and retain possession 'and his protected status simply by proving .an inward intention 'to return after so protracted an absence would be to fn.istrate the spirit c [2011) 5 S.C.R. and policy of the Acts as affirmed in Keeves v. Dean (1) and Skinner v. Geary (3), (4) Notwithstanding an absence so protracted the authorities suggest that its effect may be averted if he couples and clothes his inward intention with some formal, outward, and visible sign of it, i.e., instals in the premises some caretaker or representative, be it a relative or not, with the status of a licensee and with the · function of preserving the premises for his own ultimate home-coming. There will then, at all events, be someone to profit by the housing accommodation involved which will not stand empty. It may be that the same result can be secured by leaving on the premises, as deliberate symbols of continued occupation, furniture, though we are not clear that this was necessary to the decision in Brown v. Draper (4). Apart from authority, in principle possession in fact (for it is with possession in fact and not with possession in law that we are here concerned) requires not merely an "animus possidendi" but a "corpus possessionis," viz., some visible state of affairs in which the animus possidendi finds expression. (5) If the caretaker (to use that term for short) or the furniture be removed from the premises otherwise than quite temporarily, we are of opinion that the protection, artificially prolonged by their presence, ceases, whether the tenant wills or desires such removal or not. A man's possession of a wild bird, which he keeps in a cage, ceases if it escapes notwithstanding that his desire to retain possession of it continues and that its escape is contrary thereto. We do not think in this connection that it is open to the tenant to rely on the fact of his imprisonment as preventing him from taking steps to assert possession by visible action. The tenant, it is true, had not intended to go to prison. He committed intentionally the felonious act which in the events which have happened landed him there, and thereby put it out of his power to assert possession by visible acts after Mar. 9, 1946. He cannot, in these circumstances, we feel, DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. AP. RAHNA AND ANR. 1113 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] be in a better position than if his .absence and inaction had been voluntary." (emphasis supplied)
22. In Achut Pandurang Kulkarni v. Sadashiv Ganesh Phulambrikarm, AIR 1973 Born. 210, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court interpreted Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 the language of which is somewhat similar to Section 11 (4)(v) of the 1965 Act. The learned Single Judge referred to order passed by Chagla, C.J. in Civil Revision Application No.1527/1953 decided on July 30, 1954 and observed: "As observed by Chagla, C. J., in the above case, physical possession by a tenant himself was not necessary. Physical possession by other members of the family also is not necessary if there was reasonable cause for their remaining absent from the premises. The question is one of fact and degree. If there is evidence on record to show that the tenant had something more than a vague wish to return and that he had a real hope coupled with the practicable possibility of its fulfilment within a reasonable time, it cannot be said that he had no reasonable cause for not using the premises. In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the tenant had no reasonable cause. Absence may ba sufficiently prolonged or unintermittent to compel the inference prima facie of a cesser of occupation. The onus is on the tenant in such a case to repel the presumption and to establish that his . possession had not ceased or that he had ceased to occupy on account of reasonable cause. In my judgment, this can be established if the tenant proves notwithstanding · the intention on his part to return after his absence, his helplessness in remaining absent from the premises. It is true that the tenant should have made proper attempts to discharge the onus in the present case by producing the c orders, if not before the trial Court, at least before the Appellate Court. That, however, as stated above, does not permit the Courts to brush aside the requirements of Section 13(1)(k). It is a matter for not awarding the costs. The Court cannot ignore the nature of the tenant's services and his liability to be transferred when deciding the question under Section 13(1 )(k). I do not propose to lay down that in every case where a Government servant is transferred and he goes on paying rent in respect of the premises, he had reasonable cause for not using the premises for the purpose for which they were let. The question will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The tenant must couple and clothe his inward intention to return, with some formal, outward and visible sign of it, as for instance by installing some caretaker or representative, be it a relative or not with the status of a licensee and with the function of preserving the premises for his own ultimate home-coming. It may also be that the same result can be secured by leaving on the premises, as a deliberate symbol of continued occupation, furniture. As stated by Asquith L. J., in Brown v. Brash and Ambrose, (1948) 2 KB 247, the tenant must prove not only animus possidendi but a corpus possessionis." (emphasis supplied)
23. In Ananthasubramania Iyer v. Sarada Amma 1978 KLT 338, the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court held: "The physical absence of the tenant from the building for more than six months would raise a presumption that he had ceased to occupy the building and that he had abandoned it and that it was for the tenant to dislodge the presumption and establish that he had the intention to continue to occupy the tenanted premises."
24. The word "occupy" appearing in Section 11 (4)(v) of the DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1115 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] 1965 Act has been interpreted by the Kerala High Court in large number of cases. In Mathai Antony v. Abrah.am (2004) 3 KLT 169, the Division Bench of the High Court referred to several judgments including the one of this Court in Ram Da.ss v. Davinder (supra) and observed: "The word "occupy'' occurring in S. 11 (4)(v) has got different meaning in different context. The meaning of the word "occupy'' in the context of S. 11 (4)(v) has to be understood in the light of the object and purpose of the Rent Control Act in mind. The rent control legislation is intended to give protection to the tenant, so that there will not be interference with the user of the tenanted premises during the currency . of the tenancy. Landlord cannot disturb the possession and ·enjoyment of the tenanted prem'ises. Legislature has guardedly used the expression "occupy" in S.11 (4)(v) instead of "possession". Occupy in certain context indicates mere physical presence, but in other context actual enjoyment. Occupation includes possession as its primary element, and also includes "enjoyment". The word . "occupy" sometimes. indicates legal possession in the technical sense; at other times mere physical presence. We have to examine the question whether mere "physical possession" would satisfy the word "occupy" within the meaning of S.11 (4)(v) of the Act. In our view mere physical possession of premises would not satisfy the meaning of "occupation" under S. 11 (4)(v). The word "possession" means holding of such possession, animus possidendi, means,. the intention to exclude other persons. The word "occupy" has to be given a meaning so as to hold that the tenant is actually using the premises and not mere physical presence or possession. A learned single Judge of this Court in Abbas v. Sankaran Namboodiri (1993(1) KLT 76) took the view that the word occupation is used to denote the tenant's actual physical use of the building either by himself or through his agents or employees. The Division Bench of this Court of which one of us is a party c [2011) 5 S.C.R. (Radhakrishnan, J.), in Rajagopalan v. Gopalan (2004 (1) KLT SNP.54) interpreting- S. 11 (4)(v) took the view that occupation in the context of S.I 1(4) means only physical occupation, which requires further explanation. Occupation in the context of S. 11 (4)(v) means actual user. If the landlord could establish that in a given case even if the tenant is in physical possession of the premises, the premises is not being used, that is a good ground for eviction under S.11 (4)(v) of the Act. S.11 (4) uses the words "put the landlord in possession" and not "occupation", but 11 (4)(v) uses the words "the tenant ceases to occupy". In S. 11 (4)(v) in the case of landlord the emphasis is on "possession" but in the case of tenant the emphasis is on "occupation". The word "occupy" has a distinct meaning so far as the Rent Act is concerned when pertains to tenant, that is, possession with user."
25. In Kurian Thomas v. Sreedharan Menon (2004) 3. KLT 326, the High Court held as under: "Once landlord could establish the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises continuously for six months prior to the filing of the petition he is entitled to get order of eviction under that section. The word "occupation" must be understood to be not mere physical possession. Tenant should use the building. The word "occupy" means to cohabit with, to hold or have in possession. Tenanted premises must be in the state of being enjoyed and occupied. The word "occupy" used by the statute would show that tenanted premises be put to use. Tenant cannot be heard to contend that he is having physical possession of the premises though not in occupation. So far as this case is concerned, we are of the view landlord has discharged the burden and then the onus has shifted to the tenant and the tenant could not establish that he has not ceased to occupy the premises and even if there is cessation that was with reasonable cause." DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P .. RAHNAAND ANR. 1117 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
26. In Paµlina Joseph v. ldukki District Wholesale Co- operative Consumer Stores Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of the High Court referred to the dictionary meaning of the word "reasonable" and observed: 'The question whether the tenant ceases to o"ccupy the building continuously for six months is primarily a question of fact to be determined with reference to the facts available in each case. The scope of "occupation of the building" depends on the purpose for which the building is let and the purpose for which it is used. The nature of the business and the requirement of the physical presence or otherwise of the tenant in the building for the conduct of the business is a relevant fact. No straight jacket formula can be evolved in the matter of proof of cessation of occupation within the meaning of Section 11 (4)(v) of the Act. This intention of the tenant, though not conclusive as such has also relevance in determining whether there was actual cessation of occupation within the meaning of Section 11 (4)(v). When it is proved by the landlord that the tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months, the burden of proving that there was reasonable cause for such cessation is on the tenant. Reasonable cause is also a question of fact to be decided in the light of the facts proved in the case. No rigid formula can be evolved for proof of "reasonable cause". The facts and circumstances of the case, the particular facts with reference to the business activities of the tenant, the nature of the business, the magnitude of the business, the circumstance which led to the cessation of occupation are all relevant in considering whether there was reasonable cause. If the cessation of occupation was due to circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, certainly the Courts would be inclined to accept the case of the tenant that,cessation of occupation was not without reasonable cause. Financial constraint of the tenant by itself may not be a sufficient reason to hold that there was c (2011] 5 S.C.R. . reasonable cause. But that is not completely irrelevant in considering the question. Whether the tenant is an individual or an organization controlled by the Government or a Co-operative society may also be relevant in considering the question of reasonable cause. If there is a plausible explanation to the question why the business was not run in the premises continuously, it may well be a relevant fact in considering whether there was reasonable cause for cessation of occupation under Section 11 (4){v), depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the given set of facts and circumstances, if it can be concluded that an ordinary prudent man would act in the manner in which the tenant did, it can be safely said that the cessation of occupation was with reasonable cause." (emphasis supplied)
27. In Simon & Ors. v. Rappai (2008) 2 KLJ 488, the High Court interpreted Section 11 (4){v) and held: "As far as the ground available under Section 11(4){v) is concerned, it is well settled by various decisions of this Court that if the landlord has discharged the initial burden it is upto the tenant to lead evidence in the matter to show that he has been conducting business in the premises. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision report in Abbas v. Sankaran Namboodiri (1993 (1) KLT 76) while examining the question held that, the word 'occupation' is used to denote the tenant's actual physical use of the building either by himself or through his agents or employees and legal possession is not sufficient. It was held that, "however, if a landlord succeeds in proving that his tenant did not occupy the building almost near the period fixed in Section 11 (4)(v) of the Act it may help the court to presume that there could have been cessation of occupation for the statutory period. Such background presumption is not anathematic to the law of evidence". In para.7 it was observed that, "be that as it may, burden is DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNAAND ANR. 1119 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] .on the landlord to prove that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for six months. But it is hard to expect a landlord to prove the precise during which his tenant , ceased to occupy the building. However, if the cour:t is satisfied on the· evidence and/or with the aid of presumptions that the tenant did not occupy the building for such length of time as would cover the statutory period, then the burden would shift to the tenant to show that he had reasonable cause for such non-occupation." Finally it <was also observed in para.9 that, 'but, possession must combine with something more to make it occupation. c Legal possession does not by itself constitute occupation'. These principles can be safely applied to the facts of this ·case."
28. In this case, the Rent Control Court, after detailed scrutiny of the pleadings and the evidence of the parties recorded a finding that while the landowners (respondents herein) succeeded in proving that the tenant (appellant herein) had ceased to occupy the suit premises for a period exceeding six months, the latter could not prove that it was occupying the premises or that non occupation thereof was for a reasonable cause. The Rent Control Court took cognizance of the appellant's plea that it was carrying on business activities from the suit premises with reduced staff strength but discarded the same by observing that the relevant records like the attendance register, muster roll, wage register had not been produced and no evidence was adduced to prove payment of electricity bills and sale and purchase of goods. The High Court also analysed · the pleadings and evidence of the parties and concurred with the findings recorded by the Rent Control Court. As againstthis, the appellant did not produce any evidence to prove physical occupation of the premises or any business transaction. It also failed to produce any evidence to show that there was reasonable cause for non occupation of the suit premises.
29. The arguments of Shri Nariman that the second set of A rent control petitions should have been dismissed as barred by res judicata because the issue raised therein was directly and substantially similar to the one raised in the first set of rent control petitions does not merit acceptance for the simple reason that while in the first set of petitions, the respondents B had sought eviction on the ground that the appellant had ceased to occupy the premises from June, 1998. In the second set of petitions, the period of non occupation commenced from September, 2001 and continued till the filing of the eviction petitions. That apart, the evidence produced in the first set of c petitions was not found acceptable by the Appellate Authority because till 2.8.1999, the premises were found kept open and alive for operation. The Appellate Authority also found that in spite of extreme financial crisis, the management had kept the business premises open for operation till 1999. In the second round, the appellant did not adduce any evidence worth the name to show that the premises were kept open or used from September, 2001 onwards. The Rent Controller took cognizance of the notice fixed on the front shutter of the building by A.K. Agarwal on 1.10.2001 that the company is a sick industrial company under the 1985 Act and operation has been E suspended with effect from 1.10.2001; that no activity had been done in the premises with effect from 1.10.2001 and no evidence was produced to show attendance of the staff, payment of salary to the employees, payment of electricity bills from September, 2001 or that any commercial transaction was F done from the suit premises. It is, thus, evident that even though the ground of eviction in the two sets of petitions was similar, the same were based on different causes. Therefore, the evidence produced by the parties in the second round was rightly treated as sufficient by the Rent Control Court and the G Appellate Authority for recording a finding that the appellant had ceased to occupy the suit premises continuously for six months without any reasonable cause.
30. The question whether the prohibition contained in H Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act operates as a bar to the DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1121 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] maintainability of a petition filed for eviction of the tenant was considered and answered in negative in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association (1992) 3 SCC 1. In that case, this Court referred to the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, Section 22(1) of the 1985 Act and observed: "11. Similarly in Civil Appeal No. 2553 of 1991 this question has been raised by the appellant-company to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court dated March 15, 1991 dismissing the revision petition under Section 50(1) of Karnataka Rent Control Act. For the reasons aforementioned Section 22(1) of the Act cannot be invoked to assail the said order of the High Court on the ground that on the date of passing of the order of the High Court the matter was pending before the Appellate Authority. But in this appeal, the order allowing the eviction petition was passed by the Xll Additional Small Causes Court on September 30, 1989 and at that time the matter under Sections 15 and 16 was pending before the Board. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the second question about the applicability of Section 22(1) to eviction proceedings instituted by the landlord against the tenant who happens to be a sick company. In this regard, it may be mentioned that the following proceedings only are automatically suspended under Section 22(1) of the Act: (1) (2) proceedings for winding up of the industrial company; proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the sick industrial company; and (3) · proceedings for the appointment of receiver. 12. Eviction proceedings initiated by a landlord against a c tenant company would not fall in categories (1) and (3) referred to above. The question is whether they fall in category (2). It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant-company that such proceedings fall in category (2) since they are proceedings against the property of the sick industrial company. The submission is that the leasehold right of the appellant-company in the premises leased out to it is property and since the eviction proceedings would result in the appel/ant- company being deprived of the said property, the said proceedings would be covered by category (2). We are unable to agree. The second category contemplates proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any other properties of the industrial company. The words 'or the like' have to be construed with reference to the preceding words, namely, 'for execution, distress' which means that the proceedings which are contemplated in this category are proceedings whereby recovery of dues is sought to be made by way of execution, distress or similar proceedings against the property of the company. Proceedings for eviction instituted by a landlord against a tenant who happens to be a sick industrial company, cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as falling in this category. We may, in this context, point out that, as indicated in the Preamble, the Act has been enacted to make special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined. The provision regarding suspension of legal proceedings contained in Section 22(1) seeks to advance the object of the Act by ensuring that a proceeding having an effect on the working or the finances of a sick industrial company shall not be instituted or continued during the period the matter is under DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1123 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] consideration before the Board or the Appellate Authority or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation without the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority. It could not be the intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision to aggravate the financia) difficulties of a sick industrial company while the said matters were pending before the Board or the Appellate Authority by enabling a sick industrial company to continue to incur further liabilities during this period. This would be the consequence if sub-section (1) of Section 22 is construed to bring about suspension of proceedings for eviction c instituted by landlord against a sick industrial company which has ceased to enjoy the protection of the relevant rent law on account of default in payment of rent. It would . also mean that the landlord of such a company must continue to suffer a loss by permitting the tenant (sick industrial company) to occupy the premises even though it is not in a position to pay the rent. Such an intention cannot be imputed to Parliament. We are, therefore, of the view that Section 22(1) does not cover a proceeding instituted by a landlord of a sick industrial company for the eviction of the company premises let out to it." (emphasis supplied) 31. In Gujarat Steel Tube Co. Ltd. v. Virchandbhai B. Shah (1999) 8 sec 11, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that suit for recovery of rent etc. is not maintainable in view of the prohibition contained in Section 22(1). While affirming the judgment of the High Court, the Court referred to the earlier judgment in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association (supra) and held: "Section 22 no doubt, inter alia; states that notwithstanding any other law no suit for recovery of money shall lie or be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board, but as we look at it the filing of an eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of rent cannot be regarded as filing of a suit for recovery of money. If a tenant does not pay the rent, then the protection which is given by the Rent Control Act against his eviction is taken away and with the non-payment of rent order of eviction may be passed. It may be possible that in view of the provisions of Section s 22, the trial court may not be in a position to pass a decree for the payment of rent but when an application under Section 11(4) is filed, the trial court in effect gives an opportunity to the tenant to pay the rent failing which the consequences provided for in the sub-section would c follow. An application under Section 11 (4), or under any other similar provision, cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as being akin to a suit for recovery of money." (emphasis supplied) The same view was reiterated in Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons (2007) 8 SCC 559. 32. We shall now examine whether pendency of the proceedings under the 1985 Act, which implies that the E appellant was facing financial difficulty in conducting its business constituted reasonable cause for cessation of occupation of the premises. The appellant was declared a sick industrial company on 22.6.1998 and IDBI was appointed as the Operating Agency under Section 17(3) of the 1985 Act to examine the viability of the company. Subsequently, State Bank F of India was appointed as the Operating Agency. After several hearings, the BIFR passed order dated 19.10.2001 and directed the appellant to sort out all pending issues with secured creditors, Central/State Governments, TllC, KSllDC and TNSEP and submit a revised comprehensive and fully tied up G rehabilitation scheme to the Operating Agency. For the next about five years. no tangible step is shown to have taken by the appellant for revival of its business activities. In August and November, 2006, the appellant filed applications before the BIFR seeking its permission for issue of two crore equity H shares of Rs. 10/- each fully paid up at par to the company's DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED v. A.P. RAHNA AND ANR. 1125 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] promoters and/or its associates on private placement basis against full consideration to be. utilized for. rehabilitation. Thereupon, the BIFR passed order· dated 16.3;2007. Three appeals were filed against that order: The AAIFR dismissed · the appeals after taking note of order passed by the Madras High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 24422 of 2006, order dated· 25.4.2007 passed by the Orissa High Court in W.P '(C) No. 344 of 2008, order dated 5.2.2008 passed by this Court in SLP(C) CC Nos. 1943-1944 of 2008 and held that in view of the various orders, the net worth of the appellant having turned positive and it C-an no longer be treated as sick industrial c company. Before the Rent Control Court, the appellant had neither pleaded nor any evidence was produced to show that due to financial stringency was due to the reasons beyond its control and on that account, the suit premises could not be used from September, 2001 onwards for the purpose specified in the lease deeds. Therefore, the so called financial stringency cannot be construed as reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 11 (4)(v). 33. We are also of the view that order dated 3.3.2008 passed by the AAIFR has no bearing on the decision of the issues raised by the respondents in the context of Section 11(4)(v) of the 1965 Act because what was required to be considered by the Rent Control Court was whether as on the date of filing the petition the appellant had ceased to occupy the premises continuously for a period of six months without reasonable cause. The improvement in the financial health of the appellant after many years cannot impinge upon the concurrent finding recorded by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that the respondents had succeeded in making out a case for eviction under Section 11 (4)(v) and that there was no reasonable cause for the appellant to have ~ceased to occupy the suit premises continuously for a period •Of six months. [2011) 5 S.C.R. 34. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. The appellant is allowed three months time to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondents subject to its filing usual undertaking before this Court within four weeks. It is also made B clear that during this period of three months, the appellant shall not induct any other person in the premises or transfer its possession to any other person in any capacity whatsoever. D.G. Appeals dismissed.