Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
14. But we are also unable to uphold the contention of the )…_ writ petitioner that the appeal is not maintainable since the Company had challenged the order passed in Review Petition dated January 28, 2002 and not the main order dated February ;G 17, 2000 dismissing intra-Court appeal. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that when Review Petition was dismissed, the order passed by the Division Bench in in- tra-Court appeal got merged in the order of Review Petition. But even otherwise, when the order passed in the Review Peti- H tion is challenged, it would not be proper to dismiss this appeal 1! j r ""')- EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAi KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.] particularly when leave was granted in SLP after hearing the parties. We, therefore, reject the objection raised by the writ petitioner.
15. As to delay and !aches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant-Company. It is well-settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appro- priate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ Court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and !aches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extra-ordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant.
16. Under the English law, an application for leave for judi- cial review should be made "promptly". If it is made tardily, it may be rejected. The fact that there is breach of public law duty does not necessarily make it irrelevant to consider delay or la ch es on the part of the applicant. Even if leave is granted, the question can be considered at the time of final hearing whether relief should be granted in favour of such applicant or not. ( Vide R. v Essex Country Council, 1993 COD 344).
17. In R. v Dairy Produce Quota Tribun;:il, (1990) 2 AC 738, 749: (1990) 2All ER 434: (1990) 2 WLR 1302, the House of Lords stated; "The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not'be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the persons affected by the decision".
18. The underlying object of refusing to issue a writ has been succinctly explained by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay c [2008] 11 ?.C.R. Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, ( 18 7 4) 5 PC 221 : 22 c WR492 thus; "Now the doctrine of !aches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a. waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, la.pse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy." (emphasis supplied)
19. This Court has accepted the above principles of En- glish law. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 SCR 824 and Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCR 697, this Court ruled that even in cases of violation or in- fringement of Fundamental Rights, a writ Court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in ap- G proachjng the Court. And if there is gross or unexplained delay, the Court may refu,se to grant relief in favour of such petitioner.
20. It is not necessary for us to refer to several decisions on this point wherein a similar view has been taken by this Court. Suffice it to say that in Express Publications v. Union of India, H (2004) 11 SCC 526, this Court ~eferring to Tilokchand EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.] Motichand, Rabindranath Bose and Ramchandra Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, ( 197 4) 1 SCC 317, explained the prin- ciple thus; "No hard and fast principle can be laid down that under no circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in judging constitutional validity of a provision. It has to be -:-… 'f remembered that the constitutional remedy under Article 32 is discretionary. In one case, this Court may decline discretionary relief if person aggrieved has slept over for long number of years. In another case, depending upon the nature of violation, court may ignore delay and c pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It will depend from case to case." (emphasis supplied)
21. Prima facie, we are satisfied that the learned single D Judge should not have entertained a writ petition in 1999 and in directing the Company to release balance quantity of 1008 MTs of coal to the writ petitioner. But as observed earlier, the order was passed in view of the statement of learned counsel ap- pearing for the Company that the Court could pass "usual or- der" and accordingly the order was passed. It was also stated by the writ petitioner in the counter-affidavit that similar orders were passed in several matters. It would, therefore, be appro- priate if we extend the benefit to the writ petitioner of the order passed by the learned single Judge to the extent of "balance quantity of 1008 MTs of coal", which was _based on the 'state- ment' by the counsel for the Company.
22. In our view, however, the learned counsel for the ap- pellant-Company is right that after the writ petition was disposed of on September 6, 1999 wherein balance quantity of 1008 MTs of coal was directed to be allotted to the writ petitioner, the learned single Judge was not justified in passing an order on r September 13, 1999 on mentioning of the matter without there being any application for modification/clarification of the order dated September 6, 1999.
23. On September 13, 1999, the following order was passed by the learned single. Judge; "Mr. D.P. Majumdar, Adv. Mentions and submits. Mr. A.K. Mitra, Adv. Appears and submits. The Court: The last but third paragraph of the order dated 6.9.99 is corrected in the manner as follows:- ¥ •• The respondents are directed to allot balance quantity_ of 6800 M.T. of Steam Coke, Grade-D quality of Coal c t6 the petitioner in terms of the release order dated 25.5.1989 from Nayandanga Colliery, Mugma Area in terms of Annexure 'C'. The supply is to be effected within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. This order is incorporating into the earlier order dated 6.'9.99. .. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order."
24. We are also of the view that in the light of the above. order, the Division Bench ought to haye interfered with the di- . rection of the learned single Judge in the order dated Septem- ber 13, 1999 and intra-Court. appeal ought to have been al- lowed. When the intra-Court appeal was dismissed, the appel- lant approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition. It was dismissed as withdrawn as the Company wanted to move the Division Bench in Review Petition. To us, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Division Bench ought to have considered the aforesaid aspect and passed an appropriate G order in accordance with law.
25. From the totality of circumstances, we are of the con- sidered view that the respondent-writ petitioner was entitled to the price (consideration) for the land sold by him by registered -r H sale deed to the Company which has already been paid to him. EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.] He was also entitled to 1008 MTs of coal which was given to him as per the Policy. He was further entitled to 1008 MTs which has been ordered to be given to him towards "balance quan- tity" on the basis of statement made by the Counsel for the Com- pany and in terms of 'usual order' dated September 6, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge. We are, however, con- vinced that the learned single Judge was not justified in grant- ing prayer on mentioning the matter on September 13, 1999 without any application for modification of earlier order and di- rection to the Company to allot to the writ petitioner balance quantity of 6800 MTs of steak coal Grade-D quality. To that ex- c tent, therefore, the appeal filed by the Company deserves to be allowed.
26. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed and the writ petitioner is held entitled to 1008 MTs as initially awarded to him as also 1008 MTs of coal towards "balance D quantity" as per the order dated September 6, 1999. The writ petitioner will not be entitled to anything more. If the said quan- tity of coal has already been allotted, the Company has dis- charged its liability and nothing more is required to be done. But if it has not released the said quantity, the writ petitioner E would be entitled to coal to the above extent. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. N.J. Appeal partly allowed.