[2009) 1 S.C.R. 509 EERATI LAXMAN v. STATE OF A.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 2009) JANUARY 23, 2009 [S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 1986: Murder- Conviction of accused under s.302 /PC – Claim c
of being juvenile rejected by trial court on the ground that no reliance could be placed on the date of his birth recorded in the registers of primary school – On revision, High Court
remanded the matter- Relying on Arnit Das's case* decided by Supreme Court, the trial court held that on the date of production before Magistrate, accused was not a juvenile – Appeal dismissed by High Court – On appeal, Held: Arnit
Das* has been ovemJled by Constitution Bench of Supreme Court – Date on which offence committed and not date on which accused was produced before court would be relevant date to ascertain whether accused is juvenile – Thus accused not attained the age of 16 years on the date of occurrence – Judgment of High Court set aside – Matter remitted to
Juvenile Justice Board in terms of s.20 of the Act. Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551; Balu @ Bakthvatchalu v. State of Tamil Nadu 2008 (2) SCALE 419; Jyoti Prakash Rai@ Jyoti Prakash v. State of
Bihar 2008 (3) SCALE 348; Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584; Vimal Chadha v. Vikas Choudhary & Anr. 2008 (8) SCALE 608; Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of G "'"?"
Rajasthan & Anr. (1986) 4 SCC 59; Salag Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 10 SCC 77 and Achhaibar Maurya v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. (2008) 2 sec 639, relied on. *Amit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488, referred
to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.2006 of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradeah at Hyderabad in Crl. Appeal No. 1279 of 2003.
Ashesh Lal and Susmita Lal for the Appellant. c T. Venkatnarayana, and D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant was convicted for commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to. undergo imprisonment for life. Allegations E against him were that on or about 9.5.1994 at about 1.00 p.m. he committed murder of one Pittala Chandrakala by pouring
kerosene over her and setting her on fire with a matchstick. 3. One of the grounds taken by him during trial was ttiat he was a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of ll
F Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short, "the said Acf') on the date of commission of offence. Indisputably, the date of birth of the appellant is 10.5.1978. The question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether he had completed the age of 16 years on 9.5.1994. During the trial, it appears, such a G contention was rejected by the learned trial judge opining that he was not a juvenile as no reliance could be placed on the date of his birth recorded in the registers of the primary school. A revision application was filed thereagainst before the High Court. By reason of a judgment and order dated 26.7.2000, the H matter was remanded back to the trial court. Relying on or on EERA Tl LAX.MAN v. STATE OF A. P.
[S.B. SINHA, J.] the basis of a decision of this Court in Amit Das v. State of A Bihar [(2000) 5 SCC 488], it was held that the date of production of the appellant before the learned Magistrate being 25.5.1994 and assuming that the date of birth of the accused was 10.5.1978, he was not a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act.
The learned Sessions Judge, held: "The learned Advocate feebly contended that the accused should be treated as a juvenile on the date of offence as per the decision reported in 2000 Supreme Court (Crl) c
1270, ALT 2002 AP 511 page, ALT 2002 AP 485, sec 2000 Vol. II page 1270 and AIR 1972, SC 1557. With due respect to all the above decisions, I express my inability to accept the contention of the learned advocates for the
accused. As already stated by me earlier the accused in this case has preferred Criminal Revision Case No. 418 of 2000 before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh aggrieved by the earlier order of this Court refusing to
accept him as a juvenile. In the order dated 26. 7 .2000, the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh has specifically directed this Court to follow the decision reported in Amit Das v. State of Bihar2000 (4) Supreme 186. Therefore, I
am bound by the order of the Hon'ble High Court and I cannot take a divergent view. I therefore, find that there is no force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the accused in this behalf. I accept the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor that the accused was not a
juvenile on the date when he was brought before the Court. On an analysis of the entire evidence on record, I hold that the prosecution has successfully driven home the guilt of G the accused under Section 302 I PC beyond the
reasonable doubt." 4. An appeal preferred by appellant thereagainst has been dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment, holding: c "We do not agree with such a statement in view of the
fact that a year is completed on 9.5.1994, if the date of birth of.a person is 10th May of any of the preceding year, because in the case of reckoning of a calendar year which starts with 1st January of a particular year, a year is not completed on first January of the next year but is completed on 31st December, of the same year. So, by 10th May,
1994, the accused would start 17th year of his life and on 9th May, 1995, it shall be presumed that he completed 16 years of his life, if his date of birth is 10.5.1978. Under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for
short "the Act"), "Month" shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar. "Year" as defined under section 3(66) of the Act shall mean a "Year" reckoned according to the British Calendar. The Halsbury's Laws of
England in Paragraph.143, Volume No. 37 (Third Edition), described "Month" as under:- 'When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires
with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts as the end of a calendar month which contains
more days than the next succeeding month the period expires, at the end of the latter month."' 5. Indisputably, Amit Das (supra) has been overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 sec 551] wherein it was clearly laid down that the date on which the offence had been committed and not G the date when the accused was first produced before the court/ competent authority would be the relevant date for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the accused before it was a
juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act or not. In Pratap Singh (supra) this Court in regard to Amit Das H (supra) stated: ..,. ……. …. …__ EERATI LAX.MAN v. STATE OF A.P.
[S.B. SINHA, J.] "84. With great respect, we cannot agree to the said statement of law. It is incorrect to say that the preamble speaks of the things of post-delinquency only. The Act not only refers to the obligations of the country to re-enact the existing law relating to juveniles bearing in mind, the
standards prescribed in various conventions but aiso all other international instruments. It states that the said Act was enacted inter a/ia to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles. Once the law relates to delinquent
juveniles or juveniles in conflict with law, the same would mean both pre-and post-delinquency. 85. The definition of "juvenile" under the 1986 Act, of course refers to a person who has been found to have
committed offence but the same has been clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of the 1986 Act, as noticed hereinbefore, sought to protect not only those juveniles who have been found to have committed an offence but also
those who had been charged therefor. In terms of Section · 3 of the 1986 Act as well as the 2000 Act, when an enquiry has been initiated even if the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age of 16 and 18 as the case
may be, the same must be continued in respect of such person as if he had continued to be a juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986 Act therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held that the same only applied to post- delinquency of the juvenile.
86. The field covered by the Act includes a situation leading to juvenile delinquency vis-a-vis commission of an offence .. In such an event he is to be provided the post-delinquency care and for the said purpose the date when delinquency
took place would be the relevant date. It must, therefore, be held that the relevant date for determining the age of the juvenile would be one on which the offence has been committed and not when he is produced in court."
{See also Balu @ Bakthvatchalu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2008 c A (2) SCALE 419], Jyoti Prakash Rai @ Jyoti Prakash v. State of Bihar [2008 (3) SCALE 348, Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584], Vimal Chadha v. Vikas
Choudhary & Anr. [2008 (8) SCALE 608]} 6. The offence, as noticed hereinbefore, was committed on 9.5.1994. A "delinquent juvenile" in terms of the provisions of the said Act would be a juvenile who h~s been found to have committed an offence. In terms of the provisions of the said Act, "juvenile" means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen c years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. The said Act was repealed and replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short, "the 2000 Act") in terms whereof "juvenile" or "child" means a person who has not completed eighteenth year of age.
_, Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended by Act 33 of 2006 reads as under: "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing 'any sentence in respect of. the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders
in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence. Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and
special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the y case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile. Explanation.–ln all pending cases including trial, EERATI LAX.MAN v. STATE OF A.P.
[S.B. SINHA, J.] revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (1) of section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this
Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed." 7. In our opinion, the High Court is not entirely correct in arriving at the said conclusion. The said Act is a beneficent c legislation. It, however, would not mean that the principle of literal interpretation thereof should not be resorted to.
8. Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 provides for age of majority of persons domiciled in India and the criteria for computation of age of majority. It reads as under: "3. Age of majority of persons domiciled in lndia.-(1)
Every person domiciled in India shall attain the age of majority on his completing the age of eighteen years and not before. (2) In computing the age of any person, the day on which
he was born is to be included as a whole day and he shall be deemed to have attained majority at the beginning of the eighteenth anniversary of that day." In Prabhu Dayal Sesma v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [
(1986) 4 SCC 59], this Court categorically held that in absence of any express provision, while calculating a person's age, the day of his birth must be counted as a whole day and any specified age in law is to be computed
…. as having been attained on the day preceding the anniversary of the birthday. A legal day commences at 12 o'clock midnight and continues until the same hour the following night. [See Sa/ag Ram Sharma v. State of
Rajasthan, (2005) 10 SCC 77] (2009) 1 S.C.R. 9. Appellant, therefore, having been born on 10.5.1978, the said day was to be counted as a whole day and, thus, he had not attained the age of 16 years before 12 o'clock in the
midnight of the previous day, i.e. 9.5.1978. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered in Achhaibar Maurya v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. [(2008) 2 sec 639], wherein it was held:
c "14. It is interesting to note, however, that the common law rule stated in Shurey, Re, Savory, LR (1918) 1 Ch 263, in respect of anniversaries has been abrogated by virtue of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969. The effect of the
change is that, in respect of anniversaries falling after 1- 1-1970, the time at which a person attains a particular age expressed in years is the commencement of relevant anniversary of the date of his birth. (See Halsbuty's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Reissue, p. 209.) We do not have
such statute. We have, therefore, to determine the cases on the touchstone of statute operating in the field and in absence thereof by common law principle." 10. We, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, are of the
opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and the matter is remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board in temis of Section 20 of the Act. 11. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned
direction. G.N. Appeal allowed.