Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the appeal passed the following order: . "This Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the defendant against the judgment and decree dated 22.10.2003, passed by the Additional District Jndge, · whereby the appeal filed by the plaintiff was accepted, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. While decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, it was found by the learned Additional District Judge that before fixing the annual value and imposing the house tax, the defendant had failed to decide the objections filed by the plaintiff against the proposed amendment of the assessment list. It was found that in fact the case of the defendant was that c c no objections were filed. However, when a copy of the objections and the notice for personal hearing were shown to DWl (produced by the defendant), he had to admit that those documents were issued by the defendant. It was found that from those documents, it was clear that the plaintiff had filed objections against the proposed amendment of the assessment list and there is nothing on the record to show that the objections were decided before the annual value was fixed and the house tax was imposed. This finding of the learned Additional District Judge, in my opinion, is a finding of fact based on the evidence led by the parties, especially when there is ·nothing on the record to show that there is any misreading of evidence or that any material evidence had been ignored by the learned Additional District Judge while 'giving this finding. Once it is found that the defendant had failed to follow the procedure laid down under the Act while imposing the house tax, in my opinion, the civil Court certainly had the jurisdiction to entertain the present suit and the finding of the learned Additional District Judge in this regard also has to be affirmed. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no scope for interference in the present appeal, especially when no question of law much less substantial question of law arises for determination in this appeal. Hence, the present appeal is dismissed."
12. As observed supra, we do not agree with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the impugned order. In ·our considered view, the appeal did involve the substantial question of law and, therefore, the High Court should have admitted the appeal by first framing proper substantial questions oflaw arising in the case, issued notice to the respondent for its final hearing as provided under Section 100 of the Code of Civ\1 Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") and disposed it of on merits.
13. As a matter of fact, having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the suit and the issues arising in the case, the questions raised in the second appeal did constitute substantial questions. of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code. FAR!DABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION v. M/S IRON MASTER INDIA {P) LTD. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
14. Indeed, in our considered view, the questions, viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the demand of House Tax raised under the Act is maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if so, by virtue of which provision of the Act, whether plaintiffhas any alternative statutory remedy available under the Act for adjudication of his grievance and, if so, which is that remedy, and lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the suit and, if so, whether they have paid the proper Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were legal questions arising in the appeal and involved jurisdictional issues requiring adjudication on merits in accordance with law. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any of these issues much less in its proper perspective in the light of relevant provisions of the Act governing the controversy.
15. The High Court thus, in our view, committed jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second appeal in Ii mine. We cannot countenance c the approach of the High Court.
16. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law.
17. We, however, request the High Court to admit the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions oflaw as required under Section I 00 of the Code keeping in view the pleadings and findings of the two courts below. Needless to say, the questions to be framed should be specific.
18. Before parting, we consider it proper to mention here that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the controversy and confined our inquiry only to examine whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section I 00 of the Code?
19. Since i1one appeared for the appellant( defendant) in this Court, the High Court would issue notice to the appellant before it is finally heard. We request the High Court to decide the appeal expeditiously.
20. Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent back to the High Court forthwith by the Registry. c Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.