;i.11 of I? ajo.th m y, Sripof Jain W4tt<hoo, J. , .,,,,.,, • 15. case of this kind is given to the Minister-in-charge under r. 21. The definitions therefore of "Government" and "the State Government" in the
Rajasthan General Clauses Act are of no help to the respondent once it is held that r. 31 (vii) (a) of the Business Rules when it speaks of "compulsory retiring of any officer" refers only to compulsory
retirrment as a penalty under r. 14 of the Classifi· cation Rules and not to the two other kinds of retirement (namely, superannuation under r. 56 or retirement under r. 244 (2) of the service Rules).
The appeal is therefore allowed and the ordrr of the High Court srt aside. In the circumstancea we pass no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. FIRM AND ILLURI SUBBAYYA CHETTY AND SONS
ti. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (B. P. SINJIA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRA.GADIUB, K. N. WANCHoo, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.) Civil Caurl-Jurisdi<tion-Exclusion of-" Any a•u•…,..lll
made under thi• Act" meaning of-Scope of-Madraa General Salta Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. 9 of 1939), 1. 18-A. The appellant filed a suit against the rc.pondent for a decree for Rs. 8339/• on the ground that the said amount had been illegally recovered from it under the Madras Gcnrral
Sales Tax Act, 1939, for the years 1952-54. The respondent 1 S.C.R. resisted the claim on the ground that the suit was incompetent under s. 18-A of the Act. On the merits, it was contended
that the transactions in regard to groundnuts on which sales tax was levied and recovered from the appellant were transactions of purchase and not of sale, and it was urged that the appellant having voluntarily made the return and paid the truces, it was itot open to it to contend that the transactions were not tax.able under the Act. Besides it was argued that the appellant had not preferred an appeal either to the Deputy Commissioner
of Commercial Taxes or to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal against the assessments and hence the suit was not maintainable. The suit was decreed by the trial court but the High Court reversed that decision and dismissed the suit on the ground that in view of the provisions of s. 18-A of the Act, the suit was incompetent. Alternatively, it wa< found on merits that the claim made by the appellant was not justified. The
appellant came to this Court by special leave. Held, that s. 18-A excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to set aside or modify anv assessment made under the Act. There is Il'> express provisi0n in the Act under which the suit can be said to have been filed and it falls under the prohibition contained in this section.
The prohibition is express and unambiguous and no suit can he entertained by a Civil Court, if by institutin~ the suit, the plaintiff wants to set aside or modify any assessment ma.de under the Act.
Where an order of assessment has been made by an appropriate au~hority under the provisions of the Act, any cliallenge to its cnrrcctness and any attempt either to have it set aside or modified must be made before the appellate or revisional forum prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Act. A suit insti- tuted for that purpose is barred under s. 18-A.
When the appellant made its voluntary returns and paid the tax in advanee to be adjusted at the end of the year from time to time, it treated the ~roundnut transactions as taxable. The appellant having conceded the taxable character of the transactions in question, no ocrasion arose for the taxing' authorities to consider whether the said transactions could be taxed or not.
Even after the impugned orders of assessment were made, the appellant did not choose to file an appeal and ur~e before the appellate authority tha: the transactions were sale transactions and as such were outside the purview of
s. SA (2). If an orde.r made by a taxing authority under the relevant provisions of the Act in a case where the taxable character of a transaction is dlqputed, is final and cannot be challenged in a civil court by a separate suit, the position is just Firm and fUuri
Sulbayya Chltl.1 & Sons •. Thi Star1 of Andhra Pradul> Firm a1llf flluri Subb'!'Ya Clr<11y & s.., Tu Stull of l.Jtdlwa Pi atJ.sla the 5'mc whcrr thr taxable character of the transactions is not even disputed by the dealer who accepts the order for the purp<>- scs of the Act and then imtitutcs a suit to stt aside or modify it, The exprrssion "any assessment made under this Act"
is wide enough to cover all assessments made by the appro- priate authoritics under this Act whether the said asscssmcntJ arc correct or nnt. It is the activity of the assessing otricer acting as such officer which is intended to be projected and u soon as it is shown that excrci'.'iing hio; jurisdiction and authority under this Act, an as..,~sing officer has made an order of assess- ment, that clearly falls within the scope of s. 18-A.
The fact that •he order pa~scd by the a•scssing authority may in fact be in- co,.,..rt or wronK docs not affect the position that in law the said order has been passed by an appropriate authority and the
as~essment made by it mu'lt he treatt>d as made under this Act. Whether or not an a.~sessment has hccn made under this Act will not depend on the cnrrf'ctness or accuracy of the order passed by the assessing authority.
There is a gen.ral prcsumption that there must be a remedy in 1he ordinary civil courts to a citizen claimin.rc that an amount has been recovered f om him illegally and such a remedy rould be held to be barred only on very clear and uQmistakahle indications to the conirary. The exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts to entf"rtain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relr.vant statute contains an express pro- vision tfl the effr.ct or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere fact that a
sper.ial st;iture provi,tr.s for certain rcmedi~ m.!y not by itself necessarily exclurle the jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal with a case brou~ht before it in respect of sor11e of the matters covered by the said statute.
There is no justification for the aot.sumption that if a deci•ion has been made by a taxin~ authority under the provisions of a taxing statute, its valirlitv can be cha1lcnged by a suit on the grnund that it is incorrect on merits and as such it can be claimed that the provisions of the ~aid statute have not been complied with. Non·compliance with the provisions of the stature mu't be non.compliance with such fundamental provisinns of the statute as would m<lkc the entire procee .. dings brfore the appropriate authority illegal and without j1~risdiction. If an appropriate authnrity ha5 acted in violation of thf' fundamrntal principles of judicial prOCt"durc, that may also tend to mlkc the proceedings illegal and void and that intirmi1y may affcrt <he validity of the order passed by the au:hority in question. It is case5 of this character where the 1 S.C.R.
defect or infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary cnntained in the relevant statute.
Secretary of State v. M1JBk .r, Oo., (1940) 67 I.A. 222 and Reliegh Investmmt Oo. Ltd. v. Governor General in Oouncil, (1947) 74 I.A. 50, relied on. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rri Kmhna Oownm Oo.
(1960) I Andhra W.R. 279, overruled. CtvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 315 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 16, 1960 of the Andhra
Pradesh -High Court in A.S.No~ 397 of 1957. A. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant. D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General for the State of Andhra Pradesh, T.V.R. Tatachari and P.D,
Menon, for the respondent. 1963. January 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by J96S Firm and l/luri Subboyya ci..11.1 I!! Sons 1M Stat.if Aodhro l'Taiksh GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The short question
Cajmdr•gadfra•. J. which arises in this appeal is whether the suit instituted by the appellant, Firm of Illury Subbayya Chetty & Sons, in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Kurnool, seeking to recover Rs. 8,349/- from the
respondent, the State of Andhra Pradesh, on the ground that the said amount had bren illegally recovered from it under the l\1adras General Sales . Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. IX of 1939) (hereinafter called
the Act) for the years 1952-54 is competent ornot ; and this question has to be determined in the light · of the scope and effect of section 18-A of the Act. 196! Firm and llluri .I066'!7ya ~·"'''' &
Sou v. Tiu Sra11 of bdh•a Pradull The appellant is a firm of mi;rchants carrying on commission agency and other business at Kurnool and as such, it purchases and ~els ground-nuts and
other goods on behalf of principles for commission. For the year l!J.~2-53 the Sales-tax authorities included in the appellant's taxable turnover an amount of Rs. 3,45,48'!/12/lO representing
groundnut sales and collected the tax on the total turnover from it in September, 1953 when the amount of the said tax was determined and duly adjusted. The said turnover of Rs. 3,45,488/12/10 in fact represented
sall'S of groundnuts and not purchases and tax was recovered from the appellant on the said amount illegally inasmuch as it is only on purchase of groundnuts that the tax is leviable. ru a result of
this illegal levy, the appellant had to pay Rs. 5.398/4/3 for the said year. Similarly, for the subsequent year. 1953-1954 the appellant had to pay an illegal tax of Rs. l,159/ll/9. In its plaint, the
appellant claimed to recover this amount together with interest@ It% per annum and that is how the claim was valued at Rs. 8,349/-. This claim was resisted by the respondent on two grounds. It was urged that the suit was incom-
petent having rc.-gard to the provisions of s. 18-A of the Act; and on the merits it was alleged that the transactions in r, ~ard to groundnuts on which s let· tax was levied and recovered from the appellant
were tran5actions of purchase and not of sale. In this connection, the respandent referred to the fact that the appellant itself had included the transaction in question in the return submitted by it in form A
and that it was making payments tentatively every month to be adju~t~d after the final assessment was made at the end of the year. Accordingly, the final adjustment was made in September and the total
amount due from the appellant duly recovered. Thus, the appellant h:iving voluntarily made the return and paid the taxes, it was not open to him to 1 S.C.R. contend that the transactions in regard to groundnuts
were not taxable under the Act. Besides, the appellant had not preferred an appeal either to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial faxes or to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal ; and so, it had
not availed itself of remedies provided by the Act. On these pleadings, the trial Court framed three principal issues. The first issue was whether the suit was barred bv s. 18-A of the Act; the second
was whether there had been excess collection of sales tax for the two years in question and if so, how much ? And the third issue was whether the appellant was estopped from questioning the validity ot the
assessment ? According to the trial court, the respon- dent had failed to prove its pleas against the appe- lla11t's claim and. so, it recorded findings in favour of the appellant in all the three issues. In the result,
a decree followed in favour of the appellant for the recovery of Rs. 6,558/- with interest @ 6% per annum from November 12, 1955 till the date of payment. This decree was challenged by the respondent
by preferring an appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It appeared that the decision of the said High Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Shri Krishna Cocoanut Co. (1 ), was in
favour of the view taken by the trial Court ; but the respondent urged before the High Court that tqe said decision was erroneous in , law and required reconsi- deration. That is why the respondent's appeal was
placed before a Full Bench of the High Court. The Full Bench has upheld the contentions raised by the respondent. It has held that in view of the provisions of s. 18-A of the Act, the suit is incompetent.
Alternatively, it has found that cin the merits, the claim made by the appellant was not justified. The result of these findings was that the respondent's appeal was allowed and the appellant's suit was dismissed
(I) (1960) I Andbra W.R. 279. Firm and /lluri Subbayya Chitty ti s …. Th, Stal1 of Andhra Prod.sh 196!1 Fimt at1d 111111i SubHJ)'• C/tdlJ & s.., '1 Ill S1o11 ef Aodkto P.od1Sli Gajnub_,…, J.
with costs. The appellant had filed cross-objections claiming additional interest on the decretal amount, but since its suit was held to be incompetent by the High Coun, its cross-objections failed and were
dismissed with costs. "It is against this decree that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave. Mr. Ranganathan Chctty for the appellant contends that the High Coun was in error in coming
to the conclusion that the appellant's suit was in- competent because he argues that the High Court has misjudged the effect of the provisions of s. 11!1-A. In dealing with the question whether Civil Courts'
jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there is a general presumption that there must be a remedy in the ordinary civil courts to a citizen claiming thiit
an amount has been recovered from him illegally and that such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indications to the contrary. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of
Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. The mere
fact that a special statute provides for certain re- medies may not by itself necessarily exclude the jurisdiction of the civil courts to deal with a case brought before it in respect of some of the matters
covered by the said statute. It is, therefore, necessary to enquire whether s. 18-A expressly or by necessary implication ex- cludes the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain
a suit like the present. Section 18-A provides that no suit or other proceeding shall, except as expressly provided in this Act. be instituted in any Court to set. aside or modify any assessment made under this
Act. It is common ground that th('re is no express provision made in the Act under which the present 1 S.C.R. suit can be said to have been filed, and so, it falls under the prohibition contained in this section. The
prohibition is express and unambiguous and there can be ne doubt on a fair construction of the section that a suit cannot be entertained by a civil court if, by instituting the suit, the plaintiff wants to set
a side or modify any assessment made under this Act. There is therefore, no difficulty in holding that this section excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of the suits covered by it. .
It is, however, urged by Mr. Chetty that if an order of assessment has been made illegally by the appropriate authority purporting to exercise its powers under the Act, such an assessment cannot be
said to be an assessment made under this Act. He contends that the words used are "any assessment made under this Act'~ and the section docs not cover cases of assessment which are purported to have been
made under this Act. In support of this argument he has referred us to the provisions of s. 17 (1) and s. 18 where any act done or purporting to be done under this Act is referred to. It would, however, be
noticed that having regard to the subject-matter of the provisions contained in ss. 17 ( l) and 18 it was obviously necessary to refer not only to acts done, but also to acts purporting to be done under this Act.
Section 17 ( l) is intended to bar certain procee- dings and s. 18 is intended to afford an indemnity and that is the reason why the legislature had to adopt the usual formula by referring to acts done
or purporting to be done. It was wholly.unnecessary to refer to cases of assessmenl purporting to have been made under this Act while enacting s. 18-A, because all assessments made under this Act would
attract the provisions of s. 18-A and that is all that the legislature intends s. 18-A to cover. The expression "any assessment made under this Act" is, -in our opinion, wide enough to cover all
19'3 Firm and ll/uri Subb•J!711 Chtl!JI fl s … y, 711' Stat1 of A.ndhra PtadJs!i CajaidragaJkar, J. 196J Fims and Jlluri s"""·1JJ11 Chtuy <1 …., Tli1 S141 .. f AN/lira P, .itU1~
assessments made by the appropriate authorities under this Act whether the said assessments arc correct or not. It is the activity of the assessing officer acting as such officer which is intended to be
protected and as soon as it is shown that exercising his jurisdiction and authority under this Act, an assessing officer has made an order of assessment that clearly falls within the scope of s.IS·A. The fact
that the order passed by the assessing authority may in fact be incorrect or wrong does not affect the position that in law, the said order has been passed by an appropriate authority and the assessment made
by it must be treated as made under this Act. Whether or not a,1 assessment has been made under this Act will not depend on the corrertness or the accuracy of the order passed by the assessing authority.
In determining the applicability of s.18-A, the only question to consider is: "ls the assessment sought co be set aside or modified by the suit instituted an assessment made under this Act or not?" It would be
extremely anomalous to hold that it is only an accurate and correct order of assessment which falls under s.18-A. Therefore, it seems to us that the orders of assessment challenged by the appellant in its suit
fall under s.18-A. In this connection, it is nccssary to emphasise that while providing for a bar to suits in ordinary civil courts in respect of matters covered by s. l 8-A, the legislature has taken the precaution of safeguard-
ing the citizens' rights by providing for adequate alternative remedies. Section 11 of the Act provides for appeals to such authority as may be prescribed; s.12 confers revisional jurisdiction on the authorities
speci~ed by it; s.12-A allows an appeal to the appellate Tribunal; s.l 2-B provides for a revision by the High Court under the cases specified in it; s. l 2-C provides for an appeal to the High Court; and s.12-D
lays down that petitions, applications and appeals to High Court should be heard by a Bench of not 1 S.C.R. less than two Judges. The matter can even be brought to this Court by way of a petition under Art. 136
of the Constitution. It would thus be seen that any dealer who is aggrieved by an order of assessment passed in respect of his transactions, can avail him- self of the remedies provided in that behalf by these
sections of the Act. It is in the light of these elaborate alternative remedies provided by the Act that the scope and effect of s.18-A must be judged. Thus considered, there can be no doubt t,hat where an
order of assessment has been made by an appropriate authority the provisions of this Act, any challenge to its correctness and any attempt either to have it set aside or modified must be made before the
appellate or the revisional forum prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Act. A suit instituted for that purpose would be barred under s. 18-A. The facts alleged by the appellant in this case
are somewhat unusual. The ·appellant itself made voluntary returns under the relevant prov.isions of the Act and included the groundnut transactions as taxable transactions. It was never alleged by the
appellant that the said transactions were transactions of sale and as such, not liable to be taxed under the Act. It is true that under s.5A(2) groundnut is made liable .to tax under s.3(1) only at the point of the
first purchase effected in the State by a dealer who is not exempt from taxation under s. 3(3), but at the rate of 2% on his turnover. When the appellant made its voluntary returns and paid the tax in
advance to be adjusted at the end of the year from time to time, it treated the groundnut transactions as taxable under s.5A(2). In other words, the appellant itself having conceded the taxable character of the
transactions in question, no occasion arose for the taxing authority to consider whether the said transac- tions could be taxed or not; and even after th'! impugned orders of assessment
were made, the appellant did not choose to file an appeal and urge Firm and llluri Subba_vya Clutty & v. 1he State Df Amlhra Pratksh Gajmdragadkar, J. Fi"" and llt.ri s~,. a..11.1 et
s…. Tlit Sto11 of A•dllt• Prad11ll Gajnubqttlk.r, J. before the appellate authority that the transactions were sale transactions and as such, were outside the purview of s.5A(2). If the appellant had urged that
the said transactions were outside the purview of the Act and the taxing authority in the first instance had rejected that contention, there would be no doubt that the decision of the taxing authority would be
final, subject, of course, to the appeals and revisions provided for by the Act. The position of the appellant cannot be any better because it did not raise any such contention in the assessment proceed-
ings under the Act. If the order made by the taxing authority under the relevant provisions nf the Act in a case where the taxable character of the transaction is disputed is final and cannot be challenged in a
civil court by a separate suit, the position would be just the same where the taxable character of the transaction is not even disputed by the dealer who accepts the order for the purpose of the Act and then
institutes a suit to set it aside or to modify it. The question about the exclusion of the juris- diction of the civil courts to entertain civil actions by virtue of specific provisions contained in special
statutes has been judicially considered on several occasions. We may in this connection refer to two decisions of the Privy Council. In Secretary of State v. Mask. &: Coy., (1) the Privy Council was dealing
with the effect of the provisions contained in s. 188 ol the Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878). The relevant portion of the said section provides that every order passed in apral under this section shall, subject to
the power o revision conferred by s. 191, be final. Dealing with the question about the effect of this provision, the Privy Council observed that it is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil
courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clear- ly implied. Lord Thankerton who delivered the opinion of the Board, however, proceeded to add that
(I) (19t0) 67 I.A. 222, J!6. IS.C.R. "it is also well-settled that that even if jurisdiction is. so excluded, the civil courts .have jurisdiction to_ examine into cases where the provisions of the Act
have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the funda· mental principles of judicial procedure." It is nece-_ ssary to add that these observations, though made in
·somewhat wide terms, do not justify the assumption that if a decision has been made by a taxing autho- rity under the provisions of the relevant taxing statute, its validity can be challenged by a suit on
the ground that it is incorrect on the merits and as such, it can be claimed that the provisions of the said statute have not been complied with. Non-compli- ance with the provisions of the statute to which
reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non-compliance with such fundamental provisions of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal
and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appro- priate authority has acted in violation of the funda- mental principles of judicial procedure, that mav also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void
and this infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in
law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstand- ing a provision to the contrary contained in the rele-
vant statute. In what cases such a plea would succeed it is unnecessary for us to decide in the present appeal because we have no doubt that the conten- tion of the appellant that on the merits, the decision
of the assessing authority was wrong, cannot be the subject-matter of a suit because s. 18-A clearly bars such a claim in the civil courts. The next decision to which reference may be
made was pronounced by the Privy Council in the Firm and llluri Subbay1a C~ll,J & ~ons v. 1ht State of Andhra Pradesh Gajendragadlcar, J. Firm and lll11ri Suh61l)'" Chi· t>' 8! So"' .
T 11t Sta11 of Andhra P1adull case of Releigh I nve8tment Coy. Ltd. v. GoVt,rrwr- General in Council('). In that case the effect of s. 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act fell to be considered. The
said section, inter alia, provides that no suit shall be brought in any civil court to set aside or modify any assessment made under this Act. lt would be noticed that the words used in this section are exactly similar
to the words used in s. 18-A with which we are con· cerned. In determining the effect of s. 67, the Privy Council considered the scheme of the Act by parti · cular reference to the machinery provided by the Act
which enables an assessec effectively to raise in courts the question whcth~r a particular provision of the Income-tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra-vires. The presence of such machinery
observed the judgment, though by no means conclu· ~ive, marches with a construction of the section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to enquire into the same subject-matter. It is true that the judgment
shows that the Privy Council took the view that even the constitutional validity of the taxing provision can be challenged by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Income-tax Act; and this assumption presum·
ably proceeded on the basis that if an asscssee wants to challenge the vires of the taxing provision on which an assessment is purported to be made against him, it would be open to him to raise that point
before the taxing authority and take it for a decision before the High Court under s. 66 ( 1) of the Act. It is not necessary for us to consider whether this assum· ption is well founded or not. But the presence of the
alternative machinery by way of appeals which a particular statute provides to a party aggrieved by the assessment order on the merits, is a relevant consideration and that consideration is satisfied by
the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal. The clause "assessment made under this Act" which occurs in s. 18-A also occurs in s. 67 with _(II (19t7) 741.A. 50, 68.
1 S.C.R. whicn the Privy Council was concerned, and in construing the said clause, the Privy Council observed that "the phrase "made und~r this Act" describes the provenance of the assessment : it does not relate to its
accuracy in point of law. The use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test." These two Privy Council's decisions support the conclusion that having regard to the scheme of
the Act, s. 18-A must be deemed to exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain claim1 like the present. In the result, we must hold that the view taken by the High Court is right and so, the appeal fails
and is dismissed. There would be no order as to '°'''· Appeal diamisaed. KISHAN CHANDER STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (P. B. GAJENDBA.GA.DKAB, K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYA.TULLA.H, K. C. DAB GUPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Ultra Virea-Principle of-001Mlitution of Ind · Arla. 13, '19, 21,-The United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) Gambling Act, samvat 2006 (Madhya Bharat Act No. 61of1949), ss. 6, 8.
The three appcllanta with five others were tried for offenceo under s. 4of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) Gamblin~ Act and sentenced to imprison- ment. The Scssioiu Judge rejected their ''""'lCals. The High Firm and llluri
Subbay_1a Chetty & Sons v. I he State of Andhra Pradesh Gajtndr11gadkar1 J. January, 25.