Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
6. One of the features available to users on Google Maps is the ability of users to drop a ‘PIN’ on a location of their choosing on the map. Dropping a PIN, allows the user to mark or identify a location on the map without necessarily requiring access to the user’s location data. Users may drop a PIN either on the mobile application or on the web browser. To drop a PIN, a user may either: [2024] 7 S.C.R. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors. a. press and hold the desired location where the PIN is to be dropped on the map on the mobile application; or b. click on the desired location on the map on a web browser.
7. Upon dropping the PIN, the user dropping the PIN can identify the specific coordinates of the location on the map. Through the Google Maps app or through a web browser, the user dropping the PIN may opt to get directions to the location, mark the location with a label, add a business address to the location, or share the location with another user.
8. The PIN identifies and marks a specific location of the user’s choosing on Google Maps. The PIN need not be dropped at the location where the user/the user’s device is located at the time of sharing the PIN. The PIN dropped and shared need not be the real-time location of the user sharing the PIN.
9. Google Maps allows users to share information, such as the PIN, with third parties. This is explained in Google’s privacy policy, which is available at https:policies.google. com/privacy?hI=en-US, and shares as follows: “Many of our services let you share information with other people, and you have control over how you share [emphasis supplied]”. Users consent to the privacy policy when they create a Google Account. In this case, if a user wants to share a PIN, they can do so by clicking on the ‘share’ button. This generates a link to Google Maps that the user can share with others through messaging platforms or other modes of online communication. When clicked, the link directs users (having access to the link) to the location where the PIN was dropped on the map.
10. The Google Maps PIN feature, which includes the creation of a PIN or the sharing of such a PIN with another user, does not impinge on the user’s privacy as the user has full control over sharing of such information. The user with access to the link can only access the static 110 location pinned and shared on Google Maps. The pinned location does not enable real-time tracking of the user or their device. Even if the PIN were to coincide with a user’s location at a given time, this would (a) be the static location pinned by the user; and (b) only be accessible to others when a user affirmatively shares the PIN with them by clicking on the share button.” (emphasis added) 10.1. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit, Google LLC stated that the user has full control over sharing PINs with other users. Moreover, it does not impinge on the user’s privacy, as the user retains full control. Most importantly, it is stated that the PIN location does not enable real-time tracking of the user or the user’s device. Therefore, the condition of the accused dropping a pin on Google Maps, as it stands, is completely redundant as the same does not help the first respondent. 10.2. Imposing any bail condition which enables the Police/ Investigation Agency to track every movement of the accused released on bail by using any technology or otherwise would undoubtedly violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21. In this case, the condition of dropping a PIN on Google Maps has been incorporated without even considering the technical effect of dropping a PIN and the relevance of the said condition as a condition of bail. This cannot be a condition of bail. The condition deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. In some cases, this Court may have imposed a similar condition. But in those cases, this Court was not called upon to decide the issue of the effect and legality of such a condition. THE CONDITION OF FURNISHING CERTIFICATE OF THE EMBASSY
11. Now, we come to the decision of the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee1 relied upon by the High Court. In the first part of paragraph 15, the prayers made in the petition filed before this Court have been set out. We are quoting the relevant part of paragraph 15, which reads thus: [2024] 7 S.C.R. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors. “15. But the main reason which motivated the Supreme Court Legal Aid Society to file this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was the delay in the disposal of cases under the Act involving foreigners. The reliefs claimed included a direction to treat further detention of foreigners, who were languishing in jails as undertrials under the Act for a period exceeding two years, as void or in any case they be released on bail and it was further submitted by counsel that their cases be given priority over others. When the petition came up for admission it was pointed out to counsel that such an invidious distinction between similarly situate undertrials who are citizens of this country and who are foreigners may not be permissible under the Constitution and even if priority is accorded to the cases of foreigners it may have the effect of foreigners being permitted to jump the queue and slide down cases of citizens even if their cases are old and pending since long. Counsel immediately realised that such a distinction if drawn would result in cases of Indian citizens being further delayed at the behest of foreigners, a procedure which may not be consistent with law. He, therefore, rightly sought permission to amend the cause-title and prayer clauses of the petition which was permitted. In substance the petitioner now prays that all undertrials who are in jail for the commission of any offence or offences under the Act for a period exceeding two years on account of the delay in the disposal of cases lodged against them should be forthwith released from jail declaring their further detention to be illegal and void and pending decision of this Court on the said larger issue, they should in any case be released on bail. ………….” (emphasis added) In the same paragraph 15, directions have been issued which read thus: “We, therefore, direct as under: (i) Where the undertrial is accused of an offence(s) under the Act prescribing a punishment of imprisonment of five years 112 or less and fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail for a period which is not less than half the punishment provided for the offence with which he is charged and where he is charged with more than one offence, the offence providing the highest punishment. If the offence with which he is charged prescribes the maximum fine, the bail amount shall be 50% of the said amount with two sureties for like amount. If the maximum fine is not prescribed bail shall be to the satisfaction of the Special Judge concerned with two sureties for like amount. (ii) Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under the Act providing for punishment exceeding five years and fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail on the term set out in (i) above provided that his bail amount shall in no case be less than Rs 50,000 with two sureties for like amount. (iii) Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of ten years and a minimum fine of Rupees one lakh, such an undertrial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail for not less than five years provided, he furnishes bail in the sum of Rupees one lakh with two sureties for like amount. (iv) Where an undertrial accused is charged for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 31 and 31-A of the Act, such an undertrial shall not be entitled to be released on bail by virtue of this order. The directives in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above shall be subject to the following general conditions: [2024] 7 S.C.R. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors. (i) The undertrial accused entitled to be released on bail shall deposit his passport with the learned Judge of the Special Court concerned and if he does not hold a passport, he shall file an affidavit to that effect in the form that may be prescribed by the learned Special Judge. In the latter case the learned Special Judge will, if he has reason to doubt the accuracy of the statement, write to the Passport Officer concerned to verify the statement and the Passport Officer shall verify his record and send a reply within three weeks. If he fails to reply within the said time, the learned Special Judge will be entitled to act on the statement of the undertrial accused; (ii) the undertrial accused shall on being released on bail present himself at the police station which has prosecuted him at least once in a month in the case of those covered under clause (i), once in a fortnight in the case of those covered under clause (ii) and once in a week in the case of those covered by clause (iii), unless leave of absence is obtained in advance from the Special Judge concerned; (iii) the benefit of the direction in clauses (ii) and (iii) shall not be available to those accused persons who are, in the opinion of the learned Special Judge, for reasons to be stated in writing, likely to tamper with evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses; (iv) in the case of undertrial accused who are foreigners, the Special Judge shall, besides impounding their passports, insist on a certificate of assurance from the Embassy/ High Commission of the country to which the foreigner-accused belongs, that the said accused shall not leave the country and shall appear before the Special Court as and when required; 114 (v) the undertrial accused shall not leave the area in relation to which the Special Court is constituted except with the permission of the learned Special Judge; (vi) the undertrial accused may furnish bail by depositing cash equal to the bail amount; (vii) the Special Judge will be at liberty to cancel bail if any of the above conditions are violated or a case for cancellation of bail is otherwise made out; and (viii) after the release of the undertrial accused pursuant to this order, the cases of those undertrials who have not been released and are in jail will be accorded priority and the Special Court will proceed with them as provided in Section 309 of the Code.” (emphasis added) However, paragraph 16 is relevant, which reads thus: “16. We may state that the above are intended to operate as one-time directions for cases in which the accused persons are in jail and their trials are delayed. They are not intended to interfere with the Special Court’s power to grant bail under Section 37 of the Act. The Special Court will be free to exercise that power keeping in view the complaint of inordinate delay in the disposal of the pending cases. The Special Court will, notwithstanding the directions, be free to cancel bail if the accused is found to be misusing it and grounds for cancellation of bail exist. Lastly, we grant liberty to apply in case of any difficulty in the implementation of this order.” (emphasis added) 11.1. The directions contained in paragraph 15 were to operate as one-time directions applicable only to the pending cases of the accused who were in jail on the date of the judgment. These conditions were required to be incorporated in the order while releasing an accused on bail as a one-time measure. [2024] 7 S.C.R. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors. Paragraph 16 clarifies that if a bail application is made to the Special Court with a grievance regarding inordinate delay in the disposal of pending cases, the Special Court will be empowered to exercise power to grant bail in light of what is held in paragraph 15. Therefore, it is not necessary that in every case where bail is granted to an accused in an NDPS case who is a foreign national on the ground of long incarceration of more than 50% of the minimum sentence, the condition of obtaining a ‘certificate of assurance’ from the Embassy/High Commission should be incorporated. It will depend on the facts of each case.
12. Even if such a condition is incorporated, on an application made by the accused, the concerned Embassy/High Commission declines or fails to issue the certificate within a reasonable time, say within a period of seven days, the Court always has the power to dispense with the said condition. Grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/ High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom bail is granted. Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission does not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, as explained above, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to bail, cannot be denied bail on the ground that such a condition, which is impossible for the accused to comply with, has not been complied with. Hence, the Court will have to delete the condition. If the Embassy/High Commission records reasons for denying the certificate and the reasons are based on the adverse conduct of the accused based on material, the Court can always consider the reasons recorded while considering an application for dispensing with the condition. However, the Courts must remember that the accused has no right to compel the Embassy/High Commission to issue such a certificate. There can be very many reasons for recording adversely which again cannot be the basis to deny bail already granted. In such a case, instead of the condition of obtaining such a certificate, the condition of surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local police station/Trial Court can always be imposed, depending upon the facts of each case.
13. Coming to the facts of the case, bail has been granted to the appellant firstly on the ground that the appellant has been implicated based on statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, and that such statements are entirely inadmissible in view of the decision 116 of this Court in the case of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu 5. So, bail has been granted on merits as well. Secondly, the bail has also been granted relying upon what is held in paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee 1. As the bail was granted on merits by relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Tofan Singh 2, there was no reason for the High Court to have imposed all the onerous conditions incorporated in paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee 1.
14. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, we are of the view that it is not necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench for reconsideration of condition No. (iv) in paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee1.
15. Based on our findings on the two issues mentioned above, we direct that the two conditions in the order granting bail to the appellant, namely, obtaining a certificate from the Embassy/High Commission and dropping a pin of Google Maps, shall stand deleted.
16. The case shall be listed on 15 July 2024 for passing final orders after considering the compliances made by the appellant so far. Result of the case: Listed for final orders. †Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan [2020] 12 SCR 583 : (2021) 4 SCC 1