Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. The essential ingredients which need to be proved in· order to attract the offence of dowry death is as follows:- (i) Death is caused in unnatural circumstances. (ii) Death must have occurred within seven years of the marriage of the deceased. (iii) It needs to be shown that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
11. Coming to the first ingredient, the post mortem report suggests that the body of the deceased was bearing the mark of hanging and there is the indication of an injury mark 8 inches long around the neck. The cause of death was shock and asphyxia as a result of hanging. There are also unexplained H traces of scratches around the neck region. This raises serious G.V. SIDDARAMESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [H.L. DATIU, J.] doubts about the possibility of strangulation of the deceased, as opined by Dr. T. Parashuramappa PW-24. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the death was an unnatural death. The second ingredient is also proved as the marriage between the 'deceased took place on 13.12.1997 and the death of the deceased took place on 17.1.998, which is within the 7 year timeframe.
12. To prove the third ingredient, we need to peruse the testimony of the witnesses. The complainant PW-1 asserts that the appellant and his family demanded 20 tolas of gold, Rs. 2 c lakhs in cash and a motorcycle as dowry. Ultimately as negotiations progressed, the money was settled at Rs. 1,65,000 in cash, 18 tolas of gold and a motorcycle. These demands were met by the complainant. Also against the will of the family of the deceased, the deceased was taken to her matrimonial home on 15.1.1998, which coincided with Pushyamasa, which is considered as an inauspicious time by the family of the deceased. There is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the complainant, as the appellant himself in his statement under Secti9n 313 of Cr.PC has stated, that, there were negotiations taking place as to the amount of money and gold, which will change hands during ·the course of the marriage, but he is unclear as to the place where the negotiations took place.
The brother and sister of the deceased also testify this fact. In addition to this, Umapathy, a friend of the family of the deceased PW-10, M.G Shankarappa PW-15, Maheshwaraiah PW-16 also testified that there were indeed serious negotiations which took place as to the amount of dowry prior to the marriage. The prosecution also brought on record the testimony of Narayan PW-6, the goldsmith who testified that 18 tolas of gold were given to him by the complainant to prepare various ornaments like bangles, mangalya chain, ear hangings, nose rings etc for the bride. Some of these ornaments were recovered during the investigation and some were found on the body of the deceased. The prosecution has also established A through Karibasappa PW-2 that he was instrumental in arranging a loan of Rs. 50,000/- from his friend Shivakumar who in turn had withdrawn money from Andhra Bank and in this regard, .the receipt has also· been produced.
Umapathy PW- 10, Maheshwariah PW-16 and Shivakumar PW-9 have also s stated being present at the medical store of the appellant, where the money to the tune of Rs. 1,65,000/- changed hands. Therefore, there is no doubt that there was a demand for dowry prior to .the death of the deceased, which was met by the family of the deceased. c
13. Karibasamma PW-3, the elder sister of the deceased has also stated in her evidence that when she went to the matrimonial house of the deceased on 17.1.1998, the deceased confided in her that there is further demand of Rs. 50,000/- by way of dowry by the appellant, and on account of D the failure to meet the demand, she is being treated with cruelty and is harassed physically and mentally. She has also stated that the deceased also requested her elder sister not to disclose these developments to their father as he had health problems related to high blood pressure. When the brother of E the deceased Karibasappa PW-2, went to the house of the deceased, he also came back with the same version. The testimony of these two witnesses is consistent and very clear that the deceased was indeed mentally disturbed, the day she committed suicide by hanging herself. Cruelty can either be F mental or physical.
It is difficult to straightjacket the term cruelty by means of a definition, because cruelty is a relative term. What constitutes cruelty for one person may not constitute cruelty for another person. This court h the case of V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (AIR 1994 SC 710), has observed that mental G cruelty is such that if the wronged party continues to stay with his/her spouse there is reasonable apprehension of injury to the wronged party. The circumstances surrounding the present case, where there was pressure on the deceased to arrange a further sum of Rs~ 50,000/- and the consequent misdemeanor H on the part of the appellant no doubt puts serious apprehension G.V. SIDDARAMESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [H.L. DATTU, J.] on the mind of the deceased, that, if she continues to stay with the appellant, she might be assaulted physically and mentally. It is difficult how diffen?nt people react to different situations . .The threats by the husband of the deceased over the course of two days, when the deceased was in her matrimonial home might have. been enough for the deceased who was in a fragile state of mind to reach breaking point and end her life. Therefore all the ingredients of Section 304-8 have been satisfied, pointing towards the guilt of the appellant.
14. Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act raises a C presumption against the accused and reads :- "When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a women and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any D ·demand for dowry; the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation – For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section 3048 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
15. A reading of Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act shows that there must be material to show that soon before the death of woman, such woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry, then only a presumption can be drawn that a person has committed the dowry death of a women. It is then up to the appellant to discharge this presumption. The appellant however has not brought on record anything substantial to dispel the theory of the prosecution. In fact, while filing application for grant of bail, G . the appellant had stated that the deceased was having an affair with another person before her marriage and since she,ppul<;i '. not marry him, she was in distress and, therefore, committed suicide. However there was no evidence brought on record to prove this theory. Further in his statement under Section 313 H [201 O] 2 S.C.R. of Cr.P.C. he has stated that the deceased was not happy with the house of the appellant and stated that the house of her sister and father were bigger and better.
Further his theory of intimating the police and lodging a complaint before the Sub- Inspector of the Police Station at 12.30 AM fails as he had . closed his shop at around 10.30 PM. After that by his own admission, he went and informed the sister of the deceased and then went outside the town to bring his father before lodging the complaint. Therefore, it is very much likely that the accused after witnessing the dead body of the deceased tried to hush . C up the matter and went to the Police Station much later. If this theory is to be true, this.brings the suspicious behaviour of the appellant more to light, as the natural reaction to seeing the dead body of a wife who had come to her matrimonial home only 2 days earlier would be that of disbelief or shock. Instead by his own admission, he went and informed the/sister of the deceased. The prosecution witnesses have also testified that the appellant came to the paternal house of the deceased and made a statement to the effect that it would be detrimental to both the families if a complaint was to be lodged and to bury the 1pa$t.
The appellant has also not produced anything on record to dispel the theory of the prosecution that there was a further demand of Rs. 50,000/- on his part. He has also failed to prove that there were demands for dowry immediately before the marriage and there were negotiations which took place involving both the families. All these circumstances point to the fact that the appellant has not rebutted or discharged the presumption. Therefore we have no doubt in holding that the appellant is guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304- B of the IPC, for being responsible for the death of his wife.
16. On the point of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the appellant is in jail for more than si)_( years. The appellant was young at the time of incident and therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court may be modified. In so far as sentencing under the section is concerned, a three Judge Bench of this G V. SIDDARAMESH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [H.L. DATIU, J.] court in the case of Hemchand v. State of Haryana, has observed that "Section 304-B merely raises a presumption of dowry death and lays down that the minimum sentence should be 7 years, but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be used in rare cases and not in every case." Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, this court reduced the sentence from life imprisonment awarded by the High Court to 10 years R.1 on the above principle.
17. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and c circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly convicted under Section 304-B IPC. However, his sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears to us to be excessive. The appellant is a young man and has already undergone 6 years of imprisonment after being convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10years rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are confirmed. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modifica~on of sentence. N.J. Appeal partly dismissed.