Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
15. Thereafter, the larger Bench proceeded to observe thus: "An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1 )(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the [2014] 11 S.C.R. • document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance· of a · private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. c The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large."
16. On the base of aforesaid ratiocination, the Constitution D Bench approved the principle laid down in Sachidanand Singh (supra) by stating thus: "In view of the di~cussion made above, we are of the. opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 19591)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis " In view of the aforesaid the law laid down in Gopalkrishna Menon (supra) is no more good law.
17. Be it stated, the Constitution Bench repelled the argument of strict construction and distinguishing many a decision, came to hold that Section 195 is not a penal provision but is a part of procedural law, namely, CrPC, which elaborately gives a procedure for trial of criminal cases. Proceeding H further, their Lordships held that the provision only creates a bar : GEORGE BHAKTAN v. RABINDRA LELE against taking cognizance of an offence in certain specified situations except upon complaint by Court and a penal statute is one upon which an action for penalties can be brought by a public officer or by a person aggrieved and a penal act in its wider sense includes every statute creating an offence against the State, whatever is the character of the penalty ·for the offence.
18. Dealing with the argument that there should be no conflict in the findings recorded by the civil and criminal court, the Constitution Bench referred to earlier Constitution Bench decision in M.S. Sheriff V. State of Madras12 and declined to accept the said submission.
19. Eventually, taking note of the facts in that case, the Court held the Will in question had been produced in the Court subsequently and there was no allegation that the offence as enumerated in Section 195(1)(b){ii) was committed in respect of the said Will after it had been produced or filed in the Court, the bar created by the said provision would not come into play and hence, there was no embargo on the power of the court to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint filed by the complainants therein.
20. In the case at hand, as we find, the allegation in the complaint is that the respondents had forged the signature of the complainant and submitted to the Corporation seeking extension of the period of supply. Thereafter, seeking certain relief a suit was filed and in the suit the document was filed. There is no allegation that this document was forged when the matter was subjudice before the Civil Court. Thus, the dicta of the Constitution Bench is squarely applicable. The High Court has clearly erred in relying on the principle stated in Gopalakrishna Menon's case (supra) which makes the impugned order wholly indefensible. 12. 1954 SCR 1144 ..
21. We have already taken note of the submission of Mr. Rao that the High Court has not adverted to the factual score whether a case has been made out on the basis of the material brought on record. In the absence of any findings in that regard by the High Court, we do not intend to take up the burden on B ourselves. That makes it obligatory on our part to set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the matter to it for fresh consideration whether in the obtaining factual matrix the order of cognizance deserves to be lancinated. We would request the High Court to dispose of the petition within a period c of three months as the matter has been continuing for long. We may hasten to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
22. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order passed 0 by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal allowed.