Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. To prove the second circumstance, the prosecution firstly relied upon the evidence of P.W. 26 and P.W.7. P.W.26 testified that in presence of Mariamuthu (P.W. 7), The Village Administrative Officer, and K. Anumugam C he seized a HMT wrist watch with the word 'Cheran' engraved thereon (M.0.1 ), which was found near the dead body of Moorthy under a memo (Ext. P.6). The above testimony of P.W. 26 stands corroborated by that of P.W. 7 and the seizure memo, contemporaneously prepared. The evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the above recovery was not challenged by the defence. Next, to prove that the seized wrist watch belonged to the appellant, D the prosecution examined Sabesan (P.W 11), who is a resident of the same village and at the material time was working as a bus-conductor in Jeeva Transport Corporation. He testified that his uncle gave him a HMT wrist watch with the word. 'Cheran' written thereon, which he (his uncle) had purchased from a worker ofCheran Transport Corporation. After he (P.W. 11) E had used the wrist watch for 2/3 years he sold it to the appellant, whom he knew from before, for Rs. 240/- about two years before the incident. He identified M.O. I as the wrist watch which he sold to him. P.W. 11 was cross- examined at length but nothing could be elicited to discredit him. Rather, it was elicited that 10/15 days prior to the incident he had seen the appellant ~~thes~.
12. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 11 principally on the ground that he did not furnish any receipt regarding purchase of the wrist watch by his uncle or sale to the appellant nor could he give the number of the wrist watch. According to the trial Court, since any person could have G owned that wrist watch and could be present at the scene of crime, recovery of the same did not and could not incriminate the appellant. The above reasons are, to say the least, untenable. It is a matter of common knowledge that a person has any uncanny sense of identifying his own belongings, particularly articles of regular personal use. The trial Court was, therefore, not at all justified in discarding the assertion of P. W. 11, who admittedly bore no H A animus against the appellant, that the wrist watch (M.O. I) earlier belonged to him . While on this point it is pertinent to mention that the word 'Cheran' engraved in M.O. I unmistakably supported P.W. 11 's version. Equally unjustified was the trial Court in disbelieving his fu1ther assertion that he sold the wrist watch to th(; appellant for absence of receipt relating to the sale or B purchase of the same for it is also common knowledge that in such petty transactions in villages no body insists thereupon. It must, therefore, be said that the prosecution has been able to fim1ly establish that the wrist watch found at the place of occurrence belonged to the appellant.
13. That brings us to the third circumstance. P.W. 27, the Inspector of C Police, who took up the investigation of the case on June 4, 1984 from P.W. 26, testified that on that day he arrested the appellant at Pullyampatty bus stop and seized a blood stained lungi (M.O. 19) and a promissory note (M.0. 20) in presence of witnesses one of whom was Murugesan (P.W. 9), a Revenue Inspector. The evidence of P.W. 9 and the seizure memo (Ext. P-8) fully corroborate the evidence of P. W. 27 in this respect and the report of the D Chemical Examiner show that th(\ lungi contained human blood. It is of course true that the Serologist could not give any definite opinion as to its blood group due to disintegration but absence thereof does not in any way affect the prosecution case. In discarding the evidence regarding recovery of the hand note the trial court observed that the hand-writing expert could not give E any definite opinion that the signature appearing thereon was that of the appellant but it failed to consider that when the factum of the above recovery is read along with the admission made by the appellant before P.W. I of his having been coerced by Nagamalai to execute a hand note in his favour the recovery of the hand note is a strong incriminating circumstance against him.
14. Having found that the first three circumstances stand firmly established we turn our attention to the last circumstance. As earlier noticed, the appellant was apprehended by P.W. 27 on June 4, 1984 in presence of P.W.9 and one Arumugam. According to P.W. 27, after his arrest the appellant made a statement which he recorded in presence of the above witnesses. The G statement (Ext. P-7), to the extent it is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, was to the effect that if permitted he would identify and hand over the cycle, torch light, gunny bag and aruval. After making the statement, the appellant led them to the house of P. W.14 in village Arasur. Reaching there he brought out, from the house of P.W. 14 a cycle (M.O. 21), a gunny bag (M.0.23), a torch light (M.O. 18) and an aruval (M.0.22) . In presence H of the witnesses, namely, P.W. 9 and Arumugam P.W. 27 seized those articles ,>… ….. .,_ j… GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] under a memo which was attested by both of them. P. W. 27 further stated that A he sent the seized articles, including the aruval for chemicals analysis .
15. While supporting the testimony of P.W. 27, P.W. '>, who is an independent witness, stated that in his presence and that of Arumugam the Inspector (P.W. 27) interrogated the appellant. In course of the interrogation the appellant stated that he would identify and hand over the aruval and cycle if taken to Arasur and the statement so made was recorded by P.W. 27 (Ext. P. 7) and attested by him and Arumugam. He next stated that after the blood stained lungi and promissory note were seized (about which we have discussed earlier) he along with P.W. 27, the appellant and Arumugam proceeded to Arasur where the appellant identified the house of astrologer c Marimuthu (P.W.14). From that house he took out a cycle with a gunny bag tied in the carrier of the cycle. In that gunny bag one aruval and one torch light were found. In cross-examination he stated that the aruva/ was found to be blood stained. He denied the defence suggestion that he was deposing falsely at the instance 9f the police.
16. In his evidence P.W. 14 stated that on May 31, 1984 at or about 7 A.M. the appellant came to his house on a cycle and sought his professional advice for which he gave him Rs. 2/-. The appellant then left his house leaving behind his cycle and the gunny bag stating that he would take them back in the evening. When he asked about the contents of the gunny bag he told E him that there were some coirs in it. The appellant, however did not return as promised, but after four days he came to his house accompanied by the police. After entering his house the appellant took out the cycle and the gunny bag and brought out one aruval and a torch light therefrom. This witness was cross-examined at length but nothing could be elicited to discredit him. This witness hails from a different village altogether and there is nothing F to suggest even as to why he would depose falsely against the appellant whom he did not know from before.
The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.W. 14 on the grounds that it was not expected of him to remember each of the 20-40 persons who used to come daily to seek his advice and that, admittedly, he did not keep any account of his professional activities. In o~r . G considered view both the grounds are wholly unsustainable; the former is factually incorrect, in that he (P.W. 14) stated that on an average 5-10 persons came daily to seek his advice and so far as the second one is concerned, it was not expected of P.W. 14 who was earning his livelihood in a village as an astrologer charging Rs. 2/- per person, to keep accounts of his income. Having carefully gone through the evidence of P.Ws. 27, 9 and 14 we have H [1998) 2 S.C.R. A no hesitation in concluding that the prosecution has been able to conclusively prove that pursuant to the statement of the appellant that he would hand over the aruval, it was recovered from the house of P.W.14.
The reports of the Chemical Examiner show that the seized aruval contained human blood of group 'B' and the blood seized from the spot where the dead bodies were B lying was also of group 'B'. The fourth circumstance, thus, also stands cogently established.
17. When the above four circumstances, each of which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant, are taken cumulatively, there is no escape from the conclusion that they are consistent only with the hypothesis C of the guilt of the appellant and wholly inconsistent with his innocence. We, therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the High Court.
18. Lastly, comes the question of sentence. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the present case did not fall in the category of 'rarest of rare cases' D justifying imposing the extreme penalty of death. According to him, the mere fact that the appellant committed five murders cannot be made a ground for imposition of death sentence. In making the above submission he strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P, AIR (1995) SC 1748, wherein it was observed that a large number of deaths E on one side cannot ipso facto be a ground to bring the case into the category of 'rarest of rare cases'. He also relied upon some other judgments of this Court wherein sentences of death were commuted. To avoid prolixity we refrain from referring to those cases as they turned on their own facts. In responding to the above contention of Mr. Mukherjee, Mr. Pragasam relied upon the observations recorded by the High Court while imposing the death F sentence.
19. From the impugned judgment we find that the High Court first discussed the principles laid down by this Court, for imposing death sentence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1980) S.C. 898, and other cases and then stated as under :- "Now, we are going to consider the law laid down by the Apex Court of our land in the above rulings with reference to the present case on hand. Admittedly, as seen from the facts and circumstances of the case, the following are proved beyond doubt : (1) There is no provocation or any quarrel between the accused and GOVINDASAMI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] the five deceased. All the five deceased were unanned and sleeping A during midnight and also they were helpless. There was no scope or chance for them to face the attack. (2) It is proved beyond doubt that it was a pre-meditated one, but not on account of any sudden provocation. (3) There is no mental derangement for the accused to kill 5 human B beings in five strokes one after another and they were killed during the course of their sleep. (4) The nature and the manner in which the accused committed the five murders found to be gruesome, calculated, heinous, atrocious and cold-blooded murder. Accordingly, in the above circumstances, it is proved beyond doubt that the said heinous and calculated offence committed by the respondent/accused in killing the 5 persons with five strokes one after the another is a rarest of the rare cases of the present age in this State as a whole. We are of the clear view that the way in which he cut the neck of five individuals, while they were sleeping during mid-night, is really a pre-meditated, atrocious and calculated murder. As such we are of the clear opinion that if a human being of this nature viz., the respondent /accused is allowed to continue to live in the present E society, there is great threat to the co-human beings. There is no safety or protection for the innocent, helpless, un-anned fellow human beings in the society. In view of the above special reason and the peculiar circumstances of the case on hand, we are of the clear view that it is just, proper, appropriate, fit and deserving case where the F capital punishment of death could be awarded to the respondent/ accused."
20. From the above quoted observations, it is seen that the High Court did not base its decision to impose the penalty of death solely on the fact that 5 persons were murdered but also other attendant circumstances relating G to the murders. Having given our anxious and deep consideration to this aspect of the matter we are in complete agreement with the reasons canvassed by the High Court to impose the capital punishment. We only wish to add that the brutal manner in which the appellant wiped out the entire family of his uncle [except one of his sons, (P.W.8) who, fortunately at the material time was studying in Coimbatore], obviously to grab his properties, has shocked H A our judicial conscience. Nonetheless we looked into the record to find out whether there was any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in favour of the appellant but found none. If, inspite thereof, we commute the death sentence to life imprisonment we will be yielding to spasmodic sentiment, unregulated benevolence and misplaced sympathy.
21. In Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [ 1987] 3 SCC 80, this Court, while refusing to commute the death sentence, observed:- "It will be mockery of justi~e to permit the accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the accused would be to render the justicing system of this country suspect . The common man will lose faith in courts. Jn such cases, he understands and appreciates the deterrence more· than the reformative jargon." As the above observations squarely apply in facts of the instant case D we uphold the sentence of death imposed upon the .appellant.
22. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. R.P. Appeal dismissed. r