IW/uJkrishM SitNuiMrtri Bai Tayt!G/li Dawood/JMi <l'fi"'41.,adk4r .1. JMJ o.i• "· llfr. Pathak faintly attempted to argue in the alternative that even if the appellant was acting on behalf of the disclosed principal it would be
entitled to sue because from the subsequent conduct of the parties a contract to the contrary could be reasonably inferred. Wo have, however, not allowed Mr. Pathak to argue this point. It was
conceded by the appellant before the Appell11.te Court that if it was held that the plain till' firm was acting as agent for Khaitan & Sons Ltd., the suit WM not maintainable. This concession was made
in view of the provisions of s. 236 of the Contract Act. Besides, the alternative plea which Mr. Pathak wanted to raise does not appear to have been expree.&ly pleaded or considered in the trial court.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this ce.se we direct that the parties should bear their own eoete in this Court . .Appeal di.nnissed. HARBANS SINGH AND ANOTHER
v. STATE OF PUNJAB (P. B. GAJENDB.AGADKAB, A. K. SABKAR, K. N. WANOHOO and K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Appeal agail&d tJ«JUittal-lflW/u…u by appellaU rourt, whtn ptrmiuibk-Dyfftg ~orroboralion, if neceut1ry.
Thr. High Court set aside the Trial Court's order of …< acquittal of the appellants and convictr.d them on a charge of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal by the appellants by special leave.
H•IJ., that this Court in its earlier decisions emphaaised that interference with an order of acquittal should be baaed only on "compelling and substantial reasons" and held that unless such reasons were present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal, but this Court did not try to curtail the powers of the appellate court .un~er s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though 1n •ts more
recent pronouncements this Court hid less emphasis on (1) s.c.R. "compelling reasons" the principle has remained the same. That principle is that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine the evidence with particular
care and must also examine the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should.interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting judge was clearly unreasonable. Once the Court came to the conclusion that the view of the lower court was unreasonable that itsel{ \\·as a "compelling rcasan" for interference.
Once it was found that the High Court applied the correct principles in setting aside the order of acquittal this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the High Court's order of conviction in appeal against acquittal o- enter into the evidence to ascertain whether the High Court was right in its view of the evidence.
Only such examination of the evidence would ordinarily be necessary as is needed to see that the High Court approached the question properly and applied the principle correctly. If the judgment of the High Court did not disclose a
careful examination of the evidence in coming to the conclu- sion that the view of the acquitting court was unreasonable or if it appeared that the High Court erred on questions of Jaw or misread the evidence or the judgment of the trial court, this Court would, unless the case was sent back to the High Court for re-hearing, appraise the evidence for itself to examine the reasons on which the lower r.ourt based its order of acquittal and then decide whether the High Courts view that the
conclusions of the lower court was unreasonable, Was correct. If on such examination it appeared to this Court that the view of the acquitting court was unreasonable the acquittal would be set aside and if on the other hal)d· it appeared that the view was not unreasonable the order of acquittal would be restored.
Suraj Pal Singh v. State, [1952) S.C.R. 191, Ajmer Singh v. State oJ Punjab, [1953]S.C.R. 418, Puran v. State of Punjab A.LR. 1953 S.C. 459, Ohinta v. State of M. P., Cr. A. No. 178 of 59 and Aahrajkha Haibatkha Palhan v. State of Bombay, Cr. A. No. 38 of 1960, referred to.
It was neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration should be corroborated by other evidence· before a conviction could be based thereon. Ram Nath v. Sia~ of M. P. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 420,
referred to. Khualial Ram v. State of Bombay, [19581 S.C.R. 552, followed. A dying declaration did not become 1'1'5 credible if a Rwnber of petson1 were names as culprits. lf~l Harhans Sin1h
v. Stall uj Punjab IHI H.,b…,8U.,h St•te •J hnjd Das Gu;i. J. 106 SUPID.."ME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Khurahaid 81W;ain. v. Emperor, (1941) 43 Cr.L.J. 59, held erroneous. CRIMINAL APPELLATE Jurusmc1·10:-1: Criminal
Appeal No. 115 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order <lated May 23, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 414 of 1957. N.C. Chatterjee. l .M. Lal,, C.L. Sareen and MolUJn
Lal Agaro:al, for the appellant.a. N. S. Bindra and P. D. 1'/enon, for the res- pondent. 1961. October 16. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J .-Six persons including the
present appellants were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge Ferozpur on several charges in connection with the death by homicidal injuries of two brothers Munshi Singh and Hazura Singh.
Of these eix. Bhag Singh wae the father of the other five accused persons. All the eix accused persons were acquitted by the Additional Seeeione Judge; on appeal by the State, the High Court of
Punjab set &aide the orders of acquittal in respect of Harbans Singh and Major Singh and convicted them under 11eOtion 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appeal was diemiseed in ~t
of the other four, viz., Bhag Singh, Guni, Bant Singh and Gian Singh. It is against this order of conviction that Harbans Singh and Major Singh have filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave from
this Court. The prosecution case ie that at about 8 or 9 P. M. on July 23, 1956, shortly afterMunshiSingh had returned home and complained to his father Hire. Singh about the conduct of Harbans Singh
and Bant Singh in abusing him. Munshi Singh ran out of his house on hearing some oriee ; but when he reaohed the Dharamahala. not far from his house (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
these two appellants, along with their father Bhag Singh and their brothers Bant Singh, Gian Singh and Gursi fell upon him and caused numerous injuries with the weapons which they
carried. Harbans Singh, it is said, struek Munshi Singh on the abdomen with a Sela in his hand. Munshi Singh's brother Hazura Singh and his father Hira Singh also had followed Munshi Singh
when he ran out ef the house. On seeing this attack on Munshi Singh, Hazura Singh tried to intervene, but he too was attacked and received several injuries. Harbans Singh, it is said, gave
him a Sela thrust in the abdomen. Munshi Singh died on the spot; Hazura Singh was brought to the hospital at Gidderbha the following morning and received sonie treatment but he also died of
hia injuries the following day, that is, the 24th .July. All the accused pleaded not guilty, the defence being that they had been falsely implicated out of Pnmity. To prove its case the prosecution relied on
the evidence of two persons, the deocascd's father Hira Singh and their uncle Bhag Singh and the dying declaration alleged to have been made by Hazura Singh, once in the village before Devondra
8ingh, the Sub-Inspector of Polioe who had come to the village that night in connection with some other investigation and for the second time at Gidderbha hospital before a Magistrate.
On a consideration of the evidence the Trial Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecution case had not been proved against any of the accused person. Being of opinion that the First Informa-
tion Report had been recorded as late as 4-30 P.M. on the 24th July he thought that "the complainant party was not able to say who the assailants were and the police was making time to find out the
culprits after investigation and the First Informa- tion Report was delayed on that account." He wae doubtful also a.bout the tnith of the Sub-Inspector' e Harbans Sinth State •f Punjab
Das Gupta J. 11161 HtulHlns Singh S1"11 •f Pu11JU Dos~]. 108 SUPR:ti!E u:>UBT REPORTR (1962] SUPP. story that he actually reaohed the village of occur- renoe on that very night and consequently doubtful
about any statement h"ving been made by Hazura Singh to him on that night. In any case, he thought Hazura Singh's dying declaration had little probative value because as many ae six persons
had been named and that it could not be relied upon witibout oorroboration. The lea.med Judge was a!Bo not satisfied that Bhag Singh (Prosecution Witneaa) "was present in the village or at his house
at the time of the occurrence" since "his statement waa not recorded in the Inquest Report prepared by the polioe at midnight". The learned Judge also thought it unsatisfactory that nobody other than
these two near relatives, that is, the father and uucle of the deceased persons had been examined as witne81168 of the occurrence. These were the main reasons for which he came to the conclusion thi.t
the case had not been proved against any of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and a.ocordingly am1uitted the aocused. The High Court was of opinion that the learned Judge was wholly "wrong in holding that
Bh~ Singh was not mentioned in the Inquest Report"; that he had mierea.d the time of the first Information Report as 4·30 P. 111. for 4-30 A. M. and that he was again in error in concluding that
"the Btatemtmt made by Hazura Singh to the police on their arrival at 1-15 A. M. was inadmissible". After pointing out these "errors" in the reasoning 0f the learned Trial Judge the High Court said:-
"We have no hesitation in concluding that for the said reasons the judgment of the learned Additional Sesaions Judge is wholly erroneous resulting in complete miscarriage of justice.
After having gone through the teatimony of both of the eye-witn- and eu.mining the other material, particularly the two dying (1) S.C.R. declarations, we are of the view that the prose-
cution case was substantially true and have been proved. As regards complicity of Harbans Singh and Major Singh, there appears to he no doubt. Both of them had been assigned par- ticipation and were responsible for the fatal
blow on each of the deceased. In this respect the testimony of both of the witnesses and the dying declarations are consistent. They are accordingly held guilty under section 302,
Indian Penal Code." The main contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court had no sufficient reasons for interfering with the order of acquittal made by the Additional Sessions Judge
and that the High Court itself had been guilty of "errors", especially as the High Court has misread the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and had attributed to him statements which
are not to be found in his judgment. The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against acquittal of a person has engaged the attention of this
Court from the very beginning. In many cases, especially the earlier ones, the Court has in laying down such principles emphasised the necessity of interference with an order of acquittal being based
only on "compelling and substantial reasons" and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal. (Vide Suraj Pal Singh v.
The State (1 ); Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab ('); Puran v. State of Punjab ('). The use of the words "compelling reasons" embanassed some of the High Courts in exercising their jurisdiction in appeals
against acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this Court had meant by t.he (I) [19521 S. C.R. 19+. 12) [1953] S. C.R. 418. (3) A. I. R. (1953) S. C. 459. /{arbans Singh
Sta ft of Pu'lj ai Das G'11p1a J. H .. t.,,, Sm,h v. SttlU of Punjo6 l'as Oiipta J. words "compelling reMonR". In later years the C',ourt hRs often avoided emphasis on "compelling
reason.~" but nonetheless adhered to the view ex- pressc d earlier that bf>fore interfering in appeal with an order of acquittal a Court must examine not only questions of law Rnd fact in all their
aspects but must. also closely and carefully examine the reasonA which imp(llled the lower courtll to acquit the accu~cd and should interfere only if sati8fied after such examination that the conclu-
sion reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable. (Vide Chinta v. Tiu>. StnU>. of Madhya PradMh( 1); Aslirafklta llaibatl·ha Pathan
v. The State of Bombay('). It iH c]P.ar that in emphasising in many eases the necessity of "compelling reasons" to justify an intcrfC'rcnec with an order of acquittal the Court ditl
not in any way try to curtail the power bestowed on ap1wllat<' c-ourts und"r s. 42:i of the Code of Criminal Procedure when hearing appcal11 against acquittal; but con.~cious of tho intense dislike in
our jurisprudence c1f the conviction of innocent persons and of the facts that in many syst<:>ms of jurisprudence the law cloes not provide :it all for any dppcal against iin onlcr of acquittal tlie Conrt was
anxious to imprrss c1n the appellate courts the importance of bestowing special care in the sifting of evidence in appeal agai'lst acquittals. As has already been pointed out less cmphai;is is boing given
in the moro recent pronouncrmcnts of this Court on "compelling rra.sons". But, on olosc analysis, it i~ clear that the principles laid down by the Court i11 this matter have remained the same. What may
be caller! the golden thr"a.d running throu~h nll these decisions is th11 rul" that in deciding appeals Rgainst acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine \I l Criminal Arpeal No. 178 or 1!)59 decided on 1°-11·60. (2l Criminnl Apptal No. 38nf1960 decided on 14·12-fiO.
(1) S.C.R. the evidence with particular care, must examine also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitt·
ing Judge ts clearly unreasonable. Onee the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower court is clearly an un· reasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason"
for interference. For, it is a court's duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so
established. Wht>n the High Court's judgment sho'll:S clearly that the matter h"8 been approached in the proper manner and the correct principles have been applied, there is very little scope for _this Court to
interfere with an order made by the High Court convicting an accused person in an appeal against acquittal. Once it is found that the principles laid down by this Court have been corri:ctly applied
thia Court will not ordinarily embark upon a re- appraisal of the evidence to ascertain whether the High Court was right in its view of the evidence. The only examination of the evidence that this
Court may find itself called upon to undertake will ordinarily be just so milch as is necessary to see whether tho High Court has approached the qnes· tion properly and applied the principles correctly.
The position may however be different if the judgment of the High Court while indicating its conclusion that in its opinion the view taken by the lower court is unreasonable does not disclose a
careful examination of the evidence for coming to such conclusion. Or it may appear Crom the High Court's judgment that the High ( ourt has erred on questions of law or has ob- viously misre'ld the evidence on the record or the
judgment of the Trial Court. What is this Court to do in such cases ? We are unable to agree Htu6t1111 Sb11h Sl•le of Punja• Das Gupta J. 11161 lla1ban1 Sineh v. Stalt of Punjab with Mr. Chatt<>rjre that th11 only proper course for
this Court to take is to set. aside the order made by the High Court nnrl restore the order of acquittal. For, even where the High Court's judgment sufft•rs from any of t he~e clefects it may very we II be
that the High Court's conclusion that the view of the low<'r eon rt is unrcngonab!f' is correct. P.rJ, nnleHs this Court thinks fit to sen<l the case baek to the High Com t for re-hearing of the appea I
1md its disposal in accordance with law, it becomes the <luty of this Court in eases like these which fortunately am likely to be few in number-to appraise the evi<lenc<' for itself, to examine the
reasonH on which the lower court based the orcler of acquittal and then dt·cidc whether the High Court's conclusion that the view taken by thP lo\wr Court. on the qut•stion of the guilt of t h11
accused is clearlv unreasonable, is correct. If sat.isfiprJ that the' view was clearly unreasonable, this Court is l.Jound to dismiss the appeal and to maintain the order of conviction made by the
High Court; if on the contrary, this Court iH not sati,fie1l on Ruch examin11tion that the conclusion reachccl. by the lower court that the guilt of the accused has not been proved was clearly nnreaHnn-
abl<', the orrlcr of acquittal would be restored. The ju<lgmcnt of the High Court in the p1 ('Hl'nt "'rnc docs not cont11in much discus~ion of the evidence in the case. All the rli~cussion of the
1>virknce i.i confine<! t-0 the few sentence• which we have quote<l earlier in thiR judgment. We alHo notice that the J.,arnc<l judg1•s of the High Court were under som•l misapprehe11sion
in thinking that the Acltlitional … essions Judge had held that Bhag Singh was not mentioned as a witness in the luljucst Report. What t.he Additional Sessions ,Judge ha<l p<iintcd out
was that Bhag Singh's statement hac\ not been recorded in the Inquest Report. The Additional SeBSions Judge was certainly right in this. While the High Court might have well thought that no dQubt again.~t
(l) S.C.R. the credibility of Bhag Singh should be based on thi> fact that his statement was not recorded, the High Court was not justified in attributing to the Trial Judge something which he did not say.
It i8 also not quite clear how the learned ,Judges said about the appellant Major Singh that he had been assigned participation and was responsible for the fatal blow on each of the deceased. In
fact,, neither of the two who claim to be the eye· wit1.rsses of the occurrence has said that Major 8ingh <lea.It a fat.a.I blow on either Hazura Singh or l\furlshi Singh. While it is true that a general state-
ment is made by both the witnesses as regards all the six accused having attacked both Munshi Singh and Hazura Singh neither of them has spoken of any particular injury having been caused by Major
.. Singh. Hazura Riugh himself in his dying declaration rlid s;iy that Major 8ingh gave him a Sela blow on his left wrist but does not speak of any oth<lr injury having be<m caused by
Major Singh either to him or to Munshi Singh except that he also said generally that all the accused gave blows on the person of Mmishi Singh. 'l'he High Court }ias therefore clearly misdirected
itself in. thinking that Major Singh was responsible for any ofthe fatal injuries. In view of all this we consider it necessary to examine tho judgment of the Trial Con rt and· also
the evidence on record ourselves for n propn cl<,ri· sion of this appenl. Turning .to tho judgm<'nt of the Trial Court we fmcl that the main circumstance which weighed with him for doubting the truth of the prosecution
3tory is what he considered the considerable delay in recording the First Information Report. From the printed record before us we find that Narendar Nath Moharrir Head Constable, who actually
entered the formal First Information Report, stated in his evidence that he made tho entry at "4.30 P.M." on the 24th ,July 1966. It is apparently this Harbans Sinth v. Stall oj Punjab
Das Gupta J. Harix»u SingA v. Stau of hnjal> Das a.,,, a 7. fact takon with tho fact that the report did not reaoh th~ Magistra.to Shri Pa.sricha. before 8.45 P.M. on the 24th July that ma.de the learned Judge
think that the First Information was made &t the Police Station a.t 4.30 P.M. He has unfortunately not noticed that the record l)f the First Information Report Ex. PPl shows the time of record as 4.30
A.M. He also overlooked Narendra.nath's own evidence in cross-examination in these words: "I have peruRed the Roznamoha entries a.nd find that this special report was despatched by me through
Cha.nan Singh Foot Constable a.t 5.15 A.M. I cannot say why he did not deliver it to the Magistrate till 8.45 P.M." It is quite clear that 5.15 A.M. as rec· orded in the printed record in Na.render Nath's
cross-examination i1 not a mistake for 5.l!i P.M, If that had been so there would have been no point in his saying that he could not say why the Conata.hie did not deliver it to the Magistrate till 8.45 p,Jlf.
When this statement in cro&Hlxamina.tion is consi- dered along with the recording of the time in Ex. PPl itself there is no escape from the conclusion that 4.30 P.M. as stated in Na.render Nath's Exami-
nation·in-Chief was a. slip of tongue and the correct time of the record was 4.30 A.M. and that the fact that it reached the Magistrate at 8.45 P.M. that day may well be due to thEI fact that the Constable was
negligent and tl)ok his own time a.bout going to th11 Magistrate or to some other reason not clear from the record. The reasoning of the Trial Judge based on his wrong view about the time of recording of
the formal First Information Rt>port that the comp- lainant party was not able to Ray who the 111111&ilants were and so delay Wiil! made, th11refore falls t-0 the ground. The l<'amed Judge he.a also misdirected him-
self in thinking that the dying declaration had very little probative value because as mnny as six accu- sed pt"rsons had been named and that no conviction could in law be baaed on such dying dee] aratiPn
without corroboration. The law does not mak11 any (1) S.C.R. distinction between a dying declaration in which on' person is named and a dying declaration in which several persons are named as culprits. A
dying declaration implicating one person may well be false while a dying declaration implicating seve- ral persons may be true. Just as when a number of persons are mentioned as culprits by a person
claiming to be an eye-witness in his evidence in court the court has to take c·are in deciding whether he has lied or ma.de a mistake a.bout any of them, so also when a number of persons appear to have
been mentioned as culprits in a dying declaration the court has to scrutinise the evidence in respect of each of the accused. But it is wrong to think that a dying declaration becomes less credible if a
number of persons are named as culprits. The con- trary view taken in the Lahore High Court in Klmrshaid Hussain v. Emperor(') on which appar- ently the Trial Judge has relied is clearly erroneous.
The learned Judge appears to have relied also on what was said by this Court in Ram Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh( 1) on the need of corrobora- tion for a dying declaration. Speaking for the
Court Mahajan J. (as he then was) observed in that case:- "It is settled law that it is , not safe to convict an accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration
without further corroboration because such a statement is not made on oath and is not subject to croBB-examina.tion and because the maker of it might be mentally and physically in a state of confusion and might well be
drawing upon his imagination while he was making the declaration." The question was however considered again by this Court in Khu.9hal Rao v. Stare of Bombay(•). After pointing out that in Ram Nath's Case (Supra) the
(I) (1941) 45 Criminal L.J. 59. (2) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 420, 425. (5) [19511] S.C.R. 552. 5'8. Harbans Singh v. Stale of Purijab Dai Gupta J. HahatuSi•th Stau of Plllliu D11 Oupl• ],
116 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. Court after a. careful examination of the facts of that caee distinctly came to the conclusion that the dying declaration wa.s not true and could not be relied
upon this Court stated in the later case that the observations of the Court in Ram Nath'e ca.~e lvere in the nature of obiter dicta. The Court then proooeded to review the relevant provisions of the
Evidence Act and of the decided <'&Res in the different High Courts in India a.nd in this Court and stated the law in these words: – "that it cannot be laid down as an absolut-0 rule of law that a d~·ing declaration
cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2l that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declara-
tion was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general position that a. dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; ( 4) that a. dying declaration stands on the 8&llle footing as
another piece of evidence and haa to be judged in the light of surroundin)? circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence ; ( 5) that a dying declar-
ation which ha.s been recorded by a competent magistrat-0 in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of quest.ions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the
maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory an<!
human character, and (6) that in order to tcRt t 0he reliability of a dying declaration, the Court ha.s to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation,
for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed a.t night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the f11cts stated had not been impaired at the tim<' he
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COD.RT REPoRTS was making the statement by circumstances beyond his contwl; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration
apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. "Hence, in order to pass the test of reliabi-
lity a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity
of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once the court has come to the conclusion that the dying decla~a tion was the truthful version as to the circums-
tances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corrobora' ti on. If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all ·its
aspects and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without <.'orroboration it cannot form the basis
of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corrobo- ration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from
the fact that the court, in a given case has come to the conclusion that that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities referred to above or from other infirmities as
may be disclosed in evidence in Uiat case." In view of this latest pronouncement of this Court–whirh it should be stated in f&irneBB ta. the Trial Judge was made long after he gave hiB judg-
ment -it must be held that it is neither a. rule of law nor of prudence that a dying decla.ration requires to be corroborated by other evidence before a oonviction can ·be based thereon. The evidence
furnished by the dying declaration muat be consi· dered by the Judge, just as the evidence of any H.,batJS Singh v. Stale of Purifab D4S Gupta]. /9b/ Hn,ballJ ~in.~li v. Stult rif Puniab
Da.t Gt'ftla J. 118 SUPREM1£ COUH.'f H.EPOR'fS (1002] SL'Pl>. witness, though w1doubtedly some special considera- tions arise in the assessment of dying declarations which do not a.rise in the case of &BRessing the value
of a statement made in Court by a person claiming to be a witness of the occurrence. In the first place, the Court has to make sure as to what the statement of the dead man actually was. This iUielf i3 often
a ditticult task, specially where the statement had not been put into writing. In tho second place, the court has to be certain a.bout the identity of the persons named in the dying deolaration-a difficulty
which does not arise where a person gives hi~ depositions in Court and identifies t.he person who is present in court as the person whom he ha.a named. Other speoial considerations which arise in assessing
the value of dying declarations have been mentioned by this Court in Khushal Roo v. Swte of Bomb"y(') and need not be repeated here. In view of this latest pronouncement of this Court on the question of need of corroboration of a
dying declaration by other evidence, it must be held that the Trial Judge was wrong in thinking that he could not a.ot on the dying declaration of Ha.zura Singh w1lC88 it was corroborated by other
evidence. In view of the several defect.I in the reasoning uf the Trial Judge, it is necel!llary for us to examine the evidenoe on the reoord to see whether the High Court was right in thinking
that the view taken by the learned Judge was clearly unreasonable. The most important evidence in the ca11e i.s furnished by the dying declaration made by Hazura. Singh. The Investigating Officer,
Devender Singh has said that on July 22, 1056 he had gone to the village Rikhala on an excise raid and from there he went to Malian at about 2 P.111. on July 23, to investigate a. case under section 392
of the Indian Penal Code. His further evidence is that it was on the same night at about midnight that he started for Dhurkot from Malian. We aee (I} [1958] S.C.R. 552, 568. ……..
no roason tct doubt the truth of his statement that he did reach Dhurkot shortly after midnight of the 23rd July and that when on hearing that a murder had taken place near the Dharamsha.la he came to
the Dharamshala. Hazura Singh who was lying injured on a cot there madtJ a statement to him, he recorded the statement correctly. That statement has been marked Ex. PP. The1 substance of this
statement is that at about 9 P.M. on the night of the occurrence his brother Munshi Singh came and complained about the conduct of Bant Singh, Harbans Singh and other sons of Bhag Singh and
that shortly after this on hearing shouts of Bant Singh and others near the !Jharamshala, Munshi Singh went towards that place followed by Hazura Singh and his father Hira Singh and that when
they reached the place they found Harbans Singh and the other accused persom all armed with weapons raising uproar and when Munshi Singh reached the place and returned the abuee Herb11ns
Singh gave the first blow to Munshi Singh with a Sela in his hand hitting him on the front of the chest after which others of the 'party also gave blows and when Hazura Singh stepped forward to
rescue his brother, Harbans Singh gave him a blow with a Sela in his hand which hit him on the abdomen and the other accused also gave him blows. The blow given by Major Singh hit him on
his left wrist. It is clear that this statement was made by Hazura Singh shortly after midnight i.e., within about four hours after the ocoun-enoe. It has to be remembered that Hazura Singh had one single serious
injury viz., the penetrating wound on his abdomen. We are satisfied from the evidence of the witnesses that there was sufficient moonlight that to enable &zura Siugh to recognize clearly the ~asailant
who stmok the blow which caused this injury. He could have therefore made no mistake about the indentity of his aBS&ilant. Nor is it likely that he l.961 Harbans Sitz&li v. Stat1 of Fu1lfah
Das GuptaJ, HarlHlllS Siri.t;h v. StaU of P11.,1ab Das Gupta]. woultl withiu a few hours of the occurrence ascriLc this fa.ta.I blow on him to somebody other than the real assailant. The several injuries on Hazura. Singh
and the numerous injurie~ on Munshi Singh justify the conclusion that there was more than one assai- lant in the attacking party. Whether or not Hazura Singh could have mado a mi;;take about
the identity of th'1 other assailants or could have implicated 8omc of them at least falsely, it will be unreasonable to think that he would substitute another porson for the one assailant who gave him
the fatal blow. On 'I. consideration of these circum- stanoes wo are therefore satisfied that it would be unreasonablo to doubt or disbelieve the truth of Hazura Singh'e statement
when he said that Harbans Singh struck him with the Sela in his han<l which hit him on the abdomen. Even if then: \raB no other evidence on the records as regltfds the part taken by the appellant Har bans Singh this dying dee·
laration of Hazura Singh is so clearly true that the only reasonable view for a judge of facts to take is that Harbans Singh caused the death of Hazura Singh by striking him with a Sela.
As has already been noticed Hazura Singh in this statement mentioned Harbans Singh as the person who gave the first blow to Munshi Singh, the blow which caused one of the injuries on his chest.
We can think of no reason why this main part should be ascribed falsely to Harbans Singh; we think, considering the circumstances in which the statement was made, that this part of Hazura
Singh's statement is also clearly the truth and could reasonably be accepted oven without any corrobora- tion. A second statement of Hazura 8ingh was recorded at the Hospit.&l where he was removed.
Thia statement appears to have been record~ at about midnight of the 24th July. In this statement also he mentioned Harbans Singh and the other accused persons as having taken part in the attack.
It appears that when this stiltPmPnt was 1r.~.J.., (l) S.C.R. Ha.zura Singh's condition was very b<i.d. Indeed, after he had made a pa.rt of the statement the Magistrate recorded that he had started giving indiffe-
rent answers a.nd asked the Doctor to give him the necessary treatment. After the treatment was given the statement was concluded. We would not attach much weight to this statement on the 24th
July. But, it will be noticed that there is nothing in this latter statement which detracts from the truth of the earlier statement made shortly after the occurrence to the police sub-Inspector.
There is apart from this the testimony in Court of Hira Singh the father of the two deceased persons and his uncle Bhag Singh. As regards Bhag Singh the learned Trial Judge has pointed out
that Bhag Singh's statement was not recorded by the Sub-Inspector in the Inquest Report. While there is nothing in law which requires the statement of witnesses to be recorded in the Inquest .Report,
it appears to be a common practice in Punjab for police officers to record statements of witnesses in the Inquest Reports. In the present case the Sub- Iuspector appears to have i'ecorded a fairly full
statement of Hira Singh as also short statements of Arjan Singh, Matha Singh and Lakal Singh in the In- quest Report itself. It is somewhat curious therefore that the Sub-Inspector did not record the statement
of Bhag Singh also in this report even though it is found that Bhag Singh was named as a witness of the occurrence in llazuxa Singh's dying declaration itself, It is ilJliO difficult to
under~tand Bhag Singh's statement that he left the place as soon as some 'Jleighbours ·came up after the occurrence and did ·not go back to the spot till he was called .by the police. He has offered no explanation for this
rather unusual conduct. In vi~w of all this, .we are not prepared to say that the Trial Judge acted unreasonably in doubting his testimony. We are unahle however to discover any valid
'reason for doubting the presence of Hira Singh at lHl llaroans Singh v. State of Punjflb D•6Gupt11J. llarhanJ SuJ;/a Stalt ef PUJtjuh D•s Gupta]. tho place of occurrcnec. It seems to us that the
main rt1a11on for the Trial .Juclg" to doubt the truth of Hira f:>ingh's evidence was what he contiidered t.ho great delay in lodging the forms.I First Informa- tion Report. That r<'aaon, as we have already
pointed out, does not exist. On an examination, it seems to us quite likely that Hira Singh also accompanied Ha.zura. Singh when the latter followed Mull8hi Singh towards the Dhara.mshala a.nd it also seems
to us improbable that he would give the main part in the assault falsely to Harbans Singh if somebody else was respoll8ible for the blow which caused Hazura Singh's death. In our view the learn-
oc! Trial Judge acted unreasonably in doubt- iug the truth of Hira Singh's evidence against Harbans Singh. On a consideration of the evidence wo are therefore satisfied that the conclusion reached by
the High Court that the viow taken by the Trial Court a.a regards Harbans Singh's guilt W'l.8 clearly 'iim unreasonable is correct and that the only reasonable view on the evidence can be that Harbans Singh
cQmmitted murder by ca.using the death of Hazura Singh and also committed murder by ca.us- ing the death of Munshi Singh. The position ia however different as regards Major Singh. As has already been pointed out the
High Court is wrong in thinking that the evidence shows that Major Singh ga.ve any of the fa.ta.I blows. Hazura Singh in his first dying declaration mention- ed Major Singh aa having given a below on him
on his left wrist. Apart from Bhag Singh only Hira Singh has ascribed any specific part to Major Singh in addition to saying generally that he took part in the attack. The evidence therefore
leaves scope for thinking that Ha.zura. Singh has made a mistake a.bout Major Singh or ha.s wrongly implicated him. We are not therefore prepared to say that the view t&ken by the Trial ,Judge as
regards Major Singh is clearly uw·oaaonablo. ( 1) s.c.R. We therefore allow the appeal of Major Singh set aside the order of conviction and sentence ma.de against him by the High Court and restore
the order of acquittal made by the Trial Court. The appeal of Harbans Singh is dismissed. Major Singh should be set at liberty at once. Appeal o.f appellant 2 allowed. Appeal of appellant 1 dismissed.
HAJJ Sk. SUBHAN v. MADHORAO (K. N. WANCHOo, K. C. DAS GuPTA, J.C. SHAH and RAGHUBAR DAY.AL, JJ.) Execution Proc.eedings-Objection& t-0 executability-De.cree for po•se•sion-Enactment prot•iiing Jo1· ve<ting in the Stare of all proprietary right<J-Enactm.nt coming into force durin<J pen· de,.cy of appeal in High Goud-Effect on decree of High Oourt- Executability of decree-Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienawd Lands) Act, 1950 (M. P. I of 1951), ss. 219), 2(k), 3, 4, 41-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of l!J08,), s. 47.
The respondent purchased at a revenue auction sale eight anna share of G and obtained formal possession of that share on September 23, 1938. G relinquished his share in Khudkaaht lands and they were recorded as the occupancy
lands of his wife and sons. In 1940 the appellant got a lease of those fields. The respondent instituted a suit for possession of the lands against the appellant basing his claim on his pro· prietary right to recover possession, and obtained a decree on July 12, 1944. The trial court's decree was confirmed on April 20, 1951, by the High Court which held that the respondent was entitled to the lands as they were originally Khudka8ht fields as part and parcel of the eight anna share purchased by him. In the meantime on March 31, 1951, the Madhya Pra-
desh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alie- nated Lands) Act, 1950, had come into force but the High Court did not consHer the effect of the Act on thC appeal before it. Under s. 3 of the Act the proprietory rights in an estate specified in the notification passed from the proprietor and became vasted in the State free from all encumbrance~, ·and by s. 4, after the issue of the notification under s. 3 Harhan11 Singh
v. State of Punj•b D., Gupta ]. JHJ