Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
21. The question which fell for decision inArnit Das's case (supra), once again fell for the consideration of this Court in the case of Pratap Singh's case (supra), where the decision of this Court in Umesh Chandra's case (supra), which expressed a H …. A view which was contrary to that expressed in Amit Das's case (supra), was brought to the notice of the Court, which referred the matter to the Constitution Bench to settle the divergence of views. In fact, the Constitution Bench formulated two points for decision, namely, (a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining the age of the alleged offender as juvenile offender or the date when he is produced. in the Court/competent Authority? (b) Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in a case c where a proceeding is initiated under the 1986 .Act and was pending when the Act of 2000 was enforced with effect from 1.4.2001?
22. While considering the first question, the Constitution D Bench had occasion to consider the decision of the three Judge Bench in Umesh Chandra's case (supra), wherein it was held that the relevant date for applicability of the Act so far as age of the accused, who claims to be a child, is concerned, is the date of occurrence and not the date of trial. Consequently, the decision E in Amit Das's case (supra) was over-ruled and the view taken in Umesh Chandra's case (supra) was declared to be the correct law. On the second point, after considering the provisions of Sections 3 and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, along with the definition of"juvenile" in Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice F . Act, 2000, as contrasted with the definition of a male juvenile in Section 2(h) of the 1986Act, the majority view was that the 2000 Act would be applicable to a proceeding in any Court/Authority initiated under the 1986 Act which is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years G of age as on 1.4.2001. In other words, a male offender, who was being proceeded with in any Court/Authority initiated under the 1986 Act and had not completed the age of 18 years on 1.4.2001, would be governed by the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
23. In his concurring judgment, S.B. Sinha, J., while · .HARi RAM V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR [ALTAMAS KABIR, J] considering the provisions of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice -i' Act, 2000, observed that for the purpose of attracting Section 20 it had to be established that (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused was . pending; and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years.· The unanimous view of the Cor:istitution Bench was that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, have prospective effect and not retrospective effect, except to cover cases where though the male offender was above 16 years of age at the time of commission of the offence, he was below 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001. Consequently, the said Act would cover c . earlier cases only where a person had not completed the age of 18 years on the date of its commencement and not otherwise.
24. The said decision in Pratap Singh's case (supra) led to the substitution of Section 2(1) and the introduction of Section 7 A of the Act and the subsequent introduction of Rule 12 in the D Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, and the amendment of Section 20 of the Act.
25. Read with Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A and Rule 12, Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, is probably the Section most relevant in setting at rest the question E raised in this appeal, as it deals with cases which were pending· on 1 " 1 April, 2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force. The same is, accordingly, reproduced hereinbelow : "20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a·juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and G instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile,. forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence. ·.·/ [Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile. Explanation.- In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (1) of section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of thfs Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.]"
26. The Proviso and the Explanation to Section 20 were added by Amendment Act 33 of 2006, to set at rest any doubts that may have arisen with regard to the applicability of the D Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, to cases pending on 1st April, 2001, wtl~re a juvenile, who was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence, was involved. The Explanation which was added in 2006, makes it very clear that in all pending cases, which would include not only trials but even subsequent E proceedings by way of revision or appeal, the determination of juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of Clause (I) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on or before 1st April, 2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provision F had been in force for all purposes and for all material times · when the alleged offence was committed. In fact, Section 20 enables the Court to consider and determine the juvenility of a person even after conviction by the regular Court and also empowers the Court, while maintaining the conviction, to set G aside the sentence imposed and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000.
27. At this point it may be noted that the decision of the H Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh's case (supra) was rendered HARi RAM V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J] –f at a point of time when the amendments to Sections 2(1) and 20 A and the introduction of Section 7-A had not yetbeen effected, nor was Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules available. Several decisions on the applicability of the 2000 Act to children who were above 16 but below 18 years on the date of commission of the offence have been rendered after the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into force and several others were rendered after the amendments were introduced in the said Act by Amendment Act 33 of 2006 and the introduction of the 2007 Rules. The j decisions rendered by this Court and the High Courts prior to 1st April, 2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, came into c force and thereafter can, therefore, be divided into two groups. The decision in Pratap Singh's case (supra) and in the case of Munney@ Rahat Jan Khan vs. State of UP. [(2006) 12 SCC 697] fall into the first category, whereas the decisions in Jameel vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 11 SCC 420], Vimal Chadha D vs. Vikas Chaudhary [(2008) 8 SCALE 608], Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand [(2008) 13 SCALE 137] and Ranjit Singh vs. State of Haryana [(2008) 9 SCC 453] fall into the second category. Although, the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh's case (supra) and Munney's case (supra) are not really relevant since they have been rendered prior to 22nd August, · 2006, when the Amending Act 33 of 2006 came into force, they assume a modicum 'of significance since they have been referred to and relied upon even after the Amending Act and the 20_07 Rules came into force on 22.8.2006 and 26.10.2007, respectively.
28. Of the decisions rendered after the amendments effected in 2006 to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, the first decision of note is that of Jameef's case (supra) rendered on 16.1.2007 wherein the amendments to the Act effected by the G Amendment Act 33 of 2006, which came into effect on 22.8.2006, were not even noticed. The next decision rendered on 27.5.2008 is in the case of Vimal Chadha's case (supra), wherein, although, the amendmentoftheAct and the introduction of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, were brought to the notice H A of the Court, the same were not considered and the decision …. was rendered in the light of the decision rendered in Pratap Singh's case (supra) and other cases decided prior to 1.4.2001.
29. The next decision rendered on the same point on 11.9.2008 was the decision in Ranjit Singh's case (supra) wherein also the amendments to Section 2(1) and 20 and the introduction of Section 7-A in the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and the introduction of the 2007 Rules had not been considered and the decision passed sub silentio. c
30. Similar was the situation in Babloo Pasi's case (supra) decided on 3.10.2008 which basically dealt with Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 and Rule 22 of the Jharkhand Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2003, which is pari materia with Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. While D deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Judges did not also have occasion to consider the amendments effected to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, by the Amendment Act 33 of 2006 which had just come into force on 22.8.2006.
31. None of the aforesaid decisions are of much E assistance in deciding the question with regard to the applicability of the definition of "Juvenile" in Section 2(k) and 2(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, .as ·amended in 2006, whereby the provisions of the said Act were extended to cover juveniles who had not comgleted 18 years of age on or before F the coming into force of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 on 1.4.2001 (Emphasis supplied). The effect of the proviso to Section 7-A introduced by the Amending Act makes it clear that the claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court which shall be recognized at any stage, even after final disposal of the G case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules made thereunder which includes the definition of "Juvenile" in Section 2(k) and 2(1) of the Act even if the Juvenile had ceased to be so on or before( emphasis supplied) the date of commencement of the Act. The said intention of the legislature was reinforced by the J._ , -I HARi RAM V STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] amendment effected by the said Amending Act to Section 20 – A by introduction of the Proviso and the Explanation thereto, wherein also it has been clearly i11dicated that in any pending case in any Court the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile has to be in terms of clause 2(1) even if the juvenile ceases to be so "on or before the date of commencement of this Act" B (emphasis supplied) anc:fit was also indicated that the provisions _of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.
32. Apart from the aforesaid provisions of the 2000 Act, as amended, and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, Rule 98 thereof has to be read in tandem with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended by the Amendment Act, 2006, which provides that even in disposed of cases of juveniles in conflict with law, the State Government or the Board could, either D suo motu or on an application made for the purpose, review the case of a juvenile, determine the juvenility and pass an appropriate order under Section 64 of the Act for the immediate release of the juvenile whose period of detention had exceeded the maximum period provided in Section 15 of the Act, i.e., 3 years.
33. In addition to the above, Section 49 of the Juven.iJe Justice Act, 2000 is also of relevance and is reproduced hereinbelow : "49. Presumption and determination of age.-(1) Where it appears to a competent authority that person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile or the child, the competent authority shall make due inquiry so G as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. (2) No·order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of whom the order has been made is not a juvenile or the child, and the age recorded by the competent authority to be the age of person so brought before it, shall for the purpose of this Act, be deemed. to be the true age of that person."
34. Sub-Section (1) of Section 49 vests the Competent Authority with power to make due inquiry as to the age of a person brought before it and for the said purpose to take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall C record a finding as to whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be. Sub-Section (2) is of equal importance as it provides that no order of a Competent Authority would be deemed to have become invalid merely on account of any subsequent proof that the person, in respect of D whom an order is made, is not a juvenile or a child, and the age recorded by the Competent Authority to be the age of the person brought before it, would, for the purpose of the Act, be deemed to be the true age of a child or a juvenile in conflict with law. Sub- Rule (3) of Rule 12 indicates that the age determination inquiry E by the Court or Board, by seeking evidence, is to be derived from: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available, and in the absence of the same; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a Panchayat;
35. Sub-Clause (b) of Rule 12(3) provides that only in the absence of any such document, would a medical opinion be sought for from a duly cqnstituted Medical Board, which would declare the age of the juvenile or the child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board HARi RAM V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J] or as the case may be, the Child Welfare Committee, for A -f reasons to be recorded by it, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on the lower side within a margin of one year.
36. As will, therefore, be clear from the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended by the Amendment Act, 2006 and the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, the scheme of the Act is to give children, who have, for some reason or the other, gone astray, to realise their mistakes, rehabilitate themselves and rebuild their lives and become useful citizens of society, instead of degenerating into hardened criminals. c
37. Of the two main questions decided in Pratap Singh's case (supra), one point is now well established that the juvenility of a person in conflict with law has to be reckoned from the date of the incident and not from the date on which cognizance was 0 .J.. taken by the Magistrate. The effect of the other part of the decision was, however, neutralised by virtue of the amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, by Act 33 of 2006, whereunder the provisions oftheAct were also made applicable to juveniles who had not completed eighteen years of age on the date of E commission of the offence. The law as now crystallized on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1 51 April, 2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted.
38. The instant case is covered by the amended provisions of Sections 2(k), 2(1), 7A and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. However, inasmuch as, the appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence, the High Court was of the view that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, would not apply to the H appellant's case. Of course, the High Court, while deciding the matter, did not have the benefit of either the amendment of the Act or the introduction of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007. Even otherwise, the matter was covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder Chandra's case (supra), wherein this s Court, inter a/ia, held that when a claim of juvenility is raised and on the evidence available two views are possible, the Court should lean in favour of holding the offender to be a juvenile in borderline cases. In any event, the statutory provisions have been <1ltered since then and we are now required to consider c the question of the claim of the appellant that his date of birth was Kartik Sudi 1, Samvat Year 2039, though no basis has been provided for the fixation of the said date itself in the light of the amended provisions. Often, parents of children, who come from rural backgrounds, are not aware of the actual date of birth of a child, but relate the same to some event which may have taken place simultaneously. In such a situation, the Board and the Courts will have to take recourse to the procedure laid down in Rule 12, but such an exercise is not required to be undertaken in the present case since even according to the determination E of the appellant's age by the High Court the appellant was below eighteen years of age when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
39. Having regard to the views expressed hereinabove, we are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court in holding that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, would not be applicable to the appellant's case since he was allegedly 13 days above the age prescribed.
40. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 Act was in force and under Clause G (h) of Section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years. It is with the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, that in Section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed H eighteen years of age which was given prospective prospect. HARi RAM V STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. [AL TAMAS KABIR, J.] However, as indicated hereinbefore after the decision in Pratap Singh's case (supra), Section 2(1) was amended to define a juvenile in conflict with law to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteen years of age as on the date of commission of such offence; Section 7 A was introduced in the 2000 Act and Section 20 thereof was amended whereas Rule 12 was included in the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, which gave retrospective effect to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. Section 7 A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, made provision for the claim of juvenility to be raised before any Court at any stage, as has c been done in this case, and such claim was required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not completed eighteen years D on the date of commission of the offence was also entitled to the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act.
41. The said position was re-emphasised by virtue of the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the 2000Act, whereby the Proviso and Explanation were added to Section 20, which made it even more explicit that in all pending cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, the determination of F juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms of clause (I) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force when the alleged offence was committed.
42. In the instant case, there is no controversy that the G appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age. In view of Sections 2(k), 2(1) and 7 A read with Section 20 of the said Act, the provisions thereof would apply to the appellant's case and on the date of the alleged incident it has to be held that he was ajuvenile. 'r-
43. The appeal has, therefore, to be allowed on the ground that notwithstanding the definition of "juvenile" under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, the appellant is covered by the definition of )3 "juvenile" in Section 2(k) and the definition of"juvenile in conflict with law" in Section 2(1) of the Juvenile Jusiice Act, 2000, as amended. r
44. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and in keeping with the provisions of c Sections 2(k), 2(1),7A and 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 ..,_. and Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, hold that since the appellant was below 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence the provisions of the said Act would apply in his case in full force.
45. The matter is accordingly remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board, Ajmer, for disposal in accordance with law, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, having regard to the fact that the offence is alleged to have been committed more than ten years ago. If, however, the appellant E has been in detention for a period which is more than the maximum period for which a juvenile may be confined to a Special Home, the Board shall release the appellant from custody forthwith. K.K.T. Appeal allowed.