19~1 tah of Wrtrt Bc11{af v. S.N. B:21ak 19C:? SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963] only provides that those which the court already inherently poRseBBes shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest
it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act".
With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of r the powers of the- Court, we are in accord. The High 0ourt was in error therefore in interfering
with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station. W c therefore allow this appeal and set &Bide
the order of the High Court. The investigation will now proceed in accordance with law. Appeal allawed. HINDUSTAN IDEAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. LIFE INSURANCE OORPORATION OF INDIA (A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
J. R. M:unaoLKAR, JJ.) /nsura11 ce-"PertJOn making the reference" –Meaning of- 1./0 P'riod preacribed for moving the Corporation-EJ!ecl-Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31of1956), ••· 16(2) 48 (2) (f) -Life ln1urance Corporation Ru/ea, 1956, r. 12 Sub-rr. (•), (ii),. (iii).
The Life Insurance business of the insurer. The Andhra Insurance Company Ltd., vcs1ed in the Life Insurance Cor- poration of India and it became entitled in compensation under s. 16 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act. The Corpo- ration made an offer of it and claimed variou• deductions. The ·~ • •
2 s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS insurer raised certain disputes and on August 6, 1957, made an application to the tribunal constituted on M•y 25, 1957 for ire .. assessment of the compensation and also for extension of time for making the application by three months from
the; date of its constitution. On September 21, 1957, the insurer filed another statement giving details of its claim. In 'answer to the claim the Corporation filed its written state- ment. The tribunal held that the claim for compensation
was time-barred under r. 12 of the Rules framed under the Act: and dismissed the application. It also held that under s. J6(2) of the Act the insurer had no right to move directly the: tribunal regarding the amount of compensation, but
could move corporation for making a reference of the dis- pute to the tribunal and that it did not show any cause for extending time to make the reference to the tribunal. Against the judgment of the tribunal, the insurer obtained spetial leave to add and thereafter amalgamated with
Hindustan Ideal Insurance Company 1.td. which was sub- stituted as appellant in place of the insurer. Held, (Per Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ.) That while sub-s. (1) of s. 48 confers a power on the Central
Government, sub-s. (2) of s. 16 imposes a duty upon it and therefore, it is obligatory upon the Central Government to ,prescribe the period within which the insurer is to move the' Corporation for referring the claim to the Tribunal.
When the law requires a period to be prescribed for doing a thing, that period should be clearly specified with specific reference to the particular purpose. The specific purpose r~ferred to in Sub·s. (2) of s. 16 is, to have the matter
refl'rred to the tribunal for decision. "Making of the refer- ence is thus in the hands of the corporation and not in these of ]insurer who can only move the corporation for making the reference. Time has to be pre•cribed for enabling the insurer to move the Corporation. Prescribing time for making a
reference is not prescribing time for moving the corporation to make the reference. Prescribing time by implicatfon would not be compliance with the provisions of Sub-s. (2} of •. 16.
' West Durby Union v. Metropolitan Life ABBuranee Oo. [1897] A. C. ti47, referred to. While framing r. 12 the Rule making authority lost sight of the fact that Sub-s. (2) of s. 16 contemplates a refer- ence not by the insurer but by the corporation. The pro-
ceeding taken before the tribunal were therefore misconceived. No question of limitation arises because the oeriod within 196~ Hindusian lde'a I lnsuruce Co. Ltd • v. Life lnJUt•nce
Clf'poralion of Indio Bt"ndrulcn ld~cl ltUllltlftU Co. Ltd. Lije llUU'Onc. ~dionoflnJi4 (1963] which an insurer must move the corporation to make a reference has not yet been pre•crfbed as required by Sub·s.(2) of s. 16. It would be open to the appellant to move the
corporation under s. 16(2) after such period is prescribed . It was urged by the insurer that the claim cannot treated as barred by time and this was a fit case for extension of time und<r the proviso tor. 12.
Held, As r. 12, read by itself does not show clearly whether it appli.,. to the corporation or it applies to an insurer or a chief agent or a special agent, it is permissible to look into the proviso for ascertaining the scope of the main provisions of that rule.
Reading it along with the proviso would not violate any well accepted rule of construction. Held (per Sarkar, J.), that the insurer had no right to move the tribunal directly and the proceedings commenced
by it before the tribunal were therefore wholly misconceived and no relief could be granted by the tribunal to the insurer. As the insurer had no right to move the tribunal, no question of extending time for it to do so really arose. If the appli- cation for extension of time to move the tribunal is treated ""competent under the proviso of r. 12 of the rules, then also, the appellant is not entitled to any relief, for there is no justification on the merits to interfere with the tribunal's order refusing to extend time.
The proceedings being in- competent, an enquiry as to whether it had been started out of time would be wholly irrelevant and it is therefore unneees· sary to express any opinion on the correct interpretation of r. 12 of the Rules. The proceeding being incompetent from
the beginning it is not possible for this Court to grant any relief and, therefore, the appeal must fail in any case. Crvn. APPELLATE JURIBDICT.ION : Civil Appea.1 No. 82 of 1960 .
.Appeal by specia.l lea.ve from judgment end order dated February 17, 1958, of the Court of Life Insure.nee Tribunal, Nagpur, in case No. 16/ XVIA of 1957. B. K. B. Naidu, for the appellant.
8. T. De.8<1i, S. J. l/anaji er:d E. L. Hothi, for the reepondent. l 2 S.C.R. 1962. April 12. The following Judgment.a were delivered. The Judgment C>f Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ; was delivered by Mudholkar, J.
·SARKAR J.-The Andhra Insurance Company Ltd., hereafter called the insurer, carried on life insurance and other imluranoe business. On Sep- tember 1, 1956, the life insurance business of the
insurer became vested in the Life Insurance Corpo· 't ration of India under the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The insurer thereupon became entitled to compensation from
the Life Insurance Corporation under s. 16 of the Aot. On February 19, 1957, the Corporation hav. ing determined the amount of the compensation and obtained the Central Government's approval
made an offer of .it to the insurer as provided in s. 16. By the letter making the offer, the Corpora· tionta~laimd~d vtariousitde?uotiotns. The insure; raisehd oer Ill 1spu es. 1s no
necessary 1or t e purpose of this appeal to refer to these disputes. On August 6, 1957, the insurer ma.de an appli· cation to the Tribunal whioh had been constituted on May 25, 1957 for an order for re-asseSBment of
the compensation payable to it. In that application it also made a prayer that the Tribunal might, if ne~ssary, extend the time for making the a.pplica- ,1. tion by three months from the date of its constitu-
tion. On September 21, 1957, the insurer filed in the Tribunal another statement giving the details of its claim. The Corporation in its tum filed its written statement in answer ·to the claim of the
insurer. The Tribunal by its judgment dated February 17, 1958 held that under s. 16 of the Act an insu· "'1 rer had no right to approach the Tribunal directly for deciding any dispute with the Corporation reg-
arding the a.mount of the oompensation but ha.d Hbtllusl"" lde•I ln•tiraN• Co. Ltd. v. LiJ• ,,,,.,.,..,. Corporlilion •f lnii• Sar/et" J. /!J6:t. H1ndu1£ar1 Id.al frJsurance Co. Ltd.
v. Life lnJuronce CAtJ>orGlion of India Sarkar J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963) to move the Corporation to make a reference of tho dispute to the Tribunal and this, the present insurer had not done. It also held that the insurer
had not shown any cause why the time to make the reference to the Tribunal should ue extended. It further held that the claim for compensation was by time. In the result, the Tribunal dismissed
the insurer's application. The insurer obtained special leave from this Court to a.ppoal a~a.inst tho j111lgment of the Tribu- nal and under that leave has prrSl'nted this appeal.
Aftor th<> leave was granted, tho insurer amalgama- ted with another company called the Hindustan Ideal Insurance Company Ltd. and the latter company was substituted as ~he appellant in the place of
the insurer. Now s. l6 of the Act is in these terms : S. 16 ( 1) "Where the controlled busine88 of an insurer h:ui been transferred to and vested in the Corporation under this Act, compensa-
tion shall be given by the Corporation to that insurer in accordancp, with the principles contained in the First Schedule. (2) The a.mount of the compensation to be given in accordance with t.qe aforesaid
principles shall be determined by the Corpo- ration in the first insurance, and if the Amount so deformined is approved by the Central Governmc-nt it shall be offored to the insurer in full satisfaction of the compensa·
tion payable to him under this Act, and if, on the other hand, the amount so offered is not acceptable to the insurer he may within such time as may be prescribed for tho pur- pose have the matter reference to the Tribunal
for decision.'' It is obvious from the terms of sub-sec. (2) of s. 16, and it is indeed not seriously in dispute, that the i • -i \ 1 2 s.c.R. Tribunal can be moved by an insurer only through
the Corporation. An insurer has no right under the section to approach the Tribunal directly. The procedure contemplaten is that an insurer has to move the Corporation and the Corporation has
thereupon to refer the dispute raised by tha insurer to the Tribunal. l'his inevitably follows from the words : in section, namely, "he may …… have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision." The
section no doubt does not mention the Corporation but it is clear from the Aot as whole that the refer. nee contemplated was through the Corporation. The insurer had to move some authority to make
the reference and the only authority under the Act could be the Corporation. On this part of the case I am in agreement with the view expressed in the judgment of my brother Mudholkar.
In the present case however the insurer had directly moved the Tribunal. This it had no right to do. The proceedings commenced by it were therefore wholly misconceived. That being so, the
insurer could not have obtained any relief from the Tribunal nor could the Tribunal have granted it any relief. In this appeal, therefore, it is not possible for the Court either to grant any relief
to the insurer or its successor-in-interest, the appel- lant. The proceeding being incompetent from the beginning, the appellant cannot ask for anything in it. It would have been noticed that the insurer
had. asked the Tribunal to extend the time to enable it. to make the application to the Tribu- nal: As it had no right to move the Tribunal, no question of extending any time to do so really
arose. Now r. 12 ..,f the Rule framed under the Act ~ provides for "the time within which a reference 195S Hindust•n I deal I nsu•ance of Incli• Life lnsur•nCI C or/Jaralion oJ Int/id
Sarkar J. lllel Hindudc.n ldul ln.ntrm&t C.. Ltd. LiJ• /111uratte1 C 01jwol ion of Indio Sark•rJ. SUPltEME OOURT ltEPORTS (1963] may be ma.de to the Tribunal in respect of the de-
termination of compensation pa.:r_able under the Act." The time prescribed for the present caae was three months from the date on which the compensation was offered to the insurer. Within
these three months the insurer had done nothing. Thie rule, however, contains a. proviso which is in these terms : "Provided that any such reference may be admitted by the Tribunal after thti period of
limitation prescribed thereunder this rule, if the person ma.king thtJ reference satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient ca.use for not ma.king the reference within the ea.id
period. If it ie contended that the insurer was entitled to move the Tribune.I directly under this proviso and had in fact done so, then, I think, it must be held that the Tribune.I was right in its view·tha.t nooause
had been shown by the insurer why time should be extended. Therefore if the a.pplica.tion so far as it asked for extension of time is tr11&ted as a. com- petent one under this proviso, then also on the
merits, the appellant is not entitled to any relief, for there is no justification to interfere with the order that the Tribune.I ma.de in this behalf. The appeal must in any case fa.ii.
I do not feel ca.lied upoQ to go into any ques- tion of limitation in the present case. The proceed- ing being incompetent, an inquiry as to whether it had been started of time would be wholly irrele-
vant. I, therefore, think it unnecessary to express any opinion on the interpretation of r. 12 of the Rules ma.de under the Act. The result ie that the appeal is dismissed. As to cost.B, I think that as the Corporation itself
had not before the Tribune.I contended that the pro- ceeding wu incompetent nor had ra.illed any such • ,. ' r 6a ii· point in its statement of case in this appeal it is not entitled to any.
MuDHOLKAR, J.-The Andhra Insurance Co., Ltd., (hereinafter called the Company) was a com- posite insurance company, that is, doing business in life insurance, fire insurance and general insurance.
By virtue of the provisions of s. 7(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956) (here· inafter called the Act) all its assets and liabilities pertaining to the life insurance business stood trans·
ferred and vested in the Life Insurance Corporotion on September 1, 1956. Under s. 16(1J of the Act the Company was entitled to receive compensation from the Corporation determined in accordance
with the principles contained in First Schedule to the Act. On February 14, 1957, the Corporation wro~ to the Company stating, among other things, . that the amount of' compensation payable to it
under s. 16( l) of the Act as determined by the Corporation and approved by the Central Govern- ~. ment comes to Rs. 6,14,636. The Corporation made an offer of this amount to the Company in full
satisfaction of the compensation payable to it. The Corporation further stated in its letter that the part of the paid up capital of the Company and assets representing such part which have been allocated
to the life business of the Company in accordance with s. 18 of the Life Insurance Corporation Rules, .~ l 9/i6 (hereinafter called the Rules) amounts to ;. Rs: 3, 76,117/- and that as the aforesaid assests have
not been transferred to the corporation the said amount ofR~. 3,76,117/- will be set off against and deducted from the amount of compensation payable to ·the Company. Certain correspondence then
ensued· between the Company and the Corporation and it would appear from it that while the Company accepted the oomputa.tion of the a.mount of com- ~ pensation ma.de by the Corporation there was dis-
agreement between the parties over the valuation 1gs2 Hindusl,. Id.a I Insurane~ Co. Ltd. Lift Insur_, CO'fporati(lll ef India Al wlholltM .T. IPlll >li•lrulM ldMI ,,,,..,.,…c..Lti
Li/1 J,u.,race C••rtd'-t e/ I Mia MuAa/htJ. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] of the &88ets of the Company which stood transferr- ed to the Corporation. The Company objected to the deductione of Rs. 3,76,117/. Eventually on
August 6, 1957 the Company preferred a petition of appeal before the L..ife Insurance Tribunal, Nagpur, constituted by the Central Government under s. 17(1) of the Act, On September 21, 1957
the Company lodged its statement of olsim before the Tribunal. The Corporation resisted the claim put forward by the Company on various grounds. , The Tribunal framed 27 issues but it gave its find-
ings only on the first three issues and dismissed the claim. We may mention that we are not oonoemed with any of the issues except No. 3 because it is on the basis of its finding thereon that it dismissed the
olaim of the Company. That issue is whether the claim of the Company is barred by time. It does not appear from the writter statement of the Corporation that it had raised a plea of
limitation. All the same the Tribunal in its order hae aaid that as the Compaay did not lodge a claim before it within three months of February 14, 1957, which was the date on which compensation was
offered by the Corporation to the Company it was barred by r. 12 of the Rules framed under the Act. The Tribunal further observed that the Company had to move tho Corporation under s. 16(2) of the
Act to make a reference to the Tribunal, it failed to do so and that it did not show any cause whatso- ever for its failure to do so, but instead submitted its claim direct to the Tribunal on August 12, 1957.
No question, therefore, excusing delay under the proviso to r. 12 arose. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal the Company moved this Court under Art. 136 of the Conetitution for grant of special leave to appeal.
Leave was granted by this Con rt on August 18, 1958. ""' Subsequent to the grant of leave by this Court the · Company in pul'lluanoe of its soheme sanctioned by 2 S.C.R. the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was amalgamat-
ed with the Hindustan Ideal Insurance Co., Ltd. By reason of this the letter has now been RU bstituted as appellant under the orders of this Court dated April 14, 1959. On behalf of the appell1mt Mr. B.K.B. Naidu
contended that since the Tribunal itself waR not appointed before the expiry of the period of three months providrd in r, I 2, the claim made by the Company cannot be treated as barred, by time
because in his submission limitation would not commence to run till the date on which the Tribu- nal was constituted. Alt.ernatively he contended that this was a fit case in which, under the proviso
tor. 12, time should have been extended. On behalf of the Corporation Mr. S. T. Desai contended that under sub-s.2 of s. 16 it was not open to an insurer like the Compan,v to prefer a claim
directly before the Tribunal and that all that the law entitled the Company to do was to move the Corpl'ra- tion to make a reference, that this had to be done within three months and that therPupon the
Corporation had to make a reference to the Tribunal within the p~1icd of three months prescribed by r. 12. Since this procedure was not adopted the proceedings before the Tribunal were incompetent.
Sub-section 2 of s. 16 reads thus : •·The amount of the compensation to be given in accordanre with the aforesaid prinri- ples shall bP determined by the Corporation in first instance, and if the amount so determined
is approved by the Central Government it shall be offered to the insurer in full satisfaction of the compensation payable to him under this Act, and if, on the other hand, the amount so
offered is not acceptable to the insurer he may within such time as may be prescribed for the purpose have the matter referred to the Tri- bunal for deoieion." 1961 – Hindustan Ide4l
Ins .. ,ance Co. Ltd. L je lniuronce Corpo·atinn of ltuli• Mudt1olka• J, lliwli1R•on ftiro/ lr.111r,,ru:e CO. Ltd. v. Life ln11nanu Oarparation a/ Indio Mu:f.~olka1 J. A plain rPading of this proviRion shows that the
reference had to he ma.de not by the insurer but by someone else. Though that someone is not expres- sly specified in sub-a. :!, the context shows that that someone would be none other than the Corpo-
ration. The Central Go..-ernmont has not at any rate specifically prescribed the period within which the insurer has to move the Corporation for referr- ing its claim to the Tribunal for decision.
According to this provision the insurer is entitled to have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision "'\'•ithin such time as may be prescribed for the purpose." "Prescribed" means prescribed
by l{ull'B. It would, therefore, follow that the Central Government has to make a rule prescribing the period within which the insurer must move the Corporation for making the reference.
Mr. Desai, however, contendij that that is not provision means. A~cording to him the provision bas to be read along with a. 48(:!)(f; of the Act. Section 48 is the provision which confers power on the Central
Government to make rules. Clause (f) of sub-s. 2 enable it to prescribe the time within which any matter which mav be referred to the Tribunal for a decision under t 0he Act may be so referred. There-
fore, accordini;: to learned counsel, it is the period of limitation for this purpose which the Central Government bas to prPscribe and not the p· riod within which the insurer must move the Tribunal.
He, however, says that the inaurer has to move the Corporal ion before the expiry of the period within which the Corporation is to make a refe- rence to the Tribunal. We cannot accept the contention. On the
plain language of sub-s. 2 of s. 16 it is obligatory upon the Central Government to prescribl' the period within which the insurer is to move the , Corporation for r1:fcrring its claim to the Tribunal.
No doubt, cl. (f) does not refer to the prescription r l • • ,. .-i 2 S. C. R. SUl>REME COURT REPORTS of time for such a purpose. But the provisions of sub-s. I of s. 48 are wide enough to enable the
Central Government to prescribe tl!.e time for this purpose. Under that sub-seJtion the Central Go- vernment is empowered to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. One of the purpose of the
Act is to prescribe the time within which an insurer has to move the Corporation for making a reference. While sub-s. 1 of s. 4$ confers a power on the Central Government, sub-s. 2 of s. 16 imposes a
duty upon it and, therefore, it is obligatory upon the Central Government to make a rule in this behalf by exercising the power under s. 48 (1). Mr. Des!1i then contends that, the rule actually
framed by the Cdntral Government that is, r. 12 must be deemed to be sufficient for his purpose. That rule is in following terms : "Reference to Tribunal.-The time with- ,, in which a reference may be made to the
Tribunal in respect of the determination of compensation payable under the Act, shall be as follows, namely :- (i) in the case of an insurer to whom com- pensation is payableunder Part A or Part
B or Part C of the First Schedule to the Act, within three months from the date . .1 on which the compensation determined by the Corporation is offered to the insu- rer; (ii) in the case of an insurer to whom com-
pensation is payable under Part B of the First . Schedule to the Act, within six months . from the date on which the compensation determined by the Corpo- ration is offered to the insurer ;
(iii) in ·the case of compensation payable to a Chief agent or special agent under the Hindus/an Ideal lnsurone~ Co. Ltd. Life liuurtJ11ee Cor/JoTation of fnrlia Mud!r,olkor J. 19G~
Hindu&le.n ltf1ol lnSUJ anc1 Co. L!t/. v. proviso to section 36 of the Act, within three months from the date on which the compensation determined b.v the Corpo- Lift ln1Uf'linC4 Corpor .. lhn of lndi2
ration is offen'd to the chief a.gent or special a.gent, a.s the case ma:v be : JI iulhdkar , ' . Provided that any such reference may be arlmitted by the Tribunal after the period of
limitation prescribed therefor under this rule, if the person making the reference satisfies the 'fribunal that he h&d sufficient cause for not ma.king the reference within the said
period." According to Mr. Desai, under eub-r. (l) of th.is Rule the Corporation has to make a ref.,renoe to the Tribunal within three months. It would, thArefore, a.ccordin~ to him, follow that the insurer
must move the Corporation before the expiry of that p!'lriorl and that, therefore, by framing this rule the Central Government has not only carried out the requirements ofol. (fl of sub-s. 2 of s. 48
but also of sub-11. 2 of s. 16. It is difficult to appreciate this argument for two reasons. The first one is that when the law requires a. period to be prescribed fo; doing & thing,
that period should be clE>arly specified with specific reference to the particular purpose. The specific purpose referred to in Hub-s. 2 of s. 16 is "to have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision."
Making of the reference is thus in the hands of the C'-0rporation and not the insurer who can only move the Corporation for making the refenmce. Time is required to be prescribed for doing this act
by the inaurer. Prescribing time for ma.king a. reference is not prescribin!! time for moving the ,. Corporation to make the referl"nce. It ma.y be that · when the latter period is prescribed it . would be •
possible to say that before the expiry of that period the insurer must move the Corporation. But 2 s.c.R. SUPREME C'OURT REPQR,TS prescribing time by implication would not be com-
pliance wfoh the provisions of sub-s. 2 of s. 16. For, when a period is prescribed for doing an act the person who has to do that act is entitled to do it even on the last day. If the construction of learned·
counsel is accepted it would mean that the insurer would be within time under r. 12 if he moves the Corporation on the date· on which the period of three months expires. If he does that how would
it be. possible for the Corporation to make a refe- rence to the Tribunal al·.o on \he same <lay ? The second reason for not accepting the construction placed by learned counsel is that the
proviso to r. 12 empowers the Tribunal to admit a reference after the period of limitat.ion prescribed therefor if the "person making the reference" satis- fies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for
not. making the reference within the prescribed period. The proviso thus indio'.l.tes that the reference to the Tribunal contemplated by r. 12 is to be made by the insurer and not by the Corporation.
This appears to be so from the language of the proviso itself. ·No doubt r. 12, considered without the proviso, may well be construed as applying to reference to be made by the Corporation. But
considering the rule along with the proviso it would appear that the rule was meant to govern a refe- rence by someone else and not the Corporation. That someone could be either the insurer or a
chief agent or special agent wh? also is entitled to compensation!under the proviso to s. 36. J..earned counsel then advanced a rather novel argument. The argument is this. While the open-
ing words of r. 12 may apply to the Corporation as to an insurer, a chief agent or a special agent sub-rr. (i), (ii) and !iii) thereof apply only to the Corpo- i ration, whereas the proviso applies only to an insu-
l'er or a ohief agent or special agent as the case may be. If the provision, that ie, the whole or r. 12-ii 19112 Hindusfa11 l1hal lnsurJnca Co.Ltd. v. Life lnsuronce Corporatiori oj Indid
M udlmlf, at J . I9RI read thus, the contention procredP, there would be n;nd.,••n Id.al no lacuna in the rnles, and the provibo lo r. 12 I"'""""' Co. Lil. would not be rendered 1·eciundant.
Lift lruuran~ Oorporolion of Intli4 M 11dJiolA ar J. All that l\Ir. Desai could s1<y in support of Lis contention thut •ub-rr. (i), (ii) and (iii) of r. 12 must be eonst1 ucd to apply to the Corporation
alone is that such a construction would avoid a lacuna ill the rules. But what is the lacuna? We have already pointed out that tho lacuna is in not vrescribing the time within which an insurer must
move the Corporation for making a reference. That l .. mna will not be removed even if we accept the const1 uction pressed by learned counsel. That apart, upon the language of the sub·rules, they
cannot be oonstrued as applying to the Corporation alone. Learned counsel then contendl'd that if we construe the proviso in such a way us to make the substantive provisions of r. 12 applicablti to an
insurer or a chief agent and not to the Corporatian we would be limiting the scope of the main enact- ing provision and that is not permissible. There is no doubt that where the main provi-
sion is clear its effect cannot be cut down by the proviso. But where it is not clear the proviso, which cannot be presumed to t,e a surplusage, can properly be looked into the ascertain the me1ming
and 1;eope of the mai.n 1 roviMion. .By looking at the provii;o for this purpooe the rule of ::onitl uction refened to by learned counsel will not be infring- ed. In the West Derby Union v. M etrapolitJm Life
A68'urance Co .. (1) Lord Watson observed: " ……… I p.erfoctly admit the.t there may be and are many oases which the terms of e.n intelligible proviso may throw conaidera.ble •
(I) ( 1897) A.C. 'f I, 6~2. -1 2 S.C.R. SUPREME CO ORT ,REPORTS ·light on the ambiguous import of the statu· . tory words." Tn the same case Lord Herschell admitted that a proviso may be a useful guide in the selection of
one or other of two possible constructions of words in the enactinen t or to show the soo pe of the latter in a doubtful case. Here we find that r. 12 read by itself does not show clearly whether it appeals to the Corpora-
tion special agPnt. It is thernfore, permissible to look into the proviso for' ascertaining the scope of the main provisions of r. l:!. As we have stated earlier the proviso cannot, upon its proper construc-
tion apply to the Corporation.· When, therefore, we read r. 12 as a whole, that is, along with the proviso we woµld not be violating any well-accept- ed rule of construction though by so reading it we
came to the conclusion that r. 12 applies only to an insurer or a chief agent or a special agent but not to the Corporation. We may further point out that the proviso would be rendered useless if we are to bold that
r. 12 deals with a reference made by the Corpora- tion . only. The reason why we say that it will be rendered useless is this. Supposing an insurer moves the Corporation beyond three months for
making a reference, would the Corporation be bound to make the reference ? Upon the terms of aub-s. 2 of s. 16 the Corporation would only be bound to make a reference if is moved by the in-
surer within the prescribed period. If that is so, then no occasion would ariRe for enabling the in- surer to move the Tiibunal for condoning the delay. According to Mr. Desai, however, the Corporation
could be compelled by mandamus to make the refe- rence. The short answer to that is that there being no duty upon the Corporation to make a reference after the expiry or the period prescri'Jed by r. 12 no
mandamus can issue to it. Hindust,.,n Ideal . 1uuronce Co. Ltd, v. LiJe /nJ11rtmce Co1poru.1ion of Ltd. Mudho/kar J. Binli.;stan ttlul lruur~1i.c. QJ. U4. Life Jn1uranc• Cwj>otaho11 of India
Jlu4/wlk«' J, Another reason for not accepting the conten- tion of learned couusal is that the proviso speak of the person making the reference eatisfying the Tribu- nal that he has sufficient cause for not making tho
reference withiu the samtl period. If the insur<r is not the person making the reference, how can he be said to be permitted to Hatisfy .the Tribunal about the sufficiency of the cause for condoning the
delay in making the reference ? Mr. Desai, how- ever, suggest that we should read the words "if the person making tho rtlference satisfies tho Tri- bunal. .. etc." as if they read "if the person at whoso
instance the reference is made satisfies the Tri- buual. .. etc." That would be re-writing the pro vi. sion which we cannot do. It seems to us that while framing r. 12 the rule making authority lost sight of f~ct that sub-
s. 2 of s. 16 conttin:plates a reference not hy the insurer but by the Corporation. Learned counsel urged that we should not place an interpretation upon the rule which will leave a serious lacuna in
the working ol the act. We appreciate his conten- tion but there is no esoa.pe from the result. The proceedings before the Tribunal were mis- conceived because the only way in which they
could be initiated was by a reference by the Corpo- ration and there was no such reference. No question of limitation arises because the period within which an in8urcr must move the Corporation to make a
reference has not yet been prescri berl as required by sub-s. 2 of s. 16. It will be open to the Appellant to move the Corporation under a. 16(2) after such period is prescribed. In the result we quash all the proceedings be-
fore the Tribunal but in the particular circumsta- nces make no order as to costs. Appeal Dismisse.d.