.. ' the imposition of the octroi duty which in the context 'must mean imposition of the tax because the very first rule states:- . Rule 1 "Octroi shall ordinarily be levied on com-
modities included in the following classes and speci- fied in the schedule hereto annexed and at the rates therein entered". The various classes of articles and commodities on which octroi was to be levied are then set out and then
the exceptions and explanations are given. With these rules are the schedules specifying the goods under each class which are liable to octroi duty and the rate at which the octroi duty was chargeable.
This notification therefore clearly is one which directs imposition of octroi and falls within sub-s. (7) of s. 67 and having been notified in the Gazette it is conclu- sive evidence of the tax having been imposed in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and it cannot be challenged on the ground that all the neces- sary steps had not been taken. In our opinion this appeal is without force and is
therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. HUKUM SINGH AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (K. SUBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Criminal Trespass-Right of private defence
of property-Degree of-Trespasser, if must abide by the directions of the aggrieved party-Common object-Conclusion of-Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of I86o), s. r49. The appellants one of whom was armed with hatchet and
others with lathis, on being prevented by one 'H' and his suppor- ters through whose field they were committing cri1ninal trespass with the common object to reach a public passage with two load- ,__ ed carts, are alleged to have attacked 'H' and his supporters, as r96r
Berar Swadeshi Vanaspathi v. Municipal Com- mittee, Shegaon Kapur ]. March aB. Hukum Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Raghubar Dayal]. [1962] a result of which 'H' died. The defence was that on 'H's pro- test the appellants asked to be excused and pleaded to be allow- ed to cross the remaining small portion of the field to reach the public passage, whereupon they were attacked and in self defen- ce they attacked back.
The appellants' case was that H's right of private defence of the property had ceased for the reasons that the criminal trespass was over on the appellants having indicated their intention to do so, and they were no more an un- lawful assembly as their common object had ceased and there- after all were not responsible for acts of another.
Held, that when a criminal trespass had been committed it did not come to an end on the trespasser's expressing regret and then pleading to be allowed to proceed further with a view to end such a trespass. The aggrieved party had the right to pre- vent the trespasser from continuing to commit such further criminal trespass, and his directions had to be abided by by the trespasser, whatever be the degree of patience required; the trespasser had no right to insist on proceeding further even if not allowed to move in any direction in order to leave the field.
Held, further, that when several persons were with lathis and one of them was armed with hatchet and were agreed to use these weapons in case they were thwarted in the achievement of their object, it would be concluded that they were prepared to use violence in prosecution of their common object and that they knew that in the prosecution of such common object it was likely that some one might be so injured as to die as a result of those injuries.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 19, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1010 of 1956.
Jai Gopal Sethi, 0. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli, for the appellants. G. 0. ~Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent. 1961. March 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special
leave, is by four persons against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing their appeal and confirming their conviction for several offences including one under s. 302 read with s. 149, …
I.P.C., by the Sessions Judge, Sa.haranpur. These appellants, along with three other persons, were alleged to have forcibly taken two carts loaded with sugarcane from the field of Suraj Bhan through
the field of Harphool, in transporting the sugarcane from the field, about a furlong and a half away, to the public passage running by the side of Harphool's field, and to have beaten Harphool and others on Har-
phool's protesting against the conduct of the appellants' party at the damage caused to his wheat and gram crop. Ram Chandar, one of the appellants, was armed with a hatchet (kulhari) and the others were armed
with lathis. Harphool and others who came to his help struck the appellants' party also in self-defence. Harphool died as a result of the injuries received in this incident. The appellants admitted their taking the carts
through Harphool's field and alleged that at Har- phool's protest they asked to be excused, promised not to take the carts through the fields in future and pleaded for the carts being allowed to cross the very
small portion of the field which remained to be cover- ed before reaching the public passage. The accused state that in spite of all this meek conduct on their part, Harphool and his companions attacked them
and that then they also struck Harphool and others in self-defence. Both the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Judges of the High Court arrived at concurrent find- ings of fact and held that (i) there was no passage
through or along the boundary of Harphool's field; (ii) when the carts were near the passage and Har- phool protested, the appellants' party began the attack; and (iii) the appellants' party had no right of private
defence of person but had formed an unlawful assem- bly with the common object of committing criminal trespass over Harphool's field and using force to the extent of causing death, if necessary, in case they
were prevented from taking the carts through the fields. They accordingly convicted the appellants of the various offences . ~ •· Mr. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellants, has
raised four contentions: (i) Any right of private r96I lluku1n Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Raghubar Dayal ]. Huhum Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Raghubar Dayal]. [1962]
defence of property which Harphool had against the offence of criminal trespass committed by the appel- lants' party, had ceased when the criminal trespass was over or when the trespassers indicated their
intention to cease the criminal trespass; (ii) If one of the rioters causes injury for which the other rioters are to be liable under s. 149, 1.P.C., the injury must have been caused in prosecution of the common
object; (iii) An assembly ceases to be an unlawful assembly after the completion of its common object and only that member of the unlawful assembly would be liable for any criminal act committed later,
who has actually committed it; and (iv) The learned Judges of the High Court mis-directed themselves in ra.ising certa.in inferences from the facts found. It is clear, from the first three contentions raised,
that they are all based on the supposition that the criminal trespass which the appella.nts' party was committing had come to an end when Harphool is said to have prevented them from committing criminal
trespass and that it was Harphool who began the attack. There is no such finding recorded by the High Court. The two carts had not left Harphool's field and reached the public passage. They were inside
the field when the incident took place. They were near the boundary of Harphool's field. They must, in the circumstances, have been several yards inside the field. Criminal trespass had not therefore come
to an end and therefore Harphool had the right to prevent the appellants' party from continuing to com- mit criminal trespass for whatever short distance they had still to cover before reaching the public pathway.
It is true that the a.ppellants' party had to get out of the field and that this they could not have done with- out committing further criminal trespass. But it does not follow that this difficult position in which the
party found itself gave them any right for insisting that they must continue the criminal trespass. They had to abide by the directions of Harphool, whatever be the degree of patience required in case they were
not allowed to move in any direction in order to leave the field. If Harphool had started the attack in the .. .. I S.C.R. SUP.REME COURT REPORTS circumstances alleged by the appellants, there may
have been some scope for saying that he acted unreasonably in taking recourse to force in preference to taking recourse to public authorities or to such action which a less obstinate person would have taken
and had therefore lost any right of private defence of property against the offence of criminal trespass. We are therefore of opinion that the three propositions of law which, as abstract propositions of law, are sound
to some extent, do not arise in the present case. The fourth contention is really directed againt the view of the High Court that the common object of the appellants' party was to force their way through the
fields of Harphool and to use force to the extent of causing death, if necessary, and that the death of Harphool was caused in prosecution of that common object. We do not agree with the contention. It is
clear from the site plan, and has been so held by the Courts below, that the appellants' party could have taken their carts to the same public passage by going northwards from Suraj Bhan's sugarcane field.
In so doing, they would have had to cover a shorter distance up to the public pathway and would have had the neces- sity to trespass through one field only, and that too, of one of their own community Sandal Raj put. The other
fields lying on the way were of Suraj Bh:i,n himself. Their choosing a longer route which made them take their carts through the fields of several Sainis includ- ing Harphool, could not be justified. It must have
been obvious to them th:i,t in so doing they would cause d:i,mage to the crops growing in the number of fields through which they would have to pass. Such damage must give rise to protests by the persons to
whom loss is caused. It could be expected that some such persons might object to the passing of the carts and that unless they be prepared to cover back the distance to their own field, they would have to insist
on proceeding through the objector's field. Such instances must lead to a clash and to the use of violence. The objector is not expected to be prepared for such a conduct of the appellants' party and there-
fore for using force. Huku111 Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Raghuba,- Dayal]. Hu!tum Singh v. Tke State of U liar Pradesh Raghubar Dayal ]. [1962] The appellants' party consisted of a number of per-
sons one of whom was armed with a hatchet. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the appel- lants' party was prepared to use force against such an objector to achieve their object of taking the carts to
the public pathway by a short-cut. The northern route, previously mentioned, was certainly shorter to reach the public passage, but that route, along with the longer portion of the public passage to be covered
before reaching the spot near which the incident took place, was longer than the westerly route through the field which the party had taken. \V'hen several persons are armed with lathis and one of them is armed with
a hatchet and are agreed to use these weapons in case they are thwarted in the achievement of their object, it is by no means incorrect to conclude that they were prepared to use violence in prosecution of their com-
mon object and that they knew that in the prosecu- tion of such common object it was likely that some one may be so injured as to die as a result of those injuries. Harphool did receive seven injuries one of
which was an incised wound, bone deep, on the right side of the head. Another injury consisted of a con- tused wound, bone deep, on the left side of the head. Harphool died within twenty-four hours of his receiv-
ing injuries. The death was due to shock and haemorrhage caused by the injuries of the skull bone and brain on account of the wounds on the head. The offence made out on account of the death of Harphool
caused by the concerted acts of the members of the appellants' party has been rightly held to be the offence of murder. In view of what we have stated we do not see any force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.