INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. versus SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR.

12. As the advertisement would reveal, it did contain a categorical reference of the judgment and order dated 29. 08.1997 of the Delhi High Court, pursuant to which the same had been made to auction the right of a dealer of the company controlled outlet, situated at the place mentioned c at NH Phutahia Chauraha, Place: Basti (U.P.). Subsequent thereto, by a corrigendum dated 13 .I 0 .1998, the word "property" appearing in Clause 6 was in essence substituted by the word "dealership", as would be evident from the extract of the said corrigendum: "In item 6 of the said notice for auction for retail outlet of Mis. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. situated at NH Phutahia Chauraha, Basti (U.P.) may be read as follows: . The word PROPERTY shall also be substituted by the word DEALERSHIP. It is further clarified that in case of company controlled retail outlets only license to operate the dealership will be substituted with the word DEALERSHIP in the terms and conditions and its Annexures being sold from our office at Allahabad. Other terms and conditions shall be applicable as per earlier advertisement."

13. Mentionably, no other record has been laid before this Court to further elaborate on the terms and conditions of the proposed auction.

14. To reiterate, the High Court of Delhi in its rendition dated 29.08.1997, vis-a-vis the cases where the allottee, whose allotment had been cancelled, was unwilling to sell/part with a land on which the petrol pump/distributorship was being operated, had directed the Corporation to auction the right to open petrol pump/distributorship within the close H c (2017) 13 S.C.R. proximity of the existing location, as may be determined by it, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the need of the public with the stipulation that the highest bidder would arrange for the land/super strµcture for running the petrol pump/distributorship. To put it differently, in the eventuality where the allottee was not willing to sell/ part with the land on which the petrol pump/distributorship was operational, the Corporation was obligated in law to ensure the following steps in re- auctioning the right to open petrol pump/distributorship: (i) Determine a location in the close proximity of the existing location depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the need of the public. (ii) Such location, as determined on the above factors, alone to be auctioned with the stipulation that the highest bidder would arrange for the land/super structures for running the petrol pump/distributorship.

15. The unambiguous precept in the above premise, as contained in the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 thus did cast a duty on the Corporation as a condition precedent for the re-auction, to determine a location within the close proximity of the existing location, contingent on the facts and circumstances of each case and the need of the public. In clear terms therefore the Corporation was required to undertake this conscious exercise, it being clear that the location for the re-auction has to be essentially different from, though in proximity of the existing location.

16. The advertisement dated 05.10.1998 along with the corrigendum however do not disclose the exact location for which the re-auction was notified, the venue of the site being "NH Bhutahia Chauraha, Place: Basti (U.P.)" and wholly identical to the one of the existing location of the respondent. No attempt has been made to draw our attention to any initiative taken by the Corporation in compliance of the directives contained in the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court to identify the location as required for the fresh auction.

17. The respondent however launched her assailment against the advertisement dated 05 .I 0 .1998 and the corrigendum dated 13 .10.1998, this time before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad pleading the same to be violative of the directions contained in the judgment and INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] order dated 29.08.1997 and also in violation of her fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19( 1 )(g) of the Constitution of India. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the first instance by its order dat.ed 29.10.1998 stayed the operation of the auction notices and subsequent thereto, by its order dated 17.12.1998 directed the Corporation to permit the respondent to run the dealership of petroleum in the petrol pump of B Phutahia Chauraha, District Basti until the auction was held and finalized. Eventually, by the impugned judgment and order, noticing that the proposed auction had not taken place and that consequently the respondent had been permitted to run the retail outlet since 1998, directed the Corporation, in view ofits new policy dated 12.02.2004, to award fresh dealership to the respondent thereunder and further restrained it from interfering with her possession of the petrol pump premises in question.

18. As the impugned judgment would demonstrate, the High Court, while traversing the relevant facts, took note of the pleaded stand of the Corporation before it that the lease executed by the respondent vis-a- vis the land in question did subsist, cancellation of the dealership notwithstanding, and therefore she was not entitled for the possession thereof and that it had the right to induct some other dealer through the proposed auction to operate the agency from the land of the respondent. The High Court, while readily dismissing this plea of the Corporation on the touchstone of Article 300A of the Constitution of India held that ·as· the dealership was cancelled by the intervention of the Delhi High Court, it was not open for the Corporation to assert that the lease deed executed by her in its favour did subsist thereafter in the eye of law. Having propounded thus, the High Court observed that because of the non- removal of the fixtures, machineries and apparatus etc. from the land by the Corporation and because ofits unlawful stand precipitating the litigation before it, the respondent was sought to be denied the benefit of the use of land in questiou.~or which she was permitted, by the interim order dated 17.12.1998, to continue witli the dealership till the auction was held and finalized. Taking note of the fact that no auction had taken place and that the respondent had been permitted to run the retail outlet since 1998, the High Court provided that !Tesh dealership be awarded to her under the new Policy dated 12.02.2004 of the Corporation, which contemplated such allotments to land owners and their nominees from within the family, directly as well as through advertisement for locations outside government approved marketing plans. The High Court did also c record that the entitlement of the respondent was also cognizable in view of the fact that she had been running the present retail outlet without any complaint for a long period. To reiterate, the High Court thus directed the Corporation to award fresh dealership under the said policy by converting the earlier dealership thereunder within one month and also further restrained it from interfering with the respondent's possession over the petrol pump premises in question. This determination is the subject matter of scrutiny in the present appeal.

19. Mr. Rao has insistently argued that the dealership of the respondent having been cancelled by the ruling dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court which had attained finality, no direction for fresh dealership to her under any circumstances could have been made and thus the same being patently erroneous, the impugned judgment and order is liable to be set aside. According to the learned counsel, the advertisement dated 05 .10.1998 and the corrigendum dated 13. l 0.1998, if cumulatively read, are in meticulous compliance of the directions to that effect as contained in the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 and thus the Corporation ought to have been permitted to undertake the process to its logical end. The learned counsel for the Corporation when confronted with the omissions in the advertisement and absence of materials on record to authenticate that the exercise required to be undertaken by the Corporation for identifying a location in the proximity of the existing location was pursued, had no convincing explanation therefor.

20. Controverting the above, the learned counsel for the respondent emphatically urged that in the attendant facts and circumstances, though the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court had attained finality, the operative direction to the Corporation to convert the existing dealership into a new dealership under the policy dated 12.02.2004 is unassailable and therefore no interference in this appeal is called for. While imputing that, the Corporation though required in cases of dealership under category 'A', to provide the whole infrastructure including the land, in the case of the respondent, she was asked to make the arrangement therefor on her own investments, the learned counsel maintained that the advertisement dated 05.10.1998, even if read with the corrigendum dated 13. l 0.1998 was apparently not in compliance of the directions of the Delhi High Court and, therefore could not have been given effect to. According to him, the auction had thus been rightly INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.) stayed by the Allahabad High Court whereafter the respondent was permitted to operate the dealership and eventually taking note of the prevalent policy dated 12.02.2004, the. Corporation had been rightly directed to convert her existing dealership to a fresh dealership thereunder. It was urged as well that the plea of the appellant/Corporation that cancellation of the dealership notwithstanding, the lease did subsist and that it was entitled in law to hold a fresh auction for the land of the respondent, was wholly untenable and violative of the mandate of Article 300A, as held by the Allahabad High Court.

21. The recorded facts and the rival assertions have received our due consideration. The genesis of the instant appraisal is indeed traceable to the allotment of the retail outlet dealership to the respondent on compassionate ground by the Departmental Minister for Petroleum from his Special Discretionary Quota. As hereinbefore stated, on the recommendation of the said authority, the Corporation awarded the dealership. This award along with identically placed allotments, on judicial scrutiny, were directed to be cancelled in the public interest litigation initiated by the Center for Public Interest Litigation before the High Court of Delhi which, by its judgment and order dated 29.08.1997, on the ground that those were vitiated not by mere aberrations or arbitrariness, but by uncontrolled display of favouritism. The rendition by the High Court of Delhi in the facts and circumstances of the cases before it, was assuredly to secure administrative probity, transparency, objectivity and fairness in the matter of distribution of State largesse and public contracts. This decision, to reiterate, has become final and binding on the parties. As noted hereinabove, the Corporation in flagrant defiance and disregard to the judicial mandate of a Constitutional Court did not only issue the advertisement dated 05 .I 0.1998 with the corrigendum on 13.10.1998 without either determining or specifying the exact location for the site of dealership in the proximity of the earlier site of the respondent, instead did take up an incomprehensible plea that the cancellation of the dealership notwithstanding, the lease of the land of the respondent with it did subsist and that it was entitled in law to induct the new dealer through the auction process initiated, to the same location. The underlying objective in issuing the direction to determine and specify a location in the proximity of the existing site was with the avowed purpose of avoiding confrontation and possible litigation and also to ensure smooth and uninhibited supply of petrol and HSD from the new outlet at the fresh venue. c c

22. In the facts of the present case, we subscribe to the view of the High Court of Allahabad that with the termination of the dealership, the lease between the parties also stood extinguished and therefore, the respondent being the owner of the land and she having expressed her disinclination to sell or part with it, the Corporation by no means could have contemplated to award the new dealership to a third party on her land. On this clear premise, the failure of the Corporation to act in terms of the directions containing in the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court and in contending that the land of the respondent was available for commissioning the new dealership is patently wrong besides being contumaciously irreverent and abusively non-compliant thereof. The approach and attitude of the Corporation in making the advertisement dated 05.10.1998 with the corrigendum dated 13.10.1998 and in taking the apparently untenable stand that notwithstanding the cancellation of the dealership of the respondent, her land was available for the new process, is thus visibly militative of the rule of law besides being destructive of the salutary objective with which the High Court of Delhi had directed cancellation of the dealership/distributorship of the respondent along with others, being vitiated by the vice of nepotism and favourtism. This we say, as having regard to the progression of events, we are left with the impression, in view of the persistent omissions and commissions of the Corporation, that it is not unlikely that all these might have been strategised to eventually benefit the respondent in the long run. The pleaded stand of the Corporation that despite the cancellation of the dealership of the respondent, her land was still available, flies in the face of the determination to the contrary as recorded in the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 and only reflects the pre-determined mind of its functionaries for reasons unknown, though inferable. It is really incomprehensible as to how in spite of such explicit and clear observations and directions of the High Court of Delhi in its judgment and order dated 29.08.1997, either such a stand could have been taken or the fresh auction process could have been initiated without undertaking the initiatives required for specifying/identifying the new location. To reiterate, no material has been placed before us to demonstrate to the contrary. This is more so, as in the advertisement dated 05. l 0.1998, there is a reference of the judgment and order dated 29 .08.1997 of the Delhi High Court. A bare perusal of this document would show the venue to be "NH Phutahia Chauraha place: Basti (UP)", the same as of the dealership of the respondent. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

23. It is no longer res integra that a public authority, be a person or an administrative body is entrusted with the role to perform for the benefit of the public and not for private profit and when a prima facie case of misuse of power is made out, it is open to a court to draw the inference that unauthorized purposes have been pursued, if the competent authority fails to adduce any ground supporting the validity of its conduct. · B

24. The following extract from the Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. I(!) Administrative Law provide thefoundation of these observations: "A public authority may be descrihed as a person or administrative body entrusted with functions to perform for c the benefit of the public and not for private profit. Not every such person or body is expressly defined as public authority or body, and the meaning of a public authority or body may vary according to the statutory context."

25. In re, the duties, responsibilities and obligations of a public authority in a system based on rule oflaw, unfettered discretion or power is an anathema as every public authority is a trustee of public faith and is under a duty to hold public property in trust for the benefit of the laity and not for any individual in particular. The following excerpts from the Foulkes Ad111i11istrative Law, 7'' Edition at page 174 provide the · elaborate insight: "A true trust exists when one person, the trustee, is under a duty to hold the trust property vested in him for the benefit of other persons, the beneficiaries. The term 'trust' is, however, used in a much wider sense. We may speak of government being 'entrusted' with power, of Parliament as the trustee which the nation has authorized to act on its behalf. The purpose of the use of the concept in such contexts is of course to emphasize that the powers and duties of such bodies should be exercised not for the advancement of their own interest, but that of the others, to underline their obligation to others.

26. The distinction between the power of a public authority and a private person has since been succinctly brought about in the following quote from the celebrated work "Administrative Law", Te11th Editio11 by H. W.R. Wade and C.E Forsyth: (2017] 13 S.C.R. "The common theme of all the authorities so far mentioned is that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust not absolutely – that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which parliament when conferring if is c presumed to have intended. In a system based on rule of law, unfettered governmental discretion is contradictory in terms The powers of public authorities are therefore essentially different from thosi: of private persons. A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his dependants, dispose of his property just as he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this does not affect his exercise of his power. In the same way a private person has an absolute power to allow whom he likes to use his land, to release a debtor, or, where the law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds ofoublic interest."

27. In Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress vs. State of M.P. '· this Court was seised as well with the nature of the norms to be adhered to for allotment ofland, grant of quotas, permits, licenses etc. by way of distribution thereof as State largesse. The following observations provide the guiding comprehension: 65. What needs to be emphasised is that the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/ or officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well- defined policy, which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official Gazette and other recognised modes of publicity and such policy must be implemented/executed by adopting a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution oflargesse like allotment '(2011) s sec 29 INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] of land. grant of quota, permit licence. etc. by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favowitism or nepotism shall not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State. 66. We may add that there cannot be any policy, much less, a rational policy of allotting land on the basis of applications made by individuals, bodies, organisations or institutions dehors an invitation or advertisement by the State or its agency/ instrumentality. By entertaining applications made by individuals, organisations or institutions for allotment of land or for grant of any other type of largesse the State cannot exclude other eligible persons from lodging competing claim. Any allotment of land or grant of other form of largesse by the State or its agencies/ instrumentalities by !feating the exercise as a private venture is liable to be treated as arbitrary. discriminatory and an act of favowitism.and/or nepotism violating the soul of the egualitv clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. 28. In his work Administrative Law (6th Edn.) Prof. H.W.R. Wade highlighted the distinction between powers of public authorities and those of private persons in the following words: "The common theme of all the authorities so far mentioned is that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, no absolutely-that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended. Although the Crown's lawyers have argued in numerous cases that umestricted permissive language confers unfettered discretion, the truth is that, in a system based on the rule of law, unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms." 29. While rejecting the theory of absolute discretion, Lord Reid observed in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food2: " … Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the Act; the '[ 1968] AC 997 c policy and obj eels of the Act must be determined by constrning the Act as a whole and constrnction is always a matter of law for the court. In a matter of this kind it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line, but ifthe Minister, by reason of his having misconstrned the Act or for any other reason, so uses his discretion as to thwart or run counter to the policy and objects of the Act, then our law would be very defective if persons aggrieved were not entitled to the protection of the court." 30. The role of the Government as provider of services and benefits to the people was noticed in Ramana Dayaram Shelly v. International Airport Authority of India' in the following words: "11. Today the Government in a welfare State, is the regulator and dispenser of special services and provider of a large number of benefits, including jobs, contracts, licences, quotas, mineral rights, etc. The Government pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services, contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables dispensed by Government take many forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth. These valuables which derive from relationships to Government are of many kinds. They comprise social security benefits, cash grants for political sufferers and the whole scheme of State and local welfare. Then again, thousands of people are employed in the State and the Central Governments and local authorities. Licences are required before one can engage in many kinds of businesses or work. The power of giving licences means power to withhold them and this gives control to the Government or to the agents of Government on the lives of many people. Many individuals and many more businesses enjoy largesse in the form of government contracts. These contracts often resemble subsidies. It is virtually impossible to lose money on them and many enterprises are set up primarily to do business with the Government. The Government owns and controls hundreds of acres of public land valuable for mining and other purposes. These resources are available forutilisation by private corporations and individuals by way oflease or licence. All these mean growth in the Government largesse and with the increasing magnitude and range of governmental functions as we move closer to a welfare State, more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms. '<I 979) i sec 489 INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] Some of these forms of wealth may be in the nature of legal rights but the large majority of them are in the nature of privileges." 31. In the same vein, in Natural Resources Allocation, In Re'- this Court summed up the long line of judicial enunciations on this theme thus: "107. From a scrutiny of the trend of decisions it is clearly perceivable that the action of the State, whether it relates to distribution oflargesse, ?:rant of contracts or allotment of land, is to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. A law may not be struck down for being arbitrary without the pointing out of a constitutional infirmity as McDowell case has· said. c Therefore, a State action has to be tested for constitutional infirmities qua Article 14 of the Constitution. The action has to be fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory, transparent, non-capricious, unbiased, without favouritism or nepotism, in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment. It should conform to the norms which are rational, informed with reasons and guided by public interest, etc. All these principles are inherent in the fundamental conception of Article 14. This is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 32. This Court in Center for Public Interest Litigation and others Vs. Union of India and others', while examining the challenge to the allocation of 2G Telecom Services, reflected on the considerations that should inform the process thereof and observed thus: 95. This Court has repeatedly held that wherever a contract is to be awarded or a licence is "to be given, the public authority must adopt a transparent and fair method for making selections so that all eligible persons get a fair opportunity of competition. To put it differently, the State and its agencies/instrumentalities must always adopt a rational method for disposal of public propertv and no · attempt should be made to scuttle the claim of worthy applicants. When it comes to alienation of scarce natural resources like spectrum, etc. it is the burden of the State to ensure that a non- discriminatory method is adopted for distribution and alienation, which would necessarily result in protection of national/public interest. 'Special Reference No.I of2012 '(2012) 3 sec 2 c 33. Jurisprudentially thus, as could be gleaned from the above legal enunciations, a public authority in its dealings has to be fair, objective, non-arbitrary, transparent and non-discriminatory. The discretion vested in such an authority, which is a concomitant of its power is coupled with duty and can never be unregulated or unbridled. Any decision or action contrary to these functional precepts would be at the pain of invalidation thereof. The State and its instrumentalities, be it a public authority, either as an individual or a collective has to essentially abide by this inalienable and non-negotiable prescriptions and cannot act in breach of the trust reposed by the polity and on extraneous considerations. In exercise of uncontrolled discretion and power, it cannot resort to any act to fritter, squander and emasculate any public property, be it by way of State largesse or contracts etc. Such outrages would clearly be unconstitutional and extinctive of the rule of law which forms the bedrock of the constitutional order. 34. Adverting to the facts of the case, to recapitulate, the dealership of the respondent had been cancelled being vitiated by favourtism due to exercise of fanciful discretion of the Departmental Minister, which was neither approved nor condoned. Nevertheless, the Corporation visibly did not act in terms of the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in initiating the fresh process for auction. This led to the challenge to the faulty advertisement dated 05.10.1998 and the corrigendum dated 13. 10.1998, the operation whereof to start with was stayed and thereafter the respondent was permitted to continue with the dealership and eventually she was directed to be awarded a fresh dealership by converting the existing dealership under its policy dated 12.02.2004. The dealership of the respondent having been cancelled w.e.f. 01.12.1997, though the operation of the auction notice and the corrigendum thereto had been stayed and she had been allowed to run the outlet, we fail to comprehend as to how all these could be construed to signify that her dealership did subsist from the date of the impugned judgment and order. There was thus no scope for conversion of the existing dealership to a new dealership as ordered. In addition thereto, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the direction to award the new dealership under the prevalent policy dated 12.02.2004, having regard to the backdrop of adjudication undertaken by the Delhi High Court would amount to perpetuation of the undue benefit, earlier bestowed on her by a method held to be illegal, dubious, arbitrary and transgressive of public interest. In other words, the award INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. v. SHASHI PRABHA SHUKLA & ANR. [AMITAVA ROY, J.] of new dealership to the respondent in the prevailing facts and A circumstances, in our estimate, would amount to allowing the respondent to enjoy the premium of the illegality and arbitrariness resorted to in granting her the earlier dealership and reward her as a beneficiary of unlawful administrative patronage. In our view, the award of new dealership to the respondent would wholly undermine the purpose of B cancelling her earlier dealership and annihilate the very objective of securing transparency, fairness and non-arbitrariness in the matter of distribution of public contract. In taking the steps for initiating a fresh process ofauction, to state the least, the defaults andde-relictions of the Corporation and its functionaries are writ large and deserve to be strongly deprecated. The omissions and commissions do have the potential of C suggesting pre-determined perceptions and motivations in aid of the respondent, resulting in such disagreeable culmination in her favour. The time lag, according to us, per se cannot purge the vitiation of the award of dealership originally granted to the respondent, to entitle her to the relief granted by the impugned judgment and order, by way of a boon for the inexplicable faults and remiss in duty of the functionaries of the Corporation. In supervening public interest and to uphold the rule oflaw as well as imperative of administrative fairness, transparency and objectivity, we are thus not inclined to sustain the impugned judgment and order. It is, therefore set aside so far as it holds that the respondent is entitled to a new dealership at her location under the Policy dated 12.02.2014. We hereby reiterate that the dealership of the respondent at her present location stands cancelled w.e.f. 01.12.1997. The Corporation would now take immediate steps to this effect as permissible in law without fail. The Corporation would also initiate a fresh process for award of new distributorship/dealership in the area and at a location to be determined by it, if it considers it necessary in public interest strictly in conformity with law and the constitutionally recognized norms of transparency, objectivity and fairness. 35. In the singular facts and circumstances, we are greatly anguished and appalled by the manner in which the Corporation and its functionaries have acted in the face of the judgment and order dated 29.08.1997 of the Delhi High Court. We have no hesitation to record that we are left with the impression that the failures on their part may not be wholly bona fide. In this view of the matter, we direct the Corporation to cause an in-house inquiry to be made to fix the liability of the errant officials on the issue and decide appropriate action(s) against them in accordance with law within a period of two months herefrom. The Corporation after completing this exercise would submit a report before this Court for further orders, if necessary. We make it clear that any breach ornon-compliance of this direction would be per se construed to be a contempt of this Court with penal consequences as contemplated in law. The appeal is allowed. No costs. Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.