INDU BHUSAN BOSE v. RAMA SUNDARI DEVI & ANR. April 29, 1969 [M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVA, c K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.] Constitution of India, 7th Schedule, Entry 3, List I-If grants exclu· sive power to Parliament to legislate covering all cspects of house accom· modation in cantonment areas, including on relationships of landlord and tenant.
The first respondent, who was the owner of certain premises situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore filed a suit for the appellant's eviction from the premises. In the plaint it was claimed that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 12 of 1956, the regulation of house accommodation including control of rents being a subject in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same subject for Cantoriment areas and the extension of the Act to the cantonment area was ultra vires and void.
Upon the Trial Court making a reference under s. 113 C.P.C. to the High Court for a decision of the constitutional question, that court upheld the first respondent's contention. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court was in error in holding that the field of legislation covered by the Act, which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants, is included in the expression ';regulation of house accommodation in can- tonment areas" used in Entry 3 List I, regulation of house accommodation will not include within it laws or rules on the subject of relationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in the cantonment areas. On the other hand according to the appellant, legislation on this subject can be made either under entry 18 of List II, or entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III, so that a State Legislature is competent to legislate and regulate relation- ship between landlord and tenant in the cantonment areas; that under Entry 3 List I Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accom- modation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that house accom- modation is needed for military purposes and. laws are required for requisi- tioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation for such purposes.
The alternative submission made was that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary law should be confined to houses acquir· ed requisitioned or allotted for military pulrposes.
Entry 3, List I, a~ording to the appellant, should not be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate on the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of the military.
HELD : Dismissing the appeal, When power is granted to Parliament under Entry 3 List I to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommo- dation, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation 4'4
SUPREME OOURT REPOR.TS [1970] l S.C.R. required for mili!aly purposes, or must be. accommodation that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military. [447B] When legislating in respect of local self-government in
cantonment areas, it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire can- tonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military ofllccrs. Similarly, the
powers of the cantonment authorities, which could be granted by legisla- tion by Parliament, cannot be confined to th""<' areas or bu~dings which are in actual possession of military authorities or officers and must be in ~t
of the entire cantonment area including those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as occupation of civilians. In these circumstances, tlierc is no reason to narrow down the scope of le)lislation on regulation of house accommodation and oonfine it to houses which are required <Yr are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers.
[447F-H] 1be word "regulation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to be con- fined to allotment only an.J not to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of the house accommodation. Entry 3 List I gives power to Parliament to paS3 legisla- tion for the putposc of directing or controlling all house ae<:ommodation in cantonment areos. [448 DI
Prout v. Hunter, [1924) 2 K.B. 736, Property Holding Co. Ltd. v. Clark, (1948) I K.B. 630 and Curl v. Angelo d Anr. [1948) 2 All E.R. 189, ~eferred to. In the Constitution, the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament bas exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters contained In that Entry, notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List II or List Ill. Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to and of the mattc'rs enumerated in List I, notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament and the Slate Legislature, or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists Ill and II respectively. The general power of leaislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by a State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries 6 and 7 of List Ill is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List I, so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that, on the subje<t of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the Stale Legislatures. [454E-GJ A.C. Pare/ v. Vishwanath Chada, 1.L.R. [19541 Bom. 434, F.E, Dorukha- nawal/a v. Khemchand La/chand, l.L.R. (1954) Born. 544,
Kew":cfland v. Dashrath/a!, i.L.R. [1956] Nag. 618 and Bab11 Jagranand v. Sri Sa1y.1wa- yanji and 1.Akshmiji through the Shebait and Manager Jamuna Das, I.L.R. 40 Pat. 625, dis•pproved.
Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal. 1.L.R. 1 I Raj. 421, approved. CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 882 of 1968. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July I, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Reference No. 20 of 1963.
c INDU BHUSAN v. SUNDARI DEVI (Bhargava, J.) D. N. Mukherjee and Sunil Kumar Ghosh, for the appellant. A.. K. Sen, Sukumar Ghose and Krishna Sen, for respondent No. 1. B. Sen, Sukumar Basu and P. K. Chakravarti, for respondent No. 2.
Niren De, Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad, R. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the Union of India. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bbargava, J. Rama Sundari Debi, the first respondent in this appeal by sp~cial leave, instituted a suit for the ejectment of Indu Bhusan Bose appellant who was a tenant in premises No. 18, Riverside Road, owned by respondent No. i, situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpcre. The agreed rent was Rs. 250/- per mensem; but there was a dispute as to whether the owner or the tenant was liable to pay rates a~d taxes. On an applica- tion presented by the appellant, the Rent Controller. fixe.d fair rent under s. 10 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act No. XII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") at Rs. 170/- per month inclusive of iii! cantonment taxes, and, in appeal, the amount was enhanced to Rs. 188/- per month inclusive of all cantonment taxes. Respondent No. 1, in December, 1960, served a notice on the appellant to quit and, on failing to get vacant possession, filed a snit in the Court of the Murtsif. In the plaint, respondent No. 1 claimed that, regulation of house accommoda- tion including control of rents being a subject in entry No. 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature could not competently enact a law on the same sub- ject for cantonment areas, so that the appellant was not entitled to protectiQJ1 under the Act which had been extended to that area 'Jy the State Government.
It was urged that the extension of that State Act to the cantOllllllent area was ultra vires and void. The Munsif, thereupon, made a reference under s. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure to ~ High Court of Calcutta for decision of this constitutional question raised in the suit before him. The
High Court decided the reference by making a declaration that the notification, whereby the State Government had extended the provisions of the Act to tl1e Barrackpore cantonment area, was ultra vires and void.
This is the decision of the High Court that has been challenged in this appeal. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court is not correct in holding that the field of legislation covered by the Act, which is primarily concerned with control of rents and eviction of tenants, is included within the expression SUl'REMB COURT REPORTS
[ 1970] 1 S.C.R. "regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas" used in entry No. 3 of List I. That entry is as follows :- "3. Delimitation of cantonment areas, local SC"lf-
government in such areas, the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities and the regulation of house accommodation (including the con- trol of rents) in such areas."
The submission made is that regulation of house accommodation will not include within it laws or rules on the subject of relation- ship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in the canton- ment areas. On the other hand, according to the appellant, legis- lation on this subject can be made either under entry No. 18 of List II, or entries Nos. 6, 7 and 13 of List Ill, so that a State .Legislature is oompetent to legislate and regulate relatim:.ship between landlord and tenant even in c.antonment areas.
These relevant entries are reproduced below :- "List II 18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of
agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonisation." "List III 6. Transfer of [>roperty other than agricultural land; registration of· deeds and documents. 7. Contracts, including
partnership, agency, con- tracts of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, c but not including contracts relating to agricultural land. r I 3. Civil procedure, including all matters included
in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commenceme:1t of this Constitution; limitation and arbitration." On the scope of entry 3 of List I, the argument advanced is that Parliament is empowered to legislate in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that that house accommodation is needed for military purposes and laws are required. for re-quisitioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that. accommodation for such purposes.
In the alternative, the submission made is thut regulation of house accom- modation by parliamentary Jaw should I>\! ~onfined to houses acqmrcd, requisitioned or allotted for military purposes.
This entry 3, according to the appellant, should 11ot be read as giving Parliament the power to legislate on the relationship of landlord c INDU BHUSAN v. SUNDAIU DEVI (Bhargava, J.)
and tenant in respect af houses situated in cantonment areas if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to his tenant and have nothing at all to do with the requirements of th<: mili- tary.
We are unable to accept this submission. The language of the entry itself does not justify any such interpretation. In the entry, when power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no quali'ying words to indicate that the hous" accommoda- tion, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accom- modation required for military purposes, or must be accommoda- tion that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military. In fact, if a legislation in respect of any cantonment was to be undertaken by Parliament for the first time under this entry, there would be, at the time of that legislation, no house in the cantonment already acquired, requisitioned or allotted for military purposes; and, if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant were accepted, the power of Parliament to pass la"*'s cannot be ·exercised by Parliament at all. It is al •o significant that, in the entry, various items, which can be the subject-matter of legislation by Parliament, are mentione,d sepa- rately, and these are :-
(i) Delimitation of cantonment areas; (ii) local self-government in such areas; (iii) the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities; and (iv) the regulation
of house accommodation (in- cluding the control of rents) in such areas. In none of these clauses there is any specification that the legislation is to be confined to areas or accommodation required for military purposes. When legislating in respect of local self- govemment m cantonment areas, it is obvious that Parliament will have to legi•late for the entire cantonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military officers. Similarly, the powers of the cantonment authorities, which could be granted by legislation by Parliament, cannot be confined to those areas or buildings which are in actual possession of military authorities or officers · and must be in respect of the entire cantonment area including those buildings . and lands which may be in actual ownership as well· as occupation of civilians.
In these circumstances, there is no reason to narrow down the scope of legislation on regulation of house accommodation and confine it to houses which are re- quired or are actually in possession of military authoritks or mili- tary officers. The power to regulate house accommodation by Jaw must extend to all house accommodation in the cantonment area SUPREME COUllT RF~ORTS
[1970) I S.c.R. irrespective of its being owned by, or in the ~ion of, civi- lians. in fact, if a law were to be made for the first time under this entry, all the houses would be either vacant or occupied by owners or occupied by tenants of owners under private agreements and the law, when first made, will have to govern such houses. The scope of the expression "regulation of houSe accommoda- tion" in this entry cannot. therefore, be confined as urged on be- half of the appellant.
It is, in the alternative, contended that, even if the expression "regulation of house accommodation" in this entry includes regu- lation of houses in private occupation, it should not be interpre- ted as giving Parliament the power even to legislate for eviction of tenants who
may have occupied the houses under private arrangement with the owners. It should be confined to leglslation for the purpose of obtaining possession and allotment of such accommodation to military authorities or military officers. We
cannot accept that the word "regulation·• can be so narrowly inter- preted as to be confined to allotment only and not to other inci- dcms, such as termination of existing tenancies and evictio…i of persons in pos:;ession
of the house accommodation. The dic- tionary meaning of the word "regulation" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary i; '"the act of regulating" and the word "regulate'" is given the meaning "to control, govern or direct by rule or regu- lation".
This entry, thus, give, the power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. Clearly, this power to direct or control will include within it all aspects as to who is to make the constructions under what conditi.ons the constructions can be altered, who is to occupy the accommodation and for how lot1g, on what terms it is to be occupied, when and under what circum' stances the occupant is to cease to occupy it, and the manner in which the accommodation is to be utilised.
AIJ these are ingre- dients of regulation of house accommodation and •.ve sec no rcJson to hold that this word "regulation" has not been used in this wide se~ in this entry. It appears that, in the Government of India Act, 1935, the corresponding entry No. 2 in List I of the Seventh Scheiule to that Act was similar to this entry No. 3 of List I of the Seventh Sche- dule to the Constitution. but the expression "including ccntrol of rents" which is now in entry No. 3 of List I within brackets did not exist.
An argument was sought to be built on it that regula- tion of house accommodation was not intended to cover control of rents when that expression was used in the corresponding entry in the Government of India Act, and that this expression used in the Constitution should also be interpreted to cover the same field, so that, but for the addition made within brackets, Parliament c
c iNbu BHUSAN v. SUNDAfu DEVI (Bhargava,J;) cou!d ·not havedegislated for control of rents of house accomilw- dati0n within cantonment areas: It is further urged that, if ~ expression "regulation of house accommodation" is interpreted as not including within it .regulation or control or rents, it should also be held that it will.not.include regulation of eviction of prfvute tenants. This argument is based on the premise that. the words "including control of rents" was introduced in· entry 3 of List I of·the Seventh Schedule to the <;:onstitution for the purpose of en- .larging the scope of the legislati','.e authority. of Pa:liament· and mald.ng it wider than that of the Federal ·Legislature under the Government of Itidia Act. Such an assumption. is not necessarily justified. It may be that the words
"including the control of rents" were introduceq by ·way .of abundant caution or to clarify that the r~gulation of house accommodation rs ,wide enough to include control of rents.
The addition m~y have been made so as to concentrate attention on the fact that Je{\islation was needed for control of rents in the situation that existed at the tim~ when the Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly. It !ias to be remembered that. cantonments are intended to be and are, in fact, military· enclaves and. re!llllation of
occup~tion ·of house accommodation in the cantonment areas by parliamentary law is necessary fr.om the PQint of view of .security of military installa- tions in cantonments and requirements of military authorities ~nd personnel for accommodation in such areas.
SU ch a purpose· could only be served by ensuring that Parliament could legislate in resJ?Cct of house acCQ_mmodatiqn in cantonment areas in all its aspec:s, including regulation ·of grant of leases, ejectment of lessees, and ensuring that the accommodation is available on proper terms as to rents.
On l)ll interpretation of the contents of the entry itself, therefore, .we are led to the conclusion that. Parliament was given 1he ·lxclusive Jiower to legislate in respect of house accom- _,; !)Iodation in canto~ent ·areas for regulating the accommodation in' all its .aspects.
In this· connection, we may refer to three decisions.which ex- plain the object of legislation on the subject .of rent control. In Prout v. Hun.ter('), Scrutton, L.J., dealing with the legislation during. the war in England, held :-. –
•Great pu)llic feeling was aroused by the exorbitant demands for rent that were made and the ejectments for non-payment of it, y;ith the result thati'arliament p~sed the Rent Restriction Acts with the two-fold· object, (1)
pf preventing the rent from being raised above the pre- war standard, and (2) of preventing tenants fro\ll being turned out of their houses even if the term 'for which • . they had originajly taken tl;iem had expired.'~
(1) [1924] 2 K.B. 736. SUPREME C:OUllT REPORTS [ 1970] I S.C.R. In Property Holding Company Limited v. C/mk(' ), it was held:- "There are certain fundamental features of all the Rent Restriction legislation, or at any rate of the legisla- tion from 1920 to 1939. The two most important ob-
jects of policy expressed in it are ( 1) to protect the tenant from eviction from the house where he is living, except for defined reasons and on defined conditions; (2) to protect him from having to pay more than a fair
rent. The latter object is acllieved by the provisions for standard rent with (a) only permitted in- creases, (b) the provisions about furniture and attend- ance, and (c) the provisions about transfers of burdens
and liabilities from the landlord to the tenant which would undennine or nullify the standard rent provisions. The result has been held to be that the Acts operate in rem upon the house and confer on the house itself the
quality af ensuring to the tenant a status of irremov- ability. In this description of the distinguishing charac- teristics conferred by statute upon the house, the most salient is the tenant's security of tenure-his protection
against eviction; although the scope of the statutory . policy about a fair rent must also be borne in mind es- pecially in connexion with the provisions relating to fur- niture, attendance, services and board."
In Curl v. Angelo and Another(2 ), Lord Greene, M.R., deal- ing with Rent Restrictions Act, held:- "The courts have had to consider what the over-rid- ing purpose and intention of the Acts are, and I cannot
put it in a more clear or authoritative way than by using the words of Scrutton, L.J., in Skinner v. Geary ( 1931) 2 K.B., 546,560), that the object was to protect the per- son residing in a dwelling-house from being turned out
of his home." All these three cases clearly show that whenever any legislation Is passed relating to control of rents, that legislation can be effective and can serve its purpose only if it also regulates eviction of tenants.
Consequently, when in entry 3 of List I the power is granted to Parliament specifically to legislate on control of rents, that power cannot be effectively exercised unless it is held that Parliament also has the power to regulate
eviction of tenants whose rents are to be controlled. Such oower must, therefore, be nec~ssarily read in the expression "regulation of house accom- modation". Of course, it has to be remembered that this power (I) [)948] I K.B. 630.
(2) (1948, 2 All E.R. 189. c INDU llJlUIWf v. stJNDU[ DEVI (lJhargava, /.) reserved for P~t is to be exercised ill respect of house a<XlOllllllOdat situated in cantonment areas only and not other areas the legislative power in respect of which is governed by entries either in List II or in List ID.
This. view that we llie taking is also borne out by the lristorical background provided by the l~tion relating to cantonments and house accommodation in cantonments in India. Carnduff
in lris book on "Mjlitacy and Cantoinment Law in India" has indi- cated how the need for legislating with the object of overcomillg difficulties experienccil by military officers in obtaining suitable accommodation in cantonments came under consideration, and has stated:
c , "In the early days of the British dominion in India, the camps, stations, and posts of the field army gradually developed into cantonments, •where troops were regularly garrisoned. The areas so occupied were at first set apart
exclusively for the military and intended for occupation by them only; but, by degrees, non-military persons were admitted, land was taken possession of by them, and houses were built under e<>nditions laid down by the
Government fwm,time to time. These conditions were undoubtedly frll:ined with the main object of rendering accommodati<>11 always primarily available for the mili- tary officers WhCllle duties necessitated their residence
within cantonlle!it limits." (p. clxii). He goes on to relate that a Bill wlrich ultimately became the Can- tonments Act, 1889, originally contained a set of provisions on the subject, insisting. on the prior claim of military . officers to occupy houses in cantonments and proposing that disputes as to the rent to be paid and the repairs to be executed should be re- ferred to, and seUled by, committees of arbitration.
That part of the Bill was, however, omitted as it evoked considerable opposi- tion and a separate llieasure was, consequently, taken up, but not till after many years of discussion. The new Bill was intro- duced in the Governor-Oeneral's Council in 1898, and was passed into law as the Cantonments (House-Accommodation) Act II of 1902. The main provision in this Act was that, on the Act being applied to any cantoDl!lent, every house situated therein became liable to appropriation at any time for occupation by a militru.y officer. It recognised the paramount claim of the military authon- ties to insist upon houses in cantonments being, where necessary, made primarily available for occupation by the military officers stationed therein.
In addition, a provision was made . in s. 10 that no house in any cantonment or part of a cantonment was to be occupied for the purposes of a hospital, bank, hotel, shop or school; or by a railway administration, without the previous sane- IUPIUllOI OOUl.T llEPOllTS
[1970] l S.C.R· lion of the General Officer of the Command, given with the con- currence of the Local Government This provision, thus, clearly regulated the letting out of houses in a cantonment even for some of the civilian purposes, such as hospital, bank, etc. The reason obviously was that it was considered inappropriate that a house occupied for such a purpose should be 1cquired to be vacated in order to make the house available for military officers. Keeping the primary object of facilitatinj! availability of house accommoda- tion for military officers in view, even private letting out was, thus, regulated at that earliest stage. Subsequently came
the 'Cantonments (House-Accommodation) Act VI of 1923 which was in force when the Gover,mnent of ln4ia Act was enacted, as well as at the time when the Constitution came into force.
This Act also contained similar provisions which pennitted military autho- rities to direct an owner to lease out a house to the Central Govern- 'ment, to require the existing occupi\:r to vacate th~ house and to refrain from letting out any house for purposes of a hospital, school, school hostel, bank, hotel, or shop, or by a railway administration. · a company or finn engaged in trade or business or a club, without the previous sanction of the Officer Commanding the District given with the concurrence of the Commissioner or, in a Pro~ce where there are no Commissioners, of the Collector.
This Act also, thus, interfered with and regulated let~ out of house accommodation by owners for civilian purposes even though, at the time of letting. ·the house was not required for any military purpose.
It was in the background of this legislative history that prQ.Vision was made in the Government of India Act in entry 2 of LisrI of the Seventh Schedule reserving for the Federal Legislature the power to legis- late so as to regulate house accommodation in cantonment areas, and the same power with further clarification was reserved for Parliament in antry 3 of List I ol the Seventh Sch~ule to the Constitution.
Obviously, it could not be intended that )>arliament should not be able to pass a law containing provisiolis similar to the provisions in these earlier Acts which did interfere with private letting out of house accommodation in• cantonment areas by owners for certain purposes.
Another aspect that strengthens our view is that if we were to accept the mterpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant that the power of Parliament is confined to legislation for the purpose of obtaininit house accommodation in cantonment areas for military purposes and excludes legislation in respect of house accommodation not immediately required for military pur- poses, all that Parliament will be able to do will be to make provi- sion for acquisition or requisition of house accommodation. On the house acrommodation being acquired or requisitioned, it will be a'l!llilable for use·by military authorities. Such power, obviously, could"hot bo intended to be conferred by entry 3 in List I when c
1•" :~,, •• l c ,.,, .. . DlllU BHUSAN v: ·STJNDAl.J DBVI" (Bhargava, J.) the same power is specifically granted concurrently to both Parlia· ment and the State Legislatures under entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
On behalf of the appellant, reliance was placed on some deci· sions of some of the High Courts in support of the proposition that the power of Parliamqot under entry 3 of List I does not extend to regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant which power vests in the State Legislature unc!er entry 18 of List II. The first of these cases is A. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chada(') where the Bombay High Court was dealing with entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 wd entry 21 of List II of that Act.
The Court was concerned with the applicability of the Bomb'llr Rent Restriction Act No. 57 of 1947 to cantonment areas. Opinion was first expressed that the Rent Restriction Act had been passed by the Provincial Legislature under Entry 21 of List II and reliance was placed on the English interpretation Act to hold that land in that entry would include buildings so as to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature to legislate in respect of house accommodation.
Then, in consideri,ng the effect of Act 57 of 194 7, the Court said :-· "As the preamble of the Act sets out, the Act was passed with a'villW to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises, of rates of hotels and lodging houses,
and of evictions. , Therefore, the pith and substance of Act LVII of 1947 is to regulate the relation between landlord and te~t by controll'ng rents which the tenant has got to pay to the landlord and by con trolling the
right ·of the landlord to evict his tenant. Can it be said that when the Provincial Legislature was dealing with these relations between landlord and tenant, it was regu- lating house accommodation in cantonment areas ? In
our opinion, the. regulation contemplated by Entry 2 in List I is- regulation by the State or by the Governmen;. · Requisitioninl!; of property, acquiring of property, allo· cation of propertv, all that would be regulation of house
accommodation, [but when the Legislature merely deals with relation$ of landlord and tenant, it is not in any way legislating with regard to house accommodatioo. The house accommodation remains the same, but the tenant
is protected qutul his landlord." We have felt consid~~able doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship betw~n landlord an<\ tenant iii· respect of house accommodation m; buildiings would appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seyenth Schedule to the Government of India (1) I.L.R. [1954) Bom. 434.
L13!1uJ>CJ69- .{l.970] l S.c.R· Act, 1935, or in the corresponding Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule w the Constitution. These Entries permit legislation in respe<;t of land and explain the scope by equating it with rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of iaDjJord and tenant, and the collection of rents.
It is to be noted that the relation of landlord and tenant is mentioned as being included in land tenures and the expression "land tenures" would not, in our opinion, appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation.
That expression is only used with reference to relationship between landlord a.pd tenant in respect of vacant lands. In fact, leases in respect of. non-agricultural pro- perty are dealt wilh in the Transfer of Property Act and would much more appropriately fa[) within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act read with Entry IO in the same List, or within the scope of Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry 7 in the
same List Leases and all rights governed by leases, including the terminatio.n of leases and eviction from pro- perty leased, would be covered by the field of tran~fer of property and contracts relating thereto.
However, it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion in this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of la,ndlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas is dearly covered by the Entries in List I.
In the Constitution, the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respec1 to the matters contained in that Entry, notwith– stmding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List II or List Ill.
Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws wi•h respec·t lo any of the matters enumerated in List I, notwithstanding the concurrent pr,wer of Parliament and the State Legislature, o, the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and II respec- tively.
The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by a State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List Il or Entries 6 and 7 of List !II is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List I. so that the effect of Entrv 3 of List I is that. on the subject of relationship between landiord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legisla1ures. The submission made that this interpretation wil) lead to a conflict between the powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I. II and III has also no force, because the reservation of power for Parliament for the limited purpose of legislatin11 in respect of cantonment area only -amounts to exclusion of thi> part of the legislative power from the ~cneral powers conferred
on State Le~islatures in the other two Lis~. This kind of exclusion is not co.jfined onlv to leei,lation in respect of house accommodation in j: ji !ll \_ ·A INDU llHUSAN v. SUNDAlU DEVI (Bhargava, J.)
45& cantonment areaa. The same Entry gives Parlillment jurisdiction to make proVision by legislation for local self-government i!l cantonment areas wbicb is clearly a curtailment of the general power of the State Legislatures to make provision for local .self- goverimllent in 8lJ. areas of the State under Erl.try 5 of List II. That J:!.ntry 5 does not specifically exclude cantonment areas and, but for .Entry 3 of List 1, the State Legislature would be competent to make provision ·1or local government even in cantonment areas. Similarly, power of tho State Legislature to legislate in respect of : (i) educati~, including universities, under Entry 11 Qf List II is made subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 ell'. List III; (ii) regulation of mines and mi.tle- ral development in Entry 23 of List II is made subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the CQlltIQl of the Urnon; (iii) industries in Entry 24 of List 11 is maije. subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I; (iv) trade and commerce within the State in Entry 26 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 3 3 of List Ill; {v) productio~ supply and distribution of goods under Entry 27 of List Il is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; . a;nd {vi) theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas in Entry 33 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I. Thus, the Constitution itseli h:rs specifically put down entries in List U in which! the p0wer is expressed in general terms but is llUlde subject to the provisions of entries in either List I or List Ill. ln these circumstarices, no anomaly arises ;.n holding that the exclusive i>OWCI of Parliament for regulation· of house accommo- dation including .control of rents in cantonment areas has the effect of making the legislative powers conferred by Lists II aind Ill subject to this ~er of Parliament. In this view, we are unable to affirm the decision of the Bombay High Court in A. C. Patel's case ( 1 ) which iS based on the interpretation that Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act only permitted laws to be 111:ade for requisitiooing of property, ac;quiring of property and allocation of property only. The same High Court, in a subsequent case in F. E. Darukhanawalla v. Khemchand Lal- chand('), plac;Jd the same interpretation on Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Sclledule to the Constitution. That decision was also based qn the same interpretation of the scope of rl)guJation of house accommodation as was accepted by that Court in the earlier case.
The Nagpur)ligh Court in Kewa/cband v. Dashrathla/(1) pro- ceeded on the .!assumption that tlie decision in' the case of A. c. Patel v. Vishwtitiath Chada(') correctly defined the scope of Pintry (1) I.LR. [19S4] ll<lm. 434.
(2) l.L.R. [1954] Born. 544. (.l) 1.L.R. [1956J N'1g. 618. LIJ Sup. Cl 69-16. SUPREM.i COURT REPORTS [1970] I S.C.R. 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, and co,ru;idered the narrow question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant specifically mentioned in Entry 21 in List ll $Jf that Act covered the requirement of permission to serve a notice for eviction in regulating the relation of laindlord and tenant and fe11 within the scope of Entry 21 in List II or in Entry 2 in List I of that Act.
The Court held that it -substantially fell in Entry 21 in List II and .not in Entry 2 in List I. That Court did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the expression "regulating of house accommodation" included something besides what Chagla, C.J., had said was its ambit in the case of A. C. Patel v.
Vishwanath Chatia('), but expressed the opinion that the expression could not be stretched to include the aspect of the relation at landlord and tenant involved in that partioular case.
It is clear that, in that case also, a narrow interpretation of the expressicm "regulation of house accommoda- tion" was accepted, because it appears that there was no detailed discussion of the full scope of that expression .. Similar is the decision of the Patna High Court in Babu Jagtanand v. Sri Satya- narayanji and Lakshmiji Through the Shebait and Manager Jamuna Das('). In fact, this last c'ase merely followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of F. E. Darukhanawalla v. Khemchand La/chand (3).
On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal(') held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6, 7 acnd 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List II, and that that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us.
We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs payable to plaintiff respondent only. R.K.P.S.
(I) I. L. R. 1954 Born. 4.14. (1) 1.L.R. [1954] Born. 544. Appeal dismissed. (2) J.L.R. 40 P::tna 625. (4) 1.1 .. R. 11 Raj. 421. ll c