_,. 3 S.C.R. .SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS JAI DEV v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB (And Connected Appeal) (P. B, GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA, and J. R. MCJ'DHOLKAR, JJ.) Oriminal Law-Murder;_Self-defence-Bcope-Threat
to posses'sib'I} of land-Indian Penal Gode (Act 45· of 1860), ss: 99; JOO-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), :11':-342. ·?' The 11ppellants along with four others were charged with <;.-·
~having committed offences under s. 148 and ss. 202 and 326, ' .lead with s, 149, of the Indfan Penal Code. The incident ''which gave rise to the present criminal proceedings ·related to a cultivable field in respect of which a dispute arose as to its pos~ssion b"tween the appellants and the faction of the complainant~On September 14, 1960, a rioting .took place
in the field which resulted in the death of six persons and injuries to nine persons. The appellant's case was that they were.in possessions of the field and were cultivating it at the time of the incident whereas the prosecution contended that the complainant's party was in possession and that the appel- lants virtually invaded it and caused a massacre. The High .Coµrt found that the crop in the field had been ploughed
by 'the appellants and their companions and that when the cip~ratioris were being carried . on by' them on the day of rioting, the villagers, who did not tolerate the strangers, came ,to·the field armed with weapons to' take forcible possession of the field, that as soon as ·fire-arms were used for the first time killing a person, the villae ers started running away and ,that, after all the villagers had run away, the appellants used their rifles a~ainst their respective victims when the latter were 'standing at a COPsiderable distance from them. 'The
High Court took the· view that as at the relevant time the property had been saved from 'the trespass, there was no 'justification for using any force against the running villagers and so, the appellants who were proved to have caused the
deaths of the victims could not claim protection ·of the right I of private defence and Were guilty of the. offence of murder 'under's 302. ' t '·· ' · Hela, that the appellants were rightly convicted under s.302 of t,he Indian Peria! Code on the findings given by the :High·Court.
…t 19112 190' ! ai Deo v. Slol• oJ P•si•6 In exercising the right of private defence, th~ force which a person defending himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury
which is to be averted or which is reawnably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose, The use of• the force must be stopped as soon as the threat has disappeared. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious~
In exercising its powers under s, 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Court must take care to put all the relevant circumstances appearing in the evidence to the accu- sed, so that he might get an opportunity to say what he
wanted to do so in respect of the prosecution case against him, but it is not vecessary that the Court should put to the accused detailed questions which may amount to his cross .. examin~tion.
Hekl, that the failure to 'put• the specific point of the distance from which the appallants used their rifles, under i- s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, did not vitiate the trial or affect the conclusion of the High Court,
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 56 and 57 of 1962.- Appeals by special leave from the judgment 11.nd order dated October 4, 1961, of the Puujab High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos, 635 and 636 of
1961 and Murder Reference No. 59 of 1961. Frank Anthony, Ghanshiam and P.O. Aggarwala for the appellants. N. S. Bindra, Kartar Singh, Assistant Advocate· General for the State of Punjab and P. D. Menon, for
the respondents. 1962. July 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by, Goj1nrlrogadkarJ. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The two appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh along with four 'Others Yudhbir
Singh, Dhanpat . Singh, Sajjan Singh and Parbhati were charged with having committed offenoes under ~.lfS a1J,q ss.302 a?ld 326 both read wit4 s.149 of,tqe 3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
Indian Penal Code. The case against them was that on September 14, 1960, they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in the area of Dhani Khord and that the common object of this unlawful
assembly was to commit the offence of rioting while armed with deadly weapons and that in pursuance . of the said common object the offence of rioting was committed. That is how the charge under s. 148
was framed. The prosecution further alleged that on the same day and at the -same time and place, while the accused persons were mem hers of an unlawful assembly, they had another common object
of committing the murders of Hukma, Jai Narain, Jai Dev, Amin Lal, Mst. Sagroli and Mst.J>il Kaur and that in pursuance of the said common object, the said persons were murdered. Dhanpat Singh
killed Hukma, Sajjan Singh attacked Hukma, Yudhbir Singh shot at Amin Lal, Jai Dev shot at Mst. Sagroli and victim Jaidev, and Hari Singh shot at Jai Narain and Parbhati killed Mst. Dil Kaur.
_ [t is the murder of t.hese six victimes which gave .rise to the charge against the six accused persons under s. 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. An ·assault made by the members of the said assembly
on Ram Chander, Jug Lal, Mst. Chan Kaur, Sirya, Murti and Murligave rise to a similar charge under· s. 326/149. At the same trial along with these six persons, Basti Ram was tr.ied on the charge that he
had abetted the commiesion of the offence of murder by the members of the unlawful assembly and thus rendered himself liable to .be punished under s. 302{109 of the Indian Penal Code.
The 0ase against these seven accused persons was tried by the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurgaon. He held that the charges•against Parbhati and Basti Ram had not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubte ; so, he acquitted both the said accused per- sons. In respect of the remaining five accused :persons1 the lea:rned Jud~e h<;ild that a.ll the three J961 Jai Dev v. The State of Punjab
Gajendrogadkar J. llJfB charges framed against them had been provE;d ·be- Jsi Dev yond & reasonable doubt. For the offence of murder, v. "the learned Judge directed that all the five should
'fl• s1at1 °1 Pu.;a• be banged ; for th~ offence under s. 326/149 ·he G-J•n•at•IJm "· . sentenced each one of them two years' rigorous 1 imprisonment and for the offence under s. 148. he
sentenced each one to suffer R. I. for one year. These two latter sentences were ordered to run concurrently and that too if the death penalty imposed on them was not confirmed by the High
Court. · . Against this order of oonv.iction and sentence, three appeals were 'prefered on behalf of the five condemned persons. The sentences of death im- posed on them were also submitted for confirmation.
The Punjab High Court dealt with the confirma- tion proceedings and the three appeals together and held that the oonviotion of Yudhbir Sin~h. Dhanpat Singh and Sajja.n Singh was not justified and so,
the said order of conviction was set aside .and con- sequently,. they were ordered to be acquitted and discharged. In regard to Jai Dev and Hari Singh the High Court differed f~om the view taken ·by
the trial Court and held that they were guilty not under s. 302/149 but only under s. .302. of the lndi~n Pena.I Code. In the result, the appeals preferred by them wore dismissed and their con-
viction for the oilenoe of murder and the sentences of death imposed on them were confirmed. It is this order which is challenged by the two appel- lants before us in their appeals · ·Nos. 56 and 57 of
1962. These two appeals ha.ve brought to this Court "by special leave. The incident whioh has given rise to the pre- sent criminal proceedings occurred in Khosra No.388 in Ma.uza. Ahrod known as 'lna.mwala ·field' on ,
September 14 •. 1960, at about 10.30 A.M. This inoident has Jed to the dea.th of six persons already . …. … .l– 3 S.C.R. mentioned as well as the death of Ram Pat who belonged to the faction of the appellants. It has
a.lso resulted in injuries to nine persons three of whom belonged to the side of the appellants and ·Six to the side of the complainants. The incident itself was in a sense a tragic and gruesome culmina-
tion .of the battle for possession of' the land which was waged between the appellants on the one hand . and the faction of the complainants,on the other. One of the principal points which fell to be con-
sidered in the courts below was: who was in possJsiiion of' the said field at the material time .? The appellants pleaded that they were in possession of the field· and were cultivating the field at the
time of the incident, whereas the prosecution con- tends that the compl!J,inants' party was in posses- sion of the fiel<il. and the appellants virtually invad- ed the field and caused this ma11sacre.
The prosecution case is that between 9 and .IO A.M. on the date of the offence, the appel- lants and their brothers Ram Pat and Basti Ram came to .the field with· their tractor and started
ploughing the bajra crop which had been sown by the. villagers who were tenants in possession. Jug Lal, Amin Lal, Ram Chander, Sunda, Jai Dev, . Hukma and others remonstrated with the appal•
lants that the crops raised by them should not be· destroyed.· Dhanpat Singti who was driving the .tractor was armed with pharsi while the appellants _,… were standing arnied with rifles. Yudhbir Singh
had a pistol. Sajjan,, Singh and ·Parbhati had pharsis and Ram l'at had a bhalla. Thus all the appellants were armed with deadly weapons and three of thel!l had fire-arm. · According to the pro-
secution, the rerqonstrance made by Juglal and others did not help and the appellants told them that they ·had got possession of the land and that they would not permit any interference in their
ploughjng operations. That invitably led to an 19011 — Jai Dev n, Stale of Pu•Ja Gajen,raz•'l•r. I . Jai Dev altercation and an attempt was made to itop the working of the tractor. This immediatly led to the ·
v.· terrible scuffle which resulted in so many deaths. The State •J Pu•i•b Sajjan Singh gave a pharsi blow to Juglal whose Gajlndragadkal' J, left arm was touched. Thereupon, Ram Pat raised
his bhalla against Juglal causing injuries to the latter on the left side of the · a bdome n and on the right hand wrist· Hukma then snatched the • bhalla from the hands of Ram Pat and gave a
blow to him in self-defence. As a result, Ram Pat fell on the ground and died. Sajian Singh, Dhan- pat Singh and Parbhati then gave blows to Hukma with pharsis, Hukma fell on the ground uncon-
cious, At this stage, Amin Lal asked the appel- lants and their friends not to kill people but the only result of ~his intercession was that he was shot by the pistol of Yudhbir Singh. Then everybody
on the complainmmts; side started to run away. Thereafter Jai Narain was shot dead by the appel- lant Hari Singh. Dil Kaur was killed by Parbhati and others, anqvictim Jai Dev and Met. Sagroli
were shot dead by the appellant Jai Dev. That, in substance, is the prosecution oase. On the other hand, the defence was that all the accused persons had gone to Inamwala field at
about 8.30 A.M. on September 14, 1960, and were engaged in the lawful act of ploughing the land of which they had taken possession. They had put the tractor on the portion of the bajra crop which
was •kharaba' with the object of using it for manme. After this operation had. gone on for nearly two hours, a large number of resident~ of Dhani Sobba. and Ahrod, including women, came on the spot
armed with deadly weapons and they started a.bu- sing and assaulting the accused persons with the weapons which they carried. The accused persons then used jellies, kassi and lathi in Helf-defence.
Amin Lal from the complainants' party. was armed · with a. pistol which he aimed at the accused persons, Sajja.n Singh then gave a lathi blow to Amin Lal and in consequence, the ·pistol fell down on the
ground from his hands. It was then picked up by Yodhbir Singh and he used it is retaliation against the assailants and fired five or six rounds. Basti Ram who was charged with abetment of the princi·
pal offences denied his presenoe, while the six other accused persons admitt"ed their presence on the · spot and pleaded self-defence. . The prosecution sought to prove its case by
leading oral evidence of the witnesses who were present at the scene and some of whom had received injuries themselves. It also relied on documen· tary evidence and the evidence of the Investigating
Officer. Soon after the incident, l!'irst Information Report was filed by the appellant Jai Dev in which · the version of the accused pe>rsons was set out and a case was made out against the· villagers. In fact,
it was by reason of this F.I.R. that the investiga- tion originally commenced. Subsequently, when it was discovered that on the scene of the offence six persons on the complainants' side had been
killed and six injured, information was lodged setting out the contrary version and that led to two cross-proceedings. In one proceeding the members of the complainants party were the' accused, whereas
in the other proceeding the appellants and their companions were the accused persons. ::5ince the trial ended in the conviction of the appellants and their companions, the case made out in the com-
plaint filed by the appellant Jai Dev has been held to be not proved. At this stage, it would be convenient to refer very briefly to the findings recorded by the trial Court and the conclusions reached by the Hiph
Court in appeal. The trial Court found that the evidence adduced by the accused persons in support of their case that they had obtained possession of .fai Ddv v. The Slate of Puoja1'.
Gajendragadk•r J. 19aB Jai D~v .. · – v. I The Stall of Punjab / ·Oaj1ndr•gJdksrJ. . · 496 SuPREME CO-ORT REPORTS (1963) the land before the date of the offenee; was not satisfaotory and that the documents and the entries
made in the revenue papers were no more than pfl.per entries and were not "as good a~ they look- ed". According to tb.e learned trial Judge, the actual possession of the land all along .remained
with the complaints' party Jug Lal and his compa- nions and that the crop standing at the spot at the time of the incident had beeri sown by an.d belonged to the complaints party. This finding necessarily
meant that the ploughing of the land by the accused persons was without any lawful justification and · constituted an act of tresepass. The trial Court aecordingly held that the accused persons were the
aggressors and that the complainants' party in fact had a right of private defence. That ,is how it ell.me to the con'olusion that the six accused persons were members of an unlawful assembly and had gone to
the field in question armed with deadly weapons with a common object of committing the offences which were charged against them. Dealing with the oase on this basis, the trial Judge did not think
it necessary to enquire which of the viotiins had been killed by whioh of the particu'lar acchiied persons. As we have already indicated, he was not satisfied that the charge had been proved against
Parbhati or against Basti Ram; but in regard to the remaining five persons, he held that the evidence conclusively established the· charges under 'B. 148 and ss. 302 and 326{ 149. In dealing wit)l. the
defence, the trial Judge has categorically rejected the defence version that Amin Lal was armed with a pistol and that after ·the said pistol fell 'down from his hQnds it was picked up by Yudhbir Singh, ·
According to the trial Court, no one , on the com- plainanl:!!, side was armed with fire-arms, whereas -three persons on the side of the accused were armed ,_ with fire-arms. ·Yudhbir Singh had a pistol and the _
appellants Jai Dev and Hari Singh had rifles. 3 S.C:R~: SUPREME COURT·REPORTS When the matter was argued before the High Court, the High Oourt was not inclined to accept the ~nding of t~e trial Court on the,' question of
possession .. In its judgment, the High Court has referr!'d in detail to the disputes which preceded ph~., ~o~mission of these. offences in regard to the po~ses~9p. of the land .. It appears that this land
was ,give_n aJ: ill charitable gift by. the prnpriet~iy . p~ody.of the vHlage Ahrod to.one. Baba Kanhar Dass. pla:QYi ye~:i-s agq. Thereafter, it co;i:itinued. in the <i~ltivat!on,of :Amin Lal, Jug Lal, Charanji Lal and
J!uli Qhan,d as tenant:;.s. Kanhar Dass subsequently ~old *e ent~re piece of land to the appellants and tb,~ir brot!J.e!'S Basti H.a.m and Ram Pat on May 30, Jf)p~., for !I- s_um 9f i,ts. 25,000/·. These ,purch~sers
):>~longed.lo t~e village Kulana and so, the villagers 9f Ahrod treated them as strangers ~!tnd, they _were !Lllnoyec;l that the land whioh had been gifted by the . yi'll!Jogers .. to Kanba~ Dass by way of a. charitable
gift had been sold by him to . strangers. In their _r,~sentm~nt, the proprietary body of Ahrod filed a .d~~laratory suit challenging the sale-deed soon ·after, the sale-deed was executed. When that suit
· ~~i~ed: two pre:eoiption suits were filed .but they we_re al~o dismi~sed. The appellants and their two bf9thers then ~led a s_uit for possession. In that _suit ·a de£!.ee was p~ssed and the documentary
. evidence produoed in the oase shows that in execu- . ti?n _or the decree po'sse~sion was delivered to .. the _decree-hold~rs. It appears that some persons offer- e~L r~sestence to the delivery of possession and 15
bigh~s of land was claimed by the resisters. Liti- . gation followed in respf'.ct of that and what.~ver may be ~he position wfth }egard to those 15; bighas, according to tqe High Coilrt, possession of 56 t;>ighas
.anq 6:biswas of land was definitely d~livered over to Basti Ram and his brothers on Decembor 23, 1959. In other wor~s, reversing the finding of the tria.l Cou~~ on ~hi~. point, ~he High Court c!lme to
the conclusion that the field where the offences Jai Dev ., . The Stale of Punja Gajendragadkar J . 196Z Joi Dtt> v. The Sia:~ of Punjab GtJjendroga.dkar J. SUPREMil ciouRT REPoRTS tl963j
took place was in the possession of the appellants and~their companions. The High Court has also fq_und that the crop in the field had been ploughed· by the appellants and their companions and that the operations
which were carried on by them on the morning of September 14, 1960, did not constitute trespass in any sense. On the evidence, the High Court has come to the conclusion that the villagers who did
not tolerate that the strangers should take posses· sion of the land had come to the filed to take possession and they were armed. It appears that the number of villagers was much larger than the
number of persons on the side of the accused party, though the weapons carried by the .latter included fire-arms and so, the latter party had superiority in arms. The High Court has, therefore, come to the
conclusion that the party of the accused persons was entitled to exercise its right of private defence. The property of which they were in possession was threatened by persons who
were armed with weapons and so, the right to defend their propety a.gainst an assault whih threatened grievous hurt; if not death, !tVe them the right to use foroe even t the extent of causing
death to the assailants. It is substantially as a result of this finding that the High Court tqok the view that Sajjan Singh, Yudhbir Singh and Dhanpat Singll who were respon- sible for the death of the three of thE' victims
were not guilty of any offence. In tho circumstan- ces, they were entitled to defend their property against assailants, who threatened them with death, even by causing their death. That is how
these three accused persons have been acquitted in appeal. In regard to the appellents Jai Dev and Hari Singh, the High Court has held that at the time when these two appellants caused the deaths
of Jai Dev and Jai Narain respectively, there was no apprehension of an;y . danger at all. a S.c.R. Stti>REME dOURT REPORTS As soon as Amin Lal was · shot dead, all the villagers who had come to the field ran away and
there was no longer any justification whatever for using any force against the runnin~ villagers. Since at the relevant time the property had been saved form the trespass and the assailants had been com-
pletely dispersed, the right of private defence ceased to exist and so, the appellants who were proved to have ca.used the two deaths could not claim prate· ction either of the right of private defence or could
not even plead that they had mc:rely exceeded the right of private defence; so, they are guilty of the offence of murder under s. 302. That is how the appellants have been convicted of the said offence
and have been ordered to be hanged. The question which the appeal raises for our decision thus lies within a ve1·y narrow compass. The ~ndings of fact recorded by the High · Court in
favour of the appellants would be accepted as bin· ding on the parties for the purpose of this appeal. In other words, we would deal with the case of the appellents on the basis that initially they and their.
companions had the right of private defence. Mr. Anthony contends that having regard to the circu· mstances under which the appellants fired from their rifles, it would be erroneous to hold that the
right of private defence had come to an end, Accor- ding to him, allowance must be made in favour of the appellants in determining the issue. because it is now found that they were faced with an angry
mob whose members were armed with weapons and who appeared determined to dispossess the appel· lants and their friends of thei field in question. The decision of the point thus raised by Mr ..
Anthony would substantially depend upon the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 100 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 100 provides, in~r alia, that the right of private "lefence of tha body extends under the
196S Jat Dev v .. fht Slate of PUtl}ab Gojendrttgffkar J, 196B ,lo..~ Gajendrrigaikar J. restrictions mentioned in s. 99, to the voluntary causing. of death if the offence which occasions the
exercise of the right be an assault as may reason· ably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will . otherwise be the consequence of such assault. In other words, if the person claiming the right of
private defence has to face assailants who can be reasonably apprehended to cause grievous hurt to him, it would be open to him to defend himself by causing the death of the assailant.
In appreciating, the v11,lidity of the appellants' argument, it would be necessary to recall the basic assumptions underlying the law of self-defenm~. In a well-ordered civilised society it is generally assn·
med that the State would take care of the persons and properties of individual citizens- and that normally it is the function of the State to affor.d protection to such persons and their properties.
This, however, does not mean that a person sudde- nly called upon to face an assault must run away and 'thus protect himself, He is entitled to resist · the attack and aefend himself. The same is the
position if he has to meet au attack on his property. ,In other words, where an individual citiZen or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State machinery is not readily available,
~he individual citizen is entitled to protect himself and his property. That being so, it is a necessary corollary to the doctrine. of private defence that the violence which the citizen defending 'himself or
Ji.is property is entitled to use must not be unduly di~proportionate to the injury which is to be aver- 'ted or which is reasonably aprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. The exercise of
the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicfous. ·There can be no doubt ·that in judging the cond·' ·uct•of·a .person.who•proves·that he.had a. right· of _; 3 S:C.iR,
,SUPREME COURT REP.ORT priva.te defence, allowance has necessarily tp be made for his feelings at the relevant time. He is faced. with a.n assault which causes a reasoBable a,pprehflnsion of death or grievous hurt and that
, inevitably creates in his mind some excitement and bonfusion. At such a moment, the uppermost feel- ing in his mind would be toward off the danger and to save himself or his pr_operty, and so.
he would naturally be anxious to strike a decisive blow in exercise of his right. It is no doubt true that in striking a decisive blow, he must not use more force than appears to be reasonably necessary. But in
dealing with the question as to whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the ,prevailing circumstances, it would be inappro· priate to adopt tests of detached objectivity which
would be so natural in a court room, for instance, long after the· incident· has · taken plaoe. That .is why in same judicial decisions it has been observed that the means which a threatened person adoptR
of the force which he uses should no~ be -weighed in golden scales, To begin with, the· parson exerci- sing 8. right of private defence must consider whe- her the threat to his person or his property is real
and immediate. If he reaches the conclusion reason- ably that the threat is immediate and real, he is entitled to exercise his right. In the exercise of his right, he mm1t use force necessary for the purpose
and he must stop using the force as soon as the threat has disappeared, So long as the threat lasts and the right of private defence can be legitimately exercised, it would not be fair to require, as Mayne
·has observed, that "he should modulate his defence step by step. according to the attack, before there .is. reason t'l believe the attack il!I over" ( '). 'The \law of private defence does not require that the
person assaulted or facing an apprehension of an as1nult must run.away for safety. It entitles him•;to .. defend ~iinself and law gives "him the right ·to ( — (I) Maynes Crip!inal Law of Indians, 4th Bd. P .. 29.1
19~2 JaiDe• ;v, . Thi St,.t• •f Pf±njall a .. ;entlr.ga~k•r. J. \ … -.· 196B Jai Deo v. Th• State of Pimjab Gajrndragadkar J. …. secure his victory over his assailant by using the
necessary force. This necessarily postulates that as soon as the cause for the reasonable apprehension has disappeared and the threat has either been destroyed or has been put to rout, there can be no
occasion to exercise the right of private defence. If the danger is continuing, the right is there; if the danger or the apprehension about it has ceased to exist, there is no longer
the right . of private defence, (vide ss. 102 and 105 of the Indian Penal Code); This position cannot be and has not been disputed before us and so, the narrow question which we must proceed to examine
is whether in the light of this legal position, the appellants could be said to have had a right of private defenc@.at the time when the appellant Jai Dev fired at the victim Jai Dev and the appllant
Hari Singh fired at the victim Jai Narain. In dealing with this question, the m:ost significant circumstance against the appellants is that both the victims were at a long distance from
appellants when they were shot dead. We will take the case of victim J ai Dev first. According to Gurbux Singh (P. W. 37), Assistant Sub-Inspector, the dead body of Jai Dev was .found at a distance
of 70 paces from the place of the tractor, but it was discovered that it had been dragged from a place at a longer distance where Jai Dev stood when he was_ fired dead. From that place to the place where
his dead body was actually found there was a trail of blood which unambiguously showed that Jai Dev fell down at a more distant place and that he was dragged nearer the scene of the offence after he fell
down. This statement is corroborated by the memo prepared on Septeiµber 14, 1960 (item No. 104). Blood-stained earth was take!> from both these spots. Roughly stated, the spot where Jai Dev was
shot at can be said to be about 300 paces away from ~lj.e traotror ~f!.ere the a.ppe!l~nt J~i :Pev stooq. It ~ 3 s.c.R. true that Gurbux Singh made'no express reference to the trail of blood in rough site plan which
he ·had prepared ·on the day of the offence. But iten 8 in the plan, we were told, does refer to the dragging and that is enough c9rroboration to the evidence of Gurbux Singh. Besides, in considering the effect of the omission to
mention the trail of blood in the rough plan, we cannot ignore the fact that at that time Gurbux Singh's mind was really concentrated on the F. I. R. · received by the Police from the appellant Jai Dev
himself and that means that at that time· the impression in the mind ofGurbux Singh must have been that the de11e.ased ,Jai Dev belonged to the party of the aggressore and so, blood marks caused
by the dragging of his body may not have a-ppeared to him to be of any significance. However that may be, the sworn testimony or-Gurbux Singh is corrobo- rated· by the memo contemporaneously prepared
and it would be idle to suggest that this evidence should be disbelieved because the rough site plan prepared by Gurbux Singh does not refer to the trail of blood. Mr, Anthony has, however, strongly relied on
the statement of Juglal (P. W. 13) who has narrated the incident as it took place, and in that connection ~as st.ated that the accused Jai Dev then opened fire from his rifle killing J ai Dev deceased at the
. spot. It is suggested that the words "at the spot" _. show that the victim Jai Dev, was standing at the spot when the appellant Jai J'ev shot at him. We are not inclined to accept this
<lontention. What the witness obviously meant was that from the spot where the appellant Jai Dev- was standing he fired at the victim · ,Jai Dev. :Besides, readin~ the account ~iven by Ju$la.l as a,
J ai D.11 v. ' Slat. of Punjab GaJendragadkar J. Jai Pev v~ Slot• of PM'l)•b Gajendragadle"ar J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] whole,.it would not be fair to treat the .words •'at the spot" in that technical way.
Simil&~iy, t~e argument that 11.ccording to Jai Dev all the .shot.a ·:were fired almost simultaneously, is also not welJ- founded. When a witness gives an account' of 'aii incident like this, he.is bound 'to refer to one event
,after ano:tner. That does D,ot · .~ean ,~h_ar\he: · t~b appellants and their companions fired almost simultaneously. Therefore, we are not satialie<l l ~ l ,;,· that the evidence of Juglal supports the argumeri;t
that the victim Jai Dev was near the scene of the ~ i t offence when the appellant Jai Dev fired at him. …. – ~ ,, Mr. Anthony has also relied on .the statement of Chuni Lal (P,W. 16), in support of the same argti-
.ment. But ;it is clear that this.witnl"SS was obvious. ly making a mistake between .the _two docume11.ts -P.N.F. and P.N.E. A statement like this which.is the result of confusion cannot legitimately be pres!led
into service for the purpose of showing that: victim Jai Dev was near about .the scence of .the offence. Then again,.the statement ofHira Lal (P.W:-5). on which Mr. Anthony relies .shows ,that .in.the com-
mitting Court he bad said that Jai Dev had ;lieen injured at the spot; but he has added that he had said BO because Subsequently after the OOOUrrimce, '.he saw the deai body of Jai ·Dev near the scene· 'of
the offence. T~er9fore, in ·our opiniqn: having regard to the evidence on the '·record, tbe High Court was right in coming . to the c'oriclii- sion that Jai Dev deceased was standing al 'a
. fairly long distance.: from the scenll of the, offence ,_ . when be was shot at. …… . · That ~!'-kes .us to the c~se of the ,':!otim JaiNar!l,!P· Jai Narain was m fact not m the Inamwala field at all.
''According tp the' prosecution, he was'C>ri 'the ii\aohan ·in the a._ai~ining field .whfoh ~e i:a·s· oU.1Hvatiri'g ·.~pd it was whilst he was m his own field that the appel- lant Hari Singh fired at him. The distance between r-
f1 (. – '' ….. l. 3 s.c.R. S~R,EME OO~T ~EPORTS the appellant and the victim has been fo111nd to be about 400 paces. Now this conclusion is also sup• ported by evidence on the record. Jai Narain's
mother, Chand Kaur (P.W. 10) says that she saw her son falling on the ground from the maohan, and that clearly means the machan in the field of which Jai Narain was in possession. The position of this
field is shown in the rough plan and sketch prepar- ed by the Sub-Inspector (P.A.J.). The evidence of Hira Lal (P.W/5) eupports the same conclusion, and Gurbux Singh swears to the same fact. He says
that the dead body-of Jainarain was found lying at a distance of.more than 400 paces from the point where the tractor was said to be standing at the time of the occurrence. That is the effect of the
evidence -of Juglal (P. ·w. 13) also. Thus, there can be no doubt that the victim Jainarain was at a long distance from the field in question and like the appellant Jai Dev who took a clean aim at
the victim Jai Dev who was standing a distance and shot him dead, the appellant Hari Singh also took a clean aim at the victim Jai Narain who was away from him and shot him dead. That is the
conclusion of the High Co~rt and we see no reason to interfere with it, In the course of his arguments, Mr. Anthony relied on the fact that some of the prosecution witnesses on whose evidence the High Court has
relied were not accepted by the trial Court as truth- ful witnesses, and he contends that the High Oourf1 should not have differed from the appreciation of evidence recorded by the trial Court. There are two
obvious answers to this point. In the first place, it is not wholly accurate .to say that the trial Oonrt ha9 completely disbelieved the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. It may be ooncedr.d in
favour of Mr. Anthony that in dealing with a part of a prosecution case relating to Parbhati and Basti – Ram, the trial Court did not accept the evidence of v. The Stole of Punjab
Gajer,dragadkar J • 190! Joi Dev v. Phe State of Punjab Ga;'ent!ragadkar J. the witnesses which incriminated them, and in that connectiQl:l, he has referred to the criticism made by the defence against those witnesmes and has ob-
served that there is force in that criticism. But, while appreciating the effect of the observations made by the trial Court in dealing with that pa1ticular aspect of the matter, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
as to the actual occurrence the trial Court, in substance, has believed the major part of the prosecution evidence and has stated that the said evidence is quite consistent with medical evidence.
In other words, the sequence of events, the part played by the assailants as against the specific victims and the rest of the prosecution story have, on the whole, been believed by the trial Court. In
this connection, we ought to add that the trial Court did not feel called upon to consider the individual case of each one of the accused persons because it held that a. charge under s. 149 had been
proved. But when the High Court came to a contrary conclusion on that point, it became necess- ary for the High Court to examine the case against each one of the accused persons before it, and so,
it would ·not be accurate to say that the High Court has believed the witnesses whom the trial Court had entirely disbelieved. That is the first answer to Mr. Anthony's contention. The second answer to the
said ciontention is that even if the ' trial Court had disbelieved the evidence, it was open to the High Court, ,on a reconsideration of the matter, to come to a contrary conclusion. It is true that in dealing
with oral evidence a Court of Appeal would normally be reluctant to differ from the appreciation of oral evidence by the trial Court, because obviously the trial Court has the advantage of watching the
demeanour of the witnesses; but.that is not to say that even in a proper case, the Appeal Court cannot interfere with such appreciation. Besides, the criticism made by the trial Court is not so. much in
relation to the demeanour of the witnesses as in 3 S.C.R. SUPREllffi COURT REPORTS regard to their partisan character and the over• statements whic!l they made as partisan • witµesses
a.re generally apt to do. Therefore, we see no justifioa.iton for contending that the finding of the High Court as to the distances at which the victims Jai Dev and Ja.i Nara.in were shot a.t should not be
&CC9pted. Mr. Anthony then argued that the fact that the victims were at a Ion~ distance from the assailants when thev were fired at, will not · really be decisive oft.he point which we are called upon to consider
in the present appeal. He contends that if the assailants were surrounded by a very big mob some of whom were armed with deadly weapons and all of whom were determined to dispossess them. at any
cost, it was open to the appellants and their companions to shoot at the mob because they were themselves reasonably apprehensive of an assault by the mob which would have led at lea.st to griev•
ous hurt, if not death; and he argues that if three of the assailants who had fire-arms fired almost simultaqeously,that would be within the legitimate exercise of the right of private defence and the fact
that somebody was killed who was standing at a distance, would make no difference in law. The argument thus presented is no doubt prima facie attractive; but the assumption of fact on which it· ·
is based is not justified in the circumstances of this case .. The High Court has found that at the time when the appellants fired shots from their rifles, the villa~ers had already started running away and
there was no danger either to the property or to the bodies of the assailants. In this connection, it is important to rememb9r · that the defence version that Amin Lal had a ·pistol had been
rejected by . both the courts, so that whereas the crowd that threatened the appellants and their friends was larger in number, the weap· one in the hands of the assailants were far more
Jai Dev v. Tiu State of Punjab ' v. Gaj1nd•ag1_1tfkar J, Jai D1u v. The 'ltott of Punj .. b · Gajendragad ~ ar J. powerful than the weapons in the hands of the crowd. Having regard
to the events that took place and the nature of the assault as it developed, it is clear that Amin Lal who was one of the leaders of the villagers was shot dead and that, according to the evidence,
competely frightened the villagers who• began· to run away helterskelter. Sunda (P.· W.4) has descri- bed how Amin Lal stepped forward for the help of Hukma, but· he was fired at from the pistol by
Yudhbir Singh, and having re<'eived a fatal injury on his chest Amin Lal fell down dead on the grou- nd. This witness adds "the members of the comp- lainant. party feeling frightened because of· the
firing opened by Yudhbir Singh ran in the direction of the village abadi". Similarly, the statement of Mst. Sarian (P. W; 12) would seem to show that when the victim Jai Dev was fired at, he had run
away. On the probabilities, it is very easy to )Jelieve that when the villagers found that the appellants and their friends were inclined to use t~ir fire- arms, they must have been frightened, even the
large number of the villagers· would have meant nothing. The large number would have merely led to a large number of deaths- that is about all. · Therefore, as soon as fire-arms · were used for
the first time killing Amin Lal on the spot, the villagers must have· run away.· That is the evidence given by some of the witnesses and that is the conclusion of the High Court. It is in the
light of this conclusion that we have to deal with the point raised by Mr. Anthony. If, at the time when the two appellants used their rifles against [ their respective . V"ictims standing at considerable
distances from them, all the villagers had run away, there was obviously no threat continuing and so, the right of private defence had clearly and unambiguously come to an end. That is why
.• _JI:' 3 S.C.R. we think the High Court was right in holding that the appellants were guilty of murder under s. 302 of th~ Indian Penal code. That leaves two minor questions to be
considered,. Mr. Anthony has contended that the examination of the appellant Hari Singh under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been very defective in regard to the question of distance
on which the prosecution strongly relied against him before the High Court, and he ·argues that this defect in the examination of the appellant Hari Singh really vitiates the trial. . It is true that
in asking him questions, the learned trial Judge did not put the point of distance between him and the victim Jai .Narain clearly; but that .in ou,r opinion, cannot by itself necessarily vitia•,e the trial
or aff eot the conclusion of the High Court. In dealing with this point, we must have regard to all the questions put by the trial Judge to the appellant. Besides, it is.not so much the point of
distance by itself which goes against the appellant Hari Singh as the conclusion that at the time when he fired at Jai Narain, t,he threat had ceased; and if the thre:i.t had ceased and there was no justifi-
cation for using the firearms, the appellant would be guilty of murder even if J ai Narain was -· no.t far away from him. It is unnecessary to emphasise that it is for the party pleading r>elf-defence to
prove the circumstances giving rise to the exercise of the right of self~defence, and this right canno.t . be said to be proved as soon . as we reach the conclusion that at the relevant time there was no
threat either to the person of the appellant or the person or property of his companions. In support of his contention that the failure to put the relevant point against the appellant
Hari Singh would affect the final crmclusion of the High· Court, Mr. Anthony has relied on a decision Jai Dev v. The State.of Punjab Gajendragadkar J, 196B Jal D1u 1f/i1 Sto11 of Punjab
bajua~dr J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] of this Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat('). In that oa.se, this Court has no doubt referred to the fact that it was important
to put to the accused each material fact which is intended to be used against him and to afford him a chance of explaining it if he oa.n. But these observations must be read in the light of the other
conclusions reached by this Court in that case. It would, we . think, be incorrect to suggest that these ·observations are intended to lay down a general and inexorable rule that wherever it is ·
found that one of the point used against the accused person has not been put to him, either- the trial in vitiated or his oonviotion is rendered bad. The examination of the accused person under s. 34~ is
undoubtedly intended to give him an opportunity to explain any circumstances appearing in the evi- deµce against him. In exercising its powers under .s. 342, the Court must take care to .. put aU relevant
circumstances appearing in the evidence to the accused person. It would not be enough to put a few .general and broad questions "to the accused, for by adopting suoh a. course the accused may not
get opportunity of explaining a.11 the relevant circu- mstances. On the other hand, it would not be fair or right that the Court should put to the accused person detailed questions whfoh may amount to
his cross-examination. The ultimate test in deter· mining whether or not the accused has been , fairly examined under s. 342 would be to enquire whether, having regard to all the questions put to hi 'Il, he
did get an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution c~e against him. If it appears ~liat the examination of the accused person wa.s defective and -thereby a prejudioe has
been caused to him, that would no doubt be a seri- ous infirmity. It is opvious that 'no general rule can be laid down in regard to the manner in which (I) A. I. R. 19S3 S. C. 4E8.
3 S.C.R. 8UPREME COURT REPORTS the accused person should be examined under s. 342. Broadly .stated. however, the true position appears to be that passion for brevity which may be content
with asking a few omnibus genera] questi01;1s is as much inconsistent with the requirements of s. 342 as anxiety for thoroughness which may dictate an unduly detailed and large number of questions
which may amount to the cross-examination of the accused person. Besides, in the prf;lsent case, as we have already shown, failure to put the specific point of distance is really not very material.
The Jast argument which Mr. Anthony has urged before us is that the prosecution should have examined a ballistic expert in this case and since no expert has been examined, it cannot be said
that the prosection has proved its case that the appellants caused the deaths of the two victims by shooting from the rifles which they carried. In support of this argument, Mr. Anthoy has refe-
rred us to the decision of this Court in Mokinder Sinqk v. The State (1). In that case, it has been observed by this Court that it has always been · . considered to be duty of tlie prosecution, in a case
. where death is due to injuries or wounds caused by a lethal weapon, to prove by expert evidence that it was likely or at least possible for the inju- ries to have ·been caused with the weapon with
which and in the manner in which they are alleged to have been caused. We do not see how this principle can be invoked by Mr. Anthony in the present case. The rifles which the appellants are
alleged to have used have not been recovered and so, thE1re was no occasion to examine any expert in respect of the injuries caused to the two victims by the appellants. What Mr. Anthony suggests is
that an expert should have been examined for the purpose of determining whether any of the injuries found on the persons of the several victims could (1) A. I. R, 1953 s. O. 415, Jai Deo
v. Th, State of Punjaf> Gajendragadkrr J, J ai D~v v. Tl t Stat! of Punjab Gu,i,ndragadka' J. SOPR_EME COURT REPORTS (1963) have been inflicted by the revolver which had been recovered iil this case.
Now, the story about the recovery of this revolver is very interesting. According to the defence. Amin Lal was carrying a revolver and when he was hit with a · lathi by Sajjan Singh, the revolver fell down from his hands
and Yudhbir Singh picked it up and fired it at ' Amin Lal. · Now this revolver was carried away by Yudhbir Singh· to his house and he says that he produced the same before the Polio' Investigating
Officer. On the other ·hand, according to Gurbux Singh, it was the accused Sajjan Singh who after his arrest produced the pistol and two live cartri· dges before him. It would thus appear that the
revolver had been produced by one of the accused persons on the allegation that it was carried by Amin L!tl and had been used by. Yudhhir Singh in self-defence after it had fallen down from Amin
Lal's banns. It has not been the prosecution case that it is this revolver which had been used by Yudhbir Singh. It may well be that the revolver has been deliberately surrendered by the accused
in order to introduce complications in the case. We think, in such a case it is difficult to unders- tand for ll'hat purpoHe the prosecution was expected to examine the expert. Therefore, in our opinion,
the decision in the case of Mohinder Singh v. The State (') has no application to the case before us. In the result, we agree with the High Court in holding that the two · appellants are guilty of
murder under a. 302. • · ' · · • The only question which now remains to be considered is one of sentence. Mr. Bindra. for the State has left this question to·us since, presumably,
he did not feel justified in pressing for the imposi· tion of the sentence of death. We have carefully (I) A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 415. . ,,. 3 S.C.R. · il• · i · t considered all the facts leading to the commission
of this offence .and ·we are-not inclined' to accept the view of the High Court that the circumstances of this case require the imposition of the maximum penalty on the two offenders. On the question of
sentence, it · would be·relevant to ·take into account the background ·of ·the· incident,. the nature· and extent of the : threat held out by ·the crowd of villagers. the excitement -which must have been
caused· at the time·of the incident,.and so, though we have ·felt no diffi-OUlty. in agreeing with the decision·of the·High Court that at the time .. when the two appellants fired shots from their rifles'the
threat had ceased to exist;. it would 'not be unrea- sonable· to ·take into' ·account· the fact ·that the excitement in their minds ·may -have continued, and that, in the' special- circumstances of this case,
may be regardedras an ·extenuating circumstance. We, therefore,1. think·that1the ends of1justice would be met ·if the sentence •of death imposed on the two appellants is ·set :a.side a.nd instead, an order
is pa.ss~d.-directing that,'they. should ,suffer. impri- sonment for ·life: Aooordiogly,. .we ~confirm, the conviction of ·the appella.nts·under s. 302 and conv- ert the … sentence 6f cdea.th~ imposed :ori .them into
one of iinprisonb:ient ·'.for:life. – ·· '' · : · ,., · 0-0nvictiii'n' 7ionfirmed. · Sentence· reduced. ··'" ~"""' . – "'' . I ….. I t … • .. , • ~ — .. Jai DIV v ' ' Thi Stat, of Punjab
Gajendragadkar J.