Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
2. The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest a power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders. The question in these matters is whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under .y section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) can be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District r. Judge. This question has been answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987) 3 SCC 83 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987) 3 J.T. 663 (a decision under the Karnataka Act) and F hence this reference to a larger Bench. My learned brothers are of the ~. view that there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments are not in pari materia and that, so far as the Kerala Act is concerned, Aundal Ammal should be followed. With respect, I am unable to agree. – ..
3. Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 l of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court. The fact ""!"- that the order may have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contains expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This is the effect (19881 2 S.C.R. A of the decisions in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [ 1977] 2 SCR 871, a case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corpo- ration Act and in Krishandas Bhatija v. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju's case (supra), which ar1: direct decisions under the Karnataka Act. In my opinion, B there is no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also.
4. The relevant provisions of the two enactments have been ex- tracted in the order of Natarajan J. and need not be set out again, Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendment in 1975, rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District Munsiff or the .. _ Civil Judge/Rent. Controller, according as the case arises outside or '-1 inside the city of Bangalore. There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision. This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the District D Judge. The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff. Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the r… District Judge under this provision is final. The Kerala pattern is the same except that an appeal intervenes before the revision. Section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank. Section 20 provides for revision. The revisional power is to be exer- y "", cised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the Subor- dinate Judge and the High Court in other cases. Section 20 does not provide, as does Section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge shall be final. It is true that section 18(5) of the Kerala Act lays down that the order of the Rent Control court or, where there is an appeal, the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court of law except ::::· as provided in section 20 but the language of section 48(5) of the y ..,. Karnataka Act is even stronger. It provides that the order of the Court · or the Rent Controller shall (subject to the decision in appeal or of the G District Judg~ or the High Court in revision under section 50) be final and "shall not be liable to be called into question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision." d lf the much w idder hand. m?r~ e?1phaftichlan~ahge of the Karnataka Act oes not exc u e t e iunsd1ctton o t e Hlg Court under S. 115, as has been held in the two cases referred to above, it is difficult to see H the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. r JETHA BAI v. SUNDERDAS IRANGANATHAN, J.J
5. This poses then the question of a choice between the two views of this court: the one in Shyamaraju and the one in Aundal Ammal. As has already been pointed out, Shyamaraju follows the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal and Kris/madas Bhatija. The only other decision of this Court, which has relevance in the present context, is Vihesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32·which has been relied upon in Aundal Ammal. I am in agreement with the view expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally different statutory context. That decision turned largely on the legisla- tive history of S. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. I am therefore inclined to lean in favour 6f the view that has com- mended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of revision over the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well.
6. Aundal Ammal has pointed out that such an interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four courts under the Kerala Rent Control Act viz: the court of the first instance, the appellate D court, the district court and then the High Court whereas under the Karnataka Act there are only three courts, viz: the court of the first instance, the district court by way of revision and the High Court by way of further revision. This is no doubt true but can this alone be a reason why identical statutory language should be given different in- terpretation under the two enactments? I think not. That apart, the result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court in rent control matters and this, if I am right in thinking that the two Acts are pari materia, will leave the litigant in Karnataka with only a right of revision to the District Court. I venture to doubt whether in the absence of clear language the Legislature can be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important branch of the law. Moreover to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 would only encourage the recourse, by aggrieved parties, to articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the conclusion may not even result in reducing the spate of litigation under the Rent Control Acts in the High Courts and Supreme Court. I am, therefore, not inclined to G attach muct importance to this circumstance as a guide to the interpre- tation of the relevant provisions of the statute.
7. The above interpretation wih not render the language and scheme of section 18(5) read with section 20 totally redundant as was suggested in arguments before us. Section 20 is necessary because though, at present, Subordinate Judges have been constituted as the appellate authorities under the Act, the appellate authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and, but for such a specific statutory provision, there would be no remedy to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority. Section 18(5) is a provision of a general c nature intended to prevent the orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged in the courts. These provisions, in my opinion, do not and cannot preclude the applicability of s. 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District Court, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land. In this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revi- sional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115.
8. One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem is this. In the State of Kerala, as early as in Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 Ker. 101, a view was taken that the High Court can entertain a second revision and, though Shri Patti suggested that this view has been often chal- D lenged, the above Full Bench decision hold the field till Aundal Am- mal was decided. In Karnataka, the maintainability of a second revi- sion appears to have been taken for granted untill a doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act. This doubt was dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji's case (ILR 1978 Kar. 1585) that the High Court could maintain a sec- E ond revision. This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in Yaragatti's case, in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju's case. In the result, the position has been that, right through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court. I think that in a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be dis- turbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary.
9. I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions before the High Coutt were maintainable and that the matters before us should G be disposed of accordingly. However, the petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers. S.L. Appeals and petitions disposed of. I1