c JUSTINIANO AUGUSTO DE PIEDADA BARRETO v. ANTONIO VICENTE DE FONSECA AND ORS. March 6, 1979 [D. A. DESAI AND 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] Limitation-Provisions of the Portugue!Je Civil Code relating to limitation, whether stand repealed by Lim~tation Act 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) by necessa."Y implication, or whether they are saved by section 29(2) of that Act-Limitation Act, 1963 section 29(2), Portuguese. Civil Code Art. 535.
The Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 sub section (I) and (2) of sections Sand 6. The Goa Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulations promulgc1tcd under Art. 240 of the Constitution, scope of-"Local Law" and "Special Law" difference in– Whether the Portuguese Civil Code a local law~Whether there is any repugnancy .:111d therefore void under Art. 254(1) of the Co11.Jtitutio11. On Goa, .Daman and Diu becoming a part of India as a: Union Territory, Parliament enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962 to provide for its administration and for matters connected therewith. Section 5 (I) of the Act declared that all laws in force immediately before 20th December, 1961 in Goa, Daman and Diu or any part thereof shall continu~ to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.
Pursuant to the powers conferred by Article 240 of the Constitution, the President promulgated certain Regulations styled as 'The Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulations' from time to time. These Regulations extended certain enactments to Goa, Daman and Diu with specified modifications. To the extent that any law in forco in Goa, Dam.an and Diu corresponded to any Act which was so extended to those Territories such law was declared to stand repealed.
Before Goa, Daman and Diu becamei part of India, Portuguese Civil Codo and the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code were in force in those territories. The Portuguese Civil Code contained various provisions dealing with limitation for suits, applications and appeals. These provisions were never re.·pealed either by express legislative enactment or by an order made by the Central Govemmi!nt in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under section 5 (2) of the 1962 Act by any Regulation made by the President. Neither a·ny notification by the Central Government under section 6 of the 1962 Act was issued nor 'vas a regulation made by the President extending the Limitation Act, 1908 to Goa, Daman and Diu with or without modification. Nor did any Regulation repeal a.ny of the provision of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation. Even the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil
Procedure and Arbitration Act), 1965, neither expressly nor by implication repealed the provi .. sions relating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Code. The Goa, Daman and Diu (extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arbitration Act), 1965 also did not either expressly or by implication repeal the provisions relating to limitation in the Portuguese Civil Code.
In the circumstances, the question that arose for consideration in the appeals by the appellants-defendants was ' 1wbether the provisions of the Portuguese \I ., i v ';.cf -4 JUSTINIANO V. ANTONIO
Civil Code relating to Limitation stood repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, i\ by necessary implication, or whether they were saved by Section 29(2) ibid?" Dismissing the appeals by special leave the Court,
HELD : 1. The provisions in the Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation of suits etc. and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only is "local law" within the meaning of Se<:tion 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. These provisions have to be read into the 1963 Act, as if the schedule to the said Act is amended. muratis mutandfs. [503 B] 2. If section 32 and section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 are read together it is clear that the -only law of Limitation that was repealed was the Limitation Act, 1908 and all other laws dealing with 1~itation, special or local were saved and are to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore{, no question of repugnancy or voidness of the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to limitation on that ground arises. They continue to be i~ force, in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. [503 A-B, C] Deep Chand v. The State of U.P., [1959] 2 SCR 843; Municipal Council, Pa/ai v. T. !. Joseph, [1964] 2 SCR 87; Stahe of Jammu and Kashmir v. H. S. Farooqui. AIR 1972 S.C. 1738; referred to.
3. The word "special" has reference to subject and the \Vorel "local" has reference to a particular area or territory. A special law is a law relating to a particular subject while a local Jaw is a law confined to a particular area or territory. Used in an Act made by Parliament the word local may refer to a. part or the whole of the many States constituting the Union. Though a law deaHng with a particular subject may be a general law in the sense that it is c
a law of general applicability, laying down general rules, yet, it may cotitain · special provisions relating to bar of time, in specified cases different from the general law of limitation. Such a law would be a special la\v for the purpose of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Similarly, a law \Vhich may be a law of general applicability is yet a local law, if its applicability is confined to a particular area instead of 'generally' the whole country. [501 A-D] Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, [1964] 4 SCR 982 @ 987 and 988; a·pplied. Queen v. Land County Council, [1863] 2 Q.B. 454 @ 462 quoted with approval.
CJVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Ap~al No. of 1969. From the Judgment and Order dated 17-3-1969 of the Judicial Commissioner's Court in Appeal No. 243/66. AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2038 of 1969
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 12th March 1969 of the Court of Judicial Commissioner Goa, Daman and Diu in Second Appeal No. 5 of 1968. 12-253SCI/79 V. M. Tarkunde, Naunit Lal and Dr. Bernardo Das Rais for the Appellant (In C.A. 1818/69).
Eduardo Falero, 0. C. Mathur, D. N. Misra aoJ I. B. D. & Co. for the Respondent (In C.A. 1818/69). Naunit Lal and Dr. Bernardo Das Rais for the Appellant (In C.A. 2038/69). c S. V. Tambwekar for the Respondent (In C.A. 2038/69).
The Judgment o! the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-It is 'now a matter of history that the er:;t- while Portuguese Colonial P05sessions of Goa, Daman and Din he· came part o! the Territory o! India from 20th December, 1961. The territories of Goa, Daman and Din were incorporated as a Union Territory by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962, with effect from 20th December,
1961. The Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962, repealing and re-enacting the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Din Administration Ordinance 1962, was en- acted by Parliament to provide for the administration of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Din and for matters connected the1e- with.
Section 5 (1) of the Act declared that all laws in force imme- diately before the appointed day (20th December, 1961) in Goa, Daman and Din or any part thereof shall continue to bot in force there- in until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.
Section 5 (2) enabled the Central Governmeht, within two years from the appointed day, to make· such adaptations and modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, ;is may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of facilitating
application of any such law in relation to the administration of Goa, Daman and Din ·as a Union Territory and for the purpose of bringing tl:e provi- sions of any such law into accord with the provisions of the Consti- tution. Section 6 of the Act empowered the Central Gove;nmont, by notification in the official Gazette, to extend with such restrictions or modifications, as it thinks fit, to Goa, Daman and Din, any enactmmf which is in force in a State at the date of the notification. Befcre Goa, Daman and Din became part of India, certain laws web as (ne Portuguese Civil Code, the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code etc. were in force in those Territories. Apart from dealing with multiple other matters, the Portu!Ilese Civil Code contained, various pro,isions dealing with limitation !or suits, applications and ~ppeals. It is undisputed that the provisions o! the Portuguese Civil Code relat- ing to Limitation were never repealed either by express
Legislative • .. JUSTINIANO v. ANTONIO (Chinnappa Reddy,!,) enactment or by any order made by the Central Governmrnt in exer- cise of the powers conferred upon it u'ader Section 5 (2) of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act, 1962· It is also not in dis- pute that the Central Government did not ism~ any notification under Section G of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Administration) Act extend- ing the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, to Goa, Daman and Diu with or w)thout modification.
The Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act suitably amended Article 240 of the Constituiion to enable the President to make Regu- lations for the peace, progress and i:ood Government of the Union
Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu until a body was created by Parlia- mentary enactment to function as a Legislature for the Union Terri- tory. Pursuant to the powers conferred by Article 240 of the Consti- tution, the President promulgated certain Regulations styled as 'The Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Re&11lations' from time to time. These Regulations extended certain enactments to Goa, Daman and Diu with specified modifications. To the extent that any law in force in Goa, Daman and Diu corresponded to any Act which was so
~xtended to those Territories, such law was declared to stand repealed. The Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was not one of the Acts extended to Goa, Daman and Diu under any of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regu- lations.
Nor was any Regulation made by the President repealing any of the provisions of th•3 Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limi- tation. While so, the Limitation Act 1963, was enacted by Parliament on 5th October, 1963, to take effect from the date to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette. 1st Janu-
ary, 1964, was later specified as the date from which the Limitation Act was to come into force. Section 1 (2) extends the Limitation Act 1963, to the whole of India exo~pt the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 32 of the Act containing hnt one sentence repeals the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
No other enactment is expressly repealed. Section 31 makes special provision for suits etc. for which the prescribed period of limitation is shorter than the period pres- cribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Section 29 contains 'savings' clauses and Section 29(2) which particularly savc5 ·~pecial and local laws' is in these terms :
"29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation diffe- rent from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provi- sions of rection 3 shall !tpply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of c determining any period of limitation prescribed for any ~uit, appeal or application by any speeial or local law, the provi- sions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply iu so far as, aud to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law".
c The question which has arisen for consideration in these two appeals is whether the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation stand repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, by necessary implication, or whether th.3y are saved by Section 29(2) of that Act. Civil Appeal No. 1818 of 1969 arises out of a suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff against the appellant-defendant on 25th Novem- ber, 1965, claiming damages for malicious prosecution. The prosecu- tion which was alleged to have been maliciously launched against the plaintiff ended in an acquittal by the decision of the Supreme Court, Lisbon, on 6th April, 1960. The plaintiff claimed that the suit was within time uuder Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code which provides a period of limitation of 20 years.
On the other hand the defendant claimed that the suit was governed by Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a period of limitation of one year only. The Trial Court decided the point of limitation, as a pre- liminary issue, in favour of the plaintiff.
An 'Agravo' appeal to the District Judge and a further appeal to the Judicial Commissioner not having borne fruit the defendant has preferred this appeal aiter obtain- ing special leave from this Court.
Civil Appeal No. 2038 of 1969 arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent to recover a sum of Rs. 5,000 /- said to be due on a promissory note dated 24th November, 1962, executed by the defundant-appellant.
In this suit th;, plaintiff claimed that the period of !i,nitation was as provided by Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code while the defendant claimed that the period of limitation was as provided by Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The question of Limitation was decided
as a preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff by the Subordin~te Courts and by the Judicial Commissioner of Goa. The defendant has preferred this appeal a{ter obtainmg special leave from this Court.
The principal submission of Shri V. M. Tarkunde and Shri Naunit Lal, learn~d Counsel for the appellants in the two appeals was that the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limit.'ltion JI
for the filing of suits etc. must be considered to have been pro-tanto- repea\ed by the Limitation Act, 1963, ilb view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. It was their submission that too provisions ' ..
JUSTINIANO v. ANTONIO (Chinnappa ReJdy, !.) 4 99 relating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Civil Code, a law made by the Legislature of a State, were repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, a law made by Parliament and, therefore, the former provisions were void to the extent of the repugnancy. It was submitted that the question of a local or special law being saved by the provisions of Section 29 would arise only if the provisions of the local or special Jaw were not repugnant to the Jaw made by Parlia- ment namely the Limitation Act. It was further argued that the Portu- guese Civil Code was a general law and not a local law and, therefore, the provisions contained in it relating to limitation were not saved und~r Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. It was also contended that the words "where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application" occurring in Section 29(2) indicated that Sec- tion 29(2) was confined in its application to odd Legislation dealing with particnlar types of suits and did not extend to a general law of Limitation like the Portuguese Civil Code.
Shri Eduardo Falero and Shri Tambwekar, learned Counsel for the resrondents urged that the Portuguese Civil Code which was appli- cable lo the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only and not the whole of rndia was a local law, and, therefore, the provisions con- tained in it relating to limitation were saved by Section 29(2) of the Limitalion Act, 1963. The relevant provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code having been expressly sawd, no questi.on of any repug· nancy between those provisions and those of the Limitation Act arose. It was also urged that Parliament which made express provision in Section 30 for suits for which the Limitation Act 1963, pl',scribed shorter periods of limitation than the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, would surely not have allowed the drastic inroads into the law of Limitation of suits prevailing in Goa, Daman and Din without intro- ducing a provision similar to Section 30. It was further urged that the Limitation Act, 1963, was not retrospective so as to curtail periods of limitation in respect of causes of action which had already arisen. Before considering the rival contentions of the parties, we may, at c
this jnncture, mention that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Arbitration Act, 1940, were extended to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu by Section 3 of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Ex- tension of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration Act) Act, 1965. Section 4 of the Act repeals so much of the law in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu as corresponds to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Arbitration Act, 1940. This
Act also neither expressly nor by implication repeals the provisions relating to limitation contained in the Portuguese Civil Code . c [1979] 3 s.c.n. Article 254 ( 1) of the Constitution prescribes that if any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any pro- vision of a law, made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with resp;:ct to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Llst, then subject to the provisions of clause 2, the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or as the ca~e may be, the existing law shall prevail and the law madt> by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of repugnancy be void. We are not here concerned with the provisions of clanse 2. For the purpo~e of the present appeals, we will assume that the Portuguese Civil Code which was continued by Parliament to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu was a law made by the Legislature of a State, though there may be several objections to so doing. The principles applicable to ascertain whether there is repug- nancy or not have been ennnciated by this Court in Deep Chand v. The State of Uttftr Pradesh('), Municipal Council, Palai
v. T .. I. Joseph('), State of !ammu and Kashmir v. H. S. Farooqi( 8), :and other cases. We do not consider it necessary to restate the well known principles. Wrthout doubt the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code, unless they are saved by Section 29(2) of the limitation Act, are repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. If, however, the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code are saved by Section 29 (2) the'n there can be no question of any repugnancy, Si~c
tion 29 (2) declares that the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law shall apply as if such period was prescribed by the Sch~dule to the Limitation Act. In other words it is as if the special or local law is incorporated into the Limitation Act and the Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended, mutatis mutandis, by the special or local law. Therefore, to say that the provisions of a special or local law which by the Il'~cessary implication of Section 29(2) are read into the Limitation Act are co'ntrary to the provisions of the Limitation Act, is merely to argue in a vicious circle, to end where one begins. So the question whether the provisions of the Portuguese- Civil Code are void on the gronnd that they are repugnant to the pro- visions of the Limitation Act depends on the question whether the Portuguese Civil Code is saved by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. That depends on whether the Portuguese Civil Code is a special or local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limi- tation Act.
(l) [1959] 2 S.C.R. 843. (2) (1964! 2 S.C.R. 87. (3) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1738. JUSTINIANO v. ANTONIO (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) We do not see how we can escape from the conclusion that . the Portugu"'»e Civil Code is a local law within the meaning of Section 29(2). Obvionsly the word 'special' has reference to subject and the word 'local' has reference to area or territory. A special law is a Jaw relati'ng to a particular subject while a local law is a law confined to a particular area or territory. Used in an Act made by Parliament the word local may refer to a part or the whole of one of the many States B constituting the Union. Though a law dealing with a particular subject may be a general law in the sense that it is a law of
gm~ral appli- cability, laying down general rules, yet, it may contain special provi- sio'os relating to bar of time, in specified cases, different from too gene- ral law of limitation. Such a Jaw would be a special law for the pur- pose of Section 29(2). The rule of limitation contained in Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 was accordingly held to be a 'special Jaw' in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh('). Similarly, a Jaw which may be a law of general applicability is yet a local law if, its applicability is confined to a particular area instead of generally the whole country. In The Queen v.
London County Council(') Bowen L.J. observed : "Now, a general Act, prima fade, is that which applies lo the whole community. In the natural meaning of the term it means an Act of Parliament which is unlimited both in its area and, as reEards the individual, in its effects; a'nd as opposed to that you get statute~ which may well be pub- lic becaui;c of the importance of the
subjects with which they deal and their general interest to the community, but which are limited in respect of area a limitation which makes them local-or limited in respect of individuals or
persons-a limitation which makes them personal. Here, we may also extract the following useful observations from Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh (supra) to which we have already referred :
"It has been observed in some of the cases decided by the High Courts that the Code is not a special or a local law within the meaning of s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, that is to say, so far as the entire Code is concerned, because it is a general Jaw laying down procedure, generally, for the trial of criminal cases. But the specific question with which we are here concerned is whether the provisio'n contained in s. 417 ( '4) of the Code is a special Jaw. The whole Code is (I) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 982 at 987-988.
(2) [t 893] 2. Q .. B. 454 462. c c (1979] 3 s.c.R. indeed a general law regulating the procedure in crintinal trials generally, but it may contain provisions specifying a bar of time for particular class of cases which are of a special character. For example, a Land. Revenue Code may be a
general law regulating the relationship between the revenne- payer ahd the revenue-receiver or the rent-payer and the rent- receiver. It is a general law in the sense that it lays down the general rule governing such relationship, but it may con- tain special provision relating to bar of time, in
specified cases, different from the general law of limitation. Such a law will be a 'special law' with reference to the law generally governihg the subject-matter of that kind of relationship.
A 'special law', therefore, means a law enac_ted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rules of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals. In that sense, the Code is a general law regulating the procedure for the trial of criminal cases, generally; but if it lays dow'n any bar of time in respect of special cases in special circumstances like those contemplated bys. 417(3) & (4), read together,
it will be a special law contained within the general law. As the Limitation Act bas not defined 'special law', it is neither necessary nor expedient to attempt a definition. Thus, the Limitatioh Act is a general law laying down the
general rules of limitation applicable to all cases dealt with by th~ Act; but there may be instances of a special law of limitation laid down in other statutes, though not dealing
generally with the law of limitation. For example, rules framed under Defence of India Act, vide S. M. Thakur v. The State of Bihar (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 126); Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. (I.I.R (1952) Bom. 1083)
dealihg with the special rule of limitation laid down in the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bom. XXXIII of 1948). Theso are mere instances of special laws within the meaning of s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act".
If in the above extracted passage dealing with the scope of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act one reads the words "local Jaw" for tl1c words "special Jaw" and the word "area" for
the words "Bpecial cases", the meaning of the expression "local law" becomes clear. Now, there is only one ge'neral law of Limitation for the entire country and it is the Limitation Act, 1963. All other laws prescrib· ing periods of limitation are either special or local laws. They are
y JUSTINIANO v. ANTONIO (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) :sp<cial luws if they prescribe periods of limitation for specified cases. They are local laws if their applicability is confined to specified areas. If Section 32 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 are read together, it becomes clear that the only law of Limitation that is re- Jl"'aled is the Limitation Act, 1908, and all other laws dealing with limitatio'n, special or local are saved and are to be read into the Limi- .tation Act, 1963.
We, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that the body of provisions in the Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation .of suits etc. and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, ·Daman and Diu only is "local law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
As stated earlier these provisions have to be read into the Limitatio11 Act, 1963, as if the Schedule to the Limita- tion Act is amended mutatis mutandis. No question of repugnancy arises.
We agree with the Judicial Commissioner that the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation continue to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman a'nd Diu.
We do not think that it is nee1.>ssary to consider the other submis- . sions of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs. :~.R.
Appeals dismissed . c