Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
55. Shri G.V. Chandrashekar, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the recommendations made by the Committee should be accepted without any modification because the same are based on a comprehensive 8 consideration of the reports of CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT. Shri Chandrashekar referred to the discussion part of the report prepared by the Committee to show that experiments conducted by CIMFR, Dhanbad did not provide sound basis for determining the impact of blasting on the protected monument. C He pointed out that CIMFR had prepared the report by conducting isolated blasts at different sites on different dates and argued that the impact of such blasts is insignificant and cannot help in deciding whether or not the temple has suffered damages on account of multiple blasts simultaneously. o conducted by different leaseholders. Shri Chandrashekhar also pointed out that the report prepared by NIT is inconclusive because the agency did not have the benefit of judging the impact of multiple blasting on Jambunatheshwara temple. Learned counsel pointed out that the report submitted by respondent No.9 clearly shows that extensive damage has been E caused to the temple and its surroundings due to unabated blasting carried out by the leaseholders. Shri Chandrashekar submitted that the recommendations made by the Committee should be accepted because the same were made by the Committee after threadbare examination of the reports of F CIMFR and NIT. In the end, the learned counsel argued that the restrictions prescribed under the 1958 Act and the Karnataka Act are not conclusive and the Court should accept the recommendations made by the Committee, as was done in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1996) 8 SCC 462 and other G cases.
56. Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka relied upon notification dated 10/12.3.1998 issued under Section 4 of the Karnataka Act read with Rule 11 (1) and (2) of the Karnataka Historical and Archaeological K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Rules, 1968 and argued that the Court should not accept the recommendations of the Committee because restriction on mining within 2 kilometres from Jambunatheswara temple will not only be ultra vires the statutory provisions contained in the 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, but will also be highly detrimental to public interest. She extensively referred to the reports of CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT and argued that the recommendations made by the two expert bodies should be accepted because the same are in consonance with the provisions of the 1957 Act and the terms and conditions on which leases were granted to the private respondents.
57. Shri A.D.N. Rao learned counsel appearing for the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India and respondent No.9 argued that the Committee had rightly refused to base its recommendations on the reports of CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT because the survey and trial blasts were conducted by the two bodies under ideal conditions and not conditions similar to those in which the lessees had simultaneously operated mines till the passing of interim orders by this Court. Shri Rao also referred to the affidavits dated 2.10.2010 and 17.2.2011 filed by respondent Nos. 9 and 14 respectively and argued that respondent No.4 was carrying on mining activities in the vicinity of temple by using Wagon Blasting Method which resulted in substantial damage to the temple.
58. Shri U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.18 relied upon the judgment in Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka 2013(6) SCALE 90 and argued that in view of the express permission granted by the three-Judge Bench for operation of mines in District Bellary subject to certain conditions, the appellant cannot seek any other restriction on mining activities beyond a distance of 200 meters from Jambunatheswara temple. He pointed out that the two leases granted to respondent No.18 are at a distance A of 790 meters and 1.09 kilometres respectively from the temple and the Beneficiation Plants are at a distance of 1.14 kilometres. He then submitted that respondent No.18 does not have blasting permission and only Ripper Dozer is employed for excavation of the mineral, which is then taken to the B Beneficiation Plant through the conveyer belt. Shri Lalit emphasized that the reports submitted by respondent No.9 and the two expert bodies engaged by the Committee have not found respondent No.18 responsible for causing any damage to the structure of the temple and argued that it should be c allowed to continue mining by Ripper Dozer and Rock Breaker. He placed before the Court the papers showing photographs of Ripper Dozer and Rock Breaker machines and submitted that mining by these machines will not cause any damage to the temple or surrounding environment. Shri Lalit also filed xerox D copy of report prepared by Central Institute of Mining and Fuel Research, Regional Centre, Nagpur which was prepared at the instance of respondent No.18. He further submitted that building of the temple may have been damaged due to passage of time, lack of maintenance by the concerned government E departments and agencies or due to use of explosives in its close proximity by respondent No.4 and others. He invited the Court's attention to paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government to show that the Government of Karnataka has taken an in-principle decision not to renew any F lease falling within 200 meters of the temple. Shri Lalit then highlighted the mechanism employed in the Beneficiation Plant and submitted that the operation of the plant will not affect the temple. Shri Lalit placed before the Court papers showing the photographs of Ripper Dozer and Rock Breaker.
59. Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.2 argued that his client does not have any objection to the acceptance of the recommendations made by the Committee, provided that the same is made applicable to all the lessees. K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 661 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
60. Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing A for respondent No. 15 advocated for acceptance of the report of the Committee subject to appropriate modification in the light of the recommendations made by the expert bodies. Shri Gupta invoked the principle of sustainable development and argued that the Court should strike a balance between the B requirement of protecting the temple and the need of iron ore for the State and the country. Shri Gupta emphasised that any unreasonable restriction on mining activities in and around the temple premises will adversely impact the production of steel in the country. In support of his argument/submission, Shri Gupta C relied upon the judgment in N.O. Jayal v. Union of India (2004) 9 sec 362.
61. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and respondent No.17, Allam Basavaraj relied upon report dated 27.5.2009 filed before the High Court to show . that at the time of inspection, no mining activities were conducted in the mining pit located within 150 meters of the temple and in terms of G.O. No. 712/1996 issued by the Government of Karnataka, no mining was permitted within 100 E meters of the temple. Learned counsel emphasized that at the time of inspection carried out pursuant to the direction given by the Director of Mines and Geology, it was found that respondent No.4 was carrying on mining at a distance of 1.4 kilometres from the temple. Ms. Suri relied upon the lease F deeds executed in favour of respondent No.4, permission granted under Regulation 164(1)(b) of Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1961, letter dated 11.4.2007 issued by the Department of Mines and Geology permitting respondent No.4 to continue the mining activities and argued that no further restriction should be imposed on its mining activities by relying upon the recommendations of the Committee. Ms. Suri laid considerable emphasis on the fact that respondent No.4 has not undertaken mining operations by using heavy explosives. Learned counsel also pointed out that on being directed by the Department of Mines and Geology, respondent No.4 had constructed a protection wall around the temple and submitted that now there is no possibility of any damage to the temple on account of the blasting undertaken by respondent No.4. Ms. Suri argued that the recommendations made by the Committee are liable to be rejected because the same are contrary to the provisions of 1957 Act and the Rules made thereunder. As regards respondent No.17, Ms. Suri argued that mining activities were being undertaken as per the plan approved by IBM and there is no possibility of such activity causing any c damage to the temple. Consideration
62. We have given serious thought to the arguments/ submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the records including the affidavits/objections filed in response to the recomn;iendations made by the Committee. We have also gone through the written arguments filed by the appellant and some of the respondents.
63. Before dealing with the arguments/submissions of the learned counsel, we consider it proper to mention that even though in their counter affidavits some of the official respondents and respondent No.4 have raised an objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that relief similar to the one prayed for by the appellant had been sought in Writ Petitipn No.27067/1998 filed before the High Court by way of public interest litigation, which was dismissed on 7.8.2000, the same was not pressed during the course of arguments. That apart, we do not find valid ground to entertain the objection of res judicata because the official and private respondents have not filed the pleadings of Writ Petition No.27067/1998 and without going through the same, it is not possible for this Court to record a finding that the appellant should be non-suited because a similar petition had been dismissed by the High Court. K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 663 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
64. The 1957 Act was enacted by Parliament to provide A for development and regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union. The backdrop in which the 1957 Act was enacted is discernible from the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Bill, which reads as under: "Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the subject "Ancient and historical monuments; archaeological monuments; archaeological sites and remains" fell within Entry 15 of the Federal List. Under the Constitution, this C subject has been distributed under three different heads, namely.- Entry 67, Union List – Ancient and historical monuments and records, and archaeological sites and remains, declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of D national importance. Entry 12, State List-Ancient and historical monuments and records other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of national importance, and Entry 40, Concurrent List – Archaeological sites and remains other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of national importance."
65. Sections 4(1), 5(1) and 6(1) which postulate grant of F prospecting licences and leases and contain certain restrictions read as under: "Section 4(1) of the Act prohibits any kind of mining or related activity in any area witho.ut a license for that regard G under the Act and its rules. Section 4A also allows the Central government to terminate prospecting or mining leases in various circumstances. Section 5(1) provides that a state government can grant H c reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease only to an Indian National or a company and only on satisfaction of rules made under the Act. Section 5(2) prohibits the state government from granting a mining license unless it is satisfied that there is evidence to show that the area for which the lease is applied for has been prospected earlier and there is a mining plan duly approved. Section 6(1) limits the maximum area for which one or more mining licences can be granted to one person to 1 O sq. km, for prospecting license to 25 sq. km. and for reconnaissance permit to 10,000 sq. km. Section 7(1) provides that a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence cannot be granted for more than 3 years and if renewed cannot exceed 5 years in total. Section 8(1) and 8(2) provide that a mining lease can be granted for a maximum of 30 years and can be renewed for a period not exceeding 20 years."
66. The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 were framed by the Central Government under Section 13 of the 1957 Act. The provisions contained in Chapters II and Ill of these Rules regulate grant of reconnaissance permits and prospecting licences in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government. Chapter IV contains provisions relating to grant of mining leases in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government. Chapter V contains the procedure for obtaining a prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of land in which . the minerals vest in a person other than the government. Chapter VIII contains miscellaneous provisions.
67. The Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 which were framed by the Central Government under Section 18 of the 1957 Act are divided into ten chapters. Chapter Ill of these Rules, which relate to mining operations, provide for submission of mining plan and approval thereof by K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 665 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] the competent authority as a condition precedent for commencement of mining operations.
68. None of the provisions contained in the 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder regulate mining operations/ activities in the vicinity of ancient and historical monuments and archaeological sites. This subject is exclusively governed by the 1958 Act and similar enactments made by the State Legislatures including the Karnataka Act. Like the 1958 Act, the Karnataka Act also provides for declaration by the government of any ancient monument as a "Protected c Monument". Both the Central Government and the State Government have framed rules for grant of permission/licence in the prescribed form to undertake any mining operations in a protected and/or regulated area. Rule 10 of the 1959 Rules, which has been framed under Section 38 of the 1958 Act and Rules 11 to 15 of the Kamataka Rules provide that no person shall undertake any mining operations in a regulated area other than on the strength of a licence granted by the competent authority, i.e., the Director. The material placed on record of this appeal does not show that the private respondents have obtained such licence under the Karnataka Rules for permission to undertake mining operations within the prohibited and/or regulated area. Therefore, they cannot be allowed to operate mines in the protected and/or regulated area.
69. The argument of learned counsel for the private respondents that the report of the Committee should not be accepted because the same is contrary to the recommendations made by the two expert bodies sounds attractive but, on a wholesome consideration, we do not find any merit in it because the Committee had thoroughly scrutinised the reports sent by the two expert bodies, i.e., CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT and then decided that the area surrounding the temple should be divided into two zones, i.e., Core Zone and Buffer Zone and there shall be total ban on mining within the Core Zone while mining be permitted in the Buffer Zone under the supervision of an expert body/agency.
70. At this stage, we may mention that in June 1972, the United Nations organised a conference on 'Human Environment' at Stockholm, Sweden. The declaration issued at 8 the end of that conference, which is called as the Stockholm Declaration, has been aptly described by this Court in Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti (2004) 2 SCC 392 as 'magna carta of our environment'. Some of the principles enunciated in the Stockholm Declaration are: c "Principle 2 The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate. Principle 4 Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat, which are now gravely imperilled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation, including wildlife, must therefore receive importance in planning for economic development. Principle 8 Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life. Principle 11 The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] potential of developing countries, no'r should they hamper the attainment of better living conditions for all, and appropriate steps sho·uld be taken by States and international organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meeting the possible national and international economic consequences resulting from the application of environmental measures." Though the Stockholm Conference recognised the links between environment and development but little was done to integrate this concept for international action until 1987 when c the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future was presented to the United Nations General Assembly. The Brundtland Report stimulated debate on development policies and practices in developing and industrialised countries alike and called for an integration of our understanding of the environment and development into practical measures of action. In 1992, Earth Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The declaration issued at the end of the summit dealt with environmental needs, environmental protection, environmental degradation, etc. The World Summit on Sustainable Development was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002 for the purpose of evaluating the results achieved after the Rio Summit. This summirgave-an-opportunity to build on the knowledge gained over the past decade and provided a new impetus for commitments of resources and specific action towards global sustainability.
71. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 281, this Court described the principle of sustainable development in the following words: "While economic development should not be allowed to take place at the cost of ecology or by causing widespread environment destruction and violation; at the same time the necessity to preserve ecology and environment should not hamper economic and other developments. Both c development and environment must go hand in hand. in other words, there should not be development at the cost of environment and vice versa, but there should be development while taking due care and ensuring the protection of environment."
72. In Ve/lore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647, this Court acknowledged that the traditional notion of conflict between ecology and development is no longer acceptable and sustainable development is the answer.
73. In Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti (supra) this Court referred to the Stockholm Declaration and observed: "This; therefore, is the aim, namely, to balance economic and social needs on the one hand with environmental considerations on th_e other. But in a sense all development is an environmental threat. Indeed, the very existence of humanity and the rapid increase in the population together with consequential demands to sustain the population has resulted in the concreting of open lands, cutting down of forests, the filling up of lakes and pollution of water resources and the very air which we breathe. However, there need not necessarily be a deadlock between development on the one hand and the environment on the other. The objective of all laws on environment should be to create harmony between the two since neither one can be sacrificed at the altar of the other." 7 4. We may now notice some of the judgments which have bearing on the scope of the Court's power to issue directions but which may appear to be contrary to the statutes operating in the particular field. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161, this Court considered whether a letter addressed to a Judge of this Court could be treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and whether directions could be issued for release of an indeterminate K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 669 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] number of citizens who were held as bonded labourers. While dealing with the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution, this Court observed: " …….. It will be seen that the power conferred by clause (2) of Article 32 is in the widest terms. It is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions differing from one writ to another and which to q'uote the words spoken by Lord Atkin in United Australia Limited v. Barclays Bank Ltd. 1941 AC 1 :(1939) 2 KB 53 in another context often "stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chains". But it is much wider and includes within its matrix, power to issue any directions, orders or writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of the fundamental right in question and this is made amply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is not only the high prerogative writs of mandamus. habeas corpus. prohibition. quo warranto and certiorari which can be issued by the Supreme Court but also writs in the nature of these high prerogative writs and therefore even if the conditions for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled, the Supreme Court would not be constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its inability to help the citizen who has come before it for judicial redress. but would have power to issue any direction. order or writ including a writ in the nature of any high prerogative writ. This provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution-makers not to allow any procedural technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of fundamental rights. The Constitution-makers clearly intended that the Supreme Court should have the amplest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ may be c appropriate in a. given case for enforcement of a fundamental right. But what procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the power to issue such direction, order or writ? That is a matter on which the Constitution is silent and advisedly so, because the Constitution-makers never intended to fetter the discretion of the Supreme Court to evolve a procedure appropriate in the circumstances of a given case for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither clause (2) of Article 32 nor any other provision of the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its power to issue an appropriate direction, order or writ. The purpose for which the power to issue an appropriate direction, order or writ is conferred on the Supreme Court 'is to secure enforcement of a fundamental right and obviously therefore, whatever procedure is necessary for fulfilment of that purpose must be permissible to the Supreme Court . … … …. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has evolved the practice of appointing commissions for the purpose of gathering facts and data in regard to a complaint of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The report of the Commissioner would furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data gathered by the Commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful to appoint a responsible person as Commissioner to make an enquiry or investigation into the facts relating to the complaint. It is interesting to note that in the past the Supreme Court has appointed sometimes a District Magistrate, sometimes a District Judge, sometimes a professor of law, sometimes a journalist, sometimes an officer of the Court and sometimes an advocate practising in the Court, for the purpose of carrying out an enquiry or investigation and making report to the Court because the Commissioner K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 671 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] appointed by the Court must be a responsible person who A enjoys the confidence of the Court and who is expected to carry out his assignment objectively and impartially without any predilection or prejudice. Once the report of the Commissioner is received, copies of it would be supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants to B dispute any of the facts or data stated in the report, may do so by filing an affidavit and the court then consider the report of the Commissioner and the affidavits which may have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon the issue arising in the writ petition. It would be entirely for the Court C to consider what weight to attach to the facts and data stated in the report of the Commissioner and to what extent to act upon such facts and data." (emphasis supplied) 0 75. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P (1985) 2 sec 431, this Court was called upon to consider whether there should be ban on lime stpne quarries which had threatened life ofthe people residing in Mussoorie Hill range forming part of the Himalayas and surrounding environment. On 11.8.1983, the Court appointed a committee consisting of Shri D.N. Bhargav, Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines, Nagpur, Shri M.S. Kahlon, Director General of Mines Safety and Col. P. Mishra, Head of the Indian Photo Interpretation Institute (National Remote Sensing Agency) for the purpose of F inspecting the lime stone quarries referred to in the writ petition and the. list submitted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The committee inspected most of the lime stone quarries and submitted three reports and divided the lime stone quarries into three categories, i.e., A, Band C. The committee noted that G mining operations in the quarries categorised as A did not gravely impact the environment and life of the people whereas the quarries comprised in the other two categories had adversely impacted the environment. After taking into consideration the report of the Bhargav Committee, the Court H directed closure of all lime stone quarries in category C. As regards category B quarries, the Court appointed another committee headed by Shri D.Bandyopadhyay, Secretary, Ministry for Rural Development and issued several directions. While dealing with the question of hardship to the quarry owners, the Court observed: c "The consequence of this Order made by us would be that the lessees of lime stone quarries which have been directed to be closed down permanently under this Order or which may be directed to be closed down permanently after consideration of the Report of the Bandyopadhyay Committee, would be thrown out of business in which they have invested large sums of money and expended considerable time and effort. This would undoubtedly cause hardship to them. but it is a price that has to be paid for protecting and safeguarding the right of the people to live in healthy environment with minimal disturbance of ecological balance and without avoidable hazard to them and to their cattle. homes and agricultural land and undue affectation of air. water and environment." (emphasis supplied) 76. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655, this Court observed: · "The state to which the ecological imbalances and the consequent environmental damage have reached is so alarming that unless immediate, determined and effective steps were taken, the damage might become irreversible. The preservation of the fauna and flora, some species of which are getting extinct at an alarming rate, has been a great and urgent necessity for the survival of humanity and these laws reflect a last ditch battle for the restoration, in part at least, a grave situation emerging from a long history of callous insensitiveness to the enormity of the risks to mankind that go with the deterioration of environment. The K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 673 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] tragedy of the predicament of the civilised man is that 'Every source from which man has increased his power on earth has been used to diminish the prospects of his successors. All his progress is being made at the expense of damage to the environment which he cannot repair and cannot foresee'. In his foreword to International Wild Life Law, H.R.H. Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh said: 'Many people seem to think that the conservation of nature is simply a matter of being kind to animals and enjoying .walks in the countryside. Sadly, perhaps, it is a great deal more complicated than that …. . . . As 1:1sual with all legal systems, the crucial requirement is for the terms of the conventions to be widely accepted and rapidly implemented. Regretfully progress in this direction is proving disastrously slow …. ' 'Environmentalists' conception of the ecological balance in nature is based on the fundamental concept that nature is 'a series of complex biotic communities of which a man is an interdependent part' and that it should not be given to a part to trespass and diminish the whole. The largest single factor in the depletion of the wealth of animal life in nature has been the 'civilised man' operating directly through excessive commercial hunting or, more disastrously, indirectly through invading or destroying natural habitats." 77. In Tarun Bharat Sangh v. Union of India 1992 Supp (2) sec 448, this Court considered whether mining in the area popularly known as 'Sariska Tiger Park', which was declared as Game Reserve under the Rajasthan Wild Animals and Birds Protection Act, 1951 as a reserve forest under Sections 29 and 30 of the Rajasthan Forest Act, 1953 and as a sanctuary under Section 35 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 should be c A banned because the same was impairing environment and wild life. At one stage, the Court thought of imposing total ban on mining activities but, keeping in view some technical difficulties, it was decided to constitute a Committee headed by former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to ensure enforcement of the B notifications issued under various statutes. Simultaneously, the Court passed an interlocutory order and directed that no mining operation of any kind shall be carried on within the protected area. c 78. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1996) 8 SCC 462, this Court considered the impact of mining operations on the ecologically sensitive areas of Badkal Lake and Surajkund in Haryana. After taking cognizance of the reports submitted by Haryana Pollution Control Board and an expert body, namely, 0 National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), the Court accepted the same with certain modifications. Paragraph 8 of the judgment which depicts consideration of the recommendations of NEERI reads thus: "We are, therefore, of the view that in order to preserve environment and control pollution within the vicinity of the two tourist resorts it is necessary to stop mining in the area. The question, however, for consideration is what should be the extent of the said area? NEERI in its report has recommended that 200 metre green belts be developed at 1 km radius all around the boundaries of the two lakes. It is thus obvious that 1200 metres are required for the green belts. Leaving another 800 metres as a cushion to absorb the air and noise pollution generated by the mining operations, we are of the view that it would be reasonable to direct the stoppage of mining activity within two km radius of the tourist resorts of Badkal and Surajkund. We, therefore, order and direct as under: 1. There shall be no mining activity within two km radius of the tourist resorts of Badkal and Surajkund. All the K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 675 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] mines which fall within the said radius shall not be A reopened. 2. The Forest Department of the State of Haryana and in particular the Chief Conservator and the District Forest Officer, Faridabad shall undertake to develop the green B belts as recommended by NEER! with immediate effect. The NEER! has also suggested the development plan and the type of trees to be planted. We direct the Chief Conservator of Forests, Haryana, District Forest Officer, Faridabad and all other officers concerned of the Forest c Department to start the plantation of trees for developing the green belts and make all efforts to complete the plantations of trees before the monsoons (1996). 3. We direct the Director, Mining and Geology, Haryana, the Haryana Pollution Control Board to enforce all the D recommendations of NEER! contained in para 6.1 of its report (quoted above) so far as the mining operations in the State of Haryana are concerned. All the mine-operators shall be given notices to implement the said recommendations. Failure to comply with the E recommendations may result in the closure of the mining operations. 4. We further direct that no construction of any type shall be permitted now onwards within 5 km radius of the Badkal lake and Surajkund. All open areas shall be converted into green belts. 5. The mining leases within the area from 2 km to 5 km radius shall not be renewed without obtaining prior "no G objection" certificate from the Haryana Pollution Control Board as also from the Central Pollution Control Board. Unless both the Boards grant no objection. certificate the mining leases in .the said area shall not be renewed." · A 79. In M.C. Mehta (Taj Trapezium Matter) v. Union of India (1997) 2 SCC 353, this Court considered whether the foundries, chemical-hazardous industries and the refinery at Mathura should be closed down because they were threat to the very existence of Taj Mahal. In the course of judgment, the Court referred to the reports of various expert bodies including NEERI and the Central Pollution Control Board which unequivocally pointed out the damage caused to the monument by the industries and proceeded to order closure of industries, which were not in a position to make change over to the natural c gas by recording the following observations: "The Taj, apart from being a cultural heritage, is an industry by itself. More than two million tourists visit the Taj every year. It is a source of revenue for the country. This Court has monitored this petition for over three years with the sole object of preserving and protecting the Taj from deterioration and damage due to atmospheric and environmental pollution. It cannot be disputed that the use of coke/coal by the industries emits pollution in the ambient air. The objective behind this litigation is to stop the pollution while encouraging development of industry. The old concept that development and ecology cannot go together is no longer acceptable. Sustainable development is the answer. The development of industry is essential for the economy of the country, but at the same time the environment and the ecosystems have to be protected. The pollution created as a consequence of development must be commensurate with the carrying capacity of our ecosystems. Based on the reports of various technical authorities mentioned in this judgment. we have already reached the finding that the emissions generated by the coke/coal consuming industries are air pollutants and have damaging effect on the Taj and the people living in the TTZ. The atmospheric pollution in TTZ has to be eliminated at any K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] cost. Not even one per cent chance can be taken when human life apart – the preservation of a prestigious monument like the Taj is involved. In any case, in view of the precautionary principle as defined by this Court, the environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. The "onus of proof' is on an industry to show that its operation with the aid of coke/coal is environmentally benign. It is, rather, proved beyond doubt that the emissions generated by the use of coke/coal by the industries in TTZ are the main polluters of the ambient air." (emphasis supplied) 80. In M.C. Mehta (Taj Trapezium Pollution) v. Union of India (2001) 9 sec 235, the Court considered the report of NEERI on the issue of pollution caused by the brick kilns operating in the Taj Trapezium and issued the following directions: "(1) All licensed brick kilns within 20 km radial distance of Taj Mahal and other significant monuments in Taj Trapezium and Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary shall be closed and stop ·operating w.e.f. 15-8-1996. We direct the State of U.P. to render all possible assistance to the licensed brick kiln- owners in the process of relocation beyond Taj Trapezium, if the owners so desire. The closure order is, however, unconditional. (2) We direct the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police concerned to close all unlicensed and unauthorised brick kilns operating in the Taj Trapezium with immediate effect. The U.P. Pollution Control-Board (Board) shall file a compliance report within two months. (3) No new licences shall be issued for the establishment of brick kilns within 20 km radial distance from Taj Mahal, [2013) 11 S.C.R. other monuments in Taj Trapezium and Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary." 81. In M.C. Mehta v. Union oflndia (2004) 12 SCC 118, the Court considered several interlocutory applications filed in s the matter by which this Court had stopped mining operations near Badkal Lake and Surajkund. After considering various reports submitted by the expert bodies, the Court observed: c "The mining operation is hazardous in nature. It impairs ecology and people's right to natural resources. The entire process of setting up and functioning of mining operation requires utmost good faith and honesty on the part of the intending entrepreneur. For carrying on any mining activity close to township which has tendency to degrade environment and is likely to affect air, water and soil and impair the quality of life of inhabitants of the area, there would be greater responsibility on the part of the entrepreneur. The fullest disclosures including the potential for increased burdens on the environment consequent upon possible increase in the quantum and degree of pollution, has to be made at the outset so that the public and all those concerned including authorities may decide whether the permission can at all be granted for carrying on mining activity. The regulatory authorities have to act with utmost care in ensuring compliance of safeguards, norms and standards to be observed by such entrepreneurs. When questioned, the regulatory authorities have to show that the said authorities acted in the manner enjoined upon them. Where the regulatory authorities, either connive or act negligently by not taking prompt action to prevent, avoid or control the damage to environment, natural resources and people's life, health and property, the principles of accountability for restoration and compensation have to be applied. Development and the protection of environment are not K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] enemies. If without degrading the environment or minimising adverse effects thereupon by applying stringent safeguards, it is possible to carry on development activity applying the principles of sustainable development, in that eventuality, development has to go on because one cannot lose sight of the need for development of industries, irrigation resources and power projects etc. including the need to improve employment opportunities and the generation of revenue. A balance has to be struck. We may note that to stall fast the depletion of forest, a series of orders have been passed by this Court in T.N. c Godavarman case 1991 Supp (2) SCC 665 regulating the felling of trees in all the forests in the country. Principle 15 of the Rio Conference of 1992 relating to the applicability of precautionary principle, which stipulates that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation, is also required to be kept in view. In such matters, many a times, the option to be adopted is not very easy or in a straitjacket. If an activity is allowed to go ahead, there may be irreparable damage to the environment and if it is stopped, there may be irreparable damage to economic interest. In case of doubt, however, protection of environment would have precedence over the economic interest. Precautionary principle requires anticipatory action to be taken to prevent harm. The harm can be prevented even on a reasonable suspicion. It is not always necessary that there should be direct evidence of harm to the environment." The Court then referred to the provisions of the 1957 Act, the Rules framed thereunder as also the laws enacted by Parliament for protection of environment and forests and observed: "The Aravallis, the most distinctive and ancient mountain c -G [2013) 11 S.C.R. chain of peninsular India, mark the site of one of the oldest geological formations in the world. Heavily eroded and with exposed outcrops of slate rock and granite, it has summits reaching 4950 feet above sea level. Due to its geological location, the Aravalli range harbours a mix of Saharan, Ethiopian, peninsular, oriental and even Malayan elements of flora and fauna. In the early part of this century, the Aravallis were well wooded. There were dense forests with waterfalls and one could encounter a large number of wild animals. Today, the changes in the environment at Aravalli are severe. Though one finds a number of tree species in the hills, timber-quality trees have almost disappeared. Despite the increase of population resulting in increase of demand from the forest, it cannot be questioned nor has it been questioned that to save the ecology of the Aravalli mountains, the laws have to be strictly implemented. The notification dated 7-5-1992 was passed with a view to strictly implement the measures to protect the ecology of the Aravalli range. The notification was followed more in its breach. In the aforesaid background, any mining activity on the area under plantation under the Aravalli Project cannot be permitted. The grant of leases for mining operation over such an area would be wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and illogical." The Court then referred to the report prepared by the Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Limited on Aravalli and accepted the same. The Court finally referred to the judgment in Ambica -Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 sec 213 and refused to modify order dated 6.5.2002 by which mining activities were banned but appointed a Monitoring Committee for suggesting recommencement of mining in individual cases. 82. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2009) 6 SCC 142, K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 681 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] this Court considered the question of whether in view of Section 4A of the 1957 Act, it would be appropriate to exercise power under Article 32 read with Article 142 for suspending mining operations in the Aravalli Hills. After taking cognizance of the fact that indiscriminate mining had resulted in large scale environmental degradation in the area and the arguments of the senior counsel appearing on behalf of the leaseholders, the Court observed: "44. We find no merit in the above arguments. As stated above, in the past when mining leases were granted, c requisite clearances for carrying out mining operations were not obtained which have resulted in land and environmental degradation. Despite such breaches, approvals had been granted for subsequent slots because in the past the authorities have not taken into account the macro effect of such wide-scale land and environmental degradation caused by the absence of remedial measures (including rehabilitation plan). Time has now come, therefore, to suspend mining in the above area till statutory provisions for restoration and reclamation are duly complied with, particularly in cases where pits/quarries have been left abandoned. 45. Environment and ecology are national assets. They are subject to intergenerational equity. Time has now come to suspend all mining in the above area on sustainable development principle which is part of Articles 21, 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution of India. In fact, these articles have been extensively discussed in the judgment in M.C. Mehta case (2004) 12 SCC 118 which keeps the option of imposing a ban in future open. 46. Mining within the principle of sustainable development comes within the concept of "balancing" whereas mining beyond the principle of sustainable development comes within the co~cept of "banning". It is a ~atter of degree. c [2013) 11 S.C.R. Balancing of the mining activity with environment protection and banning such activity are two sides of the same principle of sustainable development. They are parts of precautionary principle. · 47. At this stage, we may also note that under Section 13(2)(qq) of the 1957 Act, rules have been framed for rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation destroyed by reason of any prospecting or mining operations. Under Section 18 of the 1957 Act, rules have been framed for conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for the protection of environment by preventing or controlling pollution caused by prospecting or mining operations which also form part of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988. 48. Under Rule 27(1 )(s)(i) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 every lessee is required to take measures for planting of trees not less than twice the number destroyed by mining operations. Under the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988, vide Rule 34, mandatory provisions for reclamation and rehabilitation of lands are made for every holder of prospecting licence or mining lease to be undertaken and that work has to be completed by the lessee/licensee before abandoning the mine or prospect. 49. Similarly, under Rule 37 of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 the lessee/licensee has to calibrate the air pollution within permissible limits specified under the EP Act, 1986 as well as the Air (Prevention and Control" of Pollution) Act, 1981. Under the said Rules of 1988, the most important guidelines are Guidelines 25.26.3, 25.26.4, 25.26.5 and 25.26.6. These guidelines deal with reclamation, planning and implementation; restoration strategy, principles of rehabilitation, K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 683 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] rehabilitation of mined-out sites and methods of A reclamations (see Handbook of Environment & Forest Legislations, Guidelines and Procedures in India by Ravindra N. Saxena and Sangita Saxena at pp. 1555-62). It may be noted that there are two steps to be taken in the method of reclamation, namely, technical reclamation and biological reclamation. The most important aspect of the above guidelines is making of a rehabilitation plan. Conclusion 50. None of the above provisions have been complied with. In the circumstance. by the present order. we hereby suspend all mining operations in the Aravalli hill range falling in the State of Haryana within the area of approximately 448 sq km in the districts of Faridabad and Gurgaon. including Mewat till the reclamation plan duly certified by the State of Harvana. MoEF and CEC is prepared in accordance with the above statutory provisions contained in various enactments enumerated above as well as in terms of the rules framed thereunder and the guidelines. The said plan shall state what steps are needed to be taken to rehabilitate (including reclamation) followed by status reports on steps taken by the authorities pursuant to the said plan." (emphasis supplied) 83. In N.D. Jayal v. Union of India (supra), on which reliance was placed by Shri Jaideep Gupta, this Court considered the issues relating to safety and environmental protection arising out of the construction of Tehri Dam. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below: "Before adverting to other issues, certain aspects pertaining to the preservation of ecology and development have to be noticed. In Ve/lore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647 and in M.C. Mehta v. c Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 356 it was observed that the balance between environmental protection and developmental activities could only be maintained by strictly following the principle of "sustainable development". This is a development strategy that caters to the needs of the present without negotiating the ability of upcoming generations to satisfy their needs. The strict observance of sustainable development will put us on a path that ensures development while protecting the environment, a path that works for all peoples and for all generations. It is a guarantee to the present and a bequeath to the future. All environment-related developmental activities should benefit more people while maintaining the environmental balance. This could be ensured only by strict adherence to sustainable development without which life of the coming generations will be in jeopardy. The right to development cannot be treated as a mere right to economic betterment or cannot be limited as a misnomer to simple construction activities. The right to development encompasses much more than economic well-being, and includes within its definition the guarantee of fundamental human rights. The "development" is not related only to the growth of GNP. In the classic work, Development As Freedom, the Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen pointed out that "the issue of development cannot be separated from the conceptual framework of human right". This idea is also part of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development. The right to development includes the whole spectrum of civil, cultural, economic, political and social process, for the improvement of peoples' well-being and realization of their full potential. It is an integral part of human rights. Of course, construction of a dam or a mega project is definitely an attempt to achieve the goal of wholesome development. Such works could very well be ·treated as integral component for development." K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 685 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] 84. In Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of A Kamataka {supra), this Court was called upon to consider whether all mining and other related activities undertaken in the forest areas of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in violation of order dated 12.12.1996 passed in W.P.{C) No.202/1995 and the 1980 Act should be stopped. After entertaining the writ B petition filed under Article 32, the Court appointed a committee known as the Central Empowered Committee and asked it to submit a report on the allegations of illegal mining in Bellary region of the State by M/s. Bellary Iron Ore Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Mahabaleswarapa and Sons, M/s. Ananthapur Mining C Corporation and M/s. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. Subsequently, the scope of inquiry of the Central Empowered Committee was extended to all the mining activities in District Bellary. In furtherance of Court directions, the Central Empowered Committee filed various reports. During the course o of hearing, the leaseholders raised several objections to the reports of the Central Empowered Committee including the one that in view of the scheme of the 1957 Act, the 1980 Act and the Environment {Protection) Act, 1986, the Central Empowered Committee could not have recommended taking of any step or measure beyond what is contemplated by the scheme of these statutes. Their argument was controverted by the learned Amicus who pointed out that the reports of the Central Empowered Committee revealed mass destruction of forest wealth and plundering of scarce natural resources which resulted in irreparable ecological and environmental damage and destruction and such activities need consideration by the Court beyond the limitations set out in the statutes. After considering the rival arguments and adverting to the judgments in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (supra), M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395, Taj Trapezium Pollution (supra), Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409, the Court observed: "The mechanism provided by any of the Statutes in c [2013) 11 S.C.R. question would neither be effective nor efficacious to deal with the extraordinary situation that has arisen on account of the large scale illegalities committed in the operation of the mines in question resulting in grave and irreparable loss to the forest wealth of the country besides the colossal loss caused to the national exchequer. The situation being extraordinary the remedy. indeed. must also be extraordinary. Considered against the backdrop of the statutory schemes in question. we do not see how any of the recommendations of the CEC. if accepted. would come into conflict with any law enacted by the legislature. It is only in the above situation that the Court may consider the necessity of placing the recommendations made by the CEC on a finer balancing scale before accepting the same. We. therefore. feel uninhibited to proceed to exercise our constitutional jurisdiction to remedy the enormous wrong that has happened and to provide adequate protection for the future. as may be required." (emphasis supplied) In paragraph 41, the Bench dealt with the question whether the recommendations of the Central Empowered Committee with regard to categorization, reclamation and rehabilitation (R&R) plans, reopening of categories 'A' and 'B' mines with conditions and continued closure of category 'C' mines should be accepted and answered the same in the following words: "In the light of the discussions that have preceded sanctity of the procedure of laying information and materials before the Court with regard to the extent of illegal mining and other specific details in this regard by means of the Reports of the CEC cannot be in doubt. Inter-generational equity and sustainable development have come to be firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence as an integral part of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. In enforcing such rights of a large number of citizens who are bound to be adversely affected K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] by environmental degradation, this Court cannot be constrained by the restraints of procedure. The CEC which has been assisting the Court in various environment related matters for over a decade now was assigned certain specified tasks which have been performed by the said body giving sufficient justification for the decisions. arrived and the recommendations made. If the said recommendations can withstand the test of logic and reason which issue is being examined hereinafter we will have no reason not to accept the said recommendations and embody the same as a part of the order that we will c be required to make in the present case." However, the three-Judge Bench did not deal with the issue relating to impact of mining operations on ancient monuments. As a matter of fact, vide order dated 3.9.2012, the Bench made it clear that the direction given by it for operation of 'Category A' mines will be subject to any order passed in Jambunathahalli Temple case. 85. Although, the aforesaid judgments were rendered on the petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio thereof can be aptly applied for deciding the appeals arising out of the petitions filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. In two of these cases, i.e., Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (supra) and M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395, this Court evolved an innovative mechanism for enforcing the fundamental rights of bonded labourers and those who became victims of the operation of hazardous industries. In the next three cases filed by Mr. M.C. Mehta, the Court considered the impact of mining on national assets like water bodies (Badkal Lake and Surajkund in Haryana), the Taj Mahal and the Aarvali Hills, availed the services of expert bodies and accepted their reports for issuing directions to check pollution and environmental degradation. In the second case, the Court ordered closure of all licensed brick kilns operating within a 20 A kilometers radial distance of the Taj Mahal, Taj Trapezium and Bharatpur Bird Sanctuary. The law which regulated the brick kilns did not contain any such restriction, but in larger public interest, namely, protection of a national monument and a bird sanctuary, this Court used its power to order closure of all the B licensed brick kilns. In the third case, the Court considered and unequivocally rejected the plea that the mines which were operating under the licences granted in accordance with the 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannot be closed under the Court's order and held that all mining operations in c the Aarvali Hills shall be suspended. In the last mentioned case, which relates to the mines operating in three districts of Kamataka, the Court gave multiple directions for protecting the environment, ecology and forest wealth. 86. The affidavit filed by respondent No.14 on 14.2.2011 gives a vivid description of the mining activities taking place in the vicinity of the temple by using Wagon Blasting Method. Shri T.M. Manjunathaiah (Technical Assistant) reported that during the course of inspection of the temple, he felt tremors E due to the explosion and also noticed cracks on the walls and roof due to the impact of the explosion and that the lessee was doing repairs in the form of plastering and cement coating to cover up the cracks on the temple. Respondent No.14 also referred to two inspections carried out by Superintending F Archaeologist, Archaeological Survey of India and a team of officers of the Government of Kamataka, who noticed large scale damage to the structure of the temple. This affidavit totally belies the stand of respondent No.4 that mining was done by Controlled Blasting and not by Wagon Blasting Method. 87. On its part the Committee availed the services of INTACH, Bangalore Chapter, Karnataka Remote Sensing Application Centre, ISRO, CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT. In paragraph IV of its report under the heading DISCUSSIONS, the Committee unanimously agreed that the mining operations H carried out using blasting operations at a distance of less than K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] 200 meters from the temple have already caused irreparable damage to the temple and the eco-environs of its immediate neighbourhood. The Committee noted that the study submitted by Karnataka Remote Sensing Application Centre, ISRO, Bangalore dealt with the mining activities carried out in a radius of one kilometer and two kilometers and illustrated the damage caused to the temple and its immediate environs. The Committee then discussed the conservation plan prepared by Indian National Trust for Arts and Cultural Heritage, Bangalore and observed that a sum of Rs.3,43, 19, 160 would be required for bringing the temple to its original condition so that the same may regain its past glory. The Committee then noted that the investigating agencies, i.e., CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT had conducted experimental blasts beyond 200 meters whereas Karnataka Remote Sensing Application Centre had indicated that one of the mines exists within a horizontal distance of 55 meters from the temple premises on the eastern side and, thus, the impact of blasting operation cannot be fully understood and assessed scientifically by the present investigation. The Committee also observed that many of the trial blasts conducted by the investigating agencies had locations having free f!'lces of the working benches and opined that the result of such investigation would show minimum or no impact on architecturally sensitive temple. The Committee finally declined to accept the suggestions given by CIMFR, Dhanbad and NIT to restrict the mining operations/activities only up to a distance of 200 to 300 meters from Jambunatheswara temple because the data recorded by the expert bodies were based on experimental blasts conducted at individual sites and there was no evaluation/assessment of the cumulative or compounded impact of multiple blasting at different places and altitudes. The Committee noted that the mining operations involving multiple blasting by different leaseholders had already caused substantial damage to the protected monument and the surrounding environment. SUPREME COURT R~PORTS 88. In our view, the detailed reasons recorded by the Committee, which have been extracted hereinabove, for not accepting the recommendations of the expert bodies about the distance up to which mining should not be allowed are correct and those recommendations cannot be relied upon for B accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the State and the private respondents that the recommendations made by the Committee should be rejected. We may hasten to add that the Committee's recommendations are not in conflict with the provisions of the 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. c The 1959 Rules and the Karnataka Rules provide for grant of permission/licence for mining in the prohibited/regulated/ protected area but the documents produced before this Court do not show that the competent authority had granted permission/licence to any of the private respondents for o undertaking mining operations which have the effect of damaging the temple in question. That apart, the distance criteria prescribed in the 1958 Act, the Kamataka Act and the Rules framed thereunder has little or no bearing on deciding the question of restricting the mining operations near the E protected monument which has already suffered extensive damage due to such operations. 89. The argument of learned counsel for the State and the private respondents that ban on mining operations/activities in F the Core Zone would adversely impact iron ore supply and will also cause financial loss to the leaseholders as well as the State appears quite attractive but, keeping in view larger public interest and the interest of future generations, we do not think that this would be a very heavy price to be paid by some individuals and the State. This Court has often used the G principle of sustainable development to balance the requirement of development and environmental protection and issued several directions for protection of natural resources including air, water, forest, flora and fauna as also wildlife. The H Court has also recognized that the right to development includes K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] the whole spectrum of civil, cultural, economic, political and social process, for the improvement of peoples well being and realization of their full potential. 90. In Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forest (Writ Petition (C} No.180/2011) decided on 18.4.2013, this Court recognized the customary and cultural rights of indigenous people living in Kalahandi and Rayagada Districts of Orissa. While considering challenge to order dated 24.8.2010 passed by the Ministry of Environment and Forests whereby the application made by the petitioner for grant of permission for diversion of 660.749 hectares of forest land for mining of bauxite ore in Lanjigarh Bauxite Mines in two Districts of the State was rejected, the three Judge Bench extensively referred to Saxena Committee report, which covered several issues including violation of the rights of tribal groups including primitive tribal groups and the dalit population and proceeded to observe: 'The customary and cultural rights of indigenous people have also been the subject matter of various international conventions. International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No.107) was the first comprehensive international instrument setting forth the rights of indigenous and tribal populations which emphasized the necessity for the protection of social, political and cultural rights of indigenous people. Following that there were two other conventions ILO Convention (No.169) and Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 and United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, India is a signatory only to the ILO Convention (No. 107). Apart from giving legitimacy to the cultural rights by 1957 Convention, the Convention on the Biological Diversity (CSA) adopted at the Earth Summit (1992) highlighted necessity to preserve and maintain knowledge, innovation and practices of the local communities relevant for conservation and sustainable use of bio-diversity, lridia is a signatory to CBA. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Agenda 21 and Forestry principle also encourage the promotion of customary practices conducive to conservation. The necessity to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and c philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources have also been recognized by United Nations in the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples. STs and other TFDs residing in the Scheduled Areas have a right to maintain their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands." The Bench then referred to the provisions of the Forest Rights Act, 2006, the rules framed thereunder as also the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Tribal Welfare, referred to E the judgment of this Court in Amritlal Athubhai Shah v. Union Govemmentoflndia (1976) 4 SCC 108, which recognized the power of the State Government to reserve any particular area for bauxite mining for a public sector corporation, and observed: "Religious freedom guaranteed to STs and the TFDs under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is intended to be a guide to a community of life and social demands. The above mentioned Articles guarantee them the right to practice and propagate not only matters of faith or belief, but all those rituals and observations which are regarded as integral part of their religion. Their right to worship the deity Niyam-Raja has, therefore, to be protected and preserved. Gram Sabha has a role to play in safeguarding the K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 693 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] customary and religious rights of the STs and other TFDs under the Forest Rights Act. Section 6 of the Act confers powers on the Gram Sabha to determine the nature and extent of "individual" or "community rights". In this connection, reference may also be made to Section 13 of the Act coupled with the provisions of PESA Act, which deal with the powers of Gram Sabha. Section 13 of the Forest Rights Act reads as under: "13. Act not in derogation of any other law. – Save as otherwise provided in this Act and the provisions c of the Panchayats (Extension of the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (40of1996). the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force." PESA Act has been enacted, as already stated, to provide for the extension of the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution relating to Panchayats to the Scheduled Areas. Section 4(d) of the Act says that every Gram Sabha shall be competent to safeguard and preserve the traditions, customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and community mode o(dispute resolution. Therefore, Grama Sabha functioning under the Forest Rights Act read with Section 4(d} of PESA Act has an obligation to safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the STs and other forest dwellers, their cultural identity, community resources etc., which they have to discharge following the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs vide its letter dated 12.7.2012." 91. When seen in this light, the protection of ancient monuments has necessarily to be kept in mind while carrying out development activities. The need for ensuring protection and preservation of the ancient monuments for the benefit of future generations has to be balanced with the benefits which A may accrue from mining and other development related activities. In our view, the recommendations and suggestions made by the Committee for creation of Core Zone and Buffer Zone appropriately create this balance. While mining activity is sure to create financial wealth for the leaseholders and also B the State, the immense cultural and historic wealth, not to mention the wealth of information which the temple provides cannot be ignored and every effort has to be made to protect the temple. c ~2. 13efore concluding, we may deal with the submission of Shri Lalit that mining can be permitted beyond the distance of 300 meters from the temple by using Ripper Dozer and Rock Breaker machines. According to the learned senior counsel, the use of Ripper Dozer and Rock Breaker will not produce D vibration which may cause harm to the temple. In our view, this submission does not merit acceptance because in paragraph 6 of the suggestions made by it, the Committee appointed by the Court has already indicated that mining in the Buffer Zone may be permitted with controlled blasting or without blasting by E using Ripper Dozer/Rock Breaker or any other machinery and taking adequate measures towards generation, propagation, suppression and deposition of airborne dust to be closely monitored by experts from IBM etc. 93. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned F order is set aside. The report of the Committee is accepted and the State Government is directed to implement the recommendations contained in Part V thereof including the recommendation relating to creation of Corpus Fund of Rs.3,43, 19, 160 which shall be utilized for implementing the G conservation plan for Jambunatheswara temple. However, it is made clear that respondent No.18 shall be free to operate the Beneficiation plant subject to the condition that it shall procure raw material only through E-auction mode. 94. With a view to ensure that other protected monuments K. GURUPRASAD RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 695 [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] in the State do not suffer the fate of Jambunatheswara temple, we direct that the Committee appointed by this Court vide order dated 26.4.2011 shall undertake similar exercise in respect of other protected monuments in the State in whose vicinity mining operations are being undertaken and submit report to the State Government within a maximum period of nine months. The State Government shall release a sum of Rs.30 lacs in favour of the Committee to meet the expenses of survey, investigation etc. The report submitted by the Committee shall be considered by the Government within next two months and appropriate order be passed. c 95. We hope and trust that the Government of India will also appoint an expert committee/group to ,,examine the impact of mining on the monuments declared as protected monuments under the 1958 Act and take necessary remedial measures. K.K.T. Appeal allowed.