[2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 447 K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI (Civil Appeal No. 10209 of 2011) NOVEMBER 28, 2011 [P. SATHASIVAM AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.] Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 –
s. 21 – Interpretation of – When a criminal case filed uls. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, referred to by the Magistrate c Court to Lok Ada/at is settled by the parties and an· award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of a civil court and thus executable – Held: In view of the unambiguous language of s.21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Ada/at shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court D and as such it is executable by that Court – The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made
by a civil court ana criminal court – There is no restriction on the power 1 of the Lok Ada/at to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases E referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal),
Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressa/ Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature – Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok F Ada/at based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court- Negotiable Instruments · Act, 1881- s.138.
An important question as to the interpretation of G Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act; 1987 arose for consideration in the instant appeal. The question posed was that when a criminal case filed under
Section 138 of the· Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 A referred to by the Magistrate Court to Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and an award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of a civil
court and thus executable. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 empowers Legal Services Authorities at Lhe District, State and National levels, and the different committees to
organize Lok Adalats to resolve pending and pre-litigation c disputes. It provides for permanent Lok Adalats to settle disputes involving public utility services. Under the Act, "legal services" have a meaning that includes rendering
of service in the conduct of any court-annexed proceedings or proceedings before any authority, tribunal o and so on, and giving advice on legal matters. The Act provides for a machinery to ensure access to justice to
all through the institutions of legal services authorities and committees. These\institutions are manned by Judges and judicial officers. Parliament entrusted the E judiciary with the task of implementing the provisions of the Act. [Para 7] [454-G-H; 455-A-E]
1.2. Section 21 of the Act contemplates a deeming provision, hence, it is a legal fiction that the "award" of the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court. In the case on F hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one which was referred by a civil court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal
court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not G make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. There is no
restriction on the· power of Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 H of the N.I. Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI
has to be treated as a decre~ capable of execution by a civil court. [Paras 8, 14] [45.,-F; 460-G-H; 461-A-B] 1.3. The "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision
making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under
the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. [Para 15] [461- C-D] c 1.4. In conclusion, the following propositions emerge: a) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be o
cleemed to be a decree of a civil court <1nd as such it is executable by that Court. b) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and
criminal court. c) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal),
Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature. d) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable
of execution by a civil court. [Para 17] [461-F-H; 462- A-Cl ·Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (MIS) and Others vs. Sidramappa Jagdevappa Unnad 2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 857 and Mis Va/armathi Oil Industries & Anr. vs. Mis Saradhi Ginning Factory AIR 2009 Madras 180 – approved.
State of Punjab & Anr vs. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 660: 2008 (1) SCR 922; B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. v. AM. Kutty Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198: 2008 (17) SCR 905 and P. T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC
478: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 20 – relied on. c Bhavnagar University vs. Pa/itana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Others (2003) 2 SCC 111: 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517 and lttianam .and Others vs. Cherichi @ Padmini (2010) 8 SCC
612: 2010 (8) SCR 1135 – referred to. Case Law Reference: 2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 857 approved Paras 10,14 AIR 2009 Madras 180 approved Paras 11, 14 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 517 referred to Para 12
2010 (8) SCR 1135 referred to Para 13 2008 (1) SCR 922 relied on Para 15 2008 (17) SCR 905 relied on Para 15 ]005 (2) Suppl. SCR 20 relied on Para 16 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
10209 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 24.11.2009 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 33013 of 2009. Prashanth P., Prachi Bajpai, S.K. Balachandran, T. Harish
Kumar for the Appellant. V. Giri (AC) for the Respondent. K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal raises an important question as to the
interpretation of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (in short 'the Act'). The question posed for · B consideration is that when a criminal case filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 referred to by the Magistrate Court to Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and an award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of a civil court and thus executable?
3. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 24.11.2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant herein.
'1 4. Brief facts: (a) The appellant herein filed a complaint being C.C. No. 1216 of 2007 before the Judicial 1st Class Magistrate Court No.1, Ernakulam against the respondent herein under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short 'the N.I. Act'). The Magistrate referred the said complaint to the
Ernakulam District Legal Service Authority for trying the case for settlement between the parties in the Lok Adalat. (b) On 08.05.2009, both parties appeared before the Lok Adalat and the matter was settled and an award was passed
on the same day. As per the award, out of Rs. 6,000/-, the respondent herein paid Rs.500/- on the same day and agreed to pay the balance amount of Rs.5,500/- in five equal G instalments of Rs.1, 100/- per month on or before the 10th day of every month starting from .iune, 2009 and, in case of default, the appellant herein can recover the balance amount due froin the respondent in lump sum.
(c) As the respondent did not pay any of the installments as per the settlement, the appellant filed execution petition being E.P. No ….. of 2009 in C.C. No. 1216 of 2007 in the Court of Principal Munsiff, Ernakulam for seeking the execution of the award. On 23.09.2009, the Principal Munsiff Judge,
B Ernakulam dismissed the petition holding that the award passed by the Lok Adalat on reference from the Magistrate Court cannot be construed as a "decree" executable by the civil court.
(d) Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed writ C petition being Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009 before the High Court of Kerala. The High Court, vide order dated 24.11.2009, dismissed the writ petition.
(e) Against the said order, the appellant filed the above o appeal by way of special leave before this Court. 5. The respondent, though duly served by this Court, has not chosen to contest the matter either by appearing in person or through counsel. Heard Mr. Prashanth P., learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel, who, E on our request, assisted this Court as amicus curiae.
6. In order to find out the answer to the question raised, it is useful to refer the Statement of Objects and Reasons and certain provisions of the Act applicable to the question posed F before us.
"Statement of objects and Reasons.- Article 39-A of the Constitution provides that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
disabilities. K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] 2. With the object of providing free legal aid, Government had, by Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980
appointed the "Committee for Implementing Legal P,id Schemer.'""\CILAS) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) to monitor and implement legal aid programmes on a uniform basis in all the States
and Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme for legal aid programme applicable throughout the country by which several legal aid and advice boards have been set up in the States and Union territories. CILAS is funded
wholly by grants from the Central Government. The i: Government is accordingly concerned with the programme of legal aid as it is the implementation of a constitutional · mandate. But on a review of the working of the CILAS,
certain deficiencies have comf:t to the fore. It is, therefore, felt that it will be desirable to constitute statutory legal service authorities at the National, State and District levels so as to provide for the effective monitoring of legal aid programmes. The Bill provides for the composition of such
authorities and for the funding of these authorities by means of grants from the Central Government and the State Governments. Power has been also given to the National Committee and the State Committees to
supervise the effective implementation of legal aid schemes. For some lime now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at various places in the country for the disposal, in a summary way and through the process of arbitration and
settlement between the parties, of a large number of cases expeditiously and with lesser costs. The institution of Lok Adalats is at present functioning as a voluntary and conciliatory agency without any statutory backing for its
decisions. It has proved to be very oopular in providing for a speedier system of administration of justice. In view of its growing popularity, there has been a demand for providing a statutory backing to this institution and the
c awards given by Lok Adalats. It is felt that such a statutory support would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular Courts, but would also take justice to the door- steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker
and less expensive." "2. (aaa) "Court" means a civil, criminal or revenue Court and includes any Tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for the time being in force, to exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions;" "2(c) "l~gal service" includes the rendering of any service in the conduct of any case or other legal proceeding before any Court or other authority or Tribunal and the
giving of advice on any legal matter;" "2(d) "Lok Adalat" means a Lok Adalat organized under Chapter VI." "21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court and where a
compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Ada lat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the Court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-Fee Act,
1870 (7 of 1870). (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award." _8 7. Free legal aid to the poor and marginalized members,
of the society is now viewed as a tool to empower them to use the power of the law to advance their rights and interests as, citizens and as economic actors. Parliament enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 in order to give effect to Article. 39-A of the Constitution to extend free legal aid, to ensure that K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.] the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity. Those entitled to free legal services are members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, women,
children, persons with disability, victims of ethnic violence, industrial workmen, persons in custody, and those whose income does not exceed a level set by the government (currently it is Rs 1 lakh a year in most States). The Act empowers Legal Services Authorities at the District, State and National levels, and the different committees to organize Lok Adalats to resolve pending and pre-litigation disputes. It provides for permanent Lok Adalats to settle disputes involving c public utility services. Under the Act, "legal services' have a meaning that includes rendering of service in the conduct of any court-annexed proceedings or proceedings before any
authority, tribunal and so on, and giving advice on legal matters. Promoting legal literacy and conducing legal awareness programmes are the functions of legal services institutions. The Act provides for a machinery to ensure access to justice to ·all through the institutions of legal services authorities and committees. These institutions are manned by Judges and
judicial officers. Parliament entrusted the judiciary with the task of implementing the provisions of the Act. 8. Section 21 of the Act, which we have extracted above, contemplates a deeming provision, hence, it is a legal fiction that the "award" of the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court. In the case on hand, the question posed for consideration
beforli! the High Court was that "when a criminal case referred 1 to 'by the Magis~rate to a Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and award is passed recording the settlement, can it be
considered as a decree of civil court and thus executable by that court?" After highlighting the relevant provisions, namely, Section 21 of the Act, it was contended before the High Court that every award passed by the Lok Adalat has to be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such executable by that court. Unfortunately, the said argument was not acceptable by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court has concluded A ·that when a criminal case is referred to the Lok Adalat and it is settled at the Lok Adalat, the award passed has to be treated only as an order of that criminal court and it cannot be executed as a decree of the civil court. After saying so, the High Court finally concluded "an award passed by the Lok Adalat on
B reference of a criminal case by the criminal court as already concluded can only be construed as an order by the criminal court and it is not a decree passed by a civil court" and
confirmed the order of the Principal Munsiff who declined the request of the petitioner therein to execute the award passed c by the Lok Adalat on reference of a complaint by the criminal court. On going through the Statement of Objects and Reasons, definition of 'Court', 'legal service' as well as Section 21 of the Act, in addition to the reasons given hereunder, we are of the view that the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court 0 in the impugned order is erfOneous.
9. It is useful to refer some of the judgments of this Court and the High Courts which have a bearing on the present issue. 10. In Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (MIS) and Others E vs. Sidramappa Jagdevappa Unnad, reported in 2009 (3)
Mh.L.J. 857, learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, considered an identical question. In that case, on 22.06.2001, the respondent filed a Criminal Complaint being S.C.C. No. 923 of 2001 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, F Akkalkot under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Later, the said criminal case was transferred to Lok Adalat. The matter was compromised before the Lok Adalat and an award was passed
accordingly for Rs. 4 lakhs. The respondent therein filed a Darkhast proceeding No. 17 of 2006 in the Court of C.J.J.D. G for execution of the award passed by the Lok Adalat in the criminal case as there was no compliance of the compromised order/award. The learned C.J.J.D., issued a notice under Order XXVll Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code'). The petitioner therein raised an objection stating that the Darkhast proceeding is not maintainable as the award K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.] has been passed in criminal case. By order dated 18.07.2007, the learned Civil Judge, (Jr. Division) disposed off the objection and directed to proceed with the execution by the Judgment and order. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners therein filed a revision before the High Court. After adverting to Section 20 and other provisions of the Act, the learned single Judge has concluded thus:-
"16. The parties were fully aware that under the Act, the District Legal Services Authority may explore the possibility of holding pre-litigation Lok Adalats in respect of the cheque bouncing cases. The compromise in such cases
would be treated as Award having force of a decree. All objections as raised with regard to the execution in view of above statutory provisions itself is rightly rejected. Having settled the matter in Lok Adalat and now after more than 3 years raising such plea is untenable. Having
obtained the award from Lok Adalat, the party is not permitted to resile from the same. It attains finality to the dispute between the parties finally and binds all. Therefore, the order in this regard needs no interference.
17. Once the parties entered into compromise before the Lok Adalat, & at that time no question of any pecuniary jurisdiction raised and or required to be considered by the Lok Adalat. Therefore, once the award is passed, it is
executable under C.P.C ….. " 11. In Mis Valarmathi Oil Industries & Anr. vs. Mis Saradhi Ginning Factory, AIR 2009 Madras 180, the admitted facts were that C.C. No. 308 of 2006 was taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Salem on the complaint given by the respondent therein that the cheque was issued by the second petitioner therein on behalf of the first petitioner as partner of the firm, however, the same was dishonoured by the bank due to insufficient funds. According to the respondent, after
issuance of the legal notice to the petitioner, the complaint was given under Section 138 of the N. I. Act against the petitioners. A· During the pendency of the criminal case, at the request of both the parties, the matter was referred to Lok Adalat for settlement Both the parties were present before the Lok Adalat and as per the award, they agreed for the settlement and accordingly, the petitioner/accused agreed to pay Rs. 3,75,000/- to the B respondent on or before 03.09.2007. It was signed by the respondent/complainant, petitioners/accused and their
respective counsel. In view of the compromise arrived at between both the parties, the amount payable was fixed at Rs. 3,75,000/- towards full quit of the claim and that the petitioners c therein agreed to pay the above-said amount on or before 03.09.2007 and accordingly, the award was passed and
placed before the Judicial Magistrate Court for further orders. When the said award was placed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, by judgment dated 17.10.2007, based on the award 0 held that the petitioners therein guilty and convicted under Section 138 of N.I. Act, accordingly, imposed sentence of one year simple imprisonment and directed the petitioners therein to pay a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- as compensation to the
respondent. Aggrieved by which, the petitioners/accused preferred appeal in C.S.No.167 of 2007 before the Sessions E Judge, Salem. Learned Sessions Judge, while suspending the sentence of imprisonment till 16.12.2007, directed the
petitioners/accused to deposit the sum of Rs. 3, 75,000/- before the trial court and clarified that in case of failure of depositing the amount, the order of suspension of sentence would stand F cancelled automatically and the petitioners were also directed to execute a bond for Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred criminal revision case before the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners G before the High Court that as per Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and, therefore, after the award passed by the Lok Adalat, the respondent/complainant was entitled to execute the award like a decree of the civil court, however, in the instant H case, the learned Magistrate, by his Judgment has found the K.N. GOVINDAN KUTTY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.] petitioners guilty under Section 138 of N.1. Act and also convicted and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay the compensation of Rs. 3,75,000/-. The question formulated by the High Court is whether the
Magistrate can convict the petitioner~/accused under Section 138 of N.1. Act after the award was passed in the Lok Adalat. Learned single Judge, after adverting to Section 21 (1) of the Act and the order of the learned Magistrate has concluded as under:-
"13. Had there been no settlement in the Lok Adalat, the learned Magistrate could have proceeded with the trial and deliver his Judgment, for which, there is no bar. In the instant case, as admitted by both the ·reamed Counsel,
there was an award passed in the Lok Ada lat, based on the consensus arrived at between the.Parties. As per the award, the petitioners/accused had to pay Rs. 3,75,000/- to the respondent/complainant on or .before 03.09.2007.
As it is an award made by Lok Adalat, it is final and binding on the parties to the criminal revision and as contemplated under Section 21(2) of the Act, no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.
14. In such circumstances, the petitioners could have filed the Execution Petition before the appropriate court, seeking the award amount to be paid with interest and costs. In such circumstances, it is clear that the learned Judicial Magistrate became functus officio, to decide the
case after the award passed by Lok Adalat, to convict the accused under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, hence, the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is also not sustainable in law, however, it is clear that the petitioners/accused herein after having
given consent for Lok Adalat award being passed and also the award amount agreed to pay Rs. 3,75,000/- on or before 03.09.2007 to the respondent, have riot complied with their undertaking made before the Lok Adalat, which
cannot be justified. However, the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate under Section 138 of Ne.gotiable Instruments Act has to be set aside, in view of the Lok Adalat award passed under Section 20(1)(i)(b),
20(1)(ii) of Legal Services Authorities Act (Act, 39/1987), as the Judicial Magistrate became functus officio and the award is an executable decree in the eye of law, as per Section 21 of the Act."
After arriving at such conclusion, learned single Judge made it clear that as per the award passed by the Lok Adalat, C the respondent/complainant is at liberty to file Execution Petition before the appropriate court to get the award amount of Rs. 3,75,000/- reimbursed with subsequent interest and costs, as per procedure known to law.
12. In Bhavnc.gar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. a"ld Others, (200'.3) 2 SCC 111, it was held that the purpose and object of creating a legal fiction in the statute is well known and when a legal fiction is created, it must be given its full effect. 13. In lttianam and Others vs. Cherichi@ Padmini (2010)
8 sec 612, it was held that when the Legislature uses a deeming provision to create a legal fiction, it is always used to achieve a purpose. 14. A statutory support as evidenced in the statement of
F Objects and reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take justice to the door steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one G which was referred by a civil court it coµld be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. There is H no restriction on the power of Lok Adalat to pass an award K.N. GOVINDAN KUTIY MENON v. C.D. SHAJI
[P. SATHASIVAM, J.] based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a A · case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. In this regard, the view taken in Subhash Narasappa Mangru/e (supra) and
Mis Va/armathi Oil Industries (supra) supports this contention and we fully accept the same. 1 S. It is useful to refer the judgment of this Court in Staie of Punjab & Anr. VS. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 sec 660. The ratio that decision was that the "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Ada lat, in the fonn of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. This judgment was
followed in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. vs. A.M. Kutty Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198. 16. In P. T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job, (2005) 6 SCC 478, Lok Adalat, its benefits, Award and its finality has been
extensively discussed. 17. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge: (1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be
deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court. (2) The Act does not make out any such distinction G between the reference made by a civil court and
criminal court. (3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise c arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred· to by various Courts (both civil and
criminal), Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of sjmilar nature. (4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable
of execution by a civil court. 18. In view of the above discussion and ultimate conclusion, we set aside the order dated 23.09.2009 passed by the D Principal Munsiff Judge in an unnumbered execution petition of 2009 in CC No. 1216 of 2007 and the order of the High
Court dated 24.11.2009 in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009. Consequently, we direct the execution court to restore the execution petition and to proceed further in accordance with E law.
19. Before parting with this case, we would.like to record our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae. 20. The civil appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
B.B.B. Appeal Allowed.