K.S. P ARIPOORNAN versus STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

7. In the face of these clear indications given by Section 30(1) and G (2), it is incorrect to read in Section 23, the limitations of section 30(1) and circumscribe the powers of the reference Court under Section 23. The reference Court acting under Section 23 is not inhibited in any manner as the Collector under Section 30(1), from giving benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in the proceedings pending before it on 24.9.1984, whether the said H proceedings were started prior to or after 30.4.1982. In fact the plain language of Section 23 enjoins upon the reference court to grant the said benefit in all-proceedings pending before it on the date of the commence- ment of the amending Act. For the same ·reason, neither the reference Court nor the appellate Court like the High Court and the Supreme Court c can give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in proceedings which were closed before the reference Court before 24.9.1984. This is so, because unlike sub-section (2) Section 30 which extends the benefit of the amended section 23 (2) and Section 28 of the principle Act .to the awards made by the reference Court after 30.4.1982 and before 24.9.1984 or to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award, sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to such award of the reference Court and to the orders of High Courts and the Supreme Court in appeal against such award.

8. The above interpretation is also in conformity with t~e object of D the legislation. It must be remembered in this connection that according to the Agricultural Census of 1985-86, [All-India Report on Agricultural Census, 1985-86 (1992)] the small holders of agricultural land, i.e., those who hold land between 1 to 2 hectares, constitute 18.4 per cent of the agriculturists whereas marginal holders, i.e., those who possess less than one hectare constitute 57.8 per cent of the agriculturists. Thus, together, the small and the marginal holder constitute 76.2 per cent of the agricul- turists. The average small holding is 1.43 hectare whereas the average marginal holding is 0.39 hectares. Out of the total holdings, only 27.1 per cent are wholly irrigated whereas 17.8 per cent are partly irrigated and remaining 55.1 per cent are wholly unirrigated. The vast majority of the land holders in this country, thus, are sub,&istence farmers. It is also a notorious fact that agriculture in this countfy has never been a profitable occupation. The vagaries of nature, the spiralling prices of inputs and the basic necessities of life, uneconomic prices fixed for the agricultural products, the exploitation of farmers by the middlemen and market forces, G the growing burden of dependents on the limited holdings are rendering even the so-called large holdings, the area of which ranges be~een 10 hectares to 50 hectares on average unremuner.ative. When the acquisition takes away either wholly or partly the lands from the farmers, they are deprived of their only means of livelihood or the already slender means are still further slimmed, depending upon the area of the land acquired and the person from whom it is acquired. K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA(SAWANT,J.]

9. The right to receive compensation under the priilcipal Act accrues A to the owner when the possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances when the Collector takes possession of the land after making the award in non-urgent circumstances, the urgent cases being covered by Section 17 of the prin- cipal Act. But as stated above between the date of notification under B Section 4 and the date of award and of taking possession of the land, vecy often than not a long delay occurred which affected the land-owners materially as the market value of the land is to be determined under Section 23 of the principal Act with reference to the date of the notification issued under Section 4(1). The delays became more pronounced and their consequences to the land-owners more and more adverse with the passage C of time on account of the spiralling of the prices. To remedy the situation, the Law Commission as early as in 1958 observed as follows : " …… .It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments them- selves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in D which the machinery of the government moves in the matter. They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any proposal for the reform of the · 1aw should, therefore, aim at overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages of the proceedings between the date of the notification under E Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delay arise in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses- sion until the award is made and the taking of possession is indefinitely delayed." The report submitted in 1970 which suggested a time-frame for completion of the acquisition proceedings, particularly to relieve the poor land holders whose only means livelihood was taken away, recommended as follows: "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted it was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India. It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the community for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way_ the executive H c authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country to the other the same story has been repeated again and again (with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint (not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and the exception was made the Jaw perhaps on the ground that observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor land-owners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in their own land of birth." To implement these recommendations and suggestions, the amend- ing Act was enacted. One of the suggestions made in the debate in the Parliament was that the determination of the value of the land be made with reference to the notification issued under Section 6 of the Principal Act. The Honourable Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his inability to do so due to various difficulties. Instead, he opted for measures includ- ing that provided under Section 23 (1-A) to mitigate the miseries of the land-owners. In this connection, he stated thus : "It is, therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of their land, becomes an inescapable necessity for the larger interest of the community, they ought to be provided with the necessary wherewithals of rehabilitation. In making provision in the amend- ing Bill, we have been animated by our concern of ensuring that the person who loses his property right in land, particularly one how belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his loss …….. As it is well known, a number of land KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.] acquisition proceedings have been pending for the award of Col- lector for years an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) was issued many year ago. Payment of com- pensation to the interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely unfair. To remedy this unfairness, the Bill provides B for payment, in every proceeding for acquisition of land where the award of the Collector had not been given on the 30th day of April, 1982, an additional payment of 10 per cent annum from the date of the preliminary notification on the date of the payment or deposit of compensation."

10. It is, therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature in enacting the amending Act and in particular Section 23 (1-A) with which we are concerned, was to give additional amount to the deprived land owners in all the proceedings which were pending before the Collector on c the 30th April, 1982 and before the reference Court on the 24th September, D 1984 i.e. the date of the commencement of the .Act. However, the legisla- ture conferred the power on the Collector to give the said benefit only in those proceedings which were pending before him on 30.4.1982, where no award was made by him. This is because, as explained earlier, where he had made his awards in such proceedings, either they had travelled to the reference Court and were pending before it or had been accepted and E become final. The awards which were before the reference Court were left to be dealt with by it under Section 23 while those which had become final. were not to be reopened. However, in proceedings which were started after 30.4.1982, whether the award was or was not made by the Collector before the date of commencement of the Act, the legislature gave the Collector F the power to grant the said benefit even by reopening the award, because the Collector was seized of the proceedings between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984 when the benefits were on the anvil. If he could give the benefit to the awards made by him in such proceedings after 24.9.1984, there is no reason why the awards made by him during the said interregnum should not receive the same treatment. The reference Court proprio vigore was G empowered to give the said benefit in all proceedings which were pending before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. If the Collector could give the said benefit in proceedings pending before him on 30.4.1982, although started prior to that date, where he had not made his award, it will be against the scheme of the Act to contend that the reference I I Court could not give the same benefit in the proceedings pending before it because the acquisition proceedings had started prior to 30.4.1982. c

11. According to me the error in the contrary view springs, firstly, from the fact that the said view fails to notice that section 30(1) of the amending Act is confined to spelling out the powers of the Collector. It has no reference to and bearing on the powers of the reference or the appellate Court. The dovetailing of the provisions of Section 30(1) into the provisions of Section 23 is, therefore, mainly responsible for the error. Secondly, sections 30(1) and 30(2) deal with different benefits and speak of powers of different tribunals. While Section 30(1) speaks of powers only of the Collector, Section 30(2) speaks of powers of the Collector, the ·reference Court and also of the appellate Court. An attempt to project the provisions of Section 30(2) into the provisions of Section 30(1) and conse- quently in Section 23(1-A) is no less responsible for the erroneous inter- pretation of the powers of the reference Court under Section 23 to grant D the benefit of Section 23(1-A).

12. The. relevant decisions of this Court may now be referred to. There are three decisions directly on Section 23(1-A) viz., Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990] 1 SCC 277, Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh .and Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 673, and E the referring judgment in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 684. The other decisions, viz., Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989] 2 SCC.754 which is a Constitution Bench decision and K Kamalajammiavaru (Dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1985] 1 SCC 582, Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union p Territory of Chandigarh, (1985] 3 SCC 737 and State of Punjab v. Mohinder . Singh and Anr., (1986] 1 SCC 365 are all on the interpretation of amended Sections 23 (2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore on the inter- pretation of Section 30 (2) of the Amending Act. In Vasco De Gama (supra), the facts were that the acquisition G proceedings were commenced with the notification publish~d under Sec- tion 4 (1) of the principal Act on 26.10.1967. The Collector made his award ·on 5.3.1969 and the reference Court made its award on 28.,5.1985. The Court was here called upon to interpret the provisions of sections 23 (2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore, of Section 30(2) of the Amend- H ing Act as well as the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the princiP,al Act KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.] and of Section 30 (1) of the Am.ending Act. I am in respectful agreement A with the observations made in the said judgment that Section 30 (1) of the Amending Act refers to the Collector's award and Section 30 (2) refers to the award of the reference Court as well. To this extent, the view which I have taken above on the point finds support in these observations. The conclusion, drawn in, this case however as far as Section 23 (1-A) is B concerned, was, with respect, incorrect inasmuch as it denied the power to the reference Court to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in the proceed- ings in that case, though they were pending before the Court on the commencement of the amending Act. i.e. on 24.9.1984 . .1This decision, with respect, has committed the error of projecting the provisions of section 30(2) in Section 30(1) and in Sections 23 and 23(1-A) of the principal Act. C In Zora Singh (supra), notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 10.5.1979. The Collector made his award on 31.3.1981 and the Court made its award in 1985, i.e., after the commencement of the principal Act. Although I agree with the proposition laid down there that D the plain language of Section 23(1-A) shows that a duty is cast on tht< reference Court to award the additional amount in all cases pending before that court on 24.9.1984 even if the award of the Collector was made before April 30, 1982, with respect, I am unable to agree with the following observation underlined by me in paragraph 14 of the judgment: "….. .. On a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 23(1-A) read with Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in Section 23 (1-A) is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where p the court might have made its award before September 24, 1984." The above observation, according to me, ignores that in cases where (a) acquisition proceedings were pending on 30.4.1982 and the award i.s made by the Collector after that date (b) where acquisition proceedings G had started after 30.4.1982 and the Collector made award after that date but before the 'commencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984, the Collector is given power to reopen the award and give the benefit of .Section 23(1-A). The reference Court under Section 23 has no power to reopen the award made by it before 24.9.1984 to give the benefit of Section 23 (1- A), since the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) have no. retrospective H effect. The retrospective effect is given only to the powers of the Collector to reopen the awards made by him before 24.9.1984. For the similar reason, the observations made by the Court to the same effect in paragraph 15, with respect, cannot be accepted. As regards the referring judgment in KS. Paripoornan (supra), the facts in that case show that notification under section 4 (1) was issued on 21.3.1978. The Collector made his award on 30.12.1980 and the reference Court gave its award on 28.2.1985. I agree with the observation made there that the said case is not covered by Section 30(1). However, I am unable to agree that in that case the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is not available to C be granted by the reference Court under Section 23. With respect, the decision confuses the powers of the Collector under Section 30 (1) with the powers of the Court under Section 23. The provisions of Section 30(1) govern only the powers of the Collector under Section 11 and not the powers of the Court under Section 23. Further, there is no retrospectivity D given by Section 30(1) to the powers of the Collector except where it enables the Collector to reopen the award made by him before 24.9.1984 in proceedings for acquisition started after 30.4.1982. In all other respects, the powers of the Collector are prospective in nature inasmuch as both clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) grant power to the Collector to give the benefit of section 23 (1-A) in proceedings pending before him on 30.4.1982 and thereafter. I am also unable to agree that the use of the word "Court" in Section 23 (1-A) is of no significance and that the said expression would include the appellate Courts, i.e., the High Court and the Supreme Court. It is also difficult to agree with the statement made in paragraph 11 of the judgment that even the High Court and Supreme Court can award the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) if they decide the matter on or after 24.9.1984 irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the reference Court. The said interpretation gives retrospective effect to Sec- tion 23(1-A) inasmuch as it applies the provisions of the said Section also to awards made by the reference Court prior to 24.9.1984.

13. I am further unable to accept the view that the word "award" occurring in Section 23(1-A) is used there not as a noun but as a verb. Although the word "award" is not defined in the Act, as pointed out at the outset, the legislature has used the said word in various provisions of the Act with a specific intention and meaning and hence there cannot be any H mistake that the said word has been used even in Section 23(1-A) as a K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.) noun. The inconvenient words, expressions and language, when their in- tendment and meaning are plain, cannot be got over by either mutilating or by attributing to them unnatural and unwarranted role. Such an exercise is against all canons of the interpretation of statutes.

14. Coming now to the decisions of this Court on Section 23(2), I find that on the language of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, this Court in Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985) 1 SCC 582, has with respect taken the correct vi~w of the law. In that case, the notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 28.11.1957 and the Collector and the Court made their awards either in 1970 or prior to it. The Court held that the provisions of section 23 (2) read in the light of Section 30(2) of the amending Act did not apply to the said case. This judgment is also relevant for yet another reason in that it states that it is only the awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and the reference Court under Section 18 which are "awards" proper under the Act. This observation supports the view I have taken.

15. I am, however, unable to agree with the decision in Bhag Singh, (supra) which was also a decision under Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the principal Act read with Section 30(2). In that case, notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 19.10.1974. The Collector made his award on 9.10.1975 and the Court made its award on 31.7.1979. This decision ignores the limited prospectivity given by section 30(2) of the Amending Act and makes the amended provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 of the principal Act applicable also to cases where the award were made c by the Collector or the Court prior to'30.4.1982. This decision has relied upon the earlier decision of the Court in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh p and Another, (supra). Unfortunately the latter decision has not given any reasons for coming to the conclusion in question except that S.L.P. against the same decision was already dismissed. For the reasons given above, I am unable to agree with the conclusions in this decision.

16. The last decision on the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 read with G Section 30(2) is of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raghubir Singh (supra). This decision has overruled the decisions in Bhag Singh and Mohinder Singh (supra). With respect, I am in complete agreement with the decision which has taken the correct view of law as taken in the case of K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Appellate Court, viz, that under Section H 30(2),. the High Court and the Supreme Court have power to give the benefit of the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 retrospectively only in those r proceedings where the awards are made by the Collector, or the reference Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. It is further only to such awards of the Collector and the reference Courts that the said provisions apply retrospectively.

17. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling one and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is made to take care of the period between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984, i.e., between the date of the ·introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the date of the C commencement of the Act. Since some awards might have made by the Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum, the legis- lature did not want to deprive the concerned awardees either of the newly conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the 'increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them D where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on the power of the Collector· in this behalf was that he should not reopen the awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before him on 30.4.1982 to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) to such awardees. This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending before th~ reference court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act viz., 24.9.1984, the reference Court would be al;>le to give the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should not be teopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2) and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the p proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24.9.1984 but also to those where awards were made by the Collector and the reference Courts between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. Hence these awards could not only be reopened but if they were the subject-matter of the.before High Court or the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to extend the said benefits. The difference made in the transitional provisions of Section 30 between payment of the additional amount under Section "23(1-A) and of the increased solatium and interest under Sections 23(2) and 28 has to be noted. While the former is provided for under Sub-Section (1) of Section ·· _ H 30, the latter are taken care of by sub-Section (2) thereof. Sub-section (1) KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA[SAWANT,J.] gives power to the Collector while sub-section (2) gives power to all the A tribunals – the Collector, the.reference Court and the appellate courts. The Collector's powers under sub-section (1) are confined (a) to the acquisition proceedings pending before him on 30. 4.1982 where he has not made award before that date and (b) to the acquisition proceedings commenced after 30.4.1982 whether he has or has not made award prior to the com- mencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984. As against this, the power conferred by sub- section (2) on all the tribunals is confined only to the awards made by the Collector and the reference Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. This distinction is necessitated by the difference in the nature of the benefit. While the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) which is for the first time made payable by the amending Act is to ·C compensate for the delay in the making of the award or taking possession of the land, the solatium under Section 23(2) and interest on the excess amount under Section 28 which were always payable were increased to take care of the inflation and the fall in the purchasing power of the rupee in the meanwhile. But for the provisions of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector would not have been able to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in the proceedings referred to therein. This would have defeated the object of the Act in those cases which had not travelled or could not travel to the reference Court and had or would become final with the Collector's award. E The legislature, therefore, wanted to give the power to the Collector in · addition to the reference Court to take care of such cases. It was aware that many cannot and did not go to the reference Court to get their due compensation.

18. According to me, any other interpretation will be a distortion of F the plain language, meaning and intendment of the relevant provisions. It will also amount to reading limitation on the powers of the Collector and the Courts where the legislature intended to expand them.

19. I, therefore, hold that : . -(i) Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act relates only to the powers of the Collector. It has no relation to or bearing on the powers of the reference Court. It is erroneous to read its provisions and the limitations placed by and the distinction made by it between acquisition proceedings com- . H menced prior to and after 30th April 1982, into the provisions of Section 23 including of sub-section (1-A) thereof. (ii) Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, ·.the Collector has power to grant benefit of Section 23(1-A) ·-·~· of the principal Act in every proceeding for the acquisition which is pending before him on 30th April, 1982_ but in which he has made no award before that date. ..,. (iii) Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the Collector has power to give the benefit under Section c 23(1-A) in every proceeding for the acquisition commenced aft.er 30th April, 1982 whether or not he has made his award in such proceeding before 24th September, 1984. Where he has made his award in such proceeding before that date, he is empowered to reopen the same and grant the said benefit. (iv) Section 23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition proceedings pending before the reference Court on the 24th September, 1984 between those which had commenced prior to 30th April, 1982 and those which had commenced there- after. If the proceedings are pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the Act, viz., 24th September, 1984, the reference Court is enjoined upon to give the benefit of Selection 23(1-A) in all such proceedings without making any distinction. When the reference Court does so, it gives prospective effect to Section 23(1-A). It does · not give retrospective effect to the said Section merely be- cause the proceedings in question had started prior to 30th Apri~ 1982. (v) It is not permissible to read the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act into the provisions of sub-section (1) thereof and thereby in Sections 23 and 23(1- A). The provisions of Section 30(2) are exclusively concerned with Sections 23(2) and 28 and have no relation to the provisions of Section 23(1-A). (vi) Neither the reference Court under Section 23 nor the appel- late court, whether High Court or the Supreme Court can ·c KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.] grant the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in any proceeding in A which the reference Court has made its award prior to 24th September, 1984. The grant of such benefit by the Courts is not warranted by the transitional provisions of Section 30(1). The provisions of Section 30(2) as stated above are not applicable to the benefit under Section 23 (1-A). For the B Courts to grant the said benefit in such proceedings is to give retrospective effect to the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) which is impermissible in law.

20. For the reasons stated above, I agree with the conclusion drawn in Union of Indian & Another v. Zora Singh & Others, [1992] 1 SCC 673, C that in all proceedings pending before the reference court on 24.9.1984, the reference Court has to give benefit of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to the claimants. R.M. SARAI, J. How to construe section 23(1-A) of the Land D Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short 'the Amendment Act') a substantive provision added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') after 90 years, for striking proper balance, 'between the need of acquisition of land for private purpose and the rights of the individual whose land is acquired' is the simple issue but of far reaching consequence both for the State or the acquiring body and the owners who, by process E of law are deprived of their land. Should the interpretative process, which in public welfare measures has to be purpose oriented, further the legisla- tive objective by taking recourse even to the debates in the House, if necessary, to find out the mischief the Legislature intended to remedy or it should resort to strained or unduly restrictive construction by adding or F substracting words to the otherwise plain and simple language on assump- tions of limited retrospectivity drawn from the transitional provision. Even a decade has not elapsed since the amendment was made yet there are no less than six decisions one of them being constitution bench on scope and applicability of the amending provision when it could not be disputed that G the law was amended and the Legislature made the changes to mitigate the rigour of the owners on account of delay by providing for time frame in Section 11-A, additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) enhanced solatium under Section 23(2), and equality of compensation for persons affected by same notification under Section 28-A. But the divergence has arisen not on the purpose of objective, or the benefit the provision intends H to confer but on construction arising out of difference in approach of interpreting such a provision. Brother Agrawal has opted for construction which restricts the operation of Section 23(1-A) to the proceedings for acquisition initiated after coming into force of the Amendment Act. This with profound respect to him is not made out either from the language of the provision or from the legislative objective as discerned from the Debates in the LokSabha. Therefore, despite deliberations and discussions it has not been possible to share the views expressed by him, that if the provision for additional compensation is extended to the land owner whose reference were or are pending under Section 18 it would amount to c operating the provisions retrospectively in respect of past transactions. Nor it has been possible to reconcile to the view that Section 30(1), the transitional provision, can be reflected into Section 23(1-A) to curtail its ambit and scope and construe it as applicable to notification issued under Section 4(1)'after September, 1984. Before entering into the legalistic exercise of analysing Section 23(1- A) and the time or period from which it commences to operate it, it is appropriate to preface it by making an attempt to bring out the purpose .and objective of the amendment. The Land Acquisition Act enacted in 1894 primarily, for acquiring land was more socially inclined towards displacement of the individual by providing for payment of compensation, from the date the declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Act. But as time passed and acquisition expanded the date of determining compen- sation was pushed back in 1923 to the date notification under section 4 was issued. Effect of it on the right of land owners was economically harsh as at times there was long delay between issuing of notifications under See- p tions 4 and 6 of the Act and compensation due to distance of time between the two notifications, in many cases, became nugatory. Yet it took 34 years, even, from the date the country became independent for the elected representative, most of whom come from rural background, to intervene in favour of that class of persons who not only form bulk of the society and G for whom land is not only property but their bread and butter, their life and soul, to relieve them to the effect of compulsory taking over of their land by restructuring and making the provisions more economically viable. Even though our country is vast, bristling with varied cultures yet the economy, basically, being agricultural right from Kashmir to Kanyakumari, irrespective of the fertility of land, the love and lure for it is the same. An H agriculturist of Tamil Nadu is as much concerned as a cultivator in Uttar KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.) Pradesh and Bihar. But the development of different State, the potential A value of land etc. is vastly different. An acre of land in one State due to irrigation facility and development activity may cost more than in any other State. Therefore,. the high ratio of compensation for land in that State should not be a scare for construing, the beneficient, provision narrowly. If the Legislature in kee~ing with feeling of its elected representative brings B out a legislation then the Courts endeavour should be to advance it and the draftsman devil, if any, should not be permitted to act as obstruction in achieving the basic purpose. Although the amendments touched various aspects but these peti- tions are primarily concerned with construction of Section 23(1-A) of the C Act. To put it precisely whether the provision for additional compensation introduced since 1984 is attracted even in those cases where the awards had been made by the Collector prior to 1982 and their final adjudication was pending in courts either under Section 18 of the Act or in appeal etc. But before adverting to and examining its reach it appears apposite to D mention in brief the provisions relating to determin,ation of compensation under the Act prior to 1984, the defects, if any, with which ft suffered, and if the Legislature intended to cure and remedy the mischief. Relevant sections of the Act which deal directly or indirectly with the right to receive compensation, jurisdiction and power to C;ietermine it and E method and manner of its calculation and payment of interest on it are Sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 24, 28 and 34. They can be conveniently divided in two parts, one, the right and duty of the Collector to make award and take possession and second the jurisdiction and power of the court to determine compensation. In the first part there are three stages, one, from F sections 6 to 9 that is the · period during which the . Collector acquires jurisdiction to measure and plan the land, which has been declared to be intended to be used for public purpose, and issue,, 'lotice to persons interested to file objection to the value of the land. The second stage deals with procedure which the Collector is required to follow under section 10 which ultimately ends in making of the award under Section 11 of the Act. G Section 12 make5 the award as conclusive and· binding between the parties subject to provisions of the Act. The third stage is to take possession under Section 16 is after making of the award. The second part deals with determination of compensation by the court on reference made to it under Section 18 in the manner provided by the Act by taking into consideration H certain factors in Section 23 and ignoring those in Section 24. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on difference in the amount awarded by the Collector and determined by the Court whereas Section 34 entitles Collector to award interest if the amount determined is not paid before taking possession. Nature of the proceedings for determination of the B compensation both by the Court and the Collector are statutorily regarded as award. That is apparent, amongst others, from sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act. Right to receive compensation accrues to the owners, under the Act, when possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the C State absolutely free from all encumberances when the Collector takes possession after making the award. But between Sections 4 and 6 notifica- tion and thereafter between Section 6 and 11 there occurred at times much delay. The Act did not provide for any time frame. And this affected the land owners vitally as the market value of the land under Section 2J is to D be determined on the date the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 was issued whereas the award has to be made after declaration under Section 6 and issuing of notice under Section 9. The effect of such delay become more marked as years rolled in after 1950. As far back as 1958 the Law Commission observed : "The Finance Ministry has given four instances in which the car- rying ·out of projects has been delayed because they could not obtain possession of the land in time and it has been stated that acquisition proceedings commenced as early as 1948 are still pending. It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments themselves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in which the machinery of the Government moves in the matter. They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to · work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any proposal for the reform of the law should, therefore, aim at overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages of the proceedings between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delays arise in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses- sion until the award is made indefinitely delayed." KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAf,J.] The situation deteriorated further and report submitted in 1970 suggested A time frame as delay in acquisition proceedings caused untold sufferings to the land owners and affected the poor adversely. · "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted it was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India. B It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the ~ommunity for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way the executive authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country to the other the same story has been repeated again and again (with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of C oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint (not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day D without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and the exception was made the law perhaps on the ground that observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor landowners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was E manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in their own land of birth." (emphasis supplied) There can thus be no dispute that there existed a lacuna in the Act which did not provide for compensating for the rise in price of land due to delay G rendering the compensation illusory, in many cases. To overcome this and similar defects the Parliament introduced the Bill in 1982. It was withdrawn as it suffered from certain defects. It was reintroduced in 1984. One of the suggestions in the House was that determination of value of the land may again be restored to the date the declaration was published under Section 6 of the Act. But the Hon'ble Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his H inability due to various difficulties and opted for measures including Sec- tion 23(1-A) to mitigage misery of the land owners. It was stated thus, c "It is, ·therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of their land, often the only source of their livelihood, becomes an inescapable necessity for the larger interest of the community, they ought to be provided with the necessary wherewithals of rehabilita- tion. In making provision in the amending Bill, we have been animated by our concerned of ensuring that the person who loses his property right in land, particularly one who belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his loss ……. As it is well known, a member of land acquisition proceed- ings have been pending for the_ award of the Collector for years an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued many years ago. Payment of compensation to the interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely unfair.'' (Emphasis supplied) Such being the legislative background and purpose of its enactment being to remove the hardship of the affected parties as is clear from the objects and reasons that 'The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often, caused hardship and to the affected parties and renders umealistic p the scale of compensation offered to them', it becomes the duty of the Court while construing the provisions to construe it in such a manner that the mischief which the Legislature intended to remove may be suppressed and the avowed objective of the legislation be served. The rule in this regard as laid down in numerous decisions rendered by this Court and English Courts is th<i.'t the Court when faced with interpretation of such G provisions must ascertain what was the law before making of the Act, what we.re the mischief or defects in such law and how the Parliament intended to resolve or cure it. The prevailing law and its defects have already been noticed. It has been attempted to be remedied by taking recourse to provide not only for future but present and past as welt Future has been H taken care of by providing for automatic lapse of acquisition proceedings K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.] under Section 11-A if the award is not made by the Collector within two A years of the publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Present is protected by Section 23(1-A) and past by Section 30. It is the under- standing of scope of these two sections and their inter-relation which shall be decisive of fate of these petitions. For this purpose Section 23(1-A) of the Act is extracted below : "S.23(1-A). – In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such C land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possessiop of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation. – In computing the period referred "to in this sub-section, any period or periods during 'which the proceedings D for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded." It is added to Section 23 which provides for considerations which may be taken into account for determination of compensation. But it is different in nature. Unlike sub- section (1) it operates on its own as it crates the right of additional compensation, provides for the rate at which it is to be paid and lays down the period for which it is to be calculated. Therefore, from the date it came on the statute book, i.e., September 24, 1984 an owner became entitled to the additional amount and the court became ~tatutorily obliged to award it. The use of the expression 'in every case' F widens the ambit of the Section. True it. is not a procedural law or a declaratory law, therefore it is substantive in nature and is prospective in operation. Yet the question is, as arises in every such provisions, the time or the date from which it commences to operate. The difficulty is greater when there are no express indications and the provision is general in nature and wider in reach. If the legislature does not use any expression to indicate G that the law made by it shall apply to any cause of action or incident taking place only after coming into force of the Act then the law has to be applied in presenti, that is to the matters pending before it even if those matters and arisen before coming into force of th~ Act, as "A (a) statute is not retrospective merely because it affects existing rights; nor it is retrospective H i merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing". (Halsbury Laws of England Vol. IV para 221). In The Queen v. The inhabitants of St. Ma1y Whitechapel, [1848] 12 Q.B. 120 at page 127, it was observed that the rule against retrospective opera- ' tion was not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites c for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. This principle was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394 at 398 and in T.K Lakshmana Iyer and Others v. State of Madras and others, AIR (1968) SC 1489. In T1imbak Damodhar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors., AIR (1966) SC 1758, it was observed by the Constitution Bench. 11…….. where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included ………. ". In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR (1965) D SC 1567 a rule made by the State Government providing that the age of retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the Con- stitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply retrospec- tively, a Government servant who was recruited and appointed earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government could not be retired in exercise of power under this rule otherwise it would amount to applica- tion of the rule retrospectively. The submission was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55 years. In St. Whitechapel (supra) the law intended to secure that a widow residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed for twelve months after his death. The benefit of the law extended even when the husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was observed: "It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended · supported this construction; but we have shown before that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA [SARAI, J.) time antecedent to its passing. In this case the words 'shall be A removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future removals irrespective of whether the husband had died prior to the Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within twelve months of her husband's death." This observation was made was the literal and abstract construction would hav~ resulted in hardship. Any legislation specially a legislation enacted to mitigate special mischief is norm~lly construed to serve the public good. Principles of interpretation are only the guideline they are not conclusive. The sure and safe way is to interpret the provision on the necessity and C requirement as appears from the objective of the Act and the words used by the Legislature. Reliance was placed on observations made by Lord Goffe in Alexander v. Mercouris [1979] 3 All England Law Reports 305 distinguishing Whitechepals case that a statute, 'would not be operating prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of past transac- tion.' This decision turned more on the language of the Section than the principle that the prospectivity of a provision is not effected even if it draws partly from past transactions. Section 1(1) of the Defective Premises Act, 1972 provided that a person taking on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling' owes a duty to see that the work is done properly, 'so that as regards that work the dwelling will be fit for habitation when E completed.' The question that arose was 'whether this duty applied where the work was taken on before the commencement of the 1972 Act but completed after. It was held that the substance of the matter was the initial act of 'taking on' the work, therefore, the duty could not be said to arise unless the 'taking on' occurred after the commencement of the Act'. The F decision thus turned on the explicit language used in the Section. No exception can be taken to the observation that a statute creating new right on past transactions cannot be held to be prospective. How does this principle help the State? Section 23(1-A) does not create any right on past transactions. Misconception appears to be prevailing due to fixation of the G period for which additional compensation shall be paid. The two termini, that is, issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and publication of declaration under Section 6 are erroneously understood as creating right or furnishing starting point from which the Section shall apply. The right which is substantive in nature is to get additional compensation at the rate of twelve per cent. The right is not created on past transactions. It operates H in future, that is, confer benefit of additional compensation from the date it came into force and not from a date prior to coming into force of the provisions. A substantive law is held to be prospective as a matter of legal policy since it is founded on public policy tqat no right be so created as to work to the disadv~tage for whom it is crated as if it be so, 'it would be betrayal of what the law stands for' (Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). Section 23(1-A) does not suffer from such betrayal. It is just the otherwise. It instead of operating to disadvantage promotes the law and fairness by extending the benefit provided by the Section to all such proceedings which C are pending before the court under Section 18. It ensures uniformity and equality. The Section ·is not robbed off its prospectivity because for the e.icer- D cise of right the calculation of compensation has to be made on' facts which come into existence prior· to the date of the Amending Act. To take a practical illustration a law may be made that any person who suffers an injury or damage would be liable to be compensated. If there is no, date of its commencement then the law under General Clauses Act would start applying from the date of its enactment. And any person suffering any E injury or damage after the date of enactment can file the suit. the law being substantive a person suffering any injury prior to the date of enact- ment would not be entitled to file the suit. To this extent the law is prospective. But if the Legislature while enacting such law provides the scale of damages and links it with year or place or time prior to the date. of coming into force of the Act it cannot be said that since part of it extends to any point of time anterior to the law the provision has become retrospec· tive. In Kapur Chand v. B.S. Grewa~ Financial Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh & Ors., AIR (1965) SC 1491: Section 14-A added from 1955 to the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 permitted a land owner ·to bring a suit for eviction notwithstanding anything to the contrary if the G tenant failed to pay rent regularly as provided in Section 9(ii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The suit was filed by the land owner for eviction for arrears due for the years 1952, 1953, 1954 and January, 1955. It was decreed and the argument that since the provisions came into force in 1955 the arrears of certain period could not furnish the cause of , H action else it would become retrospective was repelled and it was observed, K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.) "………….. In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant prior to the A coming into force of the new section can be taken into aceount. No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively. But a Statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a mom~nt of time prior to its passing. The clause in question makes a particular conduct the ground for an B application for eviction. The necessary condition for the applica- tion of S.9(1) (ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming. into force of the Act, cannot be over looked;" The substantive right to evict was enforced prospectively but the necessary facts for its enforcement were taken even from before coming into force c of the Act. The law was not held to be retrospective on that account. In Master Ladies Tailors Organisation & Anr. v. Minister of Labour & National Service, (1950) (1) All England Law Reports p. 525, a question arose if an D order passed by the Minister fixing remuneration for work and holding was ultra vires the Act as it applied retrospectivity. It was held the effect of the provisions relating to accrued remuneration being merely to determine and limit the quantum to be made the order could not be construed as having retrospective operation. It was observed by the Court that if a prospective benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent E facts does not make the provision retrospective. This decision makes it clear that a substantive provision is not rendered retrospective if the right created by the provision provides the scales or fixes the benefit from period prior to coming into force of the provision. Therefore, merely beeause the substantive right of additional compensation at the rate of ·12% on the p compensation determined it to be paid for the period ~mmencing from 'the date the notification under Section 4(1) was issued to. the date the publication was made under Section 6 which period may be prior to coming into force of the amending Act would not render the provision retrospec- tive. By calculating compensation for the period between the two notifica- tions the right to receive additional compensation is not taken into the past. G The right operates from the date the amending Act came into force. As explained earlier, Section 23(1A) creates not only the right to receive· additional compensation but also lays down the period for which the amount shall be paid. By the latter part of the Section which only provides for measure for compensation, the Section is not rendered retrospective. H It is not the method of drafting a provision that makes it prospective or retrospective but its effect on the rights of the parties effected by it. If the legislature would have stopped by providing for additional compensation at the rate of 12% to be calculated in the manner prescribed probably no argument could have been raised about it being applied retrospectively. B Therefore, it does not make any difference if the Legislature instead of providing separately that the additional compensation shall be payable for the period covered by the tWo notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 chose to provide it in the same section. The substantive provision which otherwise is applicable to all proceedings which are pending before the reference court, would not become retrospective as for calculation of the compensation the notification issued prior to coming into force of the Act, is to be taken into consideration. Even though no part of the Section, is of any help for deciding if the Section applies to only future or past acquisitions, yet this Court in Union D of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 tried to find out the point of time from which the Section would operate and observed as follows, "The expression "award" used in Section 23(1-A) suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the trial Court hearing the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said-section on September 24, 1984." (Emphasis supplied) Whereas in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 684 the order by which reference was made to the larger Bench it was observed, "The legislature having designed the horizontal growth in such manner, the collective scheme which has been made operational prospectively on September 24, 1984 and onwards becomes plain because that is the date on which the amendnient comes into effect. When we import this understanding to the scheme of things it becom~s evident that a Court when applying sub-section ( 1-A) of Section 23 would do so only if it has in hand an acquisition based K.S. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA [SARAI, J.] upon a notification under Section 4 of the Act issued on September A 24, 1984 or thereafter and not to any such notification issued earlier to that date. Same would be the role of the Collector at his end when employing Section 15 and making an award under Section 11 of the Act." (Emphasis supplied) The expression 'commencing on' used before the words 'on and from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)' or the words 'to be date of award' etc., do not indicate directly or indirectly that the Section shall be applied from this or that date to the proceedings C of one or the other nature. A provision laying down the date or the period on which the valuation of land shall be determined cannot be taken as the date from which the amendment in the Act providing for additional com- pensation could be said to apply. Literally or even constructionally the law requires the Court determining compensation under Section 18 of the Act, D to pay additional compensation in every case coming before it after the amendment came into force. Any other interpretation would result in rendering Section 23(1-A) dormant and non-operative in class of those cases where compensation is being determined by the Court on objection raised by interested persons against making of award by the Collector prior to 1982 not on the language of the Section but on assumption that the E Section was designed to apply to notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act after the Amendment Act came in to force. Necessity to construe a provision. by taking recourse to adding or substracting words may arise if the provision is otherwise ambiguous or it may lead to disastrous consequence. If the construction in Zora Singh (supra) was adopted by straining the language then the interpretation suggested in Paripooman's case (supra) is unduly restrictive. What has not been taken notice of in either decisions is the expression 'the court shall in every case' award the amount. Use of the word 'shall' has been used to impart it mandatory character. This obligation the court has to discharge G in every case. In absence of any expression limiting the exercise of power in only those cases where notification is issued after September, 1984 or making it retrospective so as to apply to every case in which proceedings for acquisition had started before coming into force of the Act, the provision has to be applied to every case which was pending for award of compensation on and after the date when the Section became operative. H A Any other construction may result in consequences which were not in- tended by the Legislature and may leave the mischief as it was. Such impractical or inconvenient result should be avoided. In Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928) PC 128 in more or less similar circumstances when rate of interest payable on compensation was increased from four to six per cent, it was held that the increase in the rate · B of interest was payable in respect of land acquired before the date the Act came into force and such construction did not result in making the provision retrospective as, 'the provision being substantive one which was not made to depend on any reference to corresponding provision iii the earlier Statute.' Similarly, the substantive part of Section 23(1-A) also does C not depend on any reference to the corresponding provision in the prin- cipal Act. It has been explained earlier that it stands on its own. Even otherwise when the Court proceeds to determine compensation after Sep- tember 1984 it cannot ignore sub-section (1-A) added to Section 23. That would be against plain and simple language of the Section. The additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) was thus pay- able on every matter which was pending ln. Court on 24th September, 1984. But that would not have been complete and full realisation. of the legisla- ture intention as the malady which the Legislature intended to cure was concerned not only with present and future but past as well. Section 23(1-A) being prospective in nature it could not have applied to acquisition proceedings which were pending before September, 1984 in which award has been made or not. To cover up this Section 30 was enacted which read as under: "30. Transitional provisions – (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, – (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day or April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of ~he People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the com- …. K.S. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERAIA [SAHAI, J.) mencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or B Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) ~d before the commence- ment of this Act." The Section is headed as transitional provision. The word transitional according to dictionary means, 'passage or change from one act or set of circumstances to another'. The objective of such a provision is to bridge the gap between commencement of the Act and its operation prior to it: c It is a drafting measure to, 'regulate the coming into operation of these D enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition'. As stated earlier, Section 23(1-A) empowers the Court to grant additional compensation in every case which was before it on ·the day the Act came into operation. But that could not have served the legislative purpose, therefore, Section 30 was added to serve as transitional provision to extend E the benefit of Section 23(1-A) by bridging the gap and providing for payment of additional compensation to even those who were not covered otherwise in Section 23(1-A). The Section has two sub- clauses. Clause (a) takes back applicability of section 23(1- A) to all those proceedings in which notifications had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Ac- quisition Act and proceedings were pending on 30th day of April, 1982 as F no award had been made by the Collector before that date. Clause (b) extends the benefit of Section 23(A) to the proceedings which had com~ menced after 30th April, 1982. This date . was chosen as the Bill for amending the Act was initiated in 1982. It provides that where notification had been issued after 1982 the land owner is entitled to additional com- pensation whether the award had been made before September, 1984 or not. In acquisitions in which notification has been issued prior to 1982 the Legislature placed them in two categories, one, where award had been made and others where it was still pending at a stage prior to making of H the award. Where awards had been made prior to 1982 and the persons interested had not accepted it and sought reference it was pending before the court on the date the Section came into force. No provision was necessary for such matters as they came within the purview of Section 23(1-A). But in those cases where the matter was still pending a provision had to be made to obviate any injustice to them and, therefore, clause (1) of Section 30 provided for payment of additional compensation to them as well. Therefore, if Section 23(1-A) and Section 30 are read together they cover among themselves entire proceedings for the acquisition of land in which notification had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act before 1982 but the proceedings had not become final either because no award C had been made by the Collector or because award had been made but it was pending before the court under Section 18 or the proceedings had been initiated between April, 1982 and September, 1984, irrespective of whether the award had been made or not. What was canvassed from the other side is that Section 23(1-A) having been made retrospective by Section 30 and its operation being limited to those cases where the award D had not been made by the Collector, a land owner was not entitled to claim a~ditional compensation where the award had been made before that date. That is not a correct way of construing the two Sections. In absence of Section 30 it would have been difficult for a land owner whose land had been acquired under a notification issued under Section 4(1) before com- ing into force of the Act and in which no award had been made to claim E additional compensation. That would have been contrary to the legislative objective. Therefore, the Legislature in order to cover up all those cases in which award had not been made added a transitional provision. It can better be explained by taking a practical illustration. Suppose two notifica- tions were issued on January, 1979 for acquiring the land mentioned in the F notification. In one the award is made before April, 1982 and in the other it remained pending. If the construction as suggested on behalf of the Union of India and other State Governments is accepted then the addi- tional compensation would be payable only in a case in which the proceed- ings were pending and not in those in which the proceedings had become final before the Collector. Such construction would be highly unjust and G inequitable. The benefit of additional compensation could not be denied on of chance of the award having been made. There must be some rationale for giving benefit to that class of land owners in whose cases due to delay for one or the other reasons the proceedings could not be finalised and others where award had been made. A construction which leads to anomalous and illogical results should be avoided. True once the award is —- (' K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA(SAHAl,J.] made right to compensation accrues but Section 23(1-A) does not on its A own make a distinction for purposes of payment of additional compensa- tion between pendency of proceedings and making of award. A transitional provision cannot curtail operation of the substantive provision. The field of operation of Section 30 being narrow, namely to extend the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to all those land owners whose land has been notified to be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been made by Callee- tor, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope of the main provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands excluded from Section 23(1-A). A transitional provision cannot become main provision nor it can curtail the ambit and width of the principle Section. The prospectivity of Section 23(1-A) is not eroded by applying it to the C proceedings pending before it. Nor could the concept of limited retrospec- tivity be imported by resorting to sub-section (1) of Section 30. In fact the field of operation of Section 23(1-A) and Sections 30(1)(a) and (b) are entirely different. Neither can be projected in another. The submission that Section 23(1-A) applied only to situation visualised by Section 30 is not made either by the language employed by the two Sections or any principle D of interpretation or construction. Section 23(1-A) does not suffer from casus ommisa which requires to be supplied by taking recourse to external help. The Legislature was never in doubt about the matters pending before court in reference u/s 18. Therefore, by the transitional provision it at- tempted to cover other cases. That is why it uses the expression, 'also'. The significance of this word should not be lost sight of. It is clear indication E of extended the benefit provided by Section 23(1-A) not only to those cases in which the award had been made and the matters were pending in court, but 'also' to all those cases in which acquisition proceedings due to delay were still pending. In fact in absence of transitional provision there might have been difficulty in awarding additional compensation in cases covered F by sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 30 as Section 23(1-A) could not have applied to proceedings which were pending prior to coming into force of the Act. In any case, the ambit of Section 23(1-A) coll·~ not be narrowed by operating Section 30 as it would be contrary to cannon8 of interpretation. Reliance was placed on construction of sub-section (2) of Section 30 by the Constitution Bench in Union of India & Anr v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. etc., [1989) 3 SCR 316 and it was urged that since the two sub-sections of Section 30 were enacted on the same date with same purpose and objective, the interpretation put by the Constitution Bench on the limited retrospectivity of sub-section (2) should be extended to sub- section (1) of Section 30 as well. The submission suffers from inherent fallcy of ignoring the difference in phraseology of the two sub-sections and the objective sought to be achieved by them. Their field of operation is different and they serve different purpose. The amendment in sub-section (2) of Section 23 brings about a change in existing ratio of solatium from 15% to 30%. And sub-section (2) of Section 30 makes it operative from 30th April 1982, in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. Both the decisions, i.e., Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985) Supp. 2 SCR 949 which was held to be C incorrectly decided and Raghubir Singh agreed to the extent that the retrospectivity visualised by the sub-section applied to the award made by the Collector or Court. But difference arose as to whether 30% enhanced solatium was payable in appeals pending in the High Court and this Court irrespective of the date of award. The interpretation turned on expression 'such award' used in the sub-section. In Bhag Singh (supra) it ~as extended D even to the appeals pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against award of the Collector or the Court whereas in Raghubir Singh (supra) it was confined to those appeals in High Court or this Court which arose out of, 'such award'. The question of liniited retrospectivity arose on .specific language of the sub-section. In absence of sub-section (2) of Section 30 the enhanced solatium would have been payable on not only an award after 30th April 1982 but in all appeals pending in the High Court or this Court irrespective of the date of award. The Legislature, therefore, carved out an exception and confined payment of enhanced solatium in pending appeals only if they had arisen out of award made after 30th April 1982. A comparison of the two sub-sections of Section 30 indicates thi\t the expres- sion of sub- section (1) beginning from the "provisions of sub-section" and upto "in relation to" are identical to first part of sub-section (2). But there the similarity ends. Sub-section (l)(a) applies to every proceeding which was pending on 30th day of April, 1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. Whereas sub-section (2) extends the benefit of retrospectivity to any award made by the Collector or Court or G to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against any, 'such award' under the provisions of the principal Act after 30th day of April,1982. The construction in Raghubir Singh case (supra) turned on the use of the words 'such award'. It was held that the use of the expression 'any such award' restricted the operation of the Section to only those awards which had been made after 30th day of April, 1982. K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.] T~erefore, it was held that a land-owner could claim additional solatium A in those appeals only which were directed against such award as had been made after 30th April, 1982. The interpretation placed on sub-section (2), therefore, could not help in arriving at the legislative intention of sub- section (1) of Section 30. Why this d,ifference in phraseology of the two sub-sections ? What could be the rationale for confining additional solatium in appeals arising out of the awards made after 1982? A Legisla- ture is presumed to know the needs of its people. Similarly it should be presumed to be aware of the state of affairs prevalent at the time of enacting a law. Solatium is no do:ubt compensation but it is in nature of payment for displacement. The effect of acquisition due to rise in price and inflation. was not so acute in Sixties or Seventies as in Eighties and C Nineties. It was for this economic reason that the Legislature enhanced the solatium from 15% to 30%. But this enhanced amount was not to be paid to those land owners whose land had been acquired much before 1982 but its final adjudication was pending in appeal in the High Court or this Court. The Legislature must be presumed to be aware that such disputes in which land had been acquired much earlier were still pending and could not be D · disposed of due to heavy work load in higher ·courts. Therefore, the Legislature in its wisdom considered it proper to confine the benefit of enhanced solatium to those land owners whose appeals arose out of the award made after 1982. Same rationale which in fact furnished basis in K Kamala Jamman- niavarn (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] 2 SCR 914, and was approved in Raghubir Singh (supra) cannot be applied to reference pending before the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The Legislature for good reason, therefore, used different language in two sub-sections. And the construction of one cannot furnish basis for constru- ing the other in same manner. Although brother Sawant, J. has agreed . ~th me on construction of Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act but he has written a separate order to highlight the difference between exercise of power by the Court under Section 16 on one hand and High Court and Supreme Court on the other. G He has also attempted to cull out power in favour of Collector to award additional compensation from Section 30(1). So far the first is concerned I fully agree with his reasons and conclusions. But I have reservations on the second. Section 30(1) does not spell out power of the Collector. Its clauses (a) and (b) are descriptive of those proceedings ~o which the H A benefit of Section 23(1-A) has been extended. They deal with retrospec- tivity given to Section 23(1-A). But I agree with him that the Collector should be deemed to have this power otherwise it would cause injustice in those large number of cases where a land owner does not seek any reference either because he is satisfied with the determination of compen- …… B sation or his financial resources prevent him from pursuing the hazard of taking recourse to Court of law. However, this power, in my opinion, flows froni Section 15 itself. In any case it in just and reasonable to hold that the additional compensation is payable even by the Collector when he is making an award under Section 11. c What remains to be considered is if the benefit under Section 23(1- A) could be extended even in those cases where appeals were pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against the award made by the court under section 18 of the Act. The word, 'court' used in Section 23(1-A) appears to refer to the court under Section 18, only, as the court under this D provision has been empowered to award additional compensation on such market value as is determined by taking into consideration Section 23 of the Act. The word 'court' in Section 23(1-A) does not appear to have been used in the wider sense as including the Court of appeal or the court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Zora Singh (supra) it was observed rightly by this Court that the Legislature's intention was to award additional compensation only at the stage of award made by the Collector or the Court under Section 18. The construction of the word 'court' in the wider sense would not be in consonance with the purpose and objective of the legislation the background of which has been traced in detail. It is thus clear that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is available only in those cases where the matter was pending for determination of compensation at the stage of reference under Section 18 in respect of acquisitions which had started even before 1982. Having explained the scope of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30, their inter-relation and the field of their operation, it may now be seen as to how these provisions have been dealt with by this Court in various decisions which came before it. When Sectiun 23(1-A) was added Section 23(2) providing for solatium was amended and from 15% it was raised to 30%. Its operation during transitional period was regulated by Section 30(2) of H the Act. This provisions came up for consideration earlier in point of time KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA[SAIW,J.] and by 1989 there were at least four decisions one of them being Constitu- tion Bench Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754. Since this decision has been considerably influenced the decisions on Section 23(1-A) which have been rendered since 1990 it may be adverted to first. The following question was referred for considera- tion by the Constitution Bench, "Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 the claimants are entitled to solatium at 30 per cent of the market value irrespective of the dates on which the acquisition proceedings are initiated or the dates on which the award had been passed?" But the Bench did not enter into the larger issue and confined itself to the limited question of whether the amended provision for enhanced solatium was available only in appeals arisir.tg out of awards made by the Collector or the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September 1984 or even prior to it. And on construction of the expression, 'or to any order passed D by the High Court or subordinate court on appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principle Act' after 30th April 1982 and before 24th September 1984 held that in the context they were used they intended to awards made by the Collector or the Court between the two dates. According to the Bench, "In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such a~ards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the F High Court or Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that Date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984." This decision was not concerned with the jurisdiction and power of the G Court to grant enhanced solatium in reference pending before it under Section 18 as the notification for acquiring the land was issued on 13th November 1959 and the reference court had decided the proceedings on 10th June 1968. What was pending on the date the amendment came into force was the appeal in the High Court. Therefore, the main provision of H Section 23(2) was not attracted. The land owners could get the benefit only if their case was governed by the transitional provision. Further, the con- struction turned on use of the expression, 'against such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after 30th April, 1992'. No such language has beeu used in clause (a) of Section30(1). The ratio of the decision, thus, B has to be appreciated in this context. In the present set of petitions this Court is concerned whether the power of the Court to grant additional compensation, which as explained earlier, in absence of any express indication to the contrary extends in all those cases where reference was pending at the stage of making the award C by the Court under Section 18 could be curtailed or negatived by taking recourse to the transitional provision. The question cropped up first in Union of India & Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277 when this Court while recognising that Section 23(1-A) enjoined a duty on the Court to award the additional amount on 12% on D the market value of the land observed as under : "But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensa- tion under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation· of Section 23(1-A) for certain cases. That will be found from Section 30 sub-sections (l)(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions." Consequently the Court held that a land owner was entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) only if the acquisition proceedings were pending on April 30, 1982 or they had been commenced after that day and were either pending or concluded before September 1984. In taking this view the Bench held an owner to be entitled to additional compensation if the acquisition of his land was covered in either clauses G of Section 30 or if the notification under. sub-section (1) of Section 4 had been issued after coming into force of the amended provision. No excep- tion can be taken so far as the construction of Section 30 is concerned. But the observation that the Legislature has given new starting point of opera- tion of Section 23(1-A) was based on Raghubir Singh's decision (supra). H The starting point in that decision was given for purposes of appeals KS.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA(SAIW,J.] pending in High Court or the Supreme Cotirt. The Bench did not examine A if the benefit of enhanced solatium under Section 23(2) could not be extended to the acquisitions which were pen~g before the court under Section 18. Yet prospectivity of the Section 23(1-A) was linked with issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after coming into force of the Act. The Section does not give any such indication. Determina- tion of market value on the date the no~ification is issued under Section 4(1) fixes the point of time on which date the court shail determine compensation and not the date from which the Act shall commence to operate. Use of expression, 'in addition to the market value of the land' cannot be stretched to mean that the additioMJ compensation shall be payable only in those cases in which notification under Section 4(1) has C been issued after coming into force of the Act. This decision was not accepted as laying down correct law in Zora Singh (supra) as expression 'award' used in Section 23(1-A) according to the Bench suggested that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said section applicable to cases where the Collector or the court hearing the reference D had yet to make its award. It has been explained earlier that such construc- tion would be straining language of the Section. In KS. Paripooman (supra) doubt has been expressed on correctness of Zora Singh (supra). Basis for it appears to be same as was expressed in Filip Tiago's case (supra). Neither of the decisions have noticed that in absence of any indication to the contrary the Section became operative on the date it came E into force that is 24th September, 1984. If it came into force on that date and the Section requires the court to pay additional compensation in every case then the ambit of the section cannot be narrowed by confining its operation to those cases where notification is issued after coming into force of the Act. The scope of Section 23(1-A) has already been explained. It p has also been explained, at length, as to what was the objective and purpose of it. In light of that it would not be reasonable to restrict the operation of this Section to those proceedings which will be taken for determination of compensation after the Act came into force in September 1984. The expression 'in addition to' is only descriptive rather explanatory by direct- ing that in all those cases where the Court was awarding compensation G after coming into force of the Act it shall award an additional amount as provided in sub-section (1) of the Act. For all these reasons the questions raiseq in these petitions are answered as below : c (1) Section 23(1-A) providing for additional compensation is at- tracted in every case where reference was pending under Section 18 before the Court (Section 23(1-A). (2) No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on or after 24th September 1984 either in High Court or this Court. (3) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is also payable in all those case where the proceedings were pending and the award had not been made by the Collector on or before 30th April 1982 [Section 30(1)(a)]. ( 4) Similarly every land owner is entitled to additional compensa- tion where the land acquiring proceedings started after 24th April 1982 whether the award by the Collector was made before 24th September 1984 or not [Section 30 (l)(b)]. (5) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is liable to be paid by the Collector as well. (Section 15 of the Act). ORDER OF THE COURT (PER MAJORITY) In respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the date of commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, the payment of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 30 of the said Amending Act. Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., (1992) 1 Sec 673 insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases· where the reference was pending before the reference court on September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date of which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law. The question referred is answered accordingly. The matters be now placed before the appropriate Benches for consideration and disposal of G the appeals in the light of this order and on the other contentions, if any, raised in the appeals. U.R. Appeals disposed of.