· J anwrry, 22. K. S. RAMA1\1URTHI-REDDIAR · THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, PONDICHERRY & ANR. {B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GA.JENDRAGA.DKAR, K. N. WA.Ncnoo, K.C. DAS GUPTA.. and !_ – J. C. SnA.H, JJ.)
Stage Carriage Permit-Giant to nativ~ of Pondicherry- AJJirmed by Chief Cammi'8ioner as Appellate Authority-Dis- crimination on ground of place of birth-Jurisdiction of .Supreme · Court-" The State"-"Under the control of Government ·of
· .. lndia"-Meaning-Constituti<m of India, Art•, 12, 15, 32, 136 .. The petitioner, a resident of Pondicherry, .~as. an appli, cant for a stage carriage permit, before the State Transport authority, Pondicherry, alongwith 14 other persons.
The Permit was granted to one Perumal Padayatchi taking into account the fact that he was a native of Pondicherry along with . other facts. The petitioner, whose application for the permit was rejected, went in appeal to the Appellate Authority who dismi!Sed the appeal. The petitioner filed a wiit petition under Art. 32 in this Court and contended that preference on the ground of place of birth is violative of Art. I 5 of the Constitution. · On the dates of the orders sought to be impugned: Prindicherry was not yet part of the territory of India, but when the peti- tion was heard it had become part of the territory of India. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that in view of the observations in the decision in N. M aathan Sahib v. Chief Commi8'ioner, [1962] Supp.
I S. C.R. 981, the writ petition was not maintainable. Held, that in Art. 12 the words "under the control of the Government of India" qualify the word "authorities" ani n'Jt the word "territory" ani:l Art. 12 gives an in:Iusive d~fi:iiti·~n· Of the word "State".
Held, further, that if no writ could be issued at the timo. when the order was passed for the reason that Pondicherry was not part of India at that time, no such writ could be issued in respect of past acts after Pondicherry had become part of India· as. that would
con,titution. be giving retro<:pectiv~ ol?eration _ to··,thC~- 1?63 JanarJan Reddy v. The State, [l9j0] S. C.R. 940. · referred to. H,ld, aho, that judicial or qua•i-judicial authorities· out· side the territorv of India bi.it under the administration of the Government of India cannot be said to be.'undcr the control of the Government of India' as the expression ''control" connotes pr..1wer to issue directions regarding how a thing may be done by a superior authority to_ an inft=:r ior authority, a11d in the case of a quasi-judicial authority ,no such directions or orders could be iss- ued .. It is only in the case of executive action that a superior auth- . ority may direct that a p:!rt;cular thing may be done in a parti- cular way by the subordinate authority. In the very nature of thin.gs where rule of law prevails it is not open to a Government, be it the Gaver.1ment of India or the Gwernmcnt of a State,· to direct a qu:\si-jadicial or judicial a11thority to decide any parti .. =- cufar m1tters before it in a particular manner.
N. Ma.,than Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, [1962] Supp. IS. C.R. 931, referred to. Held, also; that the Chief Commissioner who is the Appel- late ·Authority in the C!\Se, fell outside the definition of 'State', he being a quasi-judicial authority not under the control of the Government of India and, therefore, Art .. 15 of the Constitution did not apply to him and no protection, under Art. 15 wa•
available against the Chief Commissioner at the time the impugned order was made. CIVIL APPELLATE/0RIGL"iAL JURISDIC'l:ION: Civil Appeal No. 569 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the order dated
September 9, 1960, of the Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry in Appeal No. 94 of 1960. JVITH \Vrit Petition No. 347 of l!J.60. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Ri"ghts.
K.S. Ra.mttmurthi Redd;ar . .. Tiu Chbf Commis- 1ion er, 1·ondicherry K.S. Ramdlllurllti Rtdd1ar v. ~' Cliitf Commis- sionn, PundicAm, W-.loo, J, N. G. Glultterjee, R. K. Garg and S. G. Agar-
wa/a, for the Appellant. G. K. Daphtary, Solic-itor-Geneml of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respon- dent No. I (in C. A. No. 51Hl/ul). R. Malullinga l11er, for respondent ll<o. 2 (in
C. A. 569/ul). N. G. Chatterjee, R. K. Garg and S. G. Agar- wala, for the petitioner and the intervener. G. K. Daplitary. Solicitor-G1neral of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent
No. I (in W. l'. No. :14i/60). R. Thiagarajan, for respondent No. 3 (in W. P. No. 347/60). 1963. January, 22. The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCIIOO, J.-The appeal and
the writ petition arise out of the same order of the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry acting as the appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act and will be dealt with together. The petitioner is one of four-
teen persons who had applied for a stage carriage permit before the State Transport Authority, Pondicherrv. The petitioner's application was rejected and the permit was granted to Peruma·l
Padayatchi, one of the respondents before us. The State Transport Authority considered various factors one of which was that Perurnal Padayatcbi was a native of Pondicherry and taking all the fac .. lrs into
account, the permit was granted to Perumal Pada- yatchi. The petitioner wrnt in appeal before the Appellate Authority, who is the Chief Commi<sioncr of Pondichcrry. The Appellate Authority dismissed
– — ——–~ 1 S.C.R. SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS the appeal and observed that even if it were conce· ded that the claim~ of the petitioner were more or less equal to those of Perumal Padaya:chi, the latter
would be entitled to preference on the ground that he is a native of Pondicherry. \Ve may add that though the petitioner used to live in Pondicherry, he was not a native of Pondicherry.
This order reject- ing the appeal was passed on' September 9, 1960. The appeal has been filed with special leave against this order. l he petitioner has also filed the writ petition against this order ·in which he raises,. the
same points. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of the appellate Authority shows that preference was granted to Perumal Padayatchi on the ground that he was a native of ·
Pondicherry (i.e. he was born in Pondichcrry), ..,,bile the petitioner was mere! y a resident of Pondicherry ._ (i. e. he was born in Pondicherry). The petitioner contends that such grant of preference on the ground
of place of birth jg hit by Art. 15 of the Constitution as the petitioner is a citizen of India, and Art. 15 lays down that "the State shall not ·discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
ca>e, sex, place of birth or any of them". This contention of the petitioner is met on behalf of the respondents io this way. The respondents submit that at the relevant time, Pondicherry was not
within the territory of India and the Constitution did not apply to it. Therefore, the petitioner would have no right to apply to this Court for special leave under Art. .136 of the Constitution; nor would the
petitioner have a right to proceed by way of a writ petition ·under Art. 32 agaimt an or<lel\ which was pas>ed by the , \ppellate Authority in Pondicherry at a time when Pondicherry 1vas not in the territory
of ludia. Reliance in this connection is placed on behalf · of the respondents on the decision of this :963 K.s. Ramamurt!. i Redt!itu 1 he Chief Commis .. sionir, Pur.diche117 JVanchoo, J.
'·,_ 1953 K.S~ &ma,,,urthi . RedHiar 71>1 Chief Commis .. sioner, -Pon1iche,…, lVancf.001 J. '"?-' ,,.-·· · 660 SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. Court in N. Masthan Sohib v. Cliief'·Coinmissioner,
Pondicherry ('). . The petitioner also relies on the same decision of this Court. It is conceded on his behalf that in view of that decision it was not· open to the petitioner to apply to this Court under Art. J 36 and therefore the ·
appeal may not be maintainable. But it is urged that under Art. 12 "the .State" for the purpose of part III of the Constitution i> defined to include "the Government and Parliament of
India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". It is therefore contended that even though
Pondicherry was not a part of India when the order under challenge was passed, the Appellate Authority which passed the order was a "local or other autho- rity under the. control of the Government of India"
and therefore was amenable to a writ under Art. 32 · of the Constitution. Further it is urged that what- ever may have been tbe position wheri .Ma•th<m Sahib's case ('), wa~ decided, Pondicherry. is now
within the territory of India since August 191\2 and therefore this Court can now issue a writ to the Appellate Authority if the order under challenge violates Art. 15 of the Coustitution.
The respondents-however contend that the fact that Pondicherry is now within the territory of India makes no difference in the application of the de!(ision in J!asthan Sahib's case('). It is submitted that the
reasons which led the majority in that case to refuse to issue a writ clearly imply (even if there is no actual · decision in express terms on the que>tion now raised) that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot be
said to be an authority "under the control of the Government of India".". within the ni·eaning of ·Art. 12, and therefore·the Appellate Authority which was a quasi-judicial 1··authority was. not under the
(t) (1962] Supp. I S.C.R, 981. 1 S.C.R. control of the Government of India and could not be amenable to a writ under Art. 32 at the time when the order under challenge was passed.
Further as the Constitution is not retrospective in operation the fact that Pondicherry since August l 9ti2 is part of the territory of India would not give this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ now when it could not
issue a writ to the Appellate Authority in Septem- ber, 1960, even reading Art. 32 along with Art. 12 of the Constitution. Before we come to consider the questions thus raised in the writ
petition, we may state that so far as the appeal is concerned, it is concluded by the decision in M11sthan Sahib'.~ case (1). Article 136 gives power to this Court to grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. Admittedly, Pondicherry was not within the
territory of India when the order was passed and therefore Art. 1:!6 would not apply to such an order. We have already indicated that this position is conceded on behalf of the petitioner. So far therefore
as the appeal is concerned it must be dismissed on the authority ~f Mastluin Sahib's case (1), though in the circumstances we shall pass no order as to costs. Turning now to the writ petition, the main
question that falls for consideration is the effect of Art. 12 and whether on a proper interpretation of that Article, the Appellate Authority could in this case be said to be "a local or other authority under
the contr<'l. of the Government of India". It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that this matter is also concluded by the decision of the majority in Mastluin Sahib's case (1), and that the
effect of that decision is that a judicial or a quasi- judicial authority would not be an authority "under the control of the Government of India''. On the (I) l19621 Supp. I s.c.R. 981.
K.S. Rom<Jmurthi Reddiar v. 7he Chjef Commis- sioner, Pondiclu"y Wa11clwo, J. /9r3 K.S. Ramamurthi feddiar . .. 7 he Chief Cvmmis- 1ioner. ro'ldicherr,J 662 SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
other hand, the petitioner contends that there was no such decision in that case as will appear from the · concluding portion of the judgment and therefore the question is open for consideration before us.
IVonchoo, J. As both parties rely on that decision we may ··· quote the relevant part thereof. Ilefore we do so we may mention that the decision in that case was in two parts, the first part being delivered on April 28,
1961 arid the final part on December 8, 1961, though the . report contains only the final part. Relevant part of that decision which appears in the first part delivered on April 28, 1961, is as below:-
"Learnea counsel ·pointed out ·that for the purpose ol the exercise of this Court's power under Art .. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the fundamental rights its juris-
diction was not limited to the authorities functioning within the territory of India but that it extended also to the giving of directions and the issuing of orders to authorities functio-
ning even outside the territory of India, provided that ·such authorities were subject to the control of the Government of -India. This submission appears to us· .well-founded and the
power of this Court under Art. 32 of the Consti- tution is not circumscribed by any territorial limitation. It extends not merely over every authority within the territory of India but also
those functioning outside, provided that such authorities are under the control of the Govern· ment of India". Then after considering Arts. 142 and 144 of the Constitution and pointing out that in view of the
limitations imposed by Art. 142 on the territory within which alone the orders or directions of this Court could be. directly enforced, a question was posted whether a writ in the nature of certiorari or
I S.C.R. SU.PRE ME COURT REPORTS other appropriate order or direction to quash a quasi-judicial order passed by an authority outside the territory of India, though such au1hority is under
the control of the Government of India could issue. The majority judgment observed as follows in answer to the question thus posed :- "If the order of the authority under the control
of the Government of India but functioning outside t\le territory of India was of an execu- tive or administrative nature, relief could be afforded to a petitioner under Art. 32 by pass-
ing suitable orders against the Government of India directing them to give effect to the deci- sion of this Court by the exercise of their powers of control over the authority outside the terri-
tory of India. Such an order could be enforce- able by virtue of Art. 144, as also Art. 14 2. But in a case where the order of the outside authority is of a quasi-judicial nature, as in the
case before us, we consider that resort to such a procedure is not possible and that if the orders or directions of this Court could not be directly enforced against the authority in Pondicherry,
the order would be ineffective and that the Court will not stultify itself by passing such an order." Jn the final order, however, at p. 1009 of the Report, the majority observed as follows :-
"The writ petitions must also fail and be dismissed for the reason that having regard to the nature of the relief sought and the authority against whose orders relief is claimed they too
must fail. They are also dismissed. We would add that these dismissals would not preclude the petitioners from approaching this Court, if so desired in the event of Pondicherry becoming part of the territory of India",
K.S. Rrmamurthi Reddiar v. Thi Chief Commis· r .•ion1r, Pondicherr7 Wanchoo, J. K.S. R1JJ111m11,thi R,t1Ji,.1 v. Tiu- <:~ -tf C11mmi1- sio11tr, J'tndicl1t".I It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that
the majority decision in th.it case seems to imply that the Appellate Authority was under the control of the Government of India as otherwise it would not have been necessary tu put the two questions which
were put to the Government of India by the first part of the decision. Furtber it is contended that the observations in the fin:il part of the judgment that the petitioners in tl1at case were not precluded
from approachin)( tbis Court, if so desired, in the event ot Pondicl1erry becoming part of the territory of India, also show that 1t was not held in that decision that judicial or quasi-judkial authorities
could not be under the control o! the Government of India. On the other hand, it is contended on be- ha1f of the respondents that judicial or quasi-judicial authorities were not under the control of the Govern-
ment of India, for if they were a writ would have bet>n issued in that case in the same way as in the case of an executive or administrative authority, i.e. a writ could issue to the Government of India
"directing them to give effect to the decision of this Court by the exercise of their powers of control ovt:r the authority outside the territory of India". We have carefully considered the observations in the majority
decision in this connection and it must be held that that decision is not a direct authority on the question that is now posed before us, for the point was not then specifically raised; and expressly decided, though
as we will later point out, the implication of the said decision is against the contention rai~ed by the petitioner. We have therefore to examine "the con- tentions of either party as to the exact scope and
effect of the words "all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India", as if the question is res integra. The first contention on behalf of the petitiorer is
that the words "under the control of the Government 1 S.C.R. 66ii of India" in Art. 12 do not qualify the word "authorities" therein hut qualify the word "tecritory". The petitioner would therefore read the relevant
words of Art. 1:2 like this : "All local or other authorities within the territory oi India or all local or other authorities within ti1e territory under the control of tbe Government of India".
Thus, accord- ing to the petitioner, all that is required is that the territory even if it is not the territory of India, should be under the control of the Government of India, and
if the territory is under the control of the Government of India all local or other authorities in such territory would be included in the words "the Stale". On the other hand, the contention on behalf of the res-
pondents is that the words "under the control of the Government of India" qualify the word "authorities" and not the word ,_territory" in the relevant part' of Art. 12 and that that part on its true interpretation
would read thus : "all local or Dther authorities within the territory of India or all local or other authorities under the contr.:>l of the Government of India". Having given our anxious consideration to this
matter we are of opinion th<it the interpretation put on the relevant words on behalf of the respon- dents is the right one, both gramatical!y and other- wise. Art. 12 gives an inclusive definition of the
words "the State" and within these words of that Article are inclnded, (i) the Government and Parlia- ment of India, (ii) the Government and the legisla- ture of each of the States, and (iii) all local or other
authorities. These are the only authorities which are included in the words "the State" in Art. I. 2 for the purpose of Part III. Then follow the words which qualify the words "all local or other authorities''.
These local or other authorities which are inclnded within the words "the State" of Art. 12 are of two kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India, and (ii) those under
the control of the 19b3 Jt.S. Ramamurthi Rrddiar v. The Chit/ Comm is· J·ioneT, funrluherry IVandwo, J, 1'63 /.-.~. Roma111uithi Rtddior v. Tiu Chuf C11mmi1- Jio11tr, Pondfrhury U'o11rhoo. J.
U66 SUPREf.1E COURT REPORTS (H!64] VOL. Government, of India. There arc thus two qualifying clauses to "all local or other authorities." These clauses arc : {i)within the territory of India and {ii)
under the control of the Government of India. It would in our opinion be gramatkally wrong to read the words "under the contrul of the Government of India" as qualifying the word' territory".
From the scheme ol Art. 1 <l it is clear that three classes of authorities are meant to be included in the wordi; "the State", there; and the third class is of two kinds and the qualifying words which full ow "all local or
other auuioritics" define the two types of such local or other authorities as already indicated above. Further all local or other authorities within the territory of India include all authorities within the
territory of India whether under the control of the Govern- ment of India or the Governments of various States and even autunomous authorities which may not be under the control of the Government
at all. In contradistinction to this the second qualifying clause refers only to such authorities as are under the control of the Government of India and so the second qualifying clause must govern the word
"'authorities". Therelore, the interpretation put forward on behalf.of the respondents seems to us to be correct both gramatically and otherwise. "All local or other authorities" would thus be of two
kinds, namely, (i) thme within the territory of India, and {ii) those under the control of the Government of India. In the latter case there is no qualification that they should be within the territory of India. It is
enough if they arc under the control of the Govern- ment of India wherever they may be. We are there- fore of opinion that no writ could issue to the appe- llate authority at the time when the order under
challenge was passed, unless it could be called "other authority under the control of the Government of India". Further, there can be no doubt that if no writ could issue to the Appellate Authority at the
time the order was passed, no writ could issue now after 1 S.C.R. Pondicherry has become part of the territory oJ India, for that would be giving retrospective operation to the Constitution for this purpose which obviously
cannot be done : (see Janardan Reddy v. the State(')). The next question is whether a judicial or quasi- judicial authority. outside the territory of India but within the territory under the administration of the
Government of India can be said to be under the control of the Government of India. For this purpose we have to find out the meaning of the words "under the control of the Government of India" as used in
Art. 12. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that if an authority is appointed by the Government of India, is paid by the Government of India and is liable to disciplinary action by the Government of
India, it would be an authority "under the control of the Government of India". It is urged that as the Chief Commissioner, who is the appellate Autho- rity, was appointed by the Government of India, was
paid by the Government of India and was under the disciplinary control of the Government of India, he would be an authority under the control of the Government of India and this court would therefore
have been entitlect to issue a writ against him even when th<' order was passed and therefore all the more so, when Pondicherry is now within the territory of India. The contention
however that this Court could issue a writ under Art. 32 against the Appellate Authority even at the time when the order was passed. is clearly negatived by the majority decision in
llfosthan Sahib's case ('), for if that could be done, writ would have been issued in that case. The reason why writ was not issued in llfasthan Sahib's case (2), was that the quasi-judicial authority was out-
side the territory of India and this Court held that if the authority were of an executive or administrative nature, a writ could have been issued to the Govern- ment of India "directing them to give effect to the
decision of this Court by the exercise of their powers (I) [1950 l S.C.R, HO. 12) [1962] Supp. I s.c.R. 981. K.S. Ramamurthi Reddic.r The Chitf CfJmmis· sioner, Pfndiclu1r,y· U'anthot, J.
K_S, Ramamurthi Retlrlfor v. It., Chief c~mi1- H011tr, Pondic!urr1 6ll8 of control over the authority outside the territory of India". But as the authoritv in that case just like the authority in the r,resent case was a quasi-judicial
authority resort to such a procedure was not possible and if the orders or directions could not be directly enforced against the authority in Pondicherry, the order would be ineffective.
This clearly implies that the quasi-judicial authority was not under the control of the Government of India like an executive or admi- nistrative authority and therefore it was not possible
for this Court to issue a direction to the Government of India to direct a qua.si-judicial authority to give effect to the decision of this Court "by the exercise of their powers of control ·over the authority outside
the territory of India". It foflows from these obstr- vations in the majority decision in that case that the control envisaged by the words "under the control of the Government of India" in Art. 12 is not the
control which arises out of mere appointment, pay· ment and the right to take disciplinary action; the control envisaged under Art. 12 is a control of the functions of the autl.orities concerned, and the right
of the Government of India by virtue of that control to give directions to the authority to function in a particular manner with respect to such functions. Now if the authorities were administrative or execu-
tive the control of the Government of India would not only be by virtue of appointment, payment and disciplinary action, but 1t would also extend to directing the auchority to carry out its func-
tions in a particular manner and a purely execu- tive or administrative authority can always be directed bv the Government of India under which it is functioning to act in a particular man-
ner with respect to it5 functions. This, however, cannot be said of a qua5i-judicial or jud:cial au- thority even though the Gov~r!1m<:nt or India may have appointed the authority and may be paying it
and may have the right to td:e disciplinary action against it in certain eventualities. It \•as not open 1 S.C.R. to the Government of India to control the functions 19~3 of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority and direct
K.s. R … amurthi it to decide a particular matter before it in a parti· Re:~iar cular way. It seems to us therefore that the control T"' Chief Cammis- envisaged under Art. 12 is control of the functions of · '""'"· Pondichmy the authorities and it is only when the Government of
Wanchoo, J. India can control the function of an authority that it can be said that the authority is under the control of the Government of India. Such control is possible in the case of a purely executive or admimstrative
authority; it is impossible in the case of a quasi-judi- cial or judicial authority, for in the very nature of things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to the Government, be it the Government of India or ·
the Government of a State, to direct a quasi-judicial or judicial authority to decide a particular mattei: before it in a particular manner. Therefore, this being the nature of the control which the Government of
India must exercise in order that an authority function- ing outside the ten itory of India may be said to be an author i •y under the control of the Government of India wi~hin the meaning of Art. 12, a quasi-judicial
or judicial authority cannot be said to be an autho- rity under the control of the Government of India within th;s meaning. We are therefore of opinion that the Appellate authority being quasi-judicial
could not be directed by the Government ofJ.ndia to decide a Farticular matter before it in a particular manner and therefore it cannot be said that it is an authority under the control of the Government of
I.,dia. As we have already indicated, this follows from the reasoning of the· majority in Masthan ifohib 's Case (1 ), though it was not decided specifi- cally as such in that case.
We are therefore of opinion that judici1>l or quasi-judicial authorities functioning in ten ., ori1·s a<lministered by the Govern- ment of India but outside the territory of India
cannot be said to be authorities under the control of the Government of India within the meaning of Art. 12, and therefore Art. 12 would not apply to 1963 — K.S. Ramamu1thi ktddiar
·v 1 ~ Chief. CommiJ- Jiontr, Ponrlirhtr ry IVanc>ioo, ), such authorities functioning outside the territory of India. Consequently it would not be open to this Court to issue a writ under Art. 32 read with Art. 12
against a quasi·ju<licial authority outside the territorv of India even though that authoritv might have been appointed by the Government of India, might be paid by the Government of India or the Government
of India might have the power of disciplinarv action against it. The Appellate Authority being' a quasi- judicial authority would thus not be under the con· trol of the Government of India within the meaning
of Art. 12. Therefore it would not have been open to this Court to issue a writ against the order under challenge when it was passed. In consequence it is not open to this Court now that Poudicherry has
become part of India to issue a writ to the Appellate Authority with respect to an order passed by it before Pondicherry became part of India, as the Constitu- tion for this purpose is not retrospective.
The matter can be looked at in another way. Art. l ii prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizrn on grounds only of religion, race, caste. sex, place of birth or any of them.
Therefore it is only when the State as defined in Art. 12 (for th,·rc is nothing in the context of Art. I:) to require otherwise) discriminates, that a citizen can complain of the breach of Art. I Ii and ask for relief from this
Court under Art. :12. We ha\·e however held that the Chief Commissioner being a qua;i-juclicial autho· rit.v was not under 1he control of the Government of India within the mcanin.i~ of Art. 12.
Therefore, he could not be the State within that Article. If so, it follows that the discrimination (assuming there was any) was by an authority which was not the State. The protection of Art. l!i is a1rninst discrimination
bv "the St<1tc." The petitioner therefore would not be e~titled to any protection under Art. 15 agai11st the Chief Commissioner at the time the impugned order I S.C.R. was made. That is another reason why the present
petition must faiL We therefore dismiss the appeal and pass no order as to costs in respect thereof. We dismiss the writ petition with costs. Appeal dism·issed. Writ petition dismissed.
—- M. RAMAPPA t•. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ANOTHER (B. P. S1mu, C. ]., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHUO, M. HrnAYATULLAH and J: C. SHAH, .JJ.) Stale Service-Dismissal of employee-Appointment of
Tribunnl-Validity-8'1derabad Public Scn;ants (Tribunal of E11q1>iry) Act, 1950 (Hyd. XXl!l of 1.950), ss. 3, 4-Andnra Civil .\]ervire.'i (Di.<ctplinary Tr1'.bunal) Rules, J9.53-i..9tates
Reorganisation Act, 1966 (XXXVII of 19-56), ss. 115, 120, 121, 122, 127. The appellant was a servant in the Hyderabad Revenue Service and was holding the post of Deputy Secretary to the Govern1 .1e11t in the Public YVorks Department. The Govern- ment of Andhra Pradesh ordered an enquiry by the Tribunal
for Disciplinary pr.)ceedings. The Tribunal enquired into the charges and recommended the dismissal of the appellam from service and after due notice to the appellant the Government of Andhra Pradesh ordered his. dismissal.
The appellant ·,here- upon m·Jved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the afon·said order, which wa.s dismissed by the High Court. In this Court it was urged by the appellant that the
appointment of 1fr. Sriram?lrnurlhy was incompc:tent as he was K.S. Ram·imurthi Reddiar The Chief Commis~ sio114r, Pondich~"Y Wanchoo, ). I onuarv, 22.