Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat F or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted.
12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words "unless the context otherwise requires", the said G definition set out in the Section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.
13. This Court in K Balakrishna Rao & Ors. v. Haji Abdulla Sait & Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 321 while considering the defmition clause of this Act H A which is under our consideration, held : "A definition clause does not necessarily in any statute apply in all possible contexts in which the word which is defined may be found therein. The opening clause of section 2 of the principal Act itself suggests ~hat any expression defined in that section should be given the meaning assigned to it therein unless the context otherwise requires."
14. In its ordinary and primary sense, the term "Family" signifies the collective body of persons living in one house or under one head or C manager or one domestic government. In its restricted sense, "Family" would include only parents and their children. It may include even grand- children and all the persons of the same blood living together. In its broader sense, it may include persons who are not connected by blood depending upon the context in which the word is used.
15. There is a consensus among the High Courts in India that the word "Family" is a word of great flexibility and is capable of different meanings.
16. In Ram Pershad Singh v. Mukand Lal, AIR (1952) Punjab 189, E nephews who were brought up by the landlord and were set up in business by him and were also married by him, were held to be member of the family. The Calcutta High Court in Puspa Lata Debi v. Dinesh Chandra Das, 85 Cal. L.J. 74, in Syed Shah Maidal Islam & Ors. v. Commr. of Wakfs & Ors., AIR (1943) Cal. 635 and again in Sukumar Guha v. Naresh Chandra p Ghosh & Anr., AIR (1968) Cal. 49; the Madras High Court in Asha Bibi & Ors. v. Nabissa Sahib & Ors., AIR (1957) Madras; the Bombay High Court in Mst. Ramubai v. Jiyaram Shanna, AIR (1964) Bombay 96; the Delhi High Court in Govind Dass & Ors. v. K.uldip Singh, AIR (1971) Delhi 151 and again inAbdul Hamid &Anr. v. Nur Mohd., AIR (1976) Delhi 328 have all held that the word "Family" is a flexible word and it may, in certain G circumstances, specially in the context in which it is used, may include persons who are not directly related by blood.
17. This Court in Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. The Nagpur Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 1192 while interpreting H the word "Family'' observed as under : …. KV.MUIBUv. ANGAMUIBUAMMAL [S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.] 195. "But the expression 'family' has according to the context in A which it occurs, a variable connotation. It does not in the setting of the rules postulate the existence of relationship either of blood or by marriage between the persons residing in the tenement. Even a single person may be regarded as a family, and a master and servant would also be so regarded."
18. It was further observed as under : "The expression 'family' must therefore take colour from the expression 'occupy' used in the same rule. In our view the expres- sion 'family' in the context in which it occurs, means no m'1fe than C a person or a group of persons."
19. It is in the background of the above discussion relating to the cases decided by various High Courts and this Court that it is to be seen whether a "Foster Son" would be covered by the word "Family" as defined in the Act.
20. "Son" as understood in common parlancr. means as natural son born to a person after marriage. It is the direct blood relationship which is the essence of the term in which "Son" is usually understood, emphasis being on legitimacy. In legal parlance, however, "Son" has a little wider connotation. It may include not only the natural son but also son's son, E namely, the grand child, and where the personal law permits adoption, it also include an adopted son.
21. Section 3(57) of the General Clauses Act defines "Son" as under: '"son' in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, shall mclude an adopted son."
22. Relying upon this definition, the Lahore High Court in In re Divi Dita AIR (1931) Lahore 661, held that where the personal law of the parties permits adoption, the word "Son" will include an adopted son. In G Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prasad Tiwari, 48 Indian Appeals 86," the . Privy Council held that 'Sons' in Mitakshara Chapter II 6(1) include a grand son. In the ancient Hindu Law, twelve sons are mentioned by the truth-seeing Sages all of whom need not be mer.~ioned here. The attempt only is to indicates that the terms "Son" itself is a flexible term and may not H A be limited to the direct descendant. Its true meaning, like the term "Family" discussed "above, will depend upon the context in which it is used. Even illegitimate son may be treated as legitimate, as for example, the 'Son' referr~(j to in Section 16 of Hindu Marriage Act, as originally enacted: . i …
23. Coming now to "Foster Son", it may be pointed out thata "Foster B Son'' is a son who is not the real son or direct descendant of a person after his marriage.
24. In Shorther Oxford Dictionary, "Foster Son" is defined as "one brought up as a son though not a son by birth." The word "Foster", in the C same dicqonary , is indicated to mean, to supply with food; to nourish, feed, support; to bring up with parental care; to nurse, tend with care to grow.
25. "Foster Brother" is a male child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of different parentage. "Foster Father" is described as one who performs the duty of a father to another's child. "Foster ¥other" D is indicated to mean a woman who nurses and brings up another's child, either as an adoptive mother or as a nurse, while "Foster Sister" means a female child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of different parentage.
26. These definitions indicate that a "Foster Child" need not be the E real legitimate child of the person who brings him up. He is essentially the child of another person but is nursed, reared and brought up by another person as his own son.
27. If a child comes to a person or is found by that person as forlorn p child or the parents of that child, may be, on account of their poverty or their family circumstances, bring that child to the other person and request him to bring up that child which is accepted ;by that person and such child is brought up from the infancy as the own son by that person who loves that child as his own, nourishes and brings him up, looks after his education in the school, college or university and bears all the expenses, such child G has to be treated as the son of that person particularly if that person holds the child out as his own. Care, therefore, in rearing up the child need not always be parental. It can be even that of a "Foster Father", In such a situation, the son so brought up would be the "Foster Son" of that person and since the devotion with which he was brought up, the love and care H which he received from that person were like those which that person K.V.MUTHUv. ANGAMUTHU AMMAL[S.SAGHIRAHMAD,J.) would have given to his real son, the "Foster Son" would certainly be a A member of the family.
28. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to a case from the United States, namely, Re Nonnan's Estate (1940) 295 NW 63 which was decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in which . the dictionary B defmition of "Foster Mother" or "Father" as a woman or man who had .. performed the duties of a parent to a child of another by rearing the child as the own child was accepted. "Foster Child" in that\~ase was defined ~s one who has been cared for by a "Foster Parent".
29. This decision was considered by the Canadian Court in Re Page C (1973) 3 OR 903 or 903 (Ont SC) in which the learn~~Judge referring to the above defmition observed as under : "This definition, which commended itself to Minnesota Court, also commends itself to me."
30. In England, Fosterage is now regulated by statutory laws. In Bromley's "Family Law'', 7th Edition, it is indicated as under : "Both at common law and under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933 there will be a duty to afford protection. Although there E is no common law. duty to maintain the child, the person with control will be criminally liable under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 if he wilfully fails to provide him with adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging. Similarly, the Education Act 1944 places him under a duty to see that the child receives full-time p education. So long· as no one else claims the care and control of the child, the person who actually has it will be clearly entitled to retain it; if thi_s is disputed, the court must be guided by the child's welfare in d~termining in whose favour to make an order." Bromley in his treatise also indicates that if anyone other than a G relative, guardian or custodian, undertakes the care and maintenance of a child, he will be subject to the provisions of the Foster Children Act, 1980. Fosterage here is essentially a matter of personal inclination, liking and devotion towards a child by those, specially, who being childless adopt or otherwise rear up a child.
31. From the above, it would appear that it is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstan- ces of a particular case.
32. Analysing the facts of this case in the light of the principles B enunciated above, it will be seen that Arunachala Bakthar is the brother's son of the Appellant's husband who, therefore, was related to the appellant's husband by blood and was his heir not only under the old Mitakshara Law (as brother's son) but also under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as a class-II heir. Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by the C appellant and her husband and was living all along with them. He apparent- ly acted as a devoted son to the appellant's husband and helped him in all possible ways including the business which he carried on. Appellant's husband acted also a a devoted father to Arunachala Bakthar in whose favour he also executed a will and after reciting therein that Arunachala D Bakthar was brought up by him, he bequeathed his business jointly to him and the appellant specifying further that after the death of the appellant, the business shall be carried on by Arunachala Bakthar. Appellant's hus- band also, significantly, did not bequeath the residential house absolutely in favour of the appellant but created only a life estate therein for her. The remainder was bequeathed to the children of Arunachala Bakthar.
33. In view of the above facts and circumstances, Arunachala Bakthar was clearly a member of the family of the ·appellant's husband within the meaning of Section 2(6A) of the Act and consequently, the appellant could well file an application for eviction of the respondent from the premises in question not only for her need but also for the need of her "Foster Son", F Arunachala Bakthar.
34. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the Madras High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs which is quantified at Rs. 15, 000. B.K.S. Appeal dismissed.