JHI M•vl. St1PRtml: COtIBT REPORTS {1963) KALIPADACHOWDHURY !I. UNION OF INDIA ( B. P. Snnu, C. J., P. B. GAJ.B:NDBA.GA.DXA.B, K. SUllB.A R..i.o, K. N. W &NCHOO and J. C. SHA.H, JJ. )
Mi,.ing R.gu1ation-Mining Boards, OOMUlt.Uion wilh- Otmatitution of boarda, if obligatory-&gulatiooA maM. toitlwut oonatituting Mining Boarda-Valiclit!I of- Coal Minu .Regula- tionA, 1957 tefl. 127 (8)-Mine• Act, 1952 (85 of 1952),
… 12, 69. Section 12 of the Mines Act,. 1952, provides that the Central Government may constitute a Mining Board for any part of the territories to which the Act extrndcd or for any group or clasa of mine·. In 1957 only one mining
board i.e. the Bihar Mining Board was in e:Wtence and other mining boards were not constituted. Section 57 em- powers the Central Government to make Regulations. Section 59(3) as it then stood, provided that before the draft of any
regula'tion was published it should be referred to every Min• ing Board concerned and th~t it ahall not be published uritil each such Mining Board had had a reasonable opportunity
of reporting on it. The Central Government referred the draft of the (',oal Mines Regulations to the Bihar Mining Board which circulated the draft to all .the membera of the Board and the members communicated their opinions indivi-
dually to the Central Government. Thereafter, the Regu- lations were duly published and came into force. The petitioner's, who were being prosecuted In Bengal for violation of the Regulations, contended that the Regulations were
invalid as 1 (i) it was incumbent upon the Central Govern- ment under a. 12 of the Act to constitute all the Mining Boards and to refer the draft Regulations to all the Boards before they could be published under s. 59, and (ii) the
communication of opinions by individual members o( the Blhar Mining Board did not amount to consultation with the Board within the meaning of s. 59(3). Held (Per majority, Subba Rao, J., ciiaaeflling), that
the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957, had been duly framed and publlahed. Section 59(3) merely provided that if a 1 Mining Board was in exiatence at the relevant time it waa ohlipl«)' Oil lhc CCAtral Government to comwt h before
.. • 2S.C.R. SUPREME (l()UR~ REPORTS 90ti the draft· Regulation was published. But s. 12 was not mandatory and it was not obligatory on the Central Govern· m•nt to constitute any or all of the Mining Boards. There
was nothing in the Act or in the context which justified reading the word "may" in s. 12 as·"shall". The Mining Board constituted under s. 12 had to perform two functions, viz., to make a report in respect of regulations or rules rcferr· ed to it and to decide cases which may be referred. to it under s. 81. The .working of the Act 1vas not dependent on the
constituting of Mining Boards, This construction of s. 12 did not render the· provisions of s. 59(3) nugatory. Apart from consulting the Boards, all parties affected by the draft had an opportunity to make_ their suggestions or objections and these had to be considered before t!;e draft was settled and the regulations were finally made.
Banwarilal Agarwalla v. Stat~ of Bihar, [1962J l S;C.R. 33, explained. He/,d, further, that the requirement• of s. 59(3) had been complied with in referring the draft Regulations to the Bihar Mining Board. All that s. 59(3) required was that a
reasonable opportunity should be given to the Board to make its report. How the Board chose to make its report, was not a matter which the C~ntral Government could control. Per Subba Rao, J.-The Coal Mines.Regulations were
not validly made. The Supreme Court had directly decided .in Banwarilal v. State of Bihar that the Regulations were bad as there was no consultation with any Mining Board under s. 59 (S)
as . the Boards were not in existence. A fair construction of ss. I 2 and 59 ( 3) of . the Act also showed that if the Central Government wanted to make regulations under s. 57 it had to appoint Mining
Board• .and to refer the regulations to. them before publication. If the Central Government wanted to exercise the power under s. 59 it had first · to exercise the· power under s. 12. The power to make regulations was coupled
with a duty to consult the Mining Boards, and to dts<ih- arge its duty it was incumbent upon the Central Govermnent to appoint the Mining Boards. Apart from this,· the Regul· atiom is so far
as they purported to regulate· mines in West Bengal had not been validly made as· no Mining Board for the West Bengal area had been consulted before making the Regulations. The . Act did not empower . the
Central Government to make regulations in regard to miri,es in one part of the country by consulting a Board constituted for another part of the Country. Kaliflad• Cloo""""".1 Union of lnl.ia
SUPREME COt::RT RFPCJM'S [1963] B1111wanlal .dg11no<Ula v. Stau q/ Bihar. [ 1962] I S. c. Kolil~.1 . R. 33, followed. rr.;;qf1"41• Akoc.1: Aahdown It Co. v. The Chief Revmu AuUwrity,
Bombay, A. I. R. 1923 P. C. 138, referred to. ORIGINAL JumsDIOTION : Criminal Appeal Writ Petition No. 15 of 1962 Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforoement of Fundamental Right.a.
B. Sen andK. L. Halhi for the petitioner. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R.L. Iyengar and R.H. DMbar, for the respondents. S. Chaudhury, S. C. Banerjee and P. K. Chatt£rjee
for the Intervener. 1962. May 3. The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Gajendradagkar, W ancboo and Shah, J J ., wa.s delivered by Gajendragadkar, J., Subba Ra.o, J. delivered a eeparate Judgment.
Goi<ndra'}al>.or J. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J .-The four petitionel'll who are in charge of the working of the mine owned by the colliery known as Sa.lanpur '•A". Sea.m Colliery in the District of Burdwan, are
being prosecuted for tbe alleged oontraventiori of the provisions of Hegulation 127(3) of the Coal Mines Hegula.tions, 1957, framed under the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952! (hereinafter called the Act).
By their petition filed under Art. 32 of the Con- stitution, the petitioners pray that an order or writ in the nature of prohibition should be ill81led quashing the said criminal proceedings on the
ground that the said proceedings contravene Art. 21)( l) of the Constitution and as such, are void. To this petition have been impleatlcd as opponents 1 to 4, the Union of India, the Chief Inspector of
Min011, Dhanbad (W.B.), the Regional Inspector of Mines, Sitarampur and the Sub-Divisional Magis- trate, Aaanaol, respectively. The proseoution of t 2 S.C.R. the petitioners has Mmmenoed at the instance of
opponen~s 2 a.nd 3 and the case against .t~em i~ ·being tried by opponent No. 4. The pet1t1oners contention is that Regulation No. 127(3) whose alleged contravention ,has given rise to the present
proceedi~s against them is inval~d, uUra vires ~r;id inoperative and so, the prosecution of the pet1t10- ners contravenes Art. 20( 1) of the Constitution. It is on this basis that they want the said proceedings
to be qua.shed and ask for an order restraining opponents 2 and 8 from proceeding with the case and opponent No. 4 from trying it. The case in question is C. 783 of 1961 pending in the court of
opponent No. 4. Regulation 127(3) is a. pa.rt.of the Coal Mines Regulations framed by opponent No. 1 in exercise of the powers conferred ·upon it by section 57 of the Aot, the same having been previously published
as required, by sub-section (1) of s. 59 of the said Act.· Regulation 127(3) provides that no working which hag approached wit,hin a distance of 6tl metres of any disused or abandoned workings (not
being workings which have been examined and found to be free from accumulation of water or other liquid matter), whether in the same mine or in an adjoining mine, shall . be extended further
except with · the prior permission in writing of the Chief Inspector and subject to such conditions as he may specify therein. There is a proviso ·and explanation attached to this provision, but it is
unnecessary to refer to them. The ca8e against the petitioners is that they have contravened the provisions of Regulation 127(3) in that they exten- ded the working of the mine further than the per-
mitted limits without the prior permission in writing of opponent No. 2. The petitioners' case is that this Regulation is invalid and inoperative and so, its contravention cannot validly be made
Ka!ipada Chowdhury v. Union of India G•jendra1adka1 J. 1'61 Xa'ifJrida CJt<,wdhuT' Un;on of Tntlia Gafendrag?d~ar J, the basis of their prosecution having regard to the provisions of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution.
Ac<'ording to the petitioners, opponent No. 1 is no doubt conferred with the power of making Regulations under s. 57 of the Act, buts. 59(3), as it stood at the rfolevant time, has imposed an obJi.
gation on opponent No. I that the draft of the ea.id Regulations shall not be publishPd unless the Mining Boards therein specified have had a reason· able opportunity of reportinl!' to It as to the expedi-
ency of making the Regulations in question and· as to the suitability of its provisions. The petitio- ners a.liege that at the relevant time, when the Regulations were made in 1957, no Mining Bo11rds
had been established under s. 12 of the Act. Three Boards had been established under s. IO of the Indian Mines Act of 1923, but as a result of the subsequent amendments made in the provisions of
s. 10, the composition of two of the said Boards became invalid with the result that two of them could not bf" treated as Boards validly constituted. These invalid Boards were the Madh.va Pradesh
Mining Board and the West Bengal Mining Board. A third Boa.rd existed at the relevant time and that is. the Bihar Minin!!' Board. This Board had been constituted on the 22nd February, 1946 und"r
s. 10 of the earlier Aot as it then stood. The petiti- tioners' case is that it was obligatory for opponent No. I to consult all the throe Boards and since to out of the three Boards were not properly constituted,
the fact that reference was ma.de to the individual members of the said two invalid Boards did not satisfy the requirement of s. 59(3). According to the petition, a. reference was made to the Biha.r
Mining Board, but the Board did not make a. report to opponent No. I as a Board but its individual members communicated their opinions to opponent No. I. Therefore, on the whole, s. 59(3) hau not
been complioJ 1vith and that makes the whole body y 2 S.C.R. of Regulations issued in 1957 invalid and inopera· tive. That, in brief, is the basis on which the peti: tioners want the criminal proceedings vending
against them to be qua8hed. The respondents dispute the main contention of the petitioners that s. 59(3) has not been com· plied with. According to them, H. 59( 3) has been duly complied with and the Regulations made are
valid. The respondents concede that two of the three existing Boards were invalid; but their case is that it is only the validly existing Board that had to be consult.ad and the Bihar Mining Board,
which was the validly existing Board at the rele· vantr time, had been duly consulted. The respon· dents allege that the fact that individual members of the Bihar Mining Board communicated their
opinions to opponent No. 1 does not introduce any infirmity in the Regulations which were ~ubsequ ently published in the Gazette and which, under s. 59(5) have, in consequence, the effect as if enac-
ted in the Act. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Sen con·. tends thats. 59(3) imposes an obligation on-the Central Government to consult the Boards therein specified and he argues that reading s. 12 of the
Act in ~he light of s. 59(3), it followq that the Cen· tral Government bas to constitute Mining Boards for the areas or mines in respect of which the Regulations are intended to be made and since two
of the Boards had not been validly constituted, s. 12 had not been complied with and s. 59(3) had been contravened. Mr. Sen suggested that his contention about the mandatory character
of the provisions contained in sections 12 and 59(3) is concluded by a rec1Jnt decision of this Court. On the other hand, the learned Solicitor ·General for the respondents contends that the said decision
has no material or direct bearing on the question about the construction of s. 12. He concedes that Kali'pada Choudhury Union of lndi4 Gojendragadkar J. ~alipoda Chowdhur,J Union of I ndin
the said decision has concluded the point that the requirement of s. 59(3) is mandatory. It is, there· fore, necessary, in the first instance, to exmine the effect of the said decision.
Gaje.dragadkarJ. In "Banwari Lal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar'' (1), this Court bad occasion to consider the validity of the prosecution launched against the appellant on the.ground pf the contravention of one
of the Regulations ma.de in 1957. It appears that in that case, the respondents stated before the Court that the Mining Boards constituted under s.10 of the Act of 1923 were continuing to operate at the
time the relevant Regulations were framed and that there was full consultation with the said Mining Boards before the said Regulations were framed. The respondents, no doubt, contended that. s.59(3)
was directory and not mandatory and according to them, no obligation had been imposed upon the Central Gover!JmPnt to consult Mining Boards even if they were in existBnce. Alternatively, it was
suggested that the i\lining Boards which had been constituted under the earlier Act were continued under the A<lt by virtue of s. '24 of the Genera.I Clauses Act and that the said Boards had been duly
consulted. On the other hand, the appellant urged that the Boards to which the respondents referred were not validly con~tituted under the Act and bad not been properly ronsulted. It was also argued on
his behalf that both sections 12 and 59(3) were man- datory. It is in the light of th~se facts th:it the effect of the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal's case(') has to be appreciated.
Das Gupta., J., who spoke for the Court set out in his judgment the argument of the appellant that both sections 12 and 59 were mandatory, but, as the judgment shows, the Court considered tha question
as to whether s.59 (3) was mandatory and came to Pl 11962) 1s.c.R.33, 2 S.C.R. the conclu~ion that it was. The Court did not con· 19~ sider whether s.12 was mandatory and in the course
— di f Kalip … da ('/ww .ur.} o the judgment, there is no reference at all either to t~e questian of construing s.12 or to its ~ffect. Union •f India Havmg held that s.59 (3) was mandatory, the Court
d Gojaidragadkar J. reman ed the case to the learned Magistrate before w.hom. the proceedings were pending with a d1rect10n that he should ·try the issue as to whether the Boards constituted under the earlier
Act validly functioned under the Act and whether they had been duly consulted. It would be noticed that if the Court had considered the .question~ .about the mandatory charaoter of the provisions· of s.12,
it would have construed ·the said provi8ions and would have addressed itself to the question as to whether the failure of the Central Government to constitute valid Boards as suggested by the appellant
in that case itself. made the impugned Regulation invalid. This course was not adopted obviously for the reason that the respondents pleaded that the requisite Boards were in existence and had· been
consulted and , so, the controversy between the parties was narrowed down to the question as to whether s. 59 (3) requires that the Central Govern- ments must consult existing Boards or not. Apparen- ·
tly, the respondents contended that even if Boards have been constituted under s.12, it is not obligatory on the Central Government' to consult them under s.59(3). The requirement about the said consulta·
ti on is directory and not mandatory. It is this con· tention which has been rejected by the Court and havin'g held that s.59(3)· was mandatory and that existing Boards must be consulted before Hegula-
tions are framed, the question of fact which ihen fell to be considered was remitted to the trial Magistrate for his decision. . Therefore, we are satisfied that the effect of the decision of this Court
in Banwari Lal Agarwalla's case is that if a Board is in existence at the relevant time, it is obligatory on the Central Government to consult it before a draft 190• Kolipah CMwdltur'
v. llni.otr t1f India Gafentl•attlflAar J. SUPREME CX>URT REPORTS (1963] Regulation is published and in that sense s.59(3) is mandatory. It would, we think, pot be right to assume that the contention of appellant that s.12
like s.59(3} is mandatory was decided without discus- sing the question about its construction and its effect. The facts pleaded hy the respondents in that case made it unneceBBary to decide the appellant's con-
tention based on the mandatory character of s.12. Therefore, we do not.think Mr. Sen is justified in contending that the point which he seeks to raise in the present appeal about the effect of s.12 is conclud-
ed by the decision in Banwari Lal Agarwalla's case. That being so, we must proceed to examine Mr. Sens contention on the merits. At this stage, it is nece888.ry to read both sections 12 and 59. Section 12 deals with the consti-
tution of Mining Boards. Section 12( l) provides tb~t the Central Government may oonstitute for any part of the territories to which the Act extends, or for any group or class of mines, a Mining Board
consisting of seven persons as specified in clauses (a) to(e). The point which calls for our decision is whether the first part of s.12(1) imposes· an obliga- tion on the Central Government to constitute Board
when it is proposed to make &gulations to which s.59(3) applies. Section 59 as it stood in the Act prior to its amendment in 1959 read thus:- f "59 (I) The power to make regulations and
rules conferred by sections 57 and 58 is subject to the condition of the regulations and rules being made after previous publication. (2) The date to be specified in aooordance with clause ( 3) of section 23 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 (I 0 of I 897), as that after which a draft of regulations or rules propoeed to be 2 S.C.R. made will be taken. under oonsidera- 1!62 tion, , shall not be. less than three
KalipadiJ CAou:dhury months from the date on which the draft of the proposed regulations or Union of India rules is published for general infor- GojendrtJgadka1 J. mation. (3) Before the draft of any regulation is
published under this section, it shall be referred t? every Mining Board which is, in the opinion of the Central Government, I concerned with the subject dealt Jwith by the regulation
. and the reg. htion shall not be so published until each such Board has had a reasdnable opportunity of reporting as~ to the expediency of making the s me and as to the suit- ability of its provisions.
(4) No rule shall be made unless the t draft thereof has been referred to every Mining · Boar<l constituted in that part of the territories to which ·this Act exte'nds w_hich is affected by
the rule, and' unless each such Boa.rd has had a reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency of making the same and as to the suit· ability of its provisions. (5) Regulations and rules shall be publi-
shed in the Official Gazette and, on such publication, shall have effect as if enacted in this Act. (6) The provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and ( 4) shall not apply to. the first
occasion on which rules referred to in clause (d) or clause ( e) of section 58 are made. KaliP•rl.s Chowdhury Union of India Caje11drag!ldka., J. SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS [1963] (7) The regulations and rules made
under sections 57 and 513 shall be laid down before Parliament, as soon as may be, after they a.re made." The petitioners' contention is that in construing section 12, we must have regard to the provisions.
of s.59(3). By an amendment made in I 9f.9 by Act 62 of 1959, sub. s(3) of B. 59 has been deleted and combin- ed provision is made both for regulations and rules by sub-section (4) by making a suita.blo amendment
in the said sub-section so as to include both regula- tion~ and rules within its scope. Sub-section (4) thus amended reads thus: "59(4). No regulation or rule shall be made unleSB the draft thereof has been
referred to every Mining Board con- stituted in th11t part of the territories to which this Act extends which is affected by the regulation or rule anq unleBB each such Board has had a
reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency of making the same and as to the suitability of its provisions." Before construing s.12, it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act which confer
power on or assign some duties or functions to the said Boards. Section 14(1) provides inter alia that a. ._ Board constituted under a. 12 may exercise such of the powers of an Inspector under this Act a.s it
thinks neoeseary or expedient to exeroise for the purpose of deciding or reporting upon any matter referred to it. 8ection 14(2) confers upon the Boa.rd the pow.era of a Civil Court for the purposes
therein specified. It would thus be seen that the Boards constituted under s. 12 may have occasion __ _,.' 2 S.C.R. either to make a report · in respect of regulations or rules referred to them under s. 59, or they may
have to decide cases sent to them under s. 81. Section 59 which speaks of reference of the rules and regulations to the Boards has already been cited. Section 81( l) provides that if the court
trying any case instituted at the instance of the Chief Inspector or other officers therein specified is of opinion tliat the case is one which should, in lieu of a prosecution, be referred to a Mining Board,
it may stay the criminal proceedings, and report the matter to the Central Government with a. view to such reference being niade. Section 81(2) autho- rises the Central Government either to refer the
case to the Mining Board· or to direct the· court to proceed with the trial.· Thrts, if the Central Govern· ment decides to refer a pending criminal case to the Board, the Board has to decide it. That is the
two-fold function which may be assigned· to the Board under provisions of the Act. Mr. Sen contends that if s. 59(3) is manda- tory, it follows that consultation with •the relevant
Board was treated as essential by the legislature before the Central Government finalised the regu- lations ; and from this obligation imposed by s. 59(3), it must follow as a corollary that the
relevant Boards must be.constituted by the Central Government under s. 12. In other words, the argument is that s. 59(3) postulates the existence of the ·relevant . Boards and makes it obligatory
on the Central Government to. consult them and this can be satillfied only if the Central Govern- ment is compelled to constitute Boards under section 12. Prima facie, there is some force in
this contention: .But, on the other hand, if s. 59(3) is read as imposing an obligation' on the, Central Government to consult the Board if it is in existence, then no corollary would follow from
the mandatory character of the said provision as Kalipada Chowdlu.r; v. Union OJ·lndia Gaiendrr gadl ar J 19111 KaiiJada Cltowihur7 v. Unicn of India is suggested by Mr. Sen. Section 59(3) as it stooci
before the amendment of 1959, provides that every Mining Board which, in the opinion of the Central Government, is concerned with the subject dealt with by the regulation, Rhall be consulted ; and
this means that there should be a Mini11g Board before it is consulted and that the said Mining Board should, in the opinion of the Central Govern- ment, be concerned with the subject dealt with by
the regulation, This provision does not mean tlaat a Mining Board muat be constituted, for that is the subject-matter of the provisions contained in s. 12. If s. 12 is not mandatory, then s. 59(11)
muat be read in the light of the position that it is open to the Central Government to constitute the Board or not to constitute it, and that being so, s. 59(3) would then mean only this and no more
that if the Board is in existence and it is concerned with the subject, it must be consulted. Similarly, s. 59(4) as it stands after the amendment of 1959, requires that 'the dr!!oft of the
rule or regulation shall be referred to every Mining Board constituted in that part of the territories to which the Act exteuds which is affected by the regulation or rule. Thlit again means no more
than this that if a Board is constituted in the part of the territories which is affected by the regula- tion, it shall be consulted. It is not as if this construction adds any words in s. 59(3)
or s. 59(4); it merely proceeds on the basis that s.12( 1) is not mandatory. Therefore, in our opinion, in construing s. 12 (I) it would not be logical to assume thats. 59(3) or e.59(4) imposes an obligation
on the Central Government to constitute a Board, because as we have just indicated the constitution of the Boards is not the subject·matter of s.59 (ii) or s. 59 (4); that is the subje<lt-matter of
s. 12 and, so, whether or not it is obligatory on < .. ,-1 2 S.Q.R. the Central Government to constitute a Board must be determined in the light of the construction of s. 12. . Reverting then to the material words used
in s. 12 itself, if, it seems clear that the said· words do not permit the construction for which Mr. Sen contends. It is not disputed that the context may justify the view that the use of the word "may"
means "shall''; but if we substitute the word" shall" for "may" in s. 12(1), it would be apparent that the argument about the mandatory character of the provisions of s. ·12(1) would just not work. To say
that the Central Government shall constitute for any part of the territories to which the Act extends or for any group or class of.mines a Mining Board, would emphatically b"ing out the contradiction
·between the obligation sought to be introduced by the use of the word "shall" and the obvious dis' oretion left to the Central Government to consti- tute the Board for any part of the territories or
any group or class of mines. The discretion left to the Central Government in the matter of con- stitution of Boards which is so clearly writ large in the operative part of the said provision indicates
that in the context, ••may" cannot mean "shall". Section 12(1) really leaves it to the discretion of the Central Government to constitute a Boe.rd for any part of the territories and that means, it may
not constitute a Board for some parts of the territories. Likewise, discretion is left to the Central Government to constitute a Board for a group or class of mines and that means that for
some groups or classes of mines, no. Board need be constituted. Whether or not Boards should be constituted for parts of territories or for groups· or classes of mines, has been le!t to be determined by
the Central Government according to the require- men ts of the territories or the exigencies of the groups or classes of mines. Therefore, we are Kalipada Ohowdhur_y Union of Indio
OaJendragad!ar J. 198ll – /Ca/;pada Cli.wdhu,., Unioti oJ Indio Cajtndragadlcar J. unable to a.ocopt the argument thats. 12(1) imposes a.n obligation on the Central Government to con-
stitute Boards in order that in ma.king regulations, there should be appropriate Boards who ha.vo to be cousulted under s. 59(3). The diroctory na.t ner of the provisions of s. 121 ( l) rather strengthen the
construction placed upon s. 59(3) by this Court in the case of Ba.nwa.ri La.I Agarwalla. that if there are Boards ih existenoe, they must bo consulted before dra.ft regula.tions are published under sec-
tion 59. But that is very different from sa.ving tha.t Boards must be constituted in all- a.reas or in respect of a.II groups or cl&l!ses of mines which are intended to be covered by the regulations
proposed to be made by the Central Government .. Mr. Se.n relied on section 5 for showing that the use of the word "ma.y" in that section really means "shall"·· The ea.id section provides that tho
Central Government may a.ppoint such a person as possesses the prescribed qua.lifioations to be the Chief Inspector of Mines for all territories to which the Act extends; and it may be conceded tha.t the
implementa.tion of the ma.teria.1 provi~ions of the' Act depends upon the appointment of tho Chief Inspector of Mines and so, in the context, "ma.y" in s. 5 would rea.lly mea.n "she.II" so fa.r a.s the
appointment of the Chief Inspector is concerned. But this section itself shows tha.t "may" may not necessa.rily mean "shall" in regard to the appoint- ment of Inspectors contempla.ted by the latter pa.rt
of the said section. Whether or not the word. "may" mt1ans "may' or it mea.ns "shall" would inevitably d11pend upon the oontext in which tho ea.id word occurs a.nd a.a we have just indicated,
the context of s. 12(1) is not in favour of the con- struction for which Mr. Son contends. It oa.nnot be said that like the appointment of the Chief Inspector of llfines, the constitution of the Boards.
2 S.C.R. is essential for the working of the Aot, for, with· out the constitution of the Boards, the working of the Aot can .smoothly prooeed apace. We have already pointed out that there are only two funo·
tions which can be assigned to the Boards;. under s. 81(2) it is discretionary for the Central Govern· meut to refer a pendinir criminal case to the Board or not, and under s. 59(3) oonsultation with the
Board is necessary only if the Board is in existence. Therefore, the working of the Act is not necessarily dependent on the constitution of the. Boards, and that distinguishes the conte;t or s. 12 from the
context of section 5. If alip ,,dii Ohl)UJdhu ~' There is another provision of the Act to which reference may he made in this connection. Seotion 61 deals with the making of the bye-laws.
Section 61(1) provides that the owner, agent or manager of a mine may, and shall; if called upon to do' so by the Chief Iilspeotor, or Inspector, frame and submit to the Chief Inspector or Inspector a draft of
bye-laws in the manner indicated in the said sub-sec· tion. Section 61(2), inter alia, authorises the Chief Inspector or the Inspector to propose amend· ments in the s<.Lid draft. Section 61(3) then lays
down that if within a period. of two months from the date on which any draft bye-laws pr draft amendments are sent by the Chief Inspector or Inspe·ctor to the owner, agent or ·man~ger under
sub-section { 2). and the Chief Inspector or· Ins- pector and the owner, agent or manager are unable to agree as to the terms of the bye.Jaws to'he made under sub-section ( l); the Chief· Inspector or Ins-
pector shall refer.the draft bye-laws for settlement to the Mining Board, or.where there is no Mining Board, to such officer or authority as the Central Government may, by general or• special order,
~ppoint in this behalf. It would be noticed that this sub-section assumes that there may not be in exi- stence a Mb1ing Board in the area where the mine Unit.n of In.d1a Gaj~ratla<lkar J . ·
IraJ;/Jat/o Ch=dlii<r7 Union of Indio SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963) in question is situated or for the group or ola~s of mines to which the said mine belon2R. Now, if thfl petitioners' construction of e. 12 read with s. 59t3)
is accepted, it would follow that in order to make the regulations binding on all the minee situated in the whole of the country, there must be Mining Board in respect of all the said mines either terri-
tory-wise or group-wise or claaa-wise; and tha.t would not be consistent with the assumption made by sPction 61(3) that in certain aree.e or in respect of certain groups or cl&880s of minee a Mining Board
may not be in existence. It is in this indirect way that s.61 (3) eopports the construction which we a.re disposed to pla.ce on section 12(1). It is then urged tha.t if the respondents' con·
•truction of s.12 is upheld, s. 59(3) ors. 59(4) would be rendered nugatory and the whole purpose of con- sulting the Boarda would be defeated. We are not impressed by this argument. In testing the validity
of this argument, it is neceS&ary to recall the scheme of s. 59. Section 57 confers power on the Central Government to make regulations and s. 58 confers power on the said Government to mAke rule• as
therein specified respectively. Section 59( I) requires that the power to ma.ke regulations is subject to the condition tbat the said regulations would be made after previous publication. Section
59( 2) thE>n provides for the period which has to pass before the said draft can be taken into consider&· tion. Section 59(3) refer to th., consultation with the Boards. Lo1rically, con•ultation with the
Boards is the first step to be taken in making regula.t.ions ; publication of the draft regulatiom is -the seoond step ; allowing the prescribed period to pass before the draft is considered is the
third step and publishing the regulations after considering them is the le.et step. After the regu · lations are thus published, they shall have effect as if enacted in the Act. That is e. 59,5). The
2 S.C.R. first publication is tha publication of the draft under s. 23(3} of the Ganeral Clauses Act and it is significant that tha object oC-this publication is Kalipadav~h.wcl/Jur'
to invite objections or suggestions from person9 or Union of rrnua bodies affected by the draft regulations. Section "d Oai1nriragadkar J. 23(4) of the· General Clauses Act prov1 es that the
authority having power to make the rules or regu- lations shall consider any objection or suggestion which may be received with respect to the draft before the date "specified therein, so that t: .•. a whole object of publishing the draft is to giv£ notice to
the parties concerned with the regulations which a.re intended to be framed and the object of the requirement that the said draft will not be consi- dered until the prescribed period has passed is to
enable parties concerned to file their objections. Therefore, the scheme of s. 59 clearly shows that apart from consulting the Boards to which s. 59(3) refera, a.II parties affected by the draft would have
an opportunity to make their suggesti!)ns or objections and they would be considered before the draft is settled and regulations a.re finally made. Therefore, in our opinion, it would not be correct
to say that the construction of s. 59(3) for which the respondents contend would enable the Central Government to make regulations without consult- ing the opinion of persons affected by them. The
result then is that s. 12(1) is directory and not mandatory and s. 59(3), or s. 59(41 after the amendment in 1959 is mandatory in the sense that· before the draft regulation is published, it is obli-
gatory for the Central Government to consult the Board which is constituted under s. 12. If no Board is constituted, there can be, and need be, no consultation. It is in the light of this· position that the
grievance ma.de by the petitioners against the validity of their prosecution has to be judged. We have already noticed that it is common ground Kol pada CMu:dhu•y Union?/ India between the parties that the Madhya. Pradesh
llfin11ing Board and the West Bengal Mining Board which were constituted under s. IO of the Act of 1923 ha.ve become invalid after the amend· ment of s. IO by the Amending Act 5 of 1935.
Under s. I 0 as it originally stood, the Board was constituted by the Provincial Government and it was composed of five members. After the amend. ment, a. Board had to be constituted by the Central
Government and it was to consist of seven mem- bers. Th11.t is why the respondents concede that the Madhya. Pradesh and West Bengal Mining Boards could not be ea.id to be validly constituted for the
purpose of s. 12 even by the application of s. 24 of the Genera.I Clauses Act. The position then is that at the time when the regulations were framed in 1947, there was only one Board which properly
constituted and that is the Bihar .!\fining Board.· It was constituted in 1946 and by virtue of s. 24 of the General Clauses . Act, it continued as a valid Board under s.12. This Board has been consulted
by the Central Government before the regulations were ma.de. It is not disputed that the draft regu· lations were sent by the C<Jntral Government to the Bihar Mining Boa.rd through the State Governm mt.
It appears that after the Boa.rd received the Bllid draft, it was circulated by the Chairman of the Board to all the members of the Board and the memb~r~ communieated their · opinions individually. It is
argued that the communication by individual members of the Boa.rd of their opinions to the Central Government cannot be said to amount to the consulation with the Boa.rd and so, it is urged
th11.t the requirement of s.59( 3) has not been com- plied with. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. All that s.59(3) requi~es is that a reBfonable opportunity should be given to the
Board to make its report as to the expediency or the suitablity of the proposed regulations. How j 2 S.C.R. the Board chooses to make its report is not a matter 1 whi<ih the Central Government can control. The
Central Government has discharged its obligation as soon as it is shown that a copy of the draft regula- tions was sent to the Board, and if the Board there- after, instead of making a collective report, chose
to sent individual opinions, that cannot .be said to constitute the contravention of s.59(3). Indeed, s.59(3) does not impose an obligation on the Board to make any report at all. It is true that since
nnder s.14, the Board is empowered to make a report, it is unlikcly that any Board, when consult- ed, would refuse to make a report. But, neverthe- leSB, the position still remains that if the Board
refused to make a report, that will not introduce any infirmity in the regulations which the Central Govemment may ultimately frame and publish under s.69(5). We . must accordingly hold that the
regulations framed in 1957 have been duly framed and published under s.59(5) and as such, they shall have .effect as if enacted in the Act. The result is, the petition fails and is dismis-
sed. SUBl!A RA.o, J.-I regret my inability to agree. The facts relevant to the question raised lie in a small compass. The petitioners are in.charge of the working of a mine, known as Salanpur "A"
Seam Colliery, in the District of Burdwan, West Bengal. On the allegation that they contravened the provisions of Regulation 127(3) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 (hereinafter called the
Regulations), a criminal complaint was filed against them in the Court of Sub-divisional · Magistrate, Asan11ol, and the said Magistrate has taken cogni· zance of the said complaint under s. 190(l)(c) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, read with s. 73 of the Mines Act; 1952 (herein.after ca.lied the Act). The petitioners challenge the validity of the la.id Begula.tfons on the ground that they were
19~· KalipJda Cii.wdlru,, Union oj India Gojendragadkar J, s..w..11 .. J. 11161 lr•lipada Cliowdhury Utti•n oflnrlia Sa6bo&oJ. made in contravention of tl1e provisions of s. 59(3)
of the Act. Section 59( 3) of the Act imposes a condition ou thll Ce!ltral Govcrnm<'nt to give a reas•1nahle opportunity to a. l\lioing Board before making regultLtions in "xeroise of the power
conferred on it by tho Act. Under s.10 of the Indian Mines Act, 19J3, th:i Central Government in the ye-.r 194,; constitnt<'d the Bihar Mining Board with jurisdiction over the area. covered by
the Provinct• ai Bihar. The Central Government sent the draft Regulations to the said Boa.rd. The Chairman of the Board circulated the said draft Regulations to al I the members of the Boa.rd and the
members communicated their opinions individually to tile C..nt1al Governm~nt. Th<>reafter the Central Governmont made tho 8&id Regulations governing the whole of India, exceptJammu and Kashmir, and
to every coal mine therein, in compliance with the other provisions of s. 59 of the Act. The, qu"stiuu in this petition is whether the R6gulatiuud so made aft.,r consulting the Bihar
Board aloue wuuld be valid and in foroe in the West Bcng'Ll area so as to sustain a. criminal prose- cution ou the basis of an infringement of the said 1~eguia.tiun in respect of a mine in that area..
This question may be di>ided into two parts, namely {l) where the CE"ntral Government has not ooIJstitutcd a Mining Boar<l, can it ignore the condi- tion lait!I <lown under s. 59(3) of the Act ? and (2) if
giving a reasonable oppor~unity within the meaning of s. 511(3) of the Act is ueeessary condition for the validity of the Regulations made thereunder, can the Central Government validly make a regulation
in r,.spect of-West Bengal after giving such a. rea.so- nable opportunity to a Mining Boa.rd constituted for Bihar f In my view, the first question is directly • \. i J I ;1 2 S.C.R..
925. covered by the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal v. State of lJihar ('). There, Das Gupta .J., delivered the judgment of the Court. As it is con- tended that the ~aitl deoitiion should be confined
only a. oa.se where a Mining Boa.rd has been validly constituted under the Act a.nil should not be applied to a oaee where such a. Boa.rd has not been constitu-· ted, it would be necessary to scrutinize the decision
carefully to a.scertain the· exact scope of the ea.id 'decision. The facts of that case where there wa.s a.n accident in the Central Bhowra Colliery in Dha.nba.d in Bihar, as a result of which 23 persons
lost their lives ; the Regional lnspecwr of Mines, Dhanba.d filed a complaint against the appellant for allegedly committing an offence under s. 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, i.e., for contravening regula-
tions 107 a.nd 127 of the Coal Mines Regulations; 1957 ; after the Sub-Divisional Offioer took cogni- zance of the complaint, the appellant made. an application to the Patna. High Court under Act. 226
of the Constitution contesting the validity of the said proceedinga on the ground, inter alia, that there wa.s no Mining · Board constituted under s. 12 of the Act a.nd therefore the Central Govern-
ment ha.d made the Regulations without consulting Mllling Boa.rd a.s it sh )Uld do under. 8. 59 ( 3) of the Act. The second ground on which a prayer for qua.Bhing the proceedings was based, wit}). which
a.lone we a.re now concerned, was stated in the judgment thus : ••the Coal Mines· Regulations, 1957, a.re invalid having been framed in contravention of s. 59(3) of the Mines Act, 1952." The. conten•
tion of lea.med counsel, who ela.bota.ted this ground, was stated thus ; "As regards the other contention that the regulations are invalid the appellant's argu· ment is tha.t the provisions of s. 12 a.nd 8. 59 of the
Mines Act, 1952, a.re mandatory." Then the learn- ed Judge quoted in extenso s. 59(3) of the A'ot and (I) (1962) I S.C …. p, ·v. u""" of Iuia 66o a .. J. proceeded to state the relevant basio faots and
,.,i;;ida cA.wdhu~ posed the question raised in the case thus : '1.Uoo of India "It was not disputed before us that when the Regulations were framed, no Board as required under s. 12 had been constituted and
so, neceBSarily there had been no reference t.o any Board as required under s. 59. The question raised is whether the omiBBion to make such a refer~ce make the rules invalid." It is manifest from the question so posed that the
question considered by the Court was whether the making of the Regulation without reference to a Mining Board, as it was not in existenoe, would be invalid. Then the leamed Judge considered the
language of A. 59(3) of the . Act and observed at p. 851 : " ………… it i.e legitimate to note that the language used in thi8 case is emphatic and appears to be designed to expreSB an anxiety
of the legislature that the publication of the regulation, which is condition preoedent to the making of the regulations, should itself be subject to two conditions precedent-first,
a reference to the Mining Board concerned, and secondly, thall' sufficient opportunity to the Board to make a report as regards the expediency and suitability of the proposed regulations."
The learned Judge then prooeeded to considered the reasons for imposing such a 6ondition and observed: "Even a cursory examination of the pur· poses set in the 27 clauses of s. 57 shows that
that most of them impinge heavily on the actual working of the mines. To mention only a few of these ……………… are sufficient t<> I_ ' l= j —( ",-" 2 S.C.R. show that the very purpose of the Act may
well be defeated unless suitable and practical regulations are framed to help the achieve- ment of this purpose." Then he pointed out that s. 12 of the Act unabled the Government to appoint Boards providing repre-
sentations for different interests which would be in a position to help the Central Gov:ernment to make suitable and practical regulations. In the wortis of the learned Judge, · "The constitution is calculated to ensure
that all aspects including on the one han!'l the need for securing the safety and welfare of labour and on the other hand the practica- bility of the provision proposed from the point of view of the likely.expense and. other
considerations can be throughly examined. It is certainly to the public benefit th11.t Boards thus constituted should have an opportunity of examining regulations proposed in the first
place, by an administrative department of the government and of expressing their opinion." According to him, tho constitution of the Board in the manner prescribed served a real purpose and,
therefore, the consultation by the Central Govern- ment with such a Bo1ud was made a condition of the making of the Regulations. ·When it was con- ' tended that the insistence upon consultation might
effect the public welfare under emergent ciroum. stances, he pointed out that under . s. 60 . of the Act; which provided for such a contingency, the Central . Government mi1?ht make regulations
without previous reference to1 Mining Boards and therefore no such consideration could prevent the Court from. holding that the giving of an opportu- nity to the Boa.rd was a condition precedent to the
exeroise of the power of ma.king regulations. The learned Jildge summarised his re&Boning thus ; ,,,, Iralipada C1"111tlhw_, Unien •f lniia Sulik RaaJ. UnUm Qf India Sul1b , If•• .! •
"An axamination of all the relevant cir- cumstances viz., the language used, the scheme of the legislation, the benefit to the public on insisting on strict compliance as well as the ri8ks to public interest on insistence on
such compliance leads us to the conclusion that the legislativo intent was to insist on these provisions for consultation with the Mining Board as a. prerequisite for the validity· of
the regulations. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that in s. 60 which providing for the framing of regulations in certain cases without following the procedure enjoined in s. 59, the
lt1gislaturo took care to add by a proviso that any regulation so made "shall not remain in force for more than two yeat'8 from the making thereof'. By an amendment ma.de 111 1959 the period has boen changed to one
year. It is not unreasonable to read this proviso a.a expressing by implication the legislature's intention tha.t when the speoial oiroumeta.noes mentioned in s. 60 do not exist and there is
no scope for the application of that section no regulation ma.de in contravention of s. 59 will be valid for a. single day." The learned Judge concluded his discussion thus, a' p. 853 :
"For all the reasons giving above, we are of opinion that the provisions of s. 59(3( of the Mining Act, 1952, are ma.ndRtory." PRusirg here for a moment., I find it very difficult
to bold thi<t thiA CCturt held, expreBBly or by neces- sary impli~ation, thats. 59(3) of the Act w~s maDd81 (IJ'V ()D)y if I be C(ll!Cl'Jncd ll<1ard ….. ID exit!tntt: 'Jbe al(\lllf'llt 'ld'tHlf(~. tile q~Mil>ll
j /f y . ../ 2 S.C.R. posed, the reasons given and ~he conclusion arrived at were all against giving suoJi· a limited scope to the said judgment. It was contended that both s. 12 and e: 59
were mandatory. In posing the question to be decided, the learned Judge olearly referred to "the omission to make auch a reference". The word "such" clearly refers to the omission to make
a reference, as no Board was constituted under s. 12 of the Act. So, as regards the posing of the question there was absolutely no ambiguity and the learned Judge had clearly in mind what the
Court was asked to decide upon. The reasons given by the learned Judge for holding that it was obligatory of the Central Government to consult the Board before the making the regulation would
equally apply whether the Boa.rd existed or not. The conclusion arrived at by the lea.med Judge that consultation with such a Board was a condi- tion precedent for the exercise of the power would
.apply to both the cases. If it was a . conditfon precedent for the exercise of the power, how could it cease to be one if a Board was not in existence? The condition is not the existence of the Board,
but the consultation with a Board. In one case, the Government would not consult the Board though it existed, and in the other c;tse it would not cClllsult, as the Board did not exist. In either oase, the
, condition was broken. But it fa said that the la.st three paragraphs of the judgmen1; make it clear that the learned Judge was not considering the case where a Board had not been oomtituted.
There, the learned Judge was considerinj( the question · whether the Mining Boards constituted under s. 10 of the Mines Act, 1923, were continu- ing to operate at the ti<ne the Regulation were
made and there was full consultation with the Mining. Boards before the Regulatio. ns we. re framed. But the ltllnled lallp wae aot able~ deciide ti. X alipada ChowJAurt: Uninn of IUia
E ubh Ru J. Kalipoda C~u:dl111ry v. i:,.ion of /Mia Stil ba Rao J. question, as there was not sufficient material on the record. Therefore, this Court directed the Magis- trate to decide that question. I fail to see how
these paragraphs in any way help us to hold that this Court confined its decision only to a cue where a Board has been con~tituted. On the other hand, the observations in the first of these three para-
graphs clearly indicate to the contrary. The relevant observations are : "As has been pointed out above, it was not disputed before us that at time when the t regulations were fr.amed to new Mining Board
had been constituted under the Mines Aot, l 9f>2 and consequently no consultation with any Mining Board constituted under the 1952 Act took place." Thie shows that the entire judgment up to that
point proceeded on the basis that there was no consultation with the MiniDg Board, as no auoh Board wa..s constituted. Thereafter the le&rDed .T udge was only considering the alternative conten-
tion advanced by the St11.te, namely, that the pre.existing Board was consulted and that that consultation was sufficient compliance with . the provisions of s. 59( 3) of the Act. If I might
analyse the mind of the learned Judge, the prooeaB of reasoning may be summarized thus: On behalf of the appellant it was argued that there was no ' consultation with the Board as it was not consti-
tuted under s. 12 of the Aot and, therefore, the Regulatiom made under the Aot without euoh consultation were void. The learned Judge accepted the contention. Then it was argued for the
Government that thoUih there was no consultation with the Board constituted under s. 12 of the Aot, consultation with a pre-existing Board would be enough compliance with the section. As there was
no material on the record, the learned Judge could 2 S.C.R. SUPEME COURT REPORTS not decide on that question and therefore directed it to be decided by the Magistrate. On the other·
hand, as it was common case that no Board under s. 12 of the Act had been constituted, if the con- tention of the Government, now pressed be.fore us, was correct, no other question would have arisen
for, according to the State, s. 59(3) could not be invoked in a case where no Board had been in existence. The plea that there was a consultation with the pre-existing Board was taken not by the
appellant but by the State and such a plea would be unnecessary if s. 58 (3) of the Act did not lay down the condition of consultation with the Board when it did not exist. To my mind, the judgment of the Coart is
clear and unambiguous on this point and it decided that, as there was no consultation with any Mining Board under a. 59(3) of the Act, as the Board was not in existence, the Regulations were bad. The
present argament is an attempt to persuade u_s to go back on a clear pronouncement on the point by a Constitution Bench of the Court. That apart, I am satisfied on a trne construc-
tion of the provisions of s. 12 and s. 59(3) of the Act that. the Central Government has to exercise the power under s. 12 if it intends to exercise the power under s. 59 of the Act. Under s. 12~-"the
Central Government may constitute for any part " of the territories to which this Act extends or for any . group or class of mines, a Mining Board", consisting of persons with specific qualifications
representing different interests in the miues. Under q. 59, the power to make regulation con• · ferred by s. 57 is subject to the condition of the regulations being made after previous publication,
and under sub-fl. (3) thereof "Before the draft of any regulations is published under this section it shall be re~erred to every Mining Board which is, .in the opi_nion of the Central Government, COJl·
19~2 Kalipar/a Ohowtlhwy Union of India Subba RaoJ. ]( alipaia Chowdhuv Uriion of lnJ.-a S .bl>o Rao J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1933] cerned with the subjeot dealt with by the regula-
tion, anrl the regulation shall not be so published until each such Board has had a reasonable oppor- tunity of reporting as to the oxpediency of making the same and as to the suitability of its provisions".
As interpreted by this Court, the said condition is a condition precedent for the making of the Regu- lations under the ssid section. If the contention of the learned Solicitor-General be accepted, the
condition may have to be diSBnnexed from the power by a situation brought about the concious withholding of the exercise of the connected power bv the Central Government under s. 12 of the Act.
central Government by its own default can ignore the condition impoaed in public interest. The construction leading to this anom~lous result can- not be accepted unleBB the provisions compel us to
d0 so. It is a well 11ettled principle of construction that when it is po88ible to do so, it. is the duty of the Court to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that th1:>y harmonies.
To put it differ- 1>ntly, of two possible oonetru~tions, one which givl's a consistent meaning to different part~ of an enactment ~hould be preferred. In the instant case, the two sections can be harmonized without
doing violence to the language used. ~eotion 12 is an enabling provision under it a power is given to the Central Government to appoint a Mining Boa.rd. Section 57, read with s. 59, confers.;,an-
other power on the Central Government to make regulation subject to, among others a condition that the draft of the regulations shall be referred to a Mining Board. These two powers are con.
nected: if they are read together, as we should do in an attempt to reconcile them, it could be reason: ably held that the power conferred under s. 12 has to be exercised by the Central Govl'rnment if it
intends to make regulations. under s. 57 of the Act. Thia oonairuct.ion carries out \he full inttntion of LegiBlature i'1 enacting a.fill ae inte1 p1eted by thia 2 S.C.R. Court. Both the powers can be exercised without
tho one detracting from the other. The conatruc tion suggested by the respondents enables the Central Gvvernment to defeat tho public purpose underlying the imposition of the condition_ under
e.59 of the Act and tha.t suggested by the petitioners enables the <'Xercise of the two powers without the one coming into conflict with the other. I would on the principle of harmonious construction, prefer
to accept the latter construction to the former. Let us took at the provisions from a different perspective. It is a well established doctrine that when the power is coupled with a duty -of the
person to whom it is given to exercise it, then the exercise of the power is imperative: see Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes, Il th Ei:ln., p. 234. It has · also been· h1>ld that "if the object for which the
power is conferred contemplates giving of a right, there would then be a duty cast on person to whom tho power is given to exercise it for the benefit of the party to whom the right is given when
required on hi8 behalf." Dealing with s. 51, Income-tax Act, 1918, which provides that. the Chief Revenue Authority "may" state tho case to High Court Lord Phillimore observ€d in Alcock
Aslul.<Ywn & Oo. v. The Okie/ Rel!<'nue Authority Bombay('}: "No doubt that the section does not say that the authority "shall" state . the case, it only says that it may and it is rightly urged
that "may" does not mean "shall", only tho capacity or power is given to the authority. But when a capacity or power is given to a public authority there may be circums- tances which · couple with the -power a
duty to exercise it, and where there is a serious j (I) A. I. R. 1923 P. C. 138. Ka/ipada Ohowdhury v. Unioti of India ·ubba Rao J. 1116t A alitad• Cloowdiu..y Union of India Subba RaoJ.
SUPREME OOUR'I' REPORTS [1963] point of law to be considered there does lie a duty upon the Revenue authority to state a OQ86 for opinion of the Court and ifhe does not a.ppreoia.te that there is such a !klrious
point, it is in the power of the t..:ourt to con- trol him a.nd to order him to state the case." Under the Act, there a.re two conneotod powers – a. power to appoint a Mining Boa.rd and a power to
make regulations subjer:t to a. condition. The con- dition imposed on the power confel'8 a right on a. Mining Board to be oonsultcd before a regulation is made. A combined rea<ling of H. 12 and ss. 57
and 59 shows that the power or powers conferred on the Central Government are coupled with a. duty to consult the Bo~rd whenever the Central Government seeks to exeroise the power under s.:"i7.
T have no hesitation in holding that the power is coupled with a. duty and that the power has to be exercised when the duty demands it. The Central Government in ma.king the Regulations has a duty
to consult the Mining Board a.nd the Mining Boa.rd has a right to be so consulted; and to discharge its duty it is incumbent upon the Central Government to exeroise the connected pawer by appointing the
Board. It is said that under s. 59 of the Act, tho Regulations and tho Rules shall be referred to a Mining Board and that under s. 58 the Central Government ha.I! the power to make a rule provid-
ing for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Mining Boa.rd and thf\t if s. 59 is mandatory, the Government ean never exercise the power under s. 58(a). No such difficulty could
arise unrler the Act before its amendment in 1959. Under s. 59(3), as it stood then, the condition of consultation with a Mining Board was :mposed only on the power of tho Gov<'mm1mt to mak~ a. regu-
lation and that s. 57 of the Act which confers a 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPOR'l'S power on the Central GovE>rmnent to make regula- tions did not contain any olause corresponding to
cl. (a) of s. 58 of the Act. That a.part, s. 58 (a) may legitimately be invoked by the Centre.I Government only- after a Boa.rd had been consti- tuted in regard to the future appointments. Any-
how, this argument may have some bearing when this question of construction of the provisions of s. 59 was raised before . this Court on the last occasion and none at present, as the true contruc-
tion of the said s~ction wa.s finally settled by this Court. That a.part, a. comparative study of the other provisions of the Act ·would also lead to the same ce>nclusion. Under the Act, there are many enabl-
ing provisiOns empowering the Centre.I Government to appoint specified authorities to discharge differ- ent duties and functions described in various sec- tions. Sheuld it be held that the Central Govern-
ment need not appoint the authorities under any circumstances, the Act would become a dead letter. Even the appointment of the Chief Inspector and Inspectors is left to the discretion of the Centre.I
Government: see s. 5 of the Act. If the Govern- ment need not appoint the Chief Inspector or the Inspec\ors, the duties and functions allotted to them could not be discharged or performed. A
reasonable construction would, therefore,· be that if the said duties and functions have to be per- formed, the Go:vernment has to appoint the officers. So too, if the Central Government seeks to exercise
the powers under s. 57 of the · Act, read with s. 59 thereof, it has to appoint the Board. I, therefore, hold on a. fair construction of ss. 12 and 59 of the Act, that the Centre.I Govermnent ha.a a dnty to
appoint the Mining Board if it seeks to exeroise its power under s. 57 of the Act. The next argument is that the Bnla.r Boa.rd has been consulted in the manner presoribed by Kali/Jada Chowdhury
v. Union of India Sabba Rao J. ' ,. i:suPREME couRT B.:EiioRfs frn6a1 s. 59(3). of the Act and, ·therefore, the regulation made after such consultation are .valid. I cannot Kalipada Choudhu'Y
. v. agree with this co1 tention either. The said Board Unwnofl.,,J;a was appointed under s. 10(1) of the Indian Mines su117:;- J __ Act, 1923 and it is not disputed that the Board
' "" · ' must be deemed to have been duly constituted under the present Act. It is also not disputed .. -that the 'said ·_Board was only constituted to have jurisdiction over the area comprised in the present
. Bihar State, that is, it· hlls no jurisdktion .over West Bengal •. Under s. 12 of the Act, the Central Government may constitute for any part of the ' territories to which this Act extends or for
any group or _class of a Mines, — a Mining Board. Under s. 59, the Central Government shall _ refer the draft to every Mining Board which, in the opinion of the Central Government, is concerned
with the subject dealt with b.r the regulation. Now, can it be said that the Board constituted for a part of the territories to which the Act extends, namely, – to tho State of Bihar, could be a Board concerned
with the . subject dealt with by the regulations, . namely, the mines in_ West Bengal area? The – entire object o( s. 59 is to consult the persons inti- mately connected with the mining operations of a
particular area so that suitable regulations may be made. to govern the working of th ode mines. It could never have been the intention : of the Legislature to empower the Government to make
regulations in regard to mines in one part of the · . country – by consulting a Board constituted for another part of the country. Such an intention could :r;iot be attributed to the Legislature._ Indeed,
the Central Government, when it is constituted the Boards, expressly indicated its intention that all the Boards, including the Board · functioning in West Bengal, should be consulted, but as the Board _
constituted there was not one constituted legall.i:: under the Act, the consultation with.the said Board. _,…,. 2 s.c.n.. SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S 93'1 had become futile. I, therefore, hold that the Regula-
tions in so far as they purport to· regulate the mines situate in West Bengal have not been validly made under the Act inasmuch as a. condition pre- cedent imposed. by s. 59. of the Act on the exercise
ofthe Government's power to make a regulation was not complied with. In the result, I direct the issue of a writ of prohibition against respondents 1 to 4 res training them from proceeding with · the criminal case
launched against the petitioners. The petitioners will have their costs. ' "' BY ComtT : In view of the majority opinion of the Court the Writ Petition fails and is dis- missed. THE NATIONAL STEEL WlJRKS LTD.
. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR,. A. K. SARKAR, M. HrnAYATlJLLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) Income-tax-Agreement by qunla·holder to aupply steel to manufacturer at a certain royalty fl'r to" -Receipt of lump aum in lieu of royaUy-Asaessm1mt on amounl received-'-!/ according lo
Zaw-Oapital receipt and revenue receipt-Distinction-'- Indian Income·tax Act, 1922,(11of1922), s, 66A (2). The assessee company was receiving quota of coal and steel from the Government but had no factory. It entered into a partnership with a penon who had a factory but no quota. The latter agreed to pay a royalty of Rs. 50 per ton of steel supplied to the firm under the quota. A few years later,. .that agreement was modified and the assessee agreed to receive a lump sum of Rs. 60;000 in consideration of waiving the· roy- ' ••
Kalipada Chowdhur,,11 · . v. U 11ion of India Bubba Ra• J, M'!JI 3 •