c KAL YAN SINGH, LONDON TRAINED, CUTTER, JOHRI BAZAR, JAIPUR v. SMT. CHHOTI AND ORS. DECEMBER I, 1989 [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND A.M. AHMADI, JJ.] Indian Succession Act: Will-Execution and validity-Open to court to look into surrounding circumstances brought out in evidence. Civil Procedure Code: Order I Rule 8-Representative Suit-
Permission of court-Mandatory. Indian Evidence Act: Sections 63 and 79-Secondary evidence- Correctness and proof of certified copy-Necessity of. This case is concerned with a garden with temples and other buildings at Jaipur claimed to be the property of Darjee (Tailors) com- munity popularly known as 'Bagichi Darjian'. It was claimed by diffe- rent persons at different intervals on different grounds. One Narayan, Pujari on the temples was said to have sold the Bagichi in favour of one Khawas Bala Bux. Darjee community filed a suit for cancellation of that sale and declaration of its right to administer the property. The Trial Court dismissed the suit bnt on appeal District Judge decreed it and this decree was affirmed by the Chief Court of Jaipur. But after 23 years on the death of Narayan his eldest son Bhonrilal-respondent No. 3 herein who became the Pujari attempted to get his name mutated in revenue records as owner of the Bagichi. On behalf of the Darjee com- munity the appellant herein together with one Khawas Suraj Narayan filed a suit in 1951 for his ejectment. This suit was decreed in favour of the Darjee community. Appeal against that decree by Bhonrilal was dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur. Second appeal in the High Court too failed.
However, even before the disposal of the aforesaid Second appeal, Gangaram the younger brother of Bhonrilal started another round of litigation. He filed a declaratory suit claiming the ownership of the Bagichi and temples on the basis of sale deed dated Baishakh Sudi 12th Samvat 1932 (about 1875 A.D.) and a Will purported to be executed in 1916A.D.inhisfavour.
KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. CHHOTI The Trial Judge decreed the suit in his favour. The defendants' appeal was dismissed hy the District Judge upholding the validity of the said Sale Deed and the Will. On further appeal, the High Court rejected the validity of the Sale Deed as well as that of the Will which formed the foundation of Ganga Ram's title. But instead of allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit the High Court declined to interfere wit_h the decree of the Court below though holding that the plaintiff's suit was a fruitless exercise.
Kalyan ·Singh the defendant challenged the decree of the High Court in this Court on two counts. Firstly that the suit against Bhonrilal was of a representatives character which could not be nullified by the present suit against individuals. Secondly the High Court after discard- ing the Sale Deed and the Will ought to have non-suited the plaintiff since there was no other material whatever to support the title. While allowing the appeal and modifying the judgment and decree of the High Court, this Court,
HELD: In the absence of permission under Order I Rule 8 CPC to file a representative suit which is mandatory any member of the community may successfully bring a suit to assert his right in the community property or for protecting such property. Such a suit need not comply with the requirements of Order I Rule 8 C.P.C. and the suit against Bhonrilal even if it was not a representatives suit on behalf of the Darjee Community would be a suit of this category. [363D-EJ It is essential that trust worthy and unimpeachable evidence should be produced before the Court to establish genuineness and authenticity of the Will. It must be stated that the factum of execution and validity of the Will cannot be determined merely by considering the evidence produced by the propounder. In order to judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the truth from falsehood the Court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would be open to the court to consider circumstances brought out in the evidence or which appear from the nature and contents of the documents itself. It would be also open to the Court to look into surrounding circumstances as well as inherent improbabilities of the case of reach a proper conclusion on the nature of the evidence adduced by the party. [366E-FI
The Will in the instant case, constituting the plaintiff as a sole legatee with no right whatever to the testator's wife seems to be unnatural. It casts a serious doubt on the genuineness of the Will. The Will has not been produced for very many years before the Court or c
c [ 1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R. public authorities even though there were occasions to produce it for asserting plaintiff's title to the property. The plaintiff was required to remove these suspicious circumstances by placing satisfactory material on record. He bas failed to discharge his duty. This Court concurs with the conclusion of the High Court and rejects the Will as not genuine. [368A-B I
Section 63 of the Evidence Act mentions five kinds of secondary evidence. Clauses (1), (2) and (3) refer to copies of documents; clause (4) refers to counter-parts of documents and clause ( 5) refers to oral accounts of the contents of documents. Correctness of certified copies referred to in clause (1) is presumed under section 79 but that of other copies must be proved by proper evidence. A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. [369B-C]
H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors., [1959] Supp. I SCR 426; Rani Purnima Devi & Anr. v. V. Kumar Khagendra D Narayan Dev & Anr., [1962] 3 SCR 195; Smt. lndu Bala Bose & Ors. v. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr., [1982] 1 SCC- 20 and Mst. Biro v. Atma Ram & Ors., AIR 1937 PC 101.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 135 l(N) of 1973. From the Judgment and Decree dated 14.3.1973 of the Rajas- than High Court in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 201of1966. K.K Jain, Pramod Dayal and A.D. Sanger for the Appellant.
U .N. Bachavat, Sushil Kumar Jain, Sudhanshu Atreya and L.C. Agarwala for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by special leave is
G from the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated March 14, 1973 in S.B. (Civil) 2nd Appeal No. 201 of 1966. The case has a long history. It is concerned with a garden (b11ghichi) with temples of Sri Satyanaraya'nji, Sri Mahadeoji and other buildings at Motidungri Road in Jaipur. The local Darjees H (Tailors) claim that it is their community property. According to them KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. CHHOTI [SHETTY, J.]
it is known as 'Baghichi Darjian' since it belongs to Darji community. The property however, was the subject-matter of several litigations. It was claimed by different persons at different intervals on different grounds. One Narayan was admittedly 'Pujari' of the Temples. There was allegation that Narayan purported to have sold the Baghichi in favour of one Khawas Bala Bux. The Panchas of Darjian community filed a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed and possession of the baghichi. The suit was also for declaration of the right to administer the trust of the temples and the other properties. Narayan was the first defendant in that suit. He did not contest the suit. He was, however, summoned and his statement was recorded on July 8, 1925, wherein he admitted that he was only the Pujari of the temples. The other defendants in the suit set up rival title to the property relying upon the sale deed of Samvat 1932 in the name of Raghunath. The trail court dismissed the suit but on appeal the District Judge decreed it. That decree was affirmed by the former Chief Court, Jaipur by judgment Ex. A 8 dated September 15, 1928.
Thereafter, for about 23 years there was no problem and there was no rival claimant to the property. But the dispute started after the death of Narayan. His eldest son Bhonrilal respondent 3 herein, made attempts to get his name mutated in the revenue records as owner of the baghichi. It appears that Bhonrilal after the death of his father was acting as Pujari of the temples. The. Darjian community authorised Kalyan Singh, the appellant herein, as well as one khawas Suraj Narayan to bring an action for ejectment of Bhonrilal. ln 1951 they instituted a suit for his ejectment. In that suit Bhonrilal admitted the Panchayat's right to the baghichi but raised a number of other pleas including his title by adverse possession. In 1966 the Munsif Court (West Jaipur) decreed the suit in favour of the Darji community. In 1958 ·the appeal against that decree was dismissed by the senior civil Judge, Jaipur City. Bhclnrilal preferred,Second Apeal No. SC of 1958 in the High Court of Rajksthan and obtained stay of delivery of posses- sion on depositing mesfie profits at Rs.25 per month. On September 15, 1960, the High Court dismissed the second appeal. Thus the title of the Darjee community in respect of the baghichi was again recognised. Even before dispasal of the aforesaid second appeal, Ganga Ram the younger brother of I;lhonrilal:started another round of litigatiop. On December 12, 1959, he brought a declaratory suit claiming that he is owner of the property consisting of baghichi and temples. In this appeal we are concerned with the right claimed by him. The suit was c
primarily against the present appellant Kalyan Singh and Suraj I J989) Supp. 2 S.C.R. Narayan, since deceased. Bhonrilal was also impleaded as the third A defendant. Ganga Ram based his title to the property under a sale deed dated Baishakh Sudi 12th Samvat 1932 (about 1875 A.D.) and also on a will dated Asaj Sudi 12th Samvat 1973 (about 1916 A.D.). It was further alleged that the bagichi belonged to Bhagala and Girdhari and they sold the s~me to Raghunath Brahmin. Raghunath construc- B ted the temple of Sri Satyanarain ji and other buildings. Raghunath had only one son called Gaurilal and he was issueless. Garuilal executed a will giving all his properties to Ganga Ram. It was alleged that the earlier suit against Bhonrilal was collusive between the parties. With these allegations, Ganga Ram prayed for the following reliefs:
c "(a) the plaint of the plaintiff be decreed and the plaintiff be declared as the owner of the aforesaid propety. The plaintiff is the onwer of the property mentioned in Para No. 1. The decree which the defendant Nos. I and 2 had
obtained on 20.8. 1956 against the Defendant No. 3 and was upheld by the Senior Civil Judge on 6.2. 1958, is null and void against the claim of the plaintiff." The appellant the first defendant in the suit denied plaintiff's title to the baghichi. He also denied the title of Bhagala and Girdhari. It was maintained that the baghichi was community property of Darjees and Narayan was only a 'Pujari' of the temples. Narayan continued as Pujari till his death in 1950 and thereafter his eldest son Bhonrilal was acting as Pujari. Reference was made to the judgment of the Chief Court of Jaipur in the first suit against Narayan and judg- ments in the second suit against Bhonrilal. In view of those litigations and judgments rendered therein, it was claimed that the present suit was barred by principle of res judicata. It was also specifically stated that the suit against Bhonrilal was not collusive but brought on behalf of the Darjee community in a representative capacity.
The trial Judge on considering the evidence produced by the parties decreed the suit declaring the plaintiff as owner of the suit G property. It was also declared that the plaintiff is not bound by the judgment and decree dated September 15, 1928 of the Chief Court of the erstwhile State of Jaipur. But no reference was made to the judg- ment and decree obtained in the suit against Bhonrilal. No declaration was given that it was not binding on the plaintiff though that relief was specifically sought for. Perhaps the plaintiff did not press that point. H Kalyan Singh and Suraj Narayan appealed to the District Court. The KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. ClilidTI lSHE'lTY, J.]
'learned District Judge dismissed the appeal. He also did' not refer to the judgment in the suit against Bhonrilal. He only examined the validity of the said Sale deed and Will and held that they were proved to have been executed. The defendants approached the High Court in S.econd Appeal No. 201/41 Before the High Court, they sought to produce additional evidence. They moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. to accept a certified copy of the judgment dated September 15, 1928 of the Chief Court of tfie erstwhile jai!iur State and a copy of the sfaiement of Narayan re·corded in that suii. The High Court accepted the judgment of the Chief Court of Jaipui State, but rejected ihe Statement cif Narayan.
During the pendency of the appeal in tlie High C6iiii Sura j Narain died and his name was deleted from the appeal·meino. Ganga Ram also died and his, wife and foil were broilghf 6ilieoofd' as !\is legal representatives.
The principal question argued before the High Court iel~ted to the validity of sale deed (Ex. 3) and will (Ex. 4) which fOhned the foundation of Gangaram's title to the suit property. The' High Court rejected both the documents. The sale deed Ex. 3' was rejected as inadmissible in evidence. The will Ex. 4 was disregarded ii:i view of the suspicious circumstances surrounding iis execution. These corldusions would. have been sufficient for allowing the appeal anii dismissing the suit. But the High Court. did not do that and instead rounded off the discussion as follows:
"The plaintiff is undoubtedly in possesion of the Baghichi and it cannot be gainsaid that he was not a party to the previous litigation and he is not claiming the property though his father Narayan or his brother Bhonrilat Apart
from everything, the suit d6es not seein to have beeri filed against Kalyan Singh and another iri a representative capacity in accordance with Order !Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code. There was no appicatiori f'M permission fo sue ilietn in their representative capacity. Therefore, in spite Of my having reached the conclusion· regarding· the document
Ex. 3 and. 4 against tl\e plaintiff respondents I am not ipclined to interfere with the decree of the court below though I do feel that the litigation againstKalyan Singh"ahd another in their individual capacity was a' fruitless
. exercise." c · [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R. Kalyan Singh the defendant has now appealed challenging the decree of the High Court. c Counsel for the appellant has a two fold contention. In the first place, it was argued that the Darjee community in their representa- tive suit against Bhonrilal has obtained a decree declaring their title to the property and that decree could not be nullified by the present suit against individuals. The High Court instead of holding that the plaintiff's suit was a fruit'l:ss exercise, ought to have dismissed the suit. Secondly, it was urged that the High Court after discarding the sale ideed Ex. 3 and will Ex. 4 ought to have non-suited the plaintiff since there is no .other material whatever to support his title to the property. Normally, these contentions would have been accepted without much discussion, but we have to consider the submissions of counsel for the respondents. He challenged the correctness of the findings 011 all material points. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the judgment in greater detail.
We will first consider whether the previous suit against Bhonrilal was a representative suit on behalf of the Darjee community. It was argued for the respondents that it was only a suit on behalf of the 'Panchayat Darjian' and not a representative suit on behalf of the Darjee community. Our attention was drawn to the trail court order dated November 16. 1962 in the present suit. Thereunder the trial court has rejected an application for amendment of written statement. It was observed that the defendants in the affidavit have not denied allegations of the plaintiff that the suit against Bhonrilal was not in a representative capacity. But the Court made that observation only on perusing the affidavits of parties for a limited purpose of considering the amendment application and not on an issue arising out of pleadings in the suit. In fact, the court has not framed any issue on that con- troversy although the defendant in the written statement has asserted that it was a representative suit on behalf of the Darjee community. The view expressed in the order dated November 1962 is therefore, unacceptable.
Counsel for the appellant however, relied upon statements from judgments in the previous suit in support of his contention that it was representative suit on behalf of the Darjee community. Ex. A-2 is the judgment of the trial court. It begins with a sentence: "This is a .rep- resentative suit by the plaintiffs Kalyan Singh and Suraj Narayan on H behalf of the Panchayat Darjian for recovery of possession of the KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. CHHOTI [SHETTY, J.]
3(i3 baghichi." But this statement may not help counsel for the appellant, since the suit was said to be on behalf of the 'Panchayat Darjian' and not Darjee community. Ex. A-4 is the High court judgment in the second appeal arising out of that suit. There th.e High court has stated: "That the suit was brought by Kalyan Singh"and another against Bhonrilal by the representatives of Darjee community." .Here again we do not find mucl:i support to the appellant. The suit might have been instituted by representatives of the Darjee community, but that by itself was not sufficient to constitute the suit as a representative suit. For a representative suit, the court's permission under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory. One does not know whether any such permission was obtained. The pleading in that suit or the order obtained under Order I Rule 8 has not been pro- duced. There is no other evidence to support the contention of either of the parties. In the absence of necessery material the conclusion one way or the other as to the nature of the previous suit will not be justified.
But that does not mean that the plaintiff could succeed ignoring the judgment and decree in the suit against Bhonrilal. It must be stated that any member of a community may successfully bring a suit to assert his right in the community prqperty or for protecting such property by seeking removal of encroachments thereform. Such a suit need not comply with the requirements of Order I Rule 8. The suit against Bhonrilal even if it was not a representative suit on behalf of the Darjee community would be a suit of this category. Kalyan Singh and another claimed that the baghichi was their community property and Bhonrilal was a trespasser. They brought the suit to recover possession . from Bhonrilal. The suit was decreed. The rival title claimed by Bhonrilal by adverse possession was negatived. So long as that decree operates it would be futile to decree the present suit. The observation of the High Court that the present suit is a fruitless exercise could therefore, be sustained on this ground if not for the reasons stated. The validity of the will may now be considered. On this question, the High Court said:
"Having read the evidence of these witnesses I am satisfied that according to the ordinary standard of proving a docu- ment the document Ex. 4 can be said to have been proved. However, there are two disturbing elements surrounding
the execution of the will. The first striking feature of this c will is that even though the wife of Gaurilal was living at c [ 1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R. the time as she had survived him, no provision whatsoever
had been made regarding her by Gaurilal in the alleged will Ex. 4. Then the second striking feature is that even though litigation had been going on almost for years this will had not been referred to by anyone. In the first suit Narain was a defendant he had not contested th~ suit and the proceed- ings remained _ex parte against him. However, he was called by the Court and his statement was recorded. The judg-
ment of the Jaipur Chief Court shows that he had laid no claim to the property and took the position that he was a Pujari at the baghichi. Then subsequently when suit was filed by the Darzi community against Bhonrilal, no refe-
rence came to be made to this will Ex. 4 Learned counsel for the respondents, as I have already observed, suggested that Narain or Bhonrilal could not be expected to make any reference to the will as that would be detrimental to the
stand taken ·by them. The argument, no doubt, looks attractive, but if it is examined in the light of none other than the statement of Ganga Ram himself it cannot stand the scrutiny. Gangaram had referred to the earlier litiga- tion in the plait, but when he entered the witnesses box he had taken a somersault. He was asked whether he was
aware of the prevous litigation and he said, he did not know of it. He was then questioned with reference to para 5 of the plaint as to how the facts had been mentioned by him therein and he kept mum and had no answer. He also
admitted that it was Narain who had given him the docu- ment, Ex. 4 some 5 or 7 years after the death of Gaurilal i.e. some 30 or 35 years back. In that situation there was no mention of the alleged .will in any of the two previous suits. It is also remarkable that even upto the High Court Bhonri- lal had asserted his own possession over the property and
bad also obtained a stay order on payment of mesne profits vide Ex. A-7. xxxxx xxxxx The will is, therefore, not free from suspicion and it bas not been dispelled. My conscience in this regard is not satisfied and therefore, I am unable to hold that Ex. 4 was the last will of Gaurilal in favour of Ganga Ram".
Counsel for the respondents however, urged that the plaintiff has KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. CHHOTI [SHETTY, J.] proved its execution by producing one of the attestors and the scribe and their evidence has not been disbelieved by the High Court. We were referred, in particular, to the evidence of plaintiff PW 3, Ramdeo PW 4 and Sham Sunder PW 7. We have perused their testimony and we are of the opinion that it is far from satisfactory. The plaintiff has deposed that Gaurilal was issueless and hence executed the will bequea- thing the property to him. Ramdeo claims to be the attesting witness to the will. He has stated that the plaintiff was 10- 11 years old when the will was executed. But the plaintiff himself has deposed that he was then a boy of 2-3 years. Ramdeo has given his age as 55 years when he deposed in the court on January 5, 1962. If we go by that age Ramdeo must have been a boy of 9 years when he attesteC: the will in 1916 Sham Sundar claims to be the scribe of the wilt. He has deposed that after he wrote the will attestation was made by witnesses but he has not named any one of them. He has not even referred to Ramdeo as an attesting witness.
It was said that the plaintiff was adopted son of Gaurilal, and was thus the object of his affection for the exclusive bequest. But there is no reference in the will that he was the adopted son. The plaint also makes no reference to his adoption by Gaurilal. Nor there is any other material to lend credence to such relationship. On the contrary, the Temple register shows that he was the son ofNarayana.
Even if we proceed on the plea that the plaintiff was adopted son of Gaurilal, there seems to be little reason to justify the bequest exclu- sively in his favour. It is now not in dispute that Gaurilal's wife was living at the time of execution of the will, but no provision was made for her maintenance. In the normal course, the wife would be the first to be thought of by the husband executing a will. She should have been the first beneficiary of her husband's bounty unless there was odium or embittered feelings between them. But there is no such evidence and it was not even the plaintiff's case that their relationship was strained. Why then she should be excluded altogether? It is indeed baffling since it runs counter to our societal values.
Yet there is another circumstance· which tells against the genuineness of the will. The will purports to have been executed in 1916 and Gangaram instituted the suit in 1959. The will had not seen the light of the day till the institution . of the suit. It. is not as if Gangaram or his brother or father had no opportunity_ to produce the will to assert rights over the property in question. The plaintiff has ·_stated in his evidence that his father Narayan handed over the will to c
c 366. [ 1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R. him. Narayan was therefore, aware of the execution of the will. Yet he did not disclose it to the court in the suit against him. His statement was recorded Qn July 8, 1925 wherein he had admitted that he was only the. Pujari of the temple and the wife of Baldeo sold the property. He did not say that his son Gangaram became owner of the property under the will executed by Gaurilal. In ,the second suit, Bhonrilal set up independent title tq the property by adverse possession. That claim was totally destructive of Gangaram's title. It cannot be said that Gangaram was ignorant of that litigation till he filed the suit. His evidence does not lead .to that inference. In fact the plaint averments and his statements in the court lead to the contrary. Gangaram, however, made no attempt to produce the will in that suit. In the'long period of 43 years, ilone'made any attempt to rely upon the will against the claim of the !Jarji commumty when the community representatives have successfully orought two suits. This would not have been the natural conduct of person if the will had been really in existence. It has been said
1almost too frequently to require repetition that a will is one of the most solemn documents known to law. The executant of the will cannot be called to deny the execution or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. It is, therefore, essential that trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence should be pr_oduced before the court ~o .establish genuineness and authenticity of the will. It must be stated that the factum of execution and validity of the will cannot be determined merely by considering the evidencne produced by the pro- pounder. In order to judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the truth from falsehood the court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would be' open to the court to consider circumstances brought out in the evidence or which appear from the nature and contents of the documents itself. It would be also open to the court to look into surrounding circumstances as well as inherent improbabiiities of the case to reach a proper conclusion on the nature of the evidence adduced by the party.
In H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors., [ 1959] Supp. 1 SCR 426 Gajendragarkar, J., as he then was, has observed that although the mode of proving a will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document, nonetheless it requires an element of solemnity in the decision on the question as to whether the document propounded is proved as the last will and testament of departed testator. Where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will could be accepted as genuine. Where there are KALYAN SINGH v. SMT. CHHOTI [SHETTY, J.I
suspicious circumstances, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the docu- ment is accepted as the last will of the testator. These principles have been reiterated in the subsequent decisions of this Court in Rani Purnima Devi & Anr. v. V. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev & Anr., Tl962J 3 SCR 195 and Smt. Indu Bala Bose & Ors. v. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr., [1982] l SCC 20.
The Privy Council in Mt. Biro v. Atma Rarlr & Ors., AIR 1937 PC 101 had an occasion to consider an analogous case where the wife was practically disinherited and there was unexplained delay in pro- ducing the will in public. There the alleged will by a testator gave only a life estate to his daughter who was the only child and who was to get some property at her marriage. The bulk of the estate was vested in the widow of the testator and three other women, namely, his mother, his step-mother and his paternal aunt. These women though entitled under the Hindu Law only to maintenance, were made joint owners equally with the widow of the testator. None of ihe devisees could get the estate ·partitioned or alienate it for necessity. It was however, provjded that the lady, who survived the other three devisees, would become the absolute owner of the estate. The widow of the testator would not get her husband's estate, if she predeceased any of her co-devisees. The will was not produced until 22 years after its ex- ecution though there were occasions to produce it, had it been in existence. Considering these circumstances, the Privy Council obser- ved (at 104):
"It is most unlikely that a person having a wife and a minor unmarried daughter, who should be the objects of his affec- tion, would make a will which would practically disinherit them.
That the testament is unnatural and runs counter to the ordinary sentiments of persons, having a status in soci- ety similar to 1that of Harbans Lal, cannot be seriously dis- puted. But this is not the only circumstances which tells
c against its genuineness. The will purports to have been executed on 24th August 1900, and the testator died within a month of thai date. But it is strange that it was not pro- duced until 1922, after the commencement of the present
litigation. During this long period of 22 years, which Inter- vened, there were occasions when the widow or her advis- . ers could have produced the document, if it had been in JI
existence; but they did not do so …… " c The will in the present case, ccnstituting the plaintiff as a sole legatee with no right whatever to the testator's wife seems to be unnatural. It casts a serjous doubt on genuineness of the will. The will has not been produced for very many years before the court or public authorities even though there were occasions to produce it for asserting plaintiffs title to the property. The plaintiff was required to remove these suspicious .circumstances by placing satisfac!ory material on record. He has failed to discharge his duty. We therefore, ccncur with the conclusion of the High Court and reject the will as not genuine. · This takes us to the validity of the sale deed Ex. 3. The High Court rejected the document with the following observations: "Ex. 3 is neitl!er a certified copy given under any of
the provisions of the Evjdence Act nor is it a copy made from the original by any mecjianical process. It also does pot appear to have been made or compared from the origi- nal as there is no verification or endorsement of the kind and it does not come under clauses 1 or 5 of section 63
either. No one has given the oral account of the contents of the original document. If in place of primary evidence secondary evidence is admitted without any objection at the proper time then the parties are precluded from raising the question that the document has not been. proved by
primary evidence but by secondary evidence. But where there is no seccndary evidence as contemplated by Section 66 of the Evidence Act then the document cannot be said to have been proved either by primary eviden~ or by secon-
dary evidence." The basis of the plaintiffs title relates back to the sale deed dated 8aisakh Sudi 12 Samvat JQ.32 ( 1875 A.O.). It was said to be a registered ~ale deed by whic.!t Bhagala Girdhari purported to have sold the baghichi co Raghunath Brahmin. The plaintiff has not produced the original sale deed. Nor a certified ccpy of it has been produced. All that we find from the record is an ordinary copy of a sale deed Ex. 3 produced by Gopal Prasad PW 1. Gopal Prasad has stated that Ex. 3 was a copy submitted by the parties along with the original sale deed for registration. The original sale deed was said to have been returned to the party after its registration and a copy was kept in the file. But Gopi!I Prasad has no personal know)edge about the registration of the sale deed, nor he has producetl 1he register to indicate that that sale H deed was registered -aim a copy was kept in th_e_ record. Ex. 3 produced KAL)'AN SINGH v. SMT. CHl;!OT~ JSHETfY, J.]
by him does not bear any e.ndorseme.nt to ,tbe .effect that it was a .u.ue copy of the original. The High Court said, and in·our opinion very .rightly, .that Ex. 3 could not be regarded as secondary evidence. Section 63 .of -the Evidence Act mentions five kinds of sec011dary evidences. Clause ( 1), (2) and (3) refer to copies of documents; clause (4) refers to co.unter- parts of documents and clause (5) refers to oral accounts of the .con- tents pf documents. Correctness of certified copies referred to in cl1111se 0) is presµmed under Section 79; but that of other copies must be: proved .by proper evidence. A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But .in $e present case E]!:. 3 is not a certified copy. It is just a11 ordinary copy. Tl)ere is also no evidence regarding contents of the qfiginal sale deed. px. 3 .cannot, therefore, be considered as secondary evi.dence. The appellate CQµrt has a right and duty to .exclude such evjden~e·
In the result, the appeal is allowed, modifying the judgment and de.cree qf the High Court. The judgment and decre.e of the trial court as affirmed by the District Court are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.
Since the original plaintiff died leaving behind his widow during pendency of the-appeal before the High Court, we make no order as to costs. R.N.J. Appeal allowed. c