Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
16. The issue that arises for our consideration is to be resolved in the background of this statutory setting. The FEMA is a self contained and special legislation dealing with the c Foreign Exchange management. It essentially deals with regulation and management of the Foreign Exchange. The provisions of the Act mandate that save as otherwise provided in the Act, rules or regulations made thereunder or with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, no person shall deal in or transfer any Foreign Exchange or foreign security to any person not being an authorised person; make any payment to or for the credit of any person resident outside India in any manner; receive otherwise through an authorised person, any payment by order or on behalf of any person E resident outside India in any manner; enter into any financial transaction in India as consideration for or in association with acquisition or creation or"transfer of a right to acquire, any asset outside India in any manner. It is further provided that no person resident in India shall acquire, hold, own, possess or transfer any Foreign Exchange, foreign security or any immovable F property situated outside India. That if any person contravenes any provision of the Act, or contravenes any rule, regulation, notification, direction or order issued in exercise of the powers under the Act, or contravenes any condition subject to which an authorisation is issued, he shall, upon adjudication, be liable G to a penalty. For the purpose of adjudication, the Central Government may, by an order, appoint officers of the Central Government as the Adjudicating Authorities for holding inquiry in the manner prescribed after giving the person alleged to have committed contravention against whom a complaint has been H made, a reasonable opportunity of being heard for the purpose KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDD~ ~] of imposing any penalty.
17. That a bare reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules makes it abundantly clear that the manner, method and procedure of adjudication are completely structured by the statute and the Rules. The Authority is bound to follow the prescribed procedure under the statute and the Rules and is not free and entitled to devise its own procedure for making inquiry while adjudicating under Section 13 of the Act since it is under legislative mandate to undertake adjudication and hold inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving the person alleged to have committed contravention against whom a complaint has been made, a reasonable opportunity of being heard for the purpose of imposing any penalty. The discretion of the Authority is so well structured by the statute and the Rules.
18. The Rules do not provide and empower the Adjudicating Authority to straightaway make any inquiry into allegations of contravention against any person against whom a complaint has been received by it. Rule 4 of the Rules mandates that for the purpose of adjudication whether any person has committed any contravention, the Adjudicating Authority shall issue a notice to such person requiring him to show cause as to why an inquiry should not be held against him. It is clear from a bare reading of the rule that show cause notice to be so issued is not for the purposes of making any adjudication into alleged contravention but only for the purpose of deciding whether an inquiry should be held against him or not. Every such notice is required to indicate the nature of contravention alleged to have been committed by the person concerned. That after taking the cause, if any, shown by such person, the Adjudicating Authority is required to form an opinion as to whether an inquiry is required to be held into the allegations of contravention. It is only then the real and substantial inquiry into allegations of contravention begins. While holding inquiry into allegations of contravention, every Adjudicating Authority shall have the powers of a Civil Court A under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the matters, namely, (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring discovery and production of documents; ( c) receiving evidence on· affidavits( (d) requisitioning any public record, document or copy of such B record or document from any office; (e) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses or documents etc. That all proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code; shall be deemed to be a c Civil Court for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Crlmina1 Procedure, 1973. Principles of natural justice : statutory requirement and fair hearing
19. It is true that rule 4 does not require the Adjudicating Authority to supply copies of any documents along with the show cause notice. The rule does not require the Adjudicating Authority even to furnish any list of documents upon which reliance has been placed by him to set the law in motion. Does E it mean that the Adjudicating Authority is not required to furnish the list of documents and copies thereof upon which reliance has been placed by him to issue notice of show cause to a person against whom a complaint has been made by the authorized officer? Whether the principles of natural justice and F doctrine of fairness require supply of documents upon which reliance has been placed at the stage of show cause notice? "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply; nor as to the scope of extent. Everything depends on the subject matter" [see R Vs. G Gaming Board for Great Britain ex p. Benaim and Khaida1]. Observed Lord Denning MR.: "Their application, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject matter of the case". Even in the application of the doctrine of fair play there H 1. (1970) 2 QB 417. KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.) must be real flexibility. There must also have been caused some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with and so forth. Can the Courts supplement the statutory procedures with requirements over and above those specified? In order to ensure a fair heanng:'"courts can insist and require additional steps as long a such steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation. c
20. In Lloyd Vs. McMahon2, Lord Bridge observed: "My Lords, the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals depends on the character of the decision-making body, the kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates. In particular, it is well- established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness".
21. As Lord Reid said in Wiseman Vs. Boardman3: "For a long time the courts have, without objection from Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for 2. [1987] AC 625. 3. [1971] AC 297. this purpose … "
22. It is thus clear that the extent of applicability of principles of natural justice depends upon the nature of inquiry, the consequences that may visit a person after such inquiry from 8 out of the decision pursuant to such inquiry.
23. The right to fair hearing is a guaranteed right. Every person before an Authority exercising the adjudicatory powers has a right to know the evidence to be used against him. This principle is firmly established and recognized by this Court in C Ohakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Benga/4• However, disclosure not necessarily involves supply of the material. A person may be allowed to inspect the file and take notes. Whatever mode is used, the fundamental principle remains that nothing should be used D against the person which has not brought to his notice. If relevant material is not disclosed to a party, there is prima facie unfairness irrespective of whether the material in question arose before, during or after the hearing. The law is fairly well settled if prejudicial allegations are to be made against a person, he E must be given particulars of that before hearing so that he can prepare his defence. However, there are various exceptions to this general rule where disclosure of evidential material might inflict serious harm on the person directly concerned or other persons or where disclosure would be breach of confidence or F might be injurious to the public interest because it would involve the revelation of official secrets. inhibit frankness of comment and the detection of crime, might make it impossible to obtain certain clauses of essential information at all in the future [See R Vs. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex. p. H]5.
24. The concept of fairness may require the Adjudicating Authority to furnish copies of those documents upon which reliance has been placed by him to issue show cause notice 4. (1955) 1 SCR 941. H 5. [1995) QB 43. KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] requiring the noticee to explain as to why an inquiry under Section 16 of the Act should not be initiated. To this extent, the principles of natural justice and concept of fairness are required to be read into rule 4(1) of the Rules. Fair procedure and the principles of natural justice are in built into the Rules. A noticee is always entitled to satisfy the Adjudicating Authority that those very documents upon which reliance has been placed do not make out even a prima facie case requiring any further inquiry. In such view of the matter, we hold that all such documents relied on by the Authority are required to be furnished to the noticee enabling him to show a proper cause as to why an c inquiry should not be held against him though the Rules do not provide for the same. Such a fair reading of the provision would not amount to supplanting the procedure laid down and would in no manner frustrate the apparent purpose of the statute. PART V : DUTY OF ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
25. The real question that arises for consideration is whether the Adjudicating Authority even at the preliminary stage is required to furnish copies of all the documents in his possession to a noticee even for the purposes of forming an opinion as to whether any inquiry at all is required to be held. In this regard, learned senior counsel for the appellant pressed into service the doctrine of duty of adequate disclosure which according to him is an essential part of the principles of natural justice and doctrine of fairness. A bare reading of the provisions of the Act and the Rules do not support the plea taken by the appellants in this regard. Even the principles of n.atural justic8 do not require supply of documents upon which no reliance has been placed by the Authority to set the law into motion. Supply of relied on documents based on which the law has been set into motion would meet the requirements of principles of natural justice. No Court can compel the Authority to deviate from the statute and exercise the power in altogether a different manner than the prescribed one. As noticed, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be provided by the Adjudicating Authority in the manner prescribed for the purpose of imposing any A penalty as provided for in the Act and not at the stage where the Adjudicating Authority is required merely to decide as t.o whether an inquiry at all be held into the matter. Imposing of penalty after the adjudication is fraught with grave and serious consequences and therefore, the requirement of providing a B reasonable opportunity of being heard before imposition of any such penalty is to be met. In contradistinction, the opinion formed by the Adjudicating Authority whether an inquiry should be held into the allegations made in the complaint are not fraught with such grave consequences and therefore the c minimum requirement of a show cause notice and consideration of cause shown would meet the ends of justice. A proper hearing always include, no doubt, a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting anything prejudicial to their view. Lord Denning 0 has added: "If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence is given and what statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a fair opportunity to E correct or contra.diet them" [see Kanda Vs. Government of Ma/aya]6 .
26. In the present case, the inquiry against the noticee is yet to commence. The evidence as may be available upon which the Adjudicating Authority may place reliance, F undoubtedly, is required to be furnished to the person proceeded against at the second stage of inquiry into allegations of contravention. It is at that stage, the Adjudicating Authority is not only required to give an opportunity to such person to produce such documents as evidence as he may G consider relevant to the inquiry, but also enforce attendance of any person acquainted with the facts of the case to give evidence or to produce any document which in its opinion may be useful for or relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. It is no doubt true that natural justice often requires the disclosure 6. [1962] AC 322. KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] of the reports and evidence in the possession of the deciding Authority and such reports and evidence relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry may have to be furnished unless the scheme of the Act specifically prohibits such disclosure.
27. However, the learned senior counsel for the appellants in support of his contention that there is a duty cast on the Adjudicating Authority to disclose and supply copies of all the documents that may be available with him to the noticee, placed reliance on State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam Vs. Surya Sankara'[/ Karri7 which is not an authority for the, C proposition canvassed. It was a case where the Court found that investigation into an offence punishable under Section 13(1 )(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act wa.s undertaken without the required authorization of the Superintendent of Police. In that context, this Court observed that the manner in which "the investigation was conducted, is condemnable. The least that a court of law would expect from the prosecution is that the investigation would be a fair one. It would not only be carried out from the stand of the prosecution, but also the defence, particularly, in view of the fact that the onus of proof may shift to the accused at a later stage". Shri La lit, strongly relied upon the observations so made by this Court which in our considered opinion, are not relevant for our purpose. One cannot pick a sentence from here and there in the Judgment and characterize it to be the ratio of the case. The observations made in that case were in the context of criminal investigation which was found to be unfair and illegal.
28. In Union of India Vs. Ranu Bhandari8 this Court found that some of the vital documents which have a direct bearing on the detention order, had not been placed before the detaining Authority and the detenu was entitled to question such omission. It was the case of the detenu that if his representation anq the writ petition had been placed before the detaining 7. (2006) 7 sec 172. 8. (2008J 17 sec 348. A Authority which according to him contained his entire defence to the allegations made against him, the same may have weighed with the detaining Authority as to the necessity of issuing the order of detention at all. It is under those circumstances, this Court expressed its view that on account B of non-supply of those documents, the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation against his detention. In fact, the said decision is an authority for the proposition that "when a detention order is passed, copies of all the documents, both against the detenu and in his f~vour, which had been relied c upon by the detaining Authority for reaching the satisfaction that in the interest of the State and its citizens the preventive detention of the detenu is necessary, must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order in compliance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution, irrespective of whether he had knowledge of the same or not.
29. The learned senior counsel further relied upon the following observations made by this Court in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by LRs. & Anr. Vs. B.D. Agarwal & Ors. 9: "The very basis upon which a judicial process can be resorted to is reasonableness and fairness in a trial. Under our Constitution as also the International Treaties and Conventions, the right to get a fair trial is a basic fundamental /human right. Any procedure which comes in the way of a party in getting a fair trial would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial Tribunal is part of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950." We fail to appreciate as to how the above observations are of any relevance to resolve the issue that arises for our consideration in the present case. It is not the case of the H 9. (2003) 6 sec 230. KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] appellants that the procedure prescribed under Rule 4 of the Rules comes in their way in getting a fair trail and therefore the said provision is ·violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not the case that the Adjudicating Authority constituted under the present Act is not an independent and impartial tribunal.
30. In Tribhuvandas Bhimji Zaveri & Anr. Vs. Collector of Central Excise10, Officers of the Income Tax Department raided the business premises of the appellant and prepared an inventory of the stock of gold and gold ornaments found in the premises. This was followed by a show cause notice as to why penal action should not be taken against the appellants. The appellants by their letter had requested the authorities to furnish a certified copy of the check list prepared at the time of raid with a view to enabling them to check and verify the particulars. In reply thereto, the Income Tax Officer expressed his inability to provide the required documents on the ground that they were not readily available with the Officer. It is under those circumstances, this Court obseNed .that the failure to supply important piece of info~ation to the appellants has prejudiced the appellants and to this extent the principles of natural justice would stand violated. From the facts in that case, it is clear that particular documents containing important piece of information which would have enabled the noticee therein to offer a proper explanation were required to be made available. The nature of the document, its relevancy being a document prepared at the time of raid and its mention in the show cause notice were taken into consideration. It was a basic document based on which the law was set into motion against the appellants therein. It is for that reason this Court was of the view that such an important document could not have been withheid from the appellants therein.
31. In support of his submissions the learned seni:~ counsel has also referred us to the decision of this Court in 10. (1997) 11 sec 21e A State of M.P. Vs. Chintaman Sadashiva Vaishampayan 11 . In that case, the charged police officer wanted the documents which were relevant and would have been of invaluable assistance to him in making his defence and cross-examining the witness who gave evidence against him in the Departmental B Enquiry. It is in that context this Court observed that "it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules; whether or not the officer in question has had a reasonable opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the c departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice, and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in Courts of law". There is no dispute with this proposition. 32. In our opinion, these decisions do not assist the appellants' case in any manner whatsoever because the documents which the appellants wanted in the present case are the documents upon which no reliance was placed by the E Authority for setting the law into motion. Observations of the Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. The observations must be read in the context in which they appear. A line or a word in a judgment cannot be read in isolation or as if interpreting a statutory F provision to impute a different meaning to the observations [see Haryana Financial Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mil/s 12]. 33. One more decision upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel is RvH!RvC13• We G fail to appreciate as to how the said judgment would render any assistance and support the case set up by the appellants in the present proceedings. In that case, the defendants were charged 11. AIR 1961 SC 1623. 12. (2002) 3 sec 496. H 13 [2004] UKHL 3. KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] with criminal conspiracy to supply a class A drug. The prosecution case was based on police surveillance evidence. In pre-trial proceedings the defendants made far-reaching requests for disclosure, including all material relating to any covert human intelligence sources involved in the investigation. At a preliminary hearing, it appeared that a public interest immunity inquiry would be necessary as the prosecution wished to withhold documents from disclosure to the defence on that ground. The Judge ruled, without having looked in detail at the documents provided by the prosecution, that unless independent counsel were appointed, so as to introduce an adversarial element into the public interest immunity inquiry, there was a risk that the trial would be perceived to be unfair and therefore violate Article 6(1) of the European Convention c for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 (as set out in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998) (the convention), which provided for the right to a fair trial. The Judge, therefore, ordered that special counsel should be appointed. The Crown's appeal against the Judge's ruling was successful. The defendants appealed to the House of Lords contending inter alia that it was incompatible with Article 6 of the convention for a Judge to rule on a claim to public interest immunity in the absence of adversarial argument on behalf of the accused where the material which the prosecution was seeking to withhold was or might be relevant to a disputed issue of fact which the Judge had to decide in order to rule on an application which would effectively determine the outcome of the proceedings. The House of Lords held that there is a golden rule that full disclosure of any material held by the prosecution which weakened its case or strengthened that of the defendants should be disclosed to the defence. In circumstances where such material could not be disclosed to the defence, fully or even at all, without the risk of serious prejudice to an important public interest, some derogation from the golden rule could be justified, but such derogation was always to be the minimum necessary to protect the public interest in question and had never to impe~ the overall fairness A of the trial. 34. This decision was followed by Attorney General's guidelines and disclosure in which it is clearly explained that disclosure is one of the most important aspects in the criminal 8 justice system and the application of proper and fair disclosure is a vital component of a fair criminal justice system. This amounts to no more and no less than a proper application of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996 (CPIA}, recently amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 2003. The C scheme set out in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996 is held to be designed to ensure that there is fair disclosure and material which may be relevant to an investigation and which does not form part of the prosecution case. The disclosure under the Act should assist the accused in the timely preparation and presentation of their case and D assist the case to focus on all the relevant issues in the trial. 35. It appears that those Acts recognize rights of accused persons in a criminal case to a fair trial. It is clear that disclosure of unused material in criminal proceedings in United Kingdom E is regulated by the provisions of those Acts and applicable to criminal trials where the accused are charged with criminal offences. Duty of disclosure of unused material is not a definite concept to be applied in any and every case in this country. There is no such Act or law as in United Kingdom, nor any F procedure prescribed for disclosure of unused material in criminal proceedings. In the present case, the appellants are not defendants in any criminal trial. The judgment has no application as to the fact situation and the law applicable in United Kingdom is not applicable to either the adjudicatory G proceedings or even criminal trials in this country. 36. On a fair reading of the statute and the Rules suggests that there is no duty of disclosure of all the documents in possession of the Adjudicating Authority before forming an opinion that an inquiry is required to be held into the alleged H contraventions by a noticee. Even the principles of natural KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] justice and concept of fairness do not require the statute and the Rules to be so read. Any other interpretation may result in defeat of the very object of the Act. Concept of fairness is not a one way street. The principles of natural justice are not intended to operate as roadblocks to obstruct statutory inquiries. Duty of adequate disclosure is only an additional- B procedural safeguard in order to ensure the attainment of the fairness and it has its own limitations. The extent of its applicability depends upon the statutory framework. Hegde, J. speaking for the Supreme Court propounded: "In other words, they (principles of natural justice) do not supplant the law of the c land but supplement it" [see AK. Kraipak Vs. Union of lndia 14]. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation; nothing more but nothing less [see Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner15]. Alternate submission 37. Yet another submission made by the learned senior counsel requiring our consideration relates to interpretation of sub-rule (6) of Rule 4. The learned senior counsel contended that the appellants' request to the Adjudicating Authority to furnish the copies of the documents could be treated as one made under sub-rule (6) of rule 4 which enables the Adjudicating Authority to direct any person to produce any document which in his opinion may be useful for or relevant to the subject matter of inquiry. We find no merit in the submission. . A plain reading of sub-rule (6) of rule 4 makes it abundantly clear that such a power to summon and enforce attendance of any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case to give evidence or to produce any document which may be relevant to the subject matter of inquiry is only available to the Adjudicating Authority while holding an inquiry into allegations of contravention, but not at the stage where the Authority is merely required to form an opinion as to whether an inquiry should be held into allegations of contraventions. It 15. (1978) 2 sec 2a2. is always open to a person facing an inquiry to invoke the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority requiring any person to produce any document which may be useful for or relevant to the subject matter of inquiry. Such request may have to be considered upon its own merits. A fair reading of rule 4 which B is a complete compendium for holding of inquiry suggests that all the evidence and documents which the Adjudicating Authority may consider relevant for the purpose of inquiry may have to be furnished to a person facing the inquiry on the allegations of contravention of the provisions of the Act etc., alleged to have c been committed by him. In addition, the Authority may require attendance of any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case to give evidence and to produce any documents which in its opinion, may be useful for or relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. Only upon consideration of the entire evidence produced, if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the person has committed the contravention, he may by order in writing accordingly impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of the Act which of course is not final as it is subject to appeal. E Practice of inclusion of list of judgments in compilations not cited at the bar : 38. Before parting with the judgment, we are constrained to observe with some reluctance about the recent practice and procedure of including list of authorities in the compilation without the leave of the Court. In many a case, even the senior counsel may not be aware of inclusion of such authorities in the compilation. In our considered opinion, this Court is not required to consider such decisions which are included in the G compilation which were not cited at the Bar. In the present case, number of judgments are included in the compilation which were not cited at the Bar by any of the counsel. We have not dealt with them as we are not required to do so. At any rate, all those judgments deal with the procedural aspects and concern the interpretation for various provisions of the Code H of Criminal Procedure applicable to a criminal trial and they are KANWAR NATWAR SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.] totally irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the issue that had arisen for our consideration in the present case. CONCLUSIONS: 39. The appellants insisted for supply of all documents in possession of the Authority and such demand is based on vague, indefinite and irrelevant grounds. The appellants are not sure as to whether they are asking for the copies of the documents in possession of the Adjudicating Authority or in possession of authorized officer who lodged the complaint. The only object in making such demand is obviously to obstruct the proceedings and the appellants, to some extent, have been able to achieve their object as is evident from the fact that the inquiry initiated as early as in the year 2006 still did not even commence. 40. We are constrained to take note of the fact that it is on account of continuous unreasonable requests on the part of the appellants, the Adjudicating Authority could not deal with the complaint expeditiously which is required to be disposed of within one year from the date of receipt of the complaint. We accordingly direct the Adjudicating Authority to deal with the complaint as expeditiously as possible and every endeavor shall be made to dispose of the complaint finally at the earliest. No unreasonable request for adjournment shall be entertained by the Adjudicating Authority. However, we make it clear that the Authority shall make inquiry into the allegations made in the complaint strictly in accordance with the law and uninfluenced ,by the observations if any made in this order. We have not expressed any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the case. The appellants are entitled to all the defence that may be available to them in law. 41. For all the aforesaid reasons, the appeals are dismissed with costs. K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.